Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertions | Frege | II 29 Asserting sentence/assertion/Frege: as an equation the assertion has two parts: one is saturated, the other one is unsaturated. >Equation, >Unsaturated. Function: the function is the meaning of the unsaturated part: e.g. "conquered Gaul". Argument: Caesar - (sic without quotation marks) - Quotation Marks/(s): the argument is not put in quotation marks ((s) the person is the argument, not the name) - ((s)>Russell: the object itself occurs in the sentence. See Substitutional Quantifikation/Hintikka). II 32 Assertion/Designating/Frege: with a judging stroke: an assertion designates nothing! But it asserts something - either assert or designate. >Judgment. IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is no complete thought without time determination. But then it is also timelessly true or false. Expression/Assertion/Frege: difference: time determination: is part of the expression - truth: is part of the assertion and timeless. Timeless things do not belong to the outer world. >Thought. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Concepts | Frege | II 29 Def Concept: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value. Concept: a concept is not an object in itself, while the concept scope (value progression, i.e. with an inserted value for the variable) is an object. >Object, >Truth value, >Function. II 66 f Concept: a concept is predicative, unsaturated and not an object. The inclusion of an object in a concept is an irreversible relation. E.g. "The morning star is nothing but Venus" but not "Venus is nothing but the morning star." II 66 f An equation is reversible, a predication is irreversible (intension, false: "Venus is nothing but the morning star.") >Intension, >Identity. II 66 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always only a subject. A concept is not an object. The "meaning" (reference): is an object. E.g. the concept horse is not a concept (but just an object). Similarly: E.g. "This rose is red" and we say: "The grammatical predicate" "is red" is part of the subject "this rose". Here, the words "The grammatical predicate" "is red" are not a grammatical predicate but a subject. This is difficult to grasp, the city of Berlin being a city and the volcano Vesuvius being a volcano. II 71 > Def Concept: Meaning of a predicate. ((s) QuineVs: >Predicates/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Meaning/Quine). II 74 Number/Numbers/Concept/Object/Frege: Figures are statements about a concept. E.g. "There is at least one root of 4" is not about a specific number 2 but about a concept: the root of 4. On the contrary: e.g. "The concept root of 4 is fulfilled": the first 5 words form the name of an object. Something is being said about an object. Fulfillment/Frege/(s): fulfillment is not a property of a concept, but of an object. The fulfilled object is the concept. >Satisfaction. II 80 Object/Relation/Frege: Problem: with the words. "The relation of being included in an object": we mean no relation but an object - ((s) the words are the name of the relation, the relation is an object). I 82 Concept/Frege: E.g. "All whales are mammals" is about concepts - not a single animal can be shown. It is better than to speak of an "indefinite object" > number: not the objects but the concepts are the carriers of the number. IV 110 Concept/Frege: whether a term is contradictory must be shown through research. Tugendhat I 195f Concept/Frege: "logical basic relationship": is the inclusion of an object in a concept", whether it is properly applied: is not a logical, but empirical question. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Concepts | Geach | I 26ff Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept. I 220 Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object. >Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless". I 226 Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) >Extension. But: Extension/Frege/Geach: = object Concept/Frege: not an object! Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name. >Name/Frege. I 228f Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier. >Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach. I 230 Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege. VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x". >Names/Geach. Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'." I 234 Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine. GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it. >Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Copula | Geach | I 221 Copula/Geach: if you understand concept and object correctly, you do not need the copula. >Concept/Geach, >Concept/Frege, >Object, >Object/Frege. Instead, you can use "falls under". - (In ancient times it was also handled like this). >Ancient philosophy. "is": ((s) "is a" suggests false identity (at most partial identity, i.e. classification). >"Is", >Identity, >Identification, >Classification. Frege late: VsFrege early: nor "falls under". "is a"/Frege: does not mean "belongs to a class"! "Is a..."/Geach: is no logical relation between an x and an object (class) called "human." >Prediation/Geach, >Predication, >Attribution. Complex Expression/Geach: "A person is wise" is a complex expression that needs to be split (analyzed): into "person" and ".... is wise". Accordingly, Frege's remark "the concept of man" (which is not supposed to be a concept) is to be divided: E.g., "The concept of man is realized" does not assert of a particular object that it is realized. To say that a certain object, e.g. Caesar, is realized does not lead to falsity (as Frege believed) but is nonsense. (GeachVsFrege). >Senseless, >Truth value gap. The sentence splits into "Man" and "The concept ... is realized". The latter is a paraphrase of "something is a...". Sentences that cannot be analyzed in this innocent way must be considered meaningless. >Sentences/Geach, cf. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. E.g., "The concept of man is timeless". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Descriptions | Frege | II 29 Description/Frege: e.g. the expression: "The capital of the German Empire" represents a proper name and means an object. Unsaturated: "capital of" Saturated: "the German Empire" Expression of a function: the expression of a function is e.g. "The capital of x" ((s) Russell: propositional function, PF). Frege: If we take the German Reich as an argument, we obtain Berlin as a function value. >Function, >unsaturated, >Object. II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: e.g. the discoverer of the planetary orbits = is an object ("meaning" (reference): has no truth value. >Truth values. II 82 Description/Name/Frege "the king of this kingdom" does not refer to anything without a specification of time. ->Description: ((s) Frege implicitly differentiates descriptions of other singular terms already before Russell). >Singular terms. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Description/terminology/Frege: descriptions are "compound proper names" (complex names). >Proper names, >Clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Designation | Meixner | I 70 f Naming/Meixner: Naming different from expressions. To name: a name is saturated (it stands for an object). >Saturated/unsaturated, >Expressions/Meixner. Difference: functions can also be expressed by unsaturated expressions. >Functions. I 102 Expression/naming/Meixner: facts are expressed by sentences and named by a phrase (subordinate clauses). >That-sentences, >States of affairs. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Determinates/ Determinables | Millikan | I 19 Definition "determinate"/determinate/Millikan: determinate is a property relative to a "determinable" property under which both this property and a lot of other properties fall. I 20 For example, red (together with its opposite green, yellow, etc.) is a determinate property relative to "colored". ((s) "colored": = determinable). E.g. purple: is determinate relative to both red and also to colored. (2) The fact that A and B have the properties p1, p2, p3, etc. in common can be explained by a natural law or laws in situ that satisfy condition (3) (see below). >Predication, >Attribution, >Statement, cf. >"unsaturated"/Frege. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Frege | Read III 153 Existence/Frege: existence is a second order property. Property of a property: is having an example. >Levels. Frege II 57 Existence/sense/meaning/subordinate clause/subsentence/Frege: e.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled." The cutting off is not part of the sense - it is rather a prerequisite for the whole sentence to makes sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Sense, >Meaning, >unsaturated; cf. >Non-existence. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Expressions | Frege | II 29ff Expression: "The capital of the German Empire" represents a proper name; here meaning an object.>Concept, >Object. "Capital of the" is unsaturated. "German Empire" is saturated. >unsaturated. Expression of a function: "The capital of x". >Function. When we take the German Empire as an argument, we obtain Berlin as a function value. An expression of a truth value does not assert anything yet. >Truth value, >Assertion. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Expressions | Meixner | I 71 Expression/Express/Meixner: expressing something is not referencing. >Reference. Functions can be expressed by unconfirmed expressions. >Functions, >Unsaturated. Predicate: expresses a property, it does not denominate it! >Predicates, >Properties, >Naming, >Denotation. Predicate: is a linguistic indicator of universals, more direct than names. >Universals, >Names. I 102 Expression/Denominating/Meixner: Facts are expressed by sentences and denominated by that-sentences (subordinate clauses). >States of affairs, >That-sentences, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Exemplification. I 118 Expressions/Expressing/Meixner: sentences can express something that is not in line with their meaning, e.g. "the sentence on page n line 1 is wrong ...". >Propositions, cf. >Paradoxes. I 152 Expressing: sentence expresses both a proposition and a fact (if it expresses something different from its meaning) - proposition: content of the sentence - fact: is unambiguously determined by this sentence content (proposition). >Content. I 153 Expressing: concepts such as universals through predicates. Satisfaction: concepts are satisfied by entities. >Satisfaction. Exemplification: universals by entities - instantiating/instantiation: concepts and universals by entities (inverse to instantiation: concepts and universals apply to entities) Cf. >True of. I 154 Expression/Expressing: Predicates express concepts or properties (universals). - concepts do not express anything, universals do not express anything, properties express nothing, they are expressed. Sentence: expresses proposition or fact. Fact, proposition: express nothing, they are expressed. E.g. "author of Waverley", "the person who is identical with Scott" do not express the same universal singularisation, but they do denominate the same individual. E.g. "brother of..."/"only brother of": ((s) can apply to the same individual, or "only" to none.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Functions | Frege | II 83 f Function: a function has generality; it is a law. Any number of an x-range is assigned to a number of the y-range. A function is not a variable (also: an elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). Function: a function is unsaturated. >Generality, >unsaturated, >Generalization. II 87 Functional characters: functional characters are unsaturated. However, in connection with numerals they are saturated. Argument: every time a number > value of the function Caution: it has become common to read the equation "y = f (x)": "y is a function of x". This contains two errors: 1) If the equal sign is translated by the copula. 2) The function with its value is mistaken for an argument. These errors gave rise to the opinion that the function was a number. >Equations, >Numbers. Husted V 93 Functions of numbers are fundamentally different (because they are unsaturated). Logic/Grammar: E.g. "Peter plays with Agnes": in the logic both Peter and Agnes can be declared subjects. >Subject, >Predicate. V 93 Argument/function: E.g. "(3) to the power of 2". The argument expression is: "3". The function expression is: "(...) to the power of 2". E.g. "3 + 2". The argument expressions is: "2" and "3". The function expression is: "+". E.g. "Peter is asleep". The argument expression is: "Peter". The function expression is: "is asleep". E.g. "Everybody loves Agnes". The argument expression is: "loves Agnes". The function expression is: "everybody". Function expressions: "+", (...) to the power of"! The verb (sometimes also the argument expression) is a second order function expression: "everybody", "nobody". Function expressions: 1st order E.g. "is asleep" 2nd order E.g. "everybody", "nobody". |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Intensions | Geach | I 226 Meaning/reference/Frege/Geach: Frege's distinction is not the same as between intension/extension. >Extension, >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. I 227 Term/Concepts/Frege: Frege has a purely extensional view. - Therefore there is no "sense of the name" but reference of the predicate. >Extensionality, >Predicate/Frege, >Sense, >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege. ((s) Reference/(s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). But: Extension/Frege: = object Concept/Frege: no object. The reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated. "Red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name. ((s) The concepts "intension" and "extension" were coined later by Carnap.) |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Introduction | Strawson | I 187 Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing. Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing. >Terms. I 188 VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not. >Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach. I 192 But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. I 193 Assertive mode primary. I 194 Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Unsaturated. I 232ff Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. >Particulars/Strawson. I 234 Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. I 235 For universals nothing corresponding. I 236 But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.) I 238 When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. I 239 Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". >Description, >Intension. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 242 E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. I 242 General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. I 254ff Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition. >Quantification. New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars. Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? I 258 Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. I 263 Both theories are independend, but connectable. I 259 Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur. E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 Problem: What is at the end of the chain? >Feature-universals. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Numbers | Frege | II 18 f Numbers/Frege: e.g. 16 = 4², 4 x 4 = 4². Here we see that equality of meaning does not lead to equality of thought. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Thoughts, >Equality, >Equations. II 66 ff The figure contains the expression of a concept. >Concepts. Properties will be expressed by a concept. A concept may fall under a higher one. E.g. there is at least one square root of 4. This is not a statement about a certain number 2, nor about -2, but about a concept, namely the square root of 4. II 81 f There are no variable numbers. Variable: do we not denote variable numbers by x, y, z? This way of speaking is used, but these letters are not proper names of variable numbers, like "2" and "3" are proper names of constant numbers. We cannot specify which properties "x" has in contrast to y. >Variables. Variable: is not a proper name of an indefinite or variable number. X has no properties (only in the context). "Indefinitely" is not an adjective, but an adverb for the process of calculating. Generality/Frege: generality is not a meaning but a hint. Proper Names: π, i, e are not variables! Generality: here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. Function: has generality, is a law. To any number of the x-range a number from the y-range is assigned. A function is not a variable! (An elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). The function is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 77 Number/object/calculating/addition/Frege: only from the meaning of the words "the number 4" (Frege: = object) we can say that it is the result of combining 3 and 1. Not of the concept. Calculation result: is an object, the result of the calculation: is not a concept. II 85 Number/Frege: e.g. "a variable takes on a value". Here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. I 38 Numbers/Frege: from physical observations no conclusions can be drawn about numbers. I 47 Quantity/Frege: quantity is a concept. Number: is an object. >Objects. I 48 Numbers/Newton: numbers are the ratio of each size to another. FregeVsNewton: here, the notions of size and ratio are presupposed. I 49 Numbers/Frege: Problem: numbers as sets: here, the concept of quantity is pressupposed. I 60 Number/Frege: number is no multiplicity. That would exclude 0 and 1. I 62 Number/one/unit/property/Frege: "One" cannot be a property. Otherwise, there would be no thing that does not have this property. I 82 Not the objects but the concepts are the bearers of the number. Otherwise, different numbers could be assigned to the same example. Thus the abstraction is accompanied by a judgment. I 90 A number is not the property of a concept. Number: is an abstract object, not a property -> see below. Number Equality/equality: number equality is a concept (not an object). I 100/101 Def Quantity/Frege: the quantity which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept equal numbered to the concept F. I 100 Scope/concept scope/Frege: if the straight a is parallel to straight b, then the scope of the concept of straight parallel to straight a is equal to the scope of the concept straight parallel to the straight b and vice versa - scope equality. >Term scope, >Equality. I 110 Number/Frege/(s): comes from the distinction concept term scope (quantity)/object (number). If the object is zero, the quantity that belongs to this concept is one. ((s) This is how Frege gets from 0 to 1: one is the number-of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero", namely one object. Zero ist the number of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero-and-not-equal-to-zero"). >Zero, >One. I 121 Numbers/Frege: numbers are not concepts. They are (abstract) objects (see above). Quantities are concepts. I 128 Term: e.g. square root of -1. This cannot be used with the definite article. I 135 Number/Frege: a number is neither heaps of things, nor a property of such. I 130 Number system/expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning is not be established arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already invariably established before the definitions, but it is determined by them. ((s) Frege: wants to point at the meaning as use within a system.). The new numbers are given to us as scopes of concepts. I 136 Each figure is an equation. >Equations. Berka I 83 Number/Frege: numbers must be defined in order to be able to present completeness of evidence at all - (> sequence).(1) 1- G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Object | Carnap | VI 32 Def Logical Object/Carnap: E.g. negation, implication, indirect evidence. (L.O. in the narrow sense). VI 35 Quasi-Object/Carnap: characters that only have an independent meaning in conjunction with others (reference). VI 36 Unsaturated sign: designate quasi-objects (qu.o.) - (> fiction character; > fictions). - E.g. "a dog" in "Karo is a dog" - E.g. "A dog is a mammal": here, no actual object names occur at all anymore - (> actual names). VI 54 Quasi-Object/Carnap: E.g. the "class of groups of five" designates no real object, but a quasi object - E.g. the class of the five fingers of my hand is a qu.o. - It only serves to make statements about the elements, without having to list them all the time. VI 223 Object/Order/CarnapVsDualism: there are certainly different forms of order, but not different types of object - E.g. fixed stars, distances, ratios of distances, triangles of distances between the stars, coverage of distance triangles: these are all different forms of order, but not objects in the real sense. VI 228 Constitution Theory: similar: it is essential for the object that it belongs to certain order contexts. >Order, >Context, >Constitution system. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Object | Frege | II 30 Object/Frege: the object is the meaning of a declarative sentence. It is at the same time the truth value and value curve of a function. >Truth value, >Value propression. (A school-adequate definition of an object is impossible, because it cannot be disassembled - due to its simplicity.) An object is anything that is not a function, i.e. whose expression does not carry an empty space with it. Truth value: A truth value cannot be a part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense, but an object. (truth value/Frege: a truth value is an object) Object/Frege: locations, times, time periods are, logically considered, objects. Consequently, the the linguistic designation of a place or date is to be interpreted as a proper name. Def Object: Something that can never be the whole meaning of a predicate, but the meaning of a subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Meaning. II 72 "The function f(a)" is not a function (but an object). "The concept F" is not a concept (but an object). I am not saying it is wrong to say about an object what is being said here about a concept, but it is impossible, meaningless, neither false nor true. Existence proposition/existence statement/Frege: e.g. "Julius Caesar exists" is neither true nor false, but meaningless. But: "There is a man named Julius Caesar" has a sense. (A concept is needed.) Brandom I 584 Object/Frege: an object should be the result to which the predicates refer according to the judgement. Frege II 57 Object/Frege: e.g. places, times, time periods - hence their linguistic designations are names. II 74 Concept/object/sentence/Frege: one and the same sentence can be interpreted a) as a statement about a concept, b) about an object. The statements are then different. E.g. the sentence "There is at least one root of 4" cannot be changed into "There is at least one concept for the root of 4." -> concept. I 98 Object/concept/property/Frege: e.g. direction: is an object! - "Same direction as": is a predicate (concept). IV 70/71 Body/Frege: bodies are not in need of completion. (>(s) Objects are saturated). >Saturated/unsaturated. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Predicates | Dummett | I 77 Frege/Dummett: The predicates as well as their reference objects themselves are unsaturated, i.e. they cannot occur independently. Dummett: is this reasoning correct, then grasping the meaning of a concept-word can not be an element of perception, except as an inseparable part of grasping a complete thought. >Thoughts/Frege. III (c) 139ff Names/meaning/logical constants/Dummett: If every single attribute can be omitted without the name of the bearer being deprived, that does not mean that the meaning remains the same - one can generalize this for all words except the >logical constants and >prepositions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Predicates | Husserl | Tugendhat I 168f Predicate/Husserl: the meaning of the predicate could be an object or an attribute. TugendhatVsHusserl: it is not real, the meaning of the predicate is not an object. It is simply drawn up linguistically (VsObject Theory). Instead of standing for an object: the function of the predicate is characterization. Predicates are unsaturated, they are only meaningful in connection with singular terms. >"Unsaturated", >Singular terms, >Predication, >Quantification over properties. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Proper Names | Meixner | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity. "Being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property (property name). >That-sentences, >States of affairs, >Properties. ad I 42 Excursion/(s): Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties. ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!) Cf. >Semantic Ascent. I 71 Saturated: e.g. names - saturated expressions only name saturated entities - Example unsaturated entity: "the paternal descent relation". >Saturated/unsaturated. I 153 Names: of facts and propositions: that-expressions. >Propositions. Name of the universal: means the property - name of the concept: means the concept (cannot be possessed like a property). >Universals. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Properties | Carnap | II 200 Features/properties/Carnap: all scientific knowledge can alone affect structures, but not quality. >Structures, >Features, >Qualities. VI 11 Science/Carnap: Aim: science should become a pure description of relationships. (Without specification of characteristics/qualities). >Relations, >Science. VI 35/36 Def Property/Carnap: propositional function with only one argument position. Example "x is a human being". Unsaturated) Def Relation/Carnap: propositional function with several argument positions. Example "x is greater than y". (Unsaturated). >Propositional function, >unsaturated. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Properties | Meixner | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity. >States of affairs, >That-clause. "Being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property (property name). >Properties. I 42 Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!) Cf. >Semantic Ascent. I 50 Exemplification/Identity/Meixner: Object X is F, this is not an identity of X and F, of the object with its property, but the property is exemplified by the object. >Exemplification, >Predication. I 73 Property/Meixner: nothing other than function. This property, when saturated with the individual Hans, again results in the fact that Hans is a human >Saturated/unsaturated. I 75fff Property/Meixner 2nd level: Properties of properties: "the property of being a trait of x" - e.g. being egoistic is the property of being a trait. Not 2nd level: e.g. being 2 meters tall. E.g. the property of being a trait cannot be said of people or cities (this is senseless), but it can be (erroneously) said of the property of being 2 meters tall. >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 76 Individual properties ("initial properties")/Meixner: exactly expressable about individuals, not something that only individuals can have. - There are cases where properties which cannot be expressed exactly about an individual can still apply to the individual. I 78 Ontological/Property/Meixner: the distinction between relational and non-relational properties is ontological. Non-ontological: distinction between negative and non-negative or between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties. >Disjunctive properties, >Disjunctive predicates. I 150 Properties/Meixner: Identity principle for individual properties: they can be satisfied by exactly the same entities. For all individuals property F and G: F is identical to G if and only if for all individuals x applies: ‹F,x› = ‹G,x›. For triangles: equiangular and equilateral triangles are satified by the same entities. >Satisfaction. I 153ff. Universal Name: means the property. >Universals. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Propositional Functions | Russell | I XXIV Propositional functions/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous, because of the variables. (Frege: somewhat unsaturated). >Ambiguity, >"unsaturated", >Statement, >Quanfication, >Truth value. I 26 Propositional function/Terminology/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: if we want to speak of the Propositional function that "x is hurt" corresponds to, we will write: "x ^ is hurt" and "x is hurt" is an ambiguous value thereof. ((s) x^: class of x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VI 73 Statement function/russell: any expression which has one or more indefinite parts and which becomes a statement when the indefinite part is determined. Example "x is red". A propositional function can be always true (x = x, necessary), sometimes true (x = human, possible) or never true (x = unicorn, impossible). VI 74 Some predicates can only be attributed to statement functions and not to statements. >Nonexistence, >Unicorn example. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Sentences | Strawson | I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Reference/Ramsey, >Particularization/Ramsey, >"unsaturated"/Frege. I 214 Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." Two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations. >Relations. Stating relations between things are not themselves relation. I 216 1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2. a) characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals. - But also universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. --- IV 53 Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Signs | Frege | II 31 Signs/Frege: as long as e.g. the plus sign is used only between integers ("a + b"), it only needs to be explained for this purpose. If other objects are to be linked, e.g. "sun" with something else, the plus sign must be redefined. >Definition, >Definability, >Connectives, >Equal sign, >Copula. II 41 Frege: a sign is a proxy. >Proxy. II 88 Numeral/Frege: e.g. "2" is saturated. In contrast: the functional character, e.g. "sin" (sine, sinus) is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 91 Sign/Frege: signs are the requirements for conceptual thinking - they no longer refer to the individual thing, but to what several things have in common. I 127 Sign/FregeVsFormalism: empty signs are only black spots on paper. Their use would be a logical error. Empty signs do not solve any task. E.g. x + b = c: if b > c, there is no natural number x that can be inserted - nor to accept the difference (c - b) as an artificial new sign. Sign/Frege: and where a solution is possible, the sign is not the solution, but the meaning of the sign. Husted V 130 FregeVsFormalism: formalism only gives instructions for definitions, not definitions themselves. >Formalism. Frege I 131 E.g. Number i: the meaning of "total" must be re-explained. FregeVsHilbert: it is not enough just to call for a sense. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Symbols | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 60f Symbol/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: symbols are not what they appear to be: R looks like a noun, but is not a noun - what is symbolized is that R occurs between a and b. >Relations. I 61 So R is not the indefinable symbol in aRb. (Aül 9) - Hintikka: but the indefinable symbols are for Wittgenstein nothing more than names and these stand for objects - but the name is not a linguistic symbol (the letter R) but a linguistic relation, namely, to occur next to a specific letter - But different than Frege's distinction saturated/unsaturated. >Definability, >Names. --- II 65 Symbol/Wittgenstein - is complete in itself - it does not refer to something outside. Cf. >Incomplete symbols. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Terminology | Frege | Frege, German Original: "gerade Rede" = "normal speech", i.e. "gerade" = normal. Normal speech/Frege: normal speech is a literal quote. Oblique speach is an analogous quote. The oblique meaning (of a word) is its normal sense (!) Chisholm II 146 Frege/saturated/unsaturated: by Husserl: are dependent/independent clauses. --- Frege II 58 Hypothetical Judgment/German original: "hypothetisches Urteil"/Frege: a hypothetical judgment is an implication. --- I I29 Unsaturated: is e.g. "capital city of". Saturated: is e.g. "Deutsches Reich". I 72f Term = is the meaning of a predicate, unsaturated, predicative, of something. Subject matter: is saturated and never the whole meaning of a predicate. A proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Thought: a part must be unsaturated, as a binder - example: "falls under". I 87 Function: is unsaturated. I 88 Function/Frege: a function sign is unsaturated, e.g. "sin" (sine). On the other hand: it is saturated by connection with numeric signs (argument): e.g. "sin 1" - is each time a number. Value of the function. I 89 Thus, we can also call functions self-unsaturated. I 88 Number sign/Frege: e.g. "2" is saturated. On the other hand: the function sign, e.g. "sin" (sine) is unsaturated. --- IV 70/71 Body/Frege: the body does not need to be supplemented. > ((s) objects are saturated). IV 11 Terminology/Frege: "subter": is an individual/class or subject/term and corresponds to "ε". Epsilon/Frege/ (s): epsilon always denotes that an individual is contained, not a subset. On the other hand: "sub": is a class/class or term/term - this corresponds to the horseshoe ⊂ (subset). IV 73 ff Mental structure/Frege: 1. type: A u B - 2. type: ~(A u B). - 3. type: ~A u ~ B. - 4. type: ~(~A u ~B). 1.-4. are interchangeable in order. 5. type ~A u B - 6. type: ~(~A u B). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Thoughts | Frege | Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Meixner Vs Carnap, R. | I 159 Def "individual terms"/Carnap/Meixner: has thus the properties in mind, which are the singularities of properties. MeixnerVsCarnap: the entities he refers to are neither individual nor terms. They are unsaturated entities, I 160 adn thus no individuals. |
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| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Meinong, A. | Russell Vs Meinong, A. | Horwich I 4/5 Believe/mean/doubts/perception/propositional attitude/Russell: everywhere here the mind has something in front of it, which is not identical to it itself. So an object. (> Relation Theory; >SchifferVs). Judgment Object/Russell: but there are now two theories: a) belief/judgment as a relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold. Vs: that does not work, in the case of false judgments: because then the object does not exist, and therefore also no relation. E.g. The belief that Charles I died in bed. b) believe/judgment as a relation to a complex (or complex object). (Russell pro). Ad a): Definition objective/Meinong/Russell: he calls this objects of believe/judgment objects. Whereby false judgments or beliefs have "false objectives". Horwich I 6 Russell: then, we must find a way to divide the objectives into wrong and right. Object of belief/RussellVsMeinong: first, there is no complete expression "the so and so" that would denote something as does a name like "Socrates". However, it will be complete if I say "I think so and so" or "I doubt that so and so". ((s)> Frege: unsaturated). Horwich I 7 RussellVsMeinong: worse is that we have to admit wrong objectives. That is, there would be things in the universe that do not depend on the existence of judgments, that would be objective falsehoods. Problem: thus, the difference between truth and falsehood becomes inexplicable. ((s) Or a property of things, not of propositions). Difference/falsehood/name: the entity that we look for is not a grammatical subject. Objective falsity/Russell: could be constructed logically, but not satisfactory. Horwich I 8 Objective/falsehood/RussellVsMeinong: when we would say now, the objective does not exist in the case of falsehood, it would indeed be a solution, but would implicate the problem, that we then have to give up the theory of relations (of belief/judgment to object) at all. (() because you can believe something wrong just as you believe something true). Belief/judgment/object/truth/falsehood/solution/RussellVsMeinong: we have to abandon the view that the object of believe would be easy. (Russell pro Relation Theory). Believe/Russell: is a relation to a complex of objects (complex object). The individual objects themselves are not fictions. E.g. Charles I, dying, scaffold. Horwich I 9 Truth: exists then, when the objects to each other have the relation, which is claimed in the judgment. Believe: does not exist in a single relationship that I have to Charles I but there are relations for each component. We can call the relation "the awareness of" ((s) a fact or proposition). (1) 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Tradition | Simons Vs Tradition | I 291 Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: thesis: integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected (> Microstructure, MiSt). Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle (1960,98). Object/thing/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia. Individual/Leibniz: an individual must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz). I 306 Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident may very well exist. This applies to accidents that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious. I 342 Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition is delivered according to the tradition of the copula: Copula/VsTradition: the copula occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion. Solution/Frege: a solution is offered by the unsaturated parts of a sentence. Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection simply is a common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection. Unsaturatedness/Simons: unsaturatedness perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others! |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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