Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
A priori Millikan I 325
A priori/Intension/Sense/Knowledge/Meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood in such a way that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori.
That's what I call the
Definition "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. ((s) Because it is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.) MillikanVsMeaning rationalism.
Main representative: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam.
I 326
Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, that should all be armchair contemplation.
I 327
Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this should be so secure, there can always be only one criterion for one concept, not several. And all terms may have only one intension, never several, except, these are "logically equivalent". "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: these conditions supposedly do not only distinguish between actual things that fall under one concept and those that do not fall under it but also between all "logically possible" things.
Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: between meaningful and meaningless must be distinguished a priori.
I 328
Error/Millikan: an error can only be there after judgments. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: E.g. I cannot ask at all myself meaningfully whether my idea of Shakespeare is perhaps not from Shakespeare.
Judgment/Millikan: but judgments cannot be made without applying concepts.
Concept/Millikan: so at least some concepts must stand on their own feet.
Tradition/Millikan: according to it these terms would be those of properties.
Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a particular ontological status, namely things that can exist and be known, and yet have no necessary relation to the actual world. E.g. platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities".
NominalismVs: it does not correspond to anything at all.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Logic Cresswell I 40
Logic/natural language/semantics/Cresswell: not every logic can be taken as the basis of semantics: difference Entailment/Consequence: in the natural language, "Monday follows Sunday" must not be taken as a consequence of "Snow is white" - (only formal, not correct content-wise). ---
I 42
Logic/Semantics/entailment/meaning postulates/Cresswell: E.g. meaning postulate: (x) (x is bachelor > x is male) - then the conclusion of "roses are red" and "violets are blue" on roses and violets ..and snow is white" becomes valid ((Vs) - /CresswellVsMeaning postulates - false alignment of entailment and consequence - snow is not white in all possible worlds - solution: possible world semantics - difference between necessary and contingent truths - Quine/Cresswell : This seems to reject analytically/synthetically the distinction together with the distinction.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Meaning Postulates Cresswell I 30
KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning postulates. ---
II 163
Meaning Postulates/Definition/Entailment/inconsistency/Cresswell: Meaning postulates are needed to define terms such as entailment and inconsistency.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Meaning Postulates Katz Cresswell I 30
Group: KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning Postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning Postulates.

Katz I
Jerrold J. Katz
"The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974

Katz II
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz III
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz V
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Meaning Theory Schiffer I 12
Meaning Theory/M.Th./Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P - then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory .. - No one has ever done this. ---
I 182
Truth Theory/Schiffer: cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. ---
I 220
Meaning Theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. ---
I 222
The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. ---
I 261
Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites - Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences - then every sentence must have a feature - and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning - because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic features. - E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. ---
I 264
SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. ---
I 265
Meaning Theory/Meaning/SchifferVsMeaning Theory: all have failed - Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation) - Meaning is not an entity - therefore also no theory of this object. ---
I 269
Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. ---
I 269
No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. - The scheme - "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. - The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Use Theory Rorty I 139
Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use.
II (c) 70
Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change.
III 36
RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >vocabulary.
III 101
Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!.
III 102
Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools.
III 194
SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Holism Fodor Vs Holism Esfeld I 60
Holism/Esfeld: although there are close relationships between all forms of belief holism, the meaning holism (MH) and justification holism (JH) do not imply the semantic holism (SH). One can accept the BH or the RH and reject the SH (conceptual content as constituent). (FodorVsSemantic Holism (Fodor/Lepore 1992, also Horwich 1998 p.150)).
SH: does not imply BH or RH in turn.
One can represent logically correctly: while beliefs ontologically depend on other beliefs in terms of having conceptual content, the justification and the confirmation is not relative to the fact that there are other beliefs.
((s) DavidsonVs: only other beliefs can justify or confirm beliefs).

Fodor/Lepore IV 5
VsMeaning Holism/VsMH/Fodor/Lepore: First objection: you may wonder whether semantic properties are anatomical, but that’s not possible with at all semantic properties. E.g. if you wanted to say that the property to express the proposition that the cat is on the mat is anatomically L (relative to the language L), then that would mean to require that this language must have at least one other expression for the cat being on the mat.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Meaning Postulate Chisholm Vs Meaning Postulate III 85
Synthetically a priori/Chisholm: examples for this may be: "everything that is red, is colored". One knows it a priori, but cannot demonstrate that it is analytic. Meaning postulates/Solution: some authors: alleged synthetic sentences a priori are in reality important postulates. ChisholmVsMeaning postulates: (in this context): this is a confusion between mentioning and use. A meaning postulate would e.g. mention the word "red". But the sentence above uses the words, it does not mention it. ((s) therefore it cannot be a meaning postulate itself).

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Rationalism Millikan Vs Rationalism I 325
Intension/meaning/knowledge/meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood as such that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori.
I call that the
Def "Meaning Rationalism"/Millikan: thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning, is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge of judgments, this is empirical. ((S) Because it indeed is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.). MillikanVsMeaning Rationalism.
Main representatives: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam.
I 326
Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, all this should be armchair reflection.
I 327
Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this is supposed to be so sure there can always only be one criterion for a concept, not several. And all the terms may only have one intension, never multiple, except if they are "logically equivalent". "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: allegedly distinguish neatly not only between actual things that fall under a concept and those who do not fall under it, but also between all "logically possible" things.
Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless should be a priori.
I 328
Error/Millikan: according to that only possible in judgments. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: Ex I can not meaningfully ask myself if my idea of Shakespeare might not be of Shakespeare.
Judgment/Millikan: but judgments can not be made without using any concepts.
Concept/Millikan: So at least some concepts have to stand on their own two feet.
Tradition/Millikan: according to tradition these concepts would be those of properties.
Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a special ontological status, namely things that exist and can be known, and yet not necessarily have a relationship to the real world (actual world). Ex Platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities".
NominalismVs: corresponds to nothing.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005