Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Millikan | I 325 A priori/Intension/Sense/Knowledge/Meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood in such a way that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori. That's what I call the Def "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. ((s) Because it is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.) MillikanVsMeaning rationalism. Main representative: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam. >Rationalism, >Descartes, >Hume, >Husserl, >Quine, >Putnam, >Wittgenstein. I 326 Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, that should all be armchair contemplation. >Synonymy. I 327 Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this should be so secure, there can always be only one criterion for one concept, not several. And all terms may have only one intension, never several, except, these are "logically equivalent". >Criteria, >Equivalence. "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: these conditions supposedly do not only distinguish between actual things that fall under one concept and those that do not fall under it but also between all "logically possible" things. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: between meaningful and meaningless must be distinguished a priori. I 328 Error/Millikan: an error can only be there after judgments. >Judgment, >Error. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: E.g. I cannot ask at all myself meaningfully whether my idea of Shakespeare is perhaps not from Shakespeare. Judgment/Millikan: but judgments cannot be made without applying concepts. Concept/Millikan: so at least some concepts must stand on their own feet. >Concepts. Tradition/Millikan: according to it these terms would be those of properties. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a particular ontological status, namely things that can exist and be known, and yet have no necessary relation to the actual world. E.g. platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities". NominalismVs: it does not correspond to anything at all. >Nominalism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Logic | Cresswell | I 40 Logic/natural language/semantics/Cresswell: not every logic can be taken as the basis of semantics: difference Entailment/Consequence: in the natural language, "Monday follows Sunday" must not be taken as a consequence of "Snow is white" - (only formal, not correct content-wise). >Everyday language, >Material conditional, >Consequence. I 42 Logic/Semantics/entailment/meaning postulates/Cresswell: E.g. meaning postulate: (x) (x is bachelor > x is male). - Then the conclusion of "roses are red" and "violets are blue" on roses and violets ..and snow is white" becomes valid. ((Vs). >Meaning postulates. CresswellVsMeaning postulates: false alignment of entailment and consequence. Snow is not white in all possible worlds. >Entailment. Solution: possible world semantics. >Possible world semantics Difference between necessary and contingent truths. >Necessity, >Contingency. Quine/Cresswell : This seems to reject analytically/synthetically the distinction together with the distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity/Quine, >Necessity/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning Postulates | Cresswell | I 30 KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning postulates. --- II 163 Meaning Postulates/Definition/Entailment/inconsistency/Cresswell: Meaning postulates are needed to define terms such as entailment and inconsistency. >Entailment, >Contradictions, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning Postulates | Katz | Cresswell I 30 Group: KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning Postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning Postulates. >Meaning, >Language rules, >Semantics, >Meaning postulates/Nagel. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer | I 12 Meaning theory/Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P. - Then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory. - No one has ever done this. >Compositionality, >Meaning theory/Davidson. I 182 Truth Theory/Schiffer: a truth theory cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. >Truth theory, >Understanding. I 220 Meaning theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. >Relation theory. I 222 The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. I 261 Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites. Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. Then every sentence must have a feature, and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning. Because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic properties. E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. >Semantic properties. I 264 SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. >Intentions/Grice. I 265 Meaning theory/meaning/SchifferVsMeaning theory: all theories have failed. Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation). Schiffer:Meaning is not an entity - therefore there is also no theory of this object. I 269 Schiffer: Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. I 269 No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. The scheme "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical. >Language use, >Language behavior. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Use Theory | Rorty | I 139 Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use. >Language use, >Community, >Convention. II (c) 70 Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change. III 36 RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. III 101 Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!. III 102 Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools. III 194 SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate. >Language game, >Heidegger, >Wittgenstein, >Sellars. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Holism | Fodor Vs Holism | Esfeld I 60 Holism/Esfeld: although there are close relationships between all forms of belief holism, the meaning holism (MH) and justification holism (JH) do not imply the semantic holism (SH). One can accept the meaning holism or the justification holism and reject the semantic holism (conceptual content as constituent). (FodorVsSemantic Holism (Fodor/Lepore 1992, also Horwich 1998 p.150)). Semantic holism: does not imply meaning holism or justification holism in turn. One can represent logically correctly: while beliefs ontologically depend on other beliefs in terms of having conceptual content, the justification and the confirmation is not relative to the fact that there are other beliefs. ((s) DavidsonVs: only other beliefs can justify or confirm beliefs). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 5 VsMeaning Holism/VsMH/Fodor/Lepore: first objection: you may wonder whether semantic properties are anatomical, but that is not possible with at all semantic properties. E.g. if you wanted to say that the property to express the proposition that the cat is on the mat is anatomically L (relative to the language L), then that would mean to require that this language must have at least one other expression for the cat being on the mat. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Meaning Postulate | Chisholm Vs Meaning Postulate | III 85 Synthetically a priori/Chisholm: examples for this may be: "everything that is red, is colored". One knows it a priori, but cannot demonstrate that it is analytic. Meaning postulates/Solution: some authors: alleged synthetic sentences a priori are in reality important postulates. ChisholmVsMeaning postulates: (in this context): this is a confusion between mentioning and use. A meaning postulate would e.g. mention the word "red". But the sentence above uses the words, it does not mention it. ((s) therefore it cannot be a meaning postulate itself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Rationalism | Millikan Vs Rationalism | I 325 Intension/meaning/knowledge/meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood as such that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori. I call that the Def "Meaning Rationalism"/Millikan: thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning, is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge of judgments, this is empirical. ((S) Because it indeed is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.). MillikanVsMeaning Rationalism. Main representatives: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam. I 326 Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, all this should be armchair reflection. I 327 Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this is supposed to be so sure there can always only be one criterion for a concept, not several. And all the terms may only have one intension, never multiple, except if they are "logically equivalent". "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: allegedly distinguish neatly not only between actual things that fall under a concept and those who do not fall under it, but also between all "logically possible" things. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless should be a priori. I 328 Error/Millikan: according to that only possible in judgments. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: Ex I can not meaningfully ask myself if my idea of Shakespeare might not be of Shakespeare. Judgment/Millikan: but judgments can not be made without using any concepts. Concept/Millikan: So at least some concepts have to stand on their own two feet. Tradition/Millikan: according to tradition these concepts would be those of properties. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a special ontological status, namely things that exist and can be known, and yet not necessarily have a relationship to the real world (actual world). Ex Platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities". NominalismVs: corresponds to nothing. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| |||