Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Distance | Gadamer | I 302 Temporal Distance/Distance/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: (...) the temporal distance is (...) not something that has to be overcome. This was rather the naive premise of historism, that one should put oneself in the spirit of the time, that one should think in its terms and conceptions and not in one's own and in this way be able to advance to historical objectivity. GadamerVsHistorism: In truth, it is important to recognize the distance of time as a positive and productive possibility of understanding. Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) only from the ontological turn, which Heidegger gave to understanding as an "existential", and the temporal interpretation, which he dedicated to the way of being of existence, the temporal distance could be thought in its hermeneutical productivity. I 303 The temporal distance apparently has another meaning than that of killing one's own interest in the object. It only allows the true meaning that lies in a thing to fully emerge. But the exhaustion of the true meaning that lies in a text or in an artistic creation does not come to a conclusion somewhere, but is in truth an infinite process. I 304 Prejudice/Hermeneutics: Often the time gap is able to make the actually critical question of hermeneutics solvable, namely to separate the true prejudices, which we understand, from the false ones, which we misunderstand. >Prejudice/Gadamer. The hermeneutically trained consciousness therefore includes historical consciousness. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Epistemology | Dilthey | Gadamer I 222 Epistemology/Dilthey/Gadamer: The tension between the aesthetic-hermeneutic and the historical-philosophical motif in the historical school reaches its peak with Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's rank is based on his real recognition of the epistemological problem that the historical view of the world implies in relation to idealism. Gadamer I 223 The root of the ambivalence (...) lies in the already marked intermediate position of the historical school between philosophy and experience. It is not dissolved by Dilthey's attempt at an epistemological foundation, but finds its own culmination. Dilthey's effort to establish a philosophical foundation for the humanities seeks to draw the epistemological consequences from what Ranke and Droysen tried to claim with respect to German idealism. Dilthey himself was fully aware of this. DiltheyVsHistorism: [Dilthey] saw the weakness of the historical school in the lack of consistency of its reflections: "Instead of going back to the epistemological presuppositions of the historical school and those of idealism from Kant to Hegel and thus recognizing the incompatibility of these presuppositions, they connected these points of view uncritically"(1). Thus he was able to set himself the goal of building a new epistemologically sustainable foundation between historical experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the purpose of his intention to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. >Historical Reason/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 In some ways [the task of epistemology] is easier. It does not need to ask why it is possible that our concepts are in agreement with it. For the historical world, the knowledge of which is at issue here, has always been a world formed and shaped by the human spirit. For this reason Dilthey thinks that generally valid synthetic judgments of history are not a problem here at all(2) and refers to Vico for this. We recall that Vico, in response to the Cartesian doubt and the certainty of mathematical knowledge of nature which he had established, asserted the epistemological primacy of the man-made world of history. Dilthey repeats the same argument. He writes: "The first condition for the possibility of the science of history is that I, myself, am a historical being, that he who studies history is the same who makes history"(3). Gadamer: It is the sameness of subject and object that makes historical recognition possible. >Experience/Dilthey. Gadamer I 228 (...) the problem of history is not how to experience and recognize interrelation, but how to recognize such interrelations that nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey sees the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. In expression, the expressed is there in a different way than Gadamer I 229 cause in effect. It is present in the expression itself and is understood when the expression is understood. Gadamer I 234 Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak at all of "making", i.e. of planning and execution in view of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? >Historical Consciousness/Dilthey, >Spirit/Dilthey, >Philosophy/Dilthey, >Epistemology/Gadamer. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 281. 2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 278. 3. a.a.O. (GadamerVsDilthey: Aber wer macht eigentlich die Geschichte?) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historism | Gadamer | I 202 Historism/Historical School/Dilthey/Gadamer: With [the] transfer of hermeneutics to historiography, Dilthey (...) is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and its background, the pantheistic metaphysics of individuality, were decisive for the theoretical reflection of historical research in the 19th century. Gadamer: That has become fatal for the fate of the humanities and the world view of the historical school. Cf. >History/Hegel, >Historiography/Dilthey, >L. v. Ranke, >J.G. Droysen. The resistance against the philosophy of world history thus drove [the Historical School] into the path of philology. It was their pride and joy that they were able to conceive Gadamer I 203 world history not teleologically, not in the style of the pre-Romantic or post-Romantic Enlightenment from an end state, which would be, as it were, the end of history, a recent day in world history. Rather, for them there is no end and outside of history. The understanding of the entire course of universal history can therefore only be gained from the historical tradition itself. But this is precisely the claim of philological hermeneutics that the meaning of a text can be understood from within itself. The basis of history is therefore hermeneutics. GadamerVsDilthey: This is how far the hermeneutic basis can go. But neither this detachment of the object from its interpreter, nor the closure of the meaning of a whole can support the historian's most important task, the universal history. For the story is not only not at the end - we stand in it as the understanders themselves, as a conditional and finite link in a rolling chain. GadamerVsHistorism/GadamerVsHistorical School: Even the "historical school" knew that there can basically be no other history than universal history, because it is only from the whole that the individual is determined in its individual meaning. How is the empirical researcher, to whom the whole can never be given, supposed to help him- or herself there without losing his or her right to the philosopher and his aprioristic arbitrariness? Cf. >History/Hegel. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History | Nietzsche | Höffe I 375 History/Nietzsche/Höffe: Nietzsche(1) gives a basic phenomenon of the political, the striving for power, a broader, yet deeper meaning. For he subjects the entire human culture, here exemplarily the consideration of history, to the principle of the enhancement of life: As the will to power, life must constantly overcome itself and productively grow beyond itself. With the principle: "Only as far as history serves life do we want to serve it" (Preface), Nietzsche introduces three kinds of a life-serving history: the "monumental history" (2. Chap.), which provides "models, teachers, comforters" to the "active and striving"; the "antiquarian history" (3. Chap.), which allows "the preserving and revering" to look back "with faithfulness and love" to his/her origins; finally, the "critical history", which gives "the suffering and the liberation of the needy" the strength to condemn a past after an embarrassing test at the end (ibid.). In terms of the tacit motive of the will to power Höffe I 376 Nietzsche warns against oversaturation with history, since it is harmful to life in five ways: (1) Through the contrast between inside and outside it weakens the personality; (2) it nourishes the illusion, the most rare virtue, justice, possesses the present to a greater degree than any other time; (3) it disturbs "the instincts of the people, whereby both the individual and the whole are "prevented from maturing"; (4) the harmful "belief to be late and epigone" is planted; and (5) implicitly NietzscheVsHegel: an epoch gets into the glorification of the present as the completion of world history. Höffe: Nietzsche does not deal with Kant's idea of history as a legal progress open to the future. >History/Hegel, >Philosophy of history/Kant. 1. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: «Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben» (1874) Ries II 36 History/NietzscheVs: VsHistorism VsTeleology, VsTeleological Meaning >Historism, >Teleology, >Historiography, >Philosophy of history. Ries II 38 History/NietzscheVsStrauß, Friedrich David: Strauss' "Life of Jesus" (1835) had once inspired the young Nietzsche. The first piece of outmoded consideration is directed against him. Ries II 39/40 History/outmoded considerations/Nietzsche: The second piece: "On the benefit and disadvantage of history for life": the immediacy of life is opposed "right inside" historical knowledge. That "immediacy" is guaranteed in oblivion. History/outmoded considerations/NietzscheVsHistorism: against the unreflected ideological implication of a philosophy whose scientific-theoretical postulate of a separation of theory and practice obscures adaptation to the actual. Ries II 42 It is impossible to prove a necessity of the event from history as the mere sequence of its events. The scientific claim to the recognition of a path must be abandoned. Also the thought of progress! Ries II 43 Historical construction tries to eliminate the senselessness of death. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Method | Gadamer | I 295 Method/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as an engagement with an event of tradition in which past and present are constantly communicated. This is what has to come into play in hermeneutic theory, which is far too much dominated by the idea of a procedure, i.e. a method. >Cultural Transmission, >Interpretation/Gadamer. I 300 Method/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [A Tension] plays between the strangeness and familiarity that tradition has for us, between the historically meant, distant representationalism and belonging to a tradition. In this in-between is the true place of hermeneutics. From the intermediate position in which hermeneutics has to take its stand, it follows that its task is not at all to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the conditions under which understanding occurs. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. However, these conditions are by no means all of the kind of "procedure" or method, so that one as the one who understands them is able to apply them of his own accord - they must I 301 rather be given. The prejudices that occupy the interpreter's consciousness are not as such at his or her free disposal. He or she is not able to separate in advance of his or her own accord the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from those prejudices that prevent understanding and lead to misunderstandings. >Prejudice, >Understanding. I 304 Method/Gadamer: GadamerVsHistorism: The naivety of so-called historism consists in the fact that it evades (...) reflection ((s) on its own preconditions) and, trusting in the methodology of its procedure, forgets its own historicity. ((s) Since methods must be capable of generalization, they cannot be designed for changeability from the outset). >Historism. Graeser I 85 Gadamer / Graeser: Truth and Method (1965) - Vs contrast between systematics and history - undermines the distinction between creation and context of justification. - Sellars ditto: has no secured bank. - Truth: is then not the ultimate, but what you do with it. -> Pragmatism. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Prejudice | Gadamer | I 273 Prejudice/Understanding/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It's not the case that if you listen to someone or start to read someting, you don't have to forget all the pre-opinions about the content and all of your own opinions. Therefore, a hermeneutically trained awareness of the otherness of the text must be receptive from the outset. But such receptiveness requires I 274 neither factual nor even self-elimination, but includes the detached appropriation of one's own prejudices and preconceptions. It is important to be aware of one's own bias so that the test presents itself in its otherness and thus has the opportunity to play off its factual truth against one's own pre-opinion. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. Only [the] recognition of the essential prejudice of all understanding sharpens the hermeneutical problem to its real peak. I 275 GadamerVsHistorism: Measured by this insight, it becomes clear that historism, despite all criticism of rationalism and natural law thinking, is on the ground of the modern Enlightenment and shares its prejudices which were not seen through. For there is very well also a prejudice of the Enlightenment that carries and determines its essence: This fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudices in general and thus the disempowerment of tradition. An analysis of the history of concepts shows that it is only through the Enlightenment that the concept of prejudice finds the negative accentuation to which we are accustomed. Prejudice in itself means a judgement that is made before the final examination of all factually determinant moments. In case law, a prejudice meant a preliminary legal decision before the actual final judgment was made. For the party in the lawsuit, however, the issuing of such a prejudice against that person meant an impairment of his or her chances. So préjudice as well as praeiudicium simply means impairment, disadvantage, damage. But this negativity is only a consecutive one. It is precisely the positive validity, the prejudicial value of the preliminary decision - as well as that of any precedent - on which the negative consequence is based. Unfoundedness (German: "Unbegründetheit"): The German word seems to have been limited by the Enlightenment and its criticism of religion to the meaning of "unfounded judgment"(1). Enlightenment: In the eyes of the Enlightenment, the lack of a statement of reasons does not leave room for other ways of validity, but means that the judgment has no substantive reason, i.e. is "unfounded". GadamerVsEnlightenment: This is a genuine conclusion in the spirit of rationalism. The discrediting of prejudices in general and the claim of scientific knowledge to eliminate them completely is based on it. >Rationalism. 1. Vgl. Leo Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, S. 163 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Questions | Gadamer | I 304 Question/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is demanded by it: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. The essence of the question is the disclosure and keeping open of possibilities. If a >prejudice becomes questionable (...) this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the other is directly brought to the fore in its place. GadamerVsHistorism/VsObjectivism: This is rather the naivety of historical >objectivism: to assume such a relinquishment of itself. In truth, one's own prejudice is actually brought into play by the fact that it is itself at stake. Only by playing itself off it is able to experience the other person's claim to truth at all and enables him or her to play him- or herself off. Cf. >Historism, >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. Historism/Gadamer: The naivety of the so-called historism consists in the fact that it withdraws itself from such a reflection and forgets its own historicity in trusting in the methodology of its procedure. I 368 Question/Gadamer: It is obvious that in all experience the structure of the question is presupposed. One does not experience without the activity of questioning. The realization that the thing is different and not as one first believed, obviously presupposes the passage through the question, whether it is the case or not. The openness that lies in the nature of experience is, logically speaking, precisely this openness of one way or another. It has the structure of the question. And just as the dialectical negativity of experience found its perfection in the idea of a completed experience, in which we are aware of our finiteness and limitedness as a whole, so the logical form of the question and the negativity inherent in it finds its completion in a radical negativity, the knowledge of not-knowing. It is the famous Socratic docta ignorantia that opens up the true superiority of questioning in the extreme negativity of aporia. Meaning: The essence of the question is that it has meaning. But meaning is a sense of direction. The sense of the question is therefore the direction in which the answer alone can take place if it wants to be a meaningful answer. The question puts the respondent in a certain respect. The emergence of a question, as it were, breaks up the being of the respondent. The logos that unfolds this broken being is in this respect always already the answer. Socrates/Plato: One of the greatest insights that the Platonic Socrates account gives us is that asking questions is - quite contrary to the general opinion - more difficult than answering them. I 369 In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, i.e., but know that one does not know. The openness of the questioned person consists in the fact that the answer is not fixed. Every question completes its meaning only when it passes through such limbo, when it becomes an open question. Every real question requires this openness. If it lacks the same, it is basically an illusionary question that has no real meaning. But the openness of the question is not a boundless one. Rather, it includes a certain boundary through the horizon of the question. A question that lacks the same question is void. It only becomes an emergent question when the fluid indeterminacy of the direction in which it points is placed in the specific of one way or another. Wrong question: We call a question a wrong question that does not reach the open, but rather distorts the same by holding on to wrong premises. As a question, it feigns openness and decisiveness. But where the questionable is not - or not correctly - set off against the preconditions that are really fixed, there it is not really brought into the open and therefore nothing can be decided. I 370 Crooked question: We do not call it wrong, but crooked, because there is a question behind it, i.e. an open question is meant - but it is not in the direction that the question has taken. The crookedness of a question consists in the fact that the question does not really follow a direction and therefore does not allow an answer. Similarly, we say of assertions that are not entirely wrong, but also not right, that they are crooked. I 372 Idea: Every idea has the structure of the question. The idea of the question, however, is already a dive into the levelled width of the widespread opinion. (>Doxa/Plato). We also say of the question that it arises or poses itself - much rather than that we rise or ask it. Experience: We have already seen that the negativity of experience logically implies the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. See >Question and Answer/Collingwood. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Technocracy | Morozov | I 138 Technocracy/VsTechnocracy/Technocracy Criticism/Technology Criticism/Morozov: most critics of modern technocracy or technology refer to the ((s) assumed) arrogance of planners and reformers who are lacking experience with the actual lives of people in their habitats. According to these critics, thought and consideration are indispensable; even the most perfect algorithms will not make them superfluous. Examples are: Jane Jacob, I. Berlin, F. Hayek, K. Popper, M. Oakeshott. >F. A. Hayek, >K. Popper, >M. Oakeshott, >I. Berlin, >Technology. Literature: I 137 Urban planning/Jane Jacob: Jacob's critique of unimaginative urban planning: see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1992); Isaiah Berlin: his critique of a "Pro-Crusteanism": a compulsive unification: See Jonathan Allen, "Isaiah Berlin's Anti-Procrustean Liberalism: Ideas, Circumstances, and the Protean Individual", lecture at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (28-31 August 2003, Philadelphia, PA). Available at http:// berlin. wolf. ox. ac. ac. uk/ lists/ onib/ allen2003. pdf; Planning/Central Planning/Friedrich Hayek: his criticism of centralized planning: see Friedrich Hayek. The Use of Knowledge in Society", The American Economic Review 35, No. 4 (September 1, 1945): 519- 530; Karl PopperVsHistorism: see Karl Popper. The Poverty of Historicism, I, Economica 11, No. 42 (May 1,1944): 86- 103; Michael OakeshottVsRationalism: see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other essays, exp. Edited by (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991). I 168 Definition Techno-neutral/Majid Tehranian/Morozov: are preferably consultants who do not want to upset their clients. (1) I 170 Definition Techno-structuralists/Tehranian/Morozov: believe that technologies evolve from institutional needs, spread by social forces of which they are part. (2) 1. Majid Tehranian, Technologies of Power: Information Machines and Democratic Prospects (New York: Ablex Publishing, 1990), 5. 2. ibid. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
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| Historism | Popper Vs Historism | Flor II 489 PopperVsHistorism/PopperVsSociology: market laws can be reformulated depending on and what kind of market is concerned; such laws are not suitable for unconditional forecasts. The conditions can change constantly or we can bring about change ourselves. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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