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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | Kripke | I 78 Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory). Bundle theory/(s): thesis: the bundle theory states that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e.g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt". Kripke: so this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met. >Bundle theory/Kripke. I 79 What are the relevant properties? If you say,"Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean: "the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this. Kripke: the essential point is that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things. I 80 One could say "The Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "The Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation. >Properties/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Relevance | Hintikka | II 143 Relevance/identification/cross-world identity/possible worlds/Hintikka: question: what are the relevant worlds that need to be considered in the perception-like identification? Solution: all worlds need to be considered that are compatible with what the subject perceives. Knowledge/belief/Hintikka: corresponding: the relevant worlds are always those that are compatible with the knowledge, the beliefs, etc. of the subject. For example, compatible with the distribution of objects in the field of vision. >Identification, >Cross world identity, >Perception. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Relevance | Leeds | I 381f Relevance/ambiguity/role/explanation/truth/leads: but the ambiguity of the truth predicate T does not show that T does not play a crucial role. - It only shows that other truth-like relations are equally important. Analogy to metrics: that one can set up physics in non-standard spacetime does not show that explanations making use of metrics would not be explanations. Explanation/LeedsVs: this is a bad analogy: the reason physicists prefer a particular explanation is that there is a well-understood sense here in which competing explanations can be considered essentially equivalent. >Explanations. Incorrect explanation: "Most of the propositions of our theory are T": this is quite empty: suppose the theory is consistent and incomplete. Then it would follow that it comes out as "true" under various incompatible W predicates. "Success" would then be to accept any of the W predicates. - If we already accept atomic physics, we don't need a W theory to explain why atomic physics works. >Truth theory, >Truth predicate, >Circular reasoning. Solution/Leeds: the correct explanandum is not that some theories work, but that we (happen to?) have some theories that work. N.B.:T could become important after all: only after T it would not be a coincidence. I 384 Wrong: Truth then to be defined in terms of our method. >Definition, >Definability. LeedsVsKant: That would be like his Copernican turn: we could change our scheme arbitrarily. Problem: 1) then we could no longer say that our induction could also harm us- 2) we could no longer say that our theories are successful because they are true. >Reference systems, >Conceptual schemes. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relevance | Schurz | I 107 Def relevance/logic/conclusion/Schurz: 1. A conclusion K of a valid argument is relevant gdw. there is no predicate in K which is simultaneously replaceable at some occurrences by any other predicate salva veritate. 2. The set of premises P of a valid argument is relevant if there is no predicate in P which can be replaced at a single occurrence by any predicate salva veritate. I 108 Ex P relevant, K irrelevant: p II- p v q,: p II- q > p ; p II- p u (q v ~q) (x)(Fx > Gx) II- (x)(Fx > Gx v Hx) P irrelevant, K relevant: p u q II p ; (x)(Fx v Hx > Gx) II- (x)(Fx > Gx) P relevant and K relevant: p > q ; p II- q ; p > q II ~q > ~p ; (x)(Fx > Gx) ; Fa II- Ga ; (x)(Fx II- Fa ; Fa II- (Ex(Fx) P irrelevant and K irrelevant: p u q II- p v r ; (x)(Fx u Gx) II- (x)(Fx v Hx) Notation: "II- " "logical consequence". Relevance/Logic/Schurz: Cognitive psychology has shown that the concept of validity in classical logic does not capture everything that is important for applied reasoning. Non-classical relevance logic/Anderson/Belnap: (1975)(1). Relevance/Logic/Schurz: solution: the relevant consequences of a theory must be decomposed into the smallest relevant conjunctive parts. Ex If A is a true consequence, and B is a false consequence of T, the conjunction A u B must not count as a third false consequence. PKN/Terminology/Schurz: prenex conjunctive normal form. >Logic, >Cognitive psychology. I 109 Def relevant consequence element/Schurz: 1. a formula A is called elementary iff it is in PKN (prenex conjunctive normal form) and not L equivalent to a conjunction of PKN formulas, which are all shorter than A. 2. K is a relevant consequence element of P iff K is an elementary relevant consequence of O. Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. 1. Anderson, A.R. and Belnap N. D. (1975). Entailment, The Logic of Relevance and Necessity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. I 125 Statistical relevance/correlation/qualitative/Schurz: A is (statistically) relevant for K iff. p(Kx I Ax) unequal p(Kx) A is irrelevant for K iff. p(Kx I Ax) = p(Kx) A is positively relevant for K iff A increases K's probability, i.e. k(Kx I Ax) > p(Kx) A is negatively relevant to Kx iff. A decreases K's probability. Simple correlation measure for qualitative characteristics: Corr(A,K) = p(Kx I Ax) - p(Kx) Corr(A,K) is always between +1 and -1. A is positively relevant if Korr (A,K) is positive, or negative if negative, irrelevant if 0. I 127 Information/relevance/statistics/Schurz: in the strict case the all proposition (x)(Ax u Bx) > Kx is irrelevant, (Bx) has no information. Rather, it follows logically from (x)(Ax > Kx) . In contrast: probabilistic: here the irrelevant generalization p(Kx I Ax u Bx) = r has additional information compared to p(Kx I Ax) = r because it does not follow from it, but expresses an independent fact. This information is needed if we want to predict Ka for an individual a to which both Aa and Ba apply. This is because, according to the principle of the closest reference class, we must ensure that conditionalization on Bs does not change the probability p(Ax I Ax). Since empirical predictions must always exclude a myriad of irrelevant assumptions, one does this by default: Default assumption/Schurz: one excludes something, or makes a decision, as long as there is nothing against it. Here against the irrelevance assumption. >Generalization, >Probability. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Relevance | Scriven | Fraassen I 104 Relevance/explanation/ScrivenVsHempel/BrombergerVsHempel: Relevance provides neither sufficient nor necessary conditions that something is an explanation. Not sufficient: good belief reasons are no explanation: e.g. redshift cannot be a reason for the expansion. >Redshift. Not necessary: not every explanation gives good belief reasons. - E.g. rare disease as a result of a frequent disease: - So you advise for treatment. - but it would not be rational to expect that the disease occurs. E.g. a very small amount of uranium does probably not radiate - but when it radiates the correct explanation is, that it is uranium. E.g. a man that takes birth control pills and does not get pregnant. I 109 Relevance is not sufficient: E.g. 90% of the plants are killed: then it is not an explanation for the plants that survived that they were sprayed. >Sufficiency, >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Statistics, >Probability, >Probability theory. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Relevance | Einstein | Genz II 314 Understanding/Einstein/Genz: (Interview with "The Listener"): "I would like to know how God created the world. The details are not very interesting." PauliVsEinstein: "Then I can paint like Rembrandt, only the details are missing." |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Aristotle | Fraassen Vs Aristotle | I 130 Asymmetry/Explanation: is solved by our other result: contextual relevance. The interest of the questioner will play a role. I 131 Aristotle: (FN 35) ("Posterior Analytics" I, 13): develops a typology of 4 explanation factors, the "four causes". Fraassen: then there may be two (relative to the background information) equivalent propositions A and B that describe the factors of various types. Then it is possible that A, but not B, contains the relevant factor or vice versa. Lantern E.g./Aristotle: (PA II, 11) shows that he already knew the problem. E.g. a father asks his son: "Why is this yard light on?" Then there are two possible answers: a) because the circuit was closed by my turning the switch and..." Background: the house is being re-electrified. b) because I’m still expecting a visit." Other background. FraassenVsAristotle: his division into four is certainly oversimplified. Asymmetry/Explanation/(s): consists in that the event actually provides all the information, but the explanation requires only a certain piece of information. I 132 Asymmetry/Fraassen: Solution: it must at least sometimes be possible to reverse it by a change of context. Thus, the salient factors become clear. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Autonomy Principle | Feyerabend Vs Autonomy Principle | I 43 Autonomy Principle/Feyerabend: the collection of facts for inspection purposes is the only thing that is left to do for the scientist. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether one takes alternatives to the theory to be tested into consideration. Principle of relative autonomy of facts. (Opposite theories). The principle does not say that the discovery and description of facts is completely independent of theories, but rather that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether one considers alternatives to this theory. ((s) i.e. that facts are autonomous, regardless of the theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: that’s a way too simple point of view. Facts and theories are far more closely linked than the principle of autonomy will admit. E.g. it is known now that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the 2nd law of thermodynamics. (GenzVs.) Could this relationship between the movement and the theory have been demonstrated or discovered directly?. Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been detected in this way? 2) Could it have been shown that it refutes the 2nd law? ((s) nonsense: "observing" relevance. Every thermometer is subject to fluctuations that are the same scale as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a different way: by means of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian movement. In this rebuttal, the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the broader framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Belnap, Nuel | Brendel Vs Belnap, Nuel | I 89 Relevance Logic/Brendel: it is not explicitly about an alternative handling of contradictions. Problem: how the different formal semantics are to be interpreted philosophically for the relevance logic. VsAnderson/VsBelnap: Although its system R corresponds to certain association theoretical structures, it is controversial how these structures are to be interpreted as truth values. Solution/Dunn/Brendel: tetravalent semantics with additional "true-and-false" and "neither-true-nor-false". However, epistemically and not to be understood ontologically. It should explain that someone can have conflicting or incomplete information. DunnVsDialethism/Brendel: Dunn does not claim the existence of "true contradictions". (Dunn, 1986, 192f). "True-and- |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Newen Vs Carnap, R. | New I 115 Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network): Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places. Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations. I 116 If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account. Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism. Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations. VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations. I 117 VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example 1) statements about our own consciousness 2) statements about the world of physical objects 3) about the consciousness of others 4) about intellectual and cultural objects. Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment. I 118 The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory. Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories. Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects. Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color. I 119 Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red. Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction. VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution: I 120 (From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc. Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C. Problem: Carnap neglected GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle. NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial. I 121 Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world. NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen. NS I 30 CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems: 1) problem of empty names. a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence b) how can various empty names be distinguished? 2) Problem: Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. NS I 101 Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory. NS I 102 Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege. VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic. Solution: Searle: bundle theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 |
| Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Fraassen Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 115 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.co./Causation/Cause/Lewis/Fraassen: Under certain circumstances, after all, it is logically correct to say: whenever "A is the cause of B" is true, it is also true that if A had not existed, B would not have existed either. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsLewis: Problem: E.g. Assuming, if the alarm had not gone off, David would have not woken up; we will concede that, however: if he had not slept the night before, he would not have woken up! Problem: it should not be the cause of his awakening that he went to sleep. Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual conditional sorts out the nodes in the causal network, while "because" points to specific factors. Relevance: E.g. falling asleep is not relevant for waking up at a certain time, even though it is a necessary condition. Not every necessary condition is relevant. Context-Dependent/Fraassen: every theory of causality must explain what is discarded as unimportant. And this is done in relation to context. This, in turn, is objective. That much context dependency must always be. Problem: there is still much more of it if we are dealing with counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FrassenVsLewis: in science, there is nothing that corresponds to counterfactual conditionals with their extreme context dependence: Science is not context-dependent. Ceteris Paribus/Fraassen: the factors that are held fixed are in the mind of the speaker! They are speaker-dependent! And it depends on the broader context, whether what I silently presume collides with the situation or not. E.g. The match is dry. I 118 E.g. Danny is interested in women. Would he be a lesbian if he were a woman? Solution: the content of "ceteris paribus" is not only determined by the one sentence and the specific situation, but also by factors of context. FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditional (if they are, as I believe, context-dependent). Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/LoN/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is or at least a law-like statement. Because only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsGoodman: this idea needs to be reversed: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, then, because they are context-dependent. Law/LoN/Fraassen: the concept of law does not point to any objective distinction in nature. Counterfactual Conditionals/Explanation/Fraassen: nevertheless, I believe that counterfactual conditionals are suitable for explanations, but that means that explanations are crucially context-dependent. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Davidson, D. | Dummett Vs Davidson, D. | Dummett I 28ff DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth. DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!. I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing. I 146 Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use. Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so. I 187 DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions. Avramides I 8 DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability). I 9 This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning. I 87 Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist. DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered. Solution: "Translation without end". II 108 Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom. Putnam I 148 Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in. Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously. VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Field, H. | Wright Vs Field, H. | Field I 43 Anti-Platonism/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): claims that modal considerations undermine my version of the anti-platonism. Because I take mathematics and the existence of mathematical entities (mE) as consistent, and consistency as the modal basic concept (possibility), I would be bound to think that it is wrong that there are mathematical entities - that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent wrong". ((s) "There could just as well have been mathematical entities, i.e. empirical question"). Contingent/Wright/HaleVsField: is not logical, and thus something other than "neither logically true nor logically contradictory". And that makes Field's position absurd. WrightVsField: where should Fields "contingency" be contingent on? For example, according to Field, the actual world contains no numbers, but it could have contained some. But there is neither an explanation for why not, nor would there be an explanation if there were numbers. FieldVsVs: if the argument were good, it would be equally valid against (nonlogical) platonism, for which mathematics goes back behind logic. Then the denial of all mathematics would be logically consistent and therefore "contingent". But this is a confusion of the different meanings of "possible". Analog: For example, if the existence of God is logically consistent, and there is none, then it is contingent wrong that there would be one. Problem: the atheist has no access to what the contingent is supposed to be on. There would be neither an explanation for the existence nor for the non-existence. There are no favorable conditions for God's existence and no unfavorable ones. (>Anselm, 2. Ontological argument). But WrightVsField: has even more interesting arguments: 1. without the assumption that mathematics consists of necessary truths, the view that mathematics is conservative (preserving) is unjustified. I 44 Analog: without the assumption that mathematics is true, the assumption that it is consistent is unjustified. Justification/FieldVsWright: You can justify any belief by a stronger belief from which it follows. (>Strength of Theories). Wright and Hale would have to show that Platonism has better reasons for the necessary truth of mathematics than Anti-Platonism has for assuming that mathematics is conservative (or consistent). And it is not certain that this is true. WrightVsField: 2. Anyone who represents both: a) that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent false" and b) that mathematics is conservative, can give no reason not to believe in mathematical entities! Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that any internally consistent combination of nominalistic statements is also consistent with mathematics. Then no combination of nominalistic statements can provide an argument against belief in mathematics (ontology). WrightVsField: how then can there be any reason at all not to believe in mathematics? He has no proof of his own nominalism. It follows that Field cannot be a nominalist, but that he must be an agnostic. FieldVsWright: this one misjudges the relevance that I attribute to the question of renunciability and indispensability. Conservativity: does not automatically show that there can be no reason to believe in mathematics. To succeed with VsPlatonism, we must also show that mathematics is dispensable in science and meta logic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Verschiedene Vs Field, H. | Field I 51 Infinity/Physics/Essay 4: even without "part of" relation we do not really need the finity operator for physics. VsField: many have accused me of needing every extension of 1st level logic. But this is not the case. I 52 I rather assume that the nominalization program has not yet been advanced far enough to be able to say what the best logical basis is. Ultimately, we are going to choose only a few natural means that go beyond the 1st level logic, preferably those that the Platonist would also need. But we can only experience this by trial and error. I 73 Indispensability Argument/Logic/VsField: if mE may be dispensable in science, they are not in logic! And we need logic in science. Logical Sequence Relation/Consequence/Field: is normally defined in terms of model theory: (Models are mE, semantic: a model is true or not true.) Even if one formulates them in a proven theoretical way ("there is a derivation", syntactically, or provable in a system) one needs mE or abstract objects: arbitrary sign sequences of symbol tokens and their arbitrary sequences. I 77 VsField: some have objected that only if we accept a Tarski Theory of truth do we need mE in mathematics. FieldVsVs: this led to the misunderstanding that without Tarskian truth mathematics would have no epistemic problems. Mathematics/Field: indeed implies mE itself, (only, we do not always need mathematics) without the help of the concept of truth, e.g. that there are prime numbers > 1000. I 138 Logic of Part-of-Relation/Field: has no complete evidence procedure. VsField: how can subsequent relations be useful then? Field: sure, the means by which we can know that something follows from something else are codifiable in an evidentiary procedure, and that seems to imply that no appeal to anything stronger than a proof can be of practical use. FieldVsVs: but you do not need to take any epistemic approach to more than a countable part of it. I 182 Field Theory/FT/Relationalism/Substantivalism/Some AuthorsVsField: justify the relevance of field theories for the dispute between S/R just the other way round: for them, FT make it easy to justify a relationalist view: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): they postulate as a field with a single huge (because of the infinity of physical forces) and a corresponding part of it for each region. Variant: the field does not exist in all places! But all points in the field are not zero. FieldVsPutnam: I do not think you can do without regions. Field II 351 Indeterminacy/Undecidability/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Thesis: not only in the set theory but also in the number theory many undecidable sets do not have a certain truth value. Many VsField: 1. truth and reference are basically disquotational. Disquotational View/Field: is sometimes seen as eliminating indeterminacy for our present language. FieldVsVs: that is not the case :>Chapter 10 showed that. VsField: Even if there is indeterminacy in our current language also for disquotationalism, the arguments for it are less convincing from this perspective. For example, the question of the power of the continuum ((s)) is undecidable for us, but the answer could (from an objectivist point of view (FieldVs)) have a certain truth value. Uncertainty/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Recently some well-known philosophers have produced arguments for the impossibility of any kind of uncertainty in set theory and number theory that have nothing to do with disquotationalism: two variants: 1. Assuming that set theory and number theory are in full logic of the 2nd level (i.e. 2nd level logic, which is understood model theoretically, with the requirement that any legitimate interpretation) Def "full" in the sense that the 2nd level quantifiers go over all subsets of the 1st level quantifier range. 2. Let us assume that number theory and the set theory are formulated in a variant of the full logic of the 2nd level, which we could call "full schematic logic of level 1". II 354 Full schematic logic 1st Level/LavineVsField: denies that it is a partial theory of (non-schematic!) logic of the 2nd level. Field: we now better forget the 2nd level logic in favour of full schematic theories. We stay in the number theory to avoid complications. We assume that the certainty of the number theory is not in question, except for the use of full schemata. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Foster, J.A. | Hintikka Vs Foster, J.A. | EMD II 15 FostersVsDavidson: a truth theory is no longer truly interpreting for all languages if that what the elements designate exceeds that which is relevant to the truth. These languages include at least all extensional languages for which L is typical. VsFoster: there are at least 4 ways to attack this view: 1) HintikkaVsFoster: (correspondingly): Foster reads more meaning into an extensional language that its simple syntax allows. In such a language, the meaning of the elements does not exceed their truth-relevant designation function. The additional conditions cited by Foster ("the earth moves and...") are more of an extensional fragment of a richer, non-extensional language. 2) VsFoster: no natural language could ever be purely extensional, a language needs propositional attitudes, and these are attributed non-extensionally. 3) VsFoster: (weaker): even if there may be a purely extensional languages, all known natural languages are non-extensional. I.e. Foster’s conclusions have little relevance. 4) VsFoster: if the method of truth theory sufficed for a certain type of non-extensional language, we can easily adapt it to an extensional language by constructing the theory only for a hypothetical non-extensional language of which this language would be a fragment. Common denominator of this criticisms VsVsDavidson: that the peculiarity of the language with which Davidson’s theory is tested was not grasped. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Habermas, J. | Rorty Vs Habermas, J. | Brendel I 133 Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals. Brendel I 134 Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either. Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality. Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths. Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness. Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community. Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto). Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community. Brendel I 135 RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests. Rorty II (b) 50 RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism". II (b) 29 French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers, Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity." II (b) 43 Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. II (d) 94 Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence. II (d) 94/95 Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves. II (d) 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship. III 113 Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas). III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower. III 120 RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of 'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language". III 231 Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste". III 232 Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?" V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Hanson, N.R. | Fraassen Vs Hanson, N.R. | I 127 Single Case/Single Case Causation/Explanation/Qua/Fraassen: single cases are never explained, they are only explained qua event of a certain type. Qua: E.g. we explain the disintegration of this uranium atom qua the disintegration of uranium atoms, but not qua disintegration at this moment. ((s) form: single case qua "specimen of a species" "as"). Problem: Why is one alternative preferred over another? That’s hard to explain. Solution/B. Hanson: A is a good answer to (Why P in contrast to X?) iff. the probability of P given A is higher than the average probability of elements of X (the contrast-class) given A. FraassenVsHanson: Problem: This does not preclude irrelevance: E.g. Vitamin C (see above, you also get better without it). According to Hanson, "Vitamin C" would still be a good answer. Asymmetry/Explanation/FraassenVsHanson: is still a problem: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast, E.g. Barometer/Storm according to Hanson it would be a good answer to say: "... because the barometer fell" as an answer to "Why is there a storm?". I 129 Even against a background of contrast class. Contrast Class/Fraassen: solves many of our problems, but not all. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Kant | Leeds Vs Kant | I 381f Relevance/Unambiguity/Role/Explanation/Truth/Leeds: The ambiguity of T does not show, however, that T is not playing an important role, but that other truthlike relations are as important. Analogy to metric: Physics cannot be established in a non-standard spacetime, but it does not mean that explanations which use metric are not explanations. Explanation/LeedsVs: That is a bad analogy: Why physicists prefer a specific statement that there is a well-understood sense in which competing explanations can be equivalently regarded as essential - incorrect statement: "Most sentences of our theory are T".: that is completely empty: Suppose the theory is consistent and complete - then it would follow that it comes out as "true" under different incompatible W predicates - "success" would be to accept just any of the W predicates - if we already accept atomic physics, we do not need W theory that explains why the atomic physics work. Solution/Leeds: The right explanandum is not that some theories work, but that we (accidentally?) have some theories that work – Important Argument: T could still become important: But it would not be a coincidence according to T! I 384 wrong: To define truth with terms of our method. LeedsVsKant: That would be like his Copernican revolution: We can arbitrary change our scheme. - Problem: 1. then we could no longer say that our induction could also harm us - 2. we could no longer say that our theories are successful because they are true. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Menzies Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 136 Def kontrafaktische Abhängigkeit/Lewis: (1986f(1),184): Modifikation: neu: B ist kontrafaktisch abhängig von A, wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk), dass B eintritt (relativ zu einer Zeit nach dem tatsächlichen Eintreten von A) ohne das Eintreten von A deutlich niedriger gewesen wäre. Schwarz I 137 Peter MenziesVsLewis: (1989(2),1996(3)): das hat noch mehr Probleme mit ausgeschalteten Ursachen: Bsp eine Verbindung zwischen Neuron A und Neuron C ist sehr verlässlich, nicht aber die zwischen B und C. Bs Erregung blockiert As Signal, wenn A und B gleichzeitig aktiv sind. Wenn nun zufällig die Verbindung B C einmal funktioniert, wird C erregt. Die Erregung ist durch Bs Erregung verursacht, nicht durch As. Ihre Wschk wird aber durch die Erregung von B gesenkt und durch die von A erhöht. Daher ist Lewis’ Bedingung weder hinreichend noch notwendig für indeterministische Verursachung. Lewis dito, das ist aber keine Lösung. Ursache/VsLewis: viele Autoren stören sich an der Transitivität von Lewis’ Ursachen Begriff. Bsp (Kvart 1991)(4): ein Mann verliert bei einem Unfall seinen Finger, der erfolgreich wieder angenäht wird und drei Monate später wieder funktioniert. Nach Lewis verursacht der Unfall die Funktionsfähigkeit. LewisVsVs: manche Ereignisfolgen sind eben intuitiv merkwürdig, obwohl sie (wie hier) stimmen. (2004a(5): 98 100). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Peter Menzies [1989]: “Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes”. Philosophy of Science, 56: 642–663 3. Peter Menzies [1996]: “Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-emption Problem”. Mind, 105: 85–117 4. Igal Kvart [1991]: “Transitivity and Preemption of Causal Relevance”. Philosophical Studies, 64: 125–160 5. David Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| McGee, V. | Field Vs McGee, V. | II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Property Dualism | Schiffer Vs Property Dualism | I 150 Schiffer: Thesis: There is no irreducible belief properties. Suppose there were, then we have the following reductio ad absurdum: if there are any, they cannot be irreducible. This has unacceptable consequences: (1) Ava is n in a neural state token. n has B, the non-pleonastic property to be a belief that a car is coming) and B is not identical to any property which is intrinsically to be specified in a non-mentalist, non-intentionalist vocabulary. We have already said that there is a full neuro physical explanation for Ava's stepping back, and we assume that implies: (2) there is a neurophysiological property P of n's, which is the most comprehensive property that enters the neurophysiological explanation of Ava's stepping back and therefore is necessary and sufficient that n is a cause of the stepping back. The property P is now completely explanatory of the body movement. (3) But if there is a non-pleonastic property B, then it also is a causal essential property, in view of the cause of stepping back. If n had not have had B, n (the neural state token) had not caused Ava's stepping back. Def Property Dualism/Schiffer/(s): assumes the simultaneous existence of physical and irreducible mentalistic or intentional properties. SchifferVsProperty Dualism: assuming the property dualism for (1), it is not possible, then one have to explain the simultaneous truth of (1) - (3), and follow one of the four ways (A) - (D), which are all wrong: A. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could argue that the causal efficacy of B (the irreducible mental, intentional property) cannot be explained in terms of the effectiveness of P. So that there is no causal overdetermination at the level of the causes (as we assume, as belief-Z-tokens = neural Z-Tokens) but at the level of causal laws. (…+…) I 152 B. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that is as if to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (…+…) C. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could try as epiphenomenalism: that the neural Z token has n P caused that it also has B. Causality/Epiphenomenalism: the causal relevance is then inherited. SchifferVsProperty Dualism/SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: the talk of "nomological appendages" shows that B does not even now do the empty part of a superfluous jobs! (…+…) D. Property Dualism/Schiffer: last rescue: supervenience: to have B "superveniere" on the Doing of P, where "supervenience" to be a primitive metaphysical relationship that is to have nothing to do with causation, but rather to have something to do with a primitive form of Entailment (to Include). So: although B is not identical or contained in P, and although there is no formal Entailment, it should be a naked, inexplicable fact that there is no possible world in which a state has P but not B. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sciama, D. | Kanitscheider Vs Sciama, D. | Kanitscheider I 376 Mach's Principle/Sciama: it is impossible to separate gravic and inertial forces, because, equal in essence, they have the same origin. Therefore only stars can be considered as sources of inertial forces in non-inertial systems. By the way, an accelerated star has a different gravitational effect than a resting star. (Newton does not consider this yet). I 377 Due to the decrease of gravity, which is caused by the acceleration of the stars, the amount of the distant masses is much stronger with 1/r than with a r -2 law, although the total amount is weakened by the expansion. (+ I 377) Thus, 80 % of the total force comes from masses beyond the range of the 200-inch telescope of Mt Palomar. The total force now depends on the gravitational mass density rhoG G, the expansion rate tau , which determines the gravitational Doppler effect, and on the heavy mass mG of the body itself. The value of the force results in rho G rho²mG (G²mG) x acceleration of the stars and should be equal to the inertial mass mi x acceleration of the stars (special character). I 378 According to this mi should be = G²mG. This is correct, since the newly defined mi has all the properties of an inert mass and the known proportionality of heavy and inert mass appears here as a derived theorem. Now a relation to the gravitational constant G can be established. Def Gravitational Constant: shows the strength of the gravitational interaction of two inert masses. Mach's Principle/Gravitational Constant/Sciama: if in the above formula the gravitational density G is replaced by the inertia density i, and mG/mi = G, the relationship Gi² = 1 is obtained. It is important because it expresses a high degree of connection of the universe. Gravitational constant: this quantification also explains the apparent irrelevance of the properties of stars for the inertia of matter: the universe manifests itself in both phenomena precisely where Newton's theory contains arbitrary elements: in the choice of inertial systems and gravitational constants. Theory/Sciama: should describe everything that occurs and should not allow to be possible what does not actually happen. I 380 KanitscheiderVsSciama: but cosmological applications can also be derived from any local gravitational theory. E.g. Scalar tensor theory by Jordan. Dirac: also his hypothesis of large numbers led to a new cosmological model. Almost all combinations of cosmic parameters from variable gravitational constants to different mechanisms of origin and annihilation of matter as well as a temporal variation of particle masses are conceivable! |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Slingshot Argument | Searle Vs Slingshot Argument | III 231 SearleVsSlingshot argument: an argument of this kind can at most show the falsity of its conditions. Contra intuitive consequences. III 232 Irrelevance: the statement that snow is white corresponds to no fact that concerns Diogenes. Even the self-identity of Diogenes (or the fact that 2 + 2 = 4) has nothing to do with what makes the statement that snow is white, true. Correspondence theory: some authors accuse it of being a petitio principii. III 233 The accusation can be returned. It is petitio principii to insinuate the correspondence theory that it should be subjected to principles such as 2b, if no argument for the applicability of this principle is given. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Universalism | Verschiedene Vs Universalism | Stegmüller IV 194 Universalization/Ethics/Stegmüller: according to many philosophers, moral judgements must be universalizable, "capable of generalization". IV 195 MackieVsAnalytical Philosophy: this is not a meta-ethical, but a genuine moral-philosophical question. Three stages of universalization: Numerical differences (between persons) are irrelevant for moral judgment. That's a 2nd order statement about moral imperatives of the first order. (For the first time prescriptive principle of 2nd order: should exclude extreme egoism). IV 196 Some authors say that this is not only a necessary, but even a sufficient condition for morality. There are only formal restrictions, not material ones. MackieVs: purely formal considerations cannot adequately analyze a moral judgment. U1/Universalization/Stegmüller: Numerical differences are irrelevant. This also excludes "reverse egoism", where someone places much higher demands on himself than on his fellow human beings. Also the reference to a founder of a religion. (Irrelevance principle of numerical differences between persons). But it does not exclude that someone is discriminated against because of his sex or his skin color! U2/Universalization 2nd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: not only numerical, but now also qualitative differences are irrelevant. (skin color, sex, race, religion). IV 198 Mackie: that is characterized by the fact that someone puts himself in the position of the other. This is prescriptive, but can also be formulated descriptively: Descriptive: moral expressions have such a meaning that all judgments, both in the first and second sense, can be universalized. U3/Universalization 3rd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: also the cultural form is now irrelevant. One tries to make one's own the inner attitudes, even the taste of the other. IV 199 The prescriptive variant is identical with a form of utilitarianism. (And just as illusionary). Universalization/Ethics/Stegmüller: descriptive: at most the 1st level has found its way into the meaning of our expressions. Prescriptive: there is probably no standard that would pass the test of the 3rd order. VsUniversalization: like VsSearle: confusion of internal and external perspective. Conclusion: one cannot justify morality meta-ethically. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wiggins, D. | Wright Vs Wiggins, D. | I 231 Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition: If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X. Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum. I 233 WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme: For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P. I 234 Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12. (ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of. Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure! I 235 Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them. The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence. WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do: Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"! Then it just says: I 235/236 "for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers. Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules. ((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.). I 237 WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner. Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed. I 238 Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive. According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable): (i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable. (ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P. Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition. However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Meixner Vs Wittgenstein | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: Example "that Regensburg is situated at the Danube" is a name for a factual entity. Example "to be square": Name, but not for an individual or a factual entity, but a name for a property. (Property name). I 32 The names tell us which entities the ontology calculates with. But they are only certain indicators for entities. We do not know if they refer successfully. (> Reference). However, if names were mistrusted in principle, language would lose a large part of its ontological relevance. I 33 Meixner: "ontological basic trust": where there is a name, there is also the corresponding entity". Therefore we can assume that the names tell us something about ontology on the whole. MeixnerVsWittgenstein: had no deeper justification for his skeptical intention of fundamental linguistic criticism. I 125 World/real world/actual world/sum/subject/state of affairs/Meixner: for "the sum of all existing state of affairs par excellence" one can also say: "the real (actual) world", or briefly "the world". (>Wittgenstein: speaks of facts, not of things that form the world). MeixnerVsWittgenstein: but one can also call the world a single large actual individual (namely the sum of all actual individuals). Vs: but the world as state of affairs has the advantage that non-actual, thus possible worlds (poss.w.) must also be state of affairs, and thus belong to the same category. Because it is not possible, since they belong to different ontological categories. Possible Worlds/poss.w./Meixner: what kind of state of affairs do they form? The paradigmatic possible worlds and the non-actual possible worlds must have something designating in common. I 126 Actual World/Real World: maximum consistency state of affairs. And also the possible world. That is what they have in common. ((s) They cannot be contradictory in themselves. That is why we need separate possible worlds.) Maximal Consistent/Meixner: incomparably richer in content than just consistent state of affairs. Possible Worlds: are so rich in content that they are temporally determined and for each state of affairs x, which is temporally determined or time-differentiated, have either this itself or its negation as partial-state of affairs. Part: the partial relationship between state of affairs is the specification of the relational transcendental "part of" for state of affairs. For example that Fritz is taller than Anna is part-state-of-affairs of the state of affairs that Anna is shorter than Fritz. General: If sentence B follows logically from sentence A, then the state of affairs is that B is part of the state of affairs that A. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Covering Law | Versus | I 44 covering law: Suppes: probabilistic model of causation: per covering law - w. Salmon: statistical relevance model: CL Bengt Hanson: contextualistic Model: per covering law - all depart from natural laws - CartwrightVs covering law - I 49 its representatives tend to determinism. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Reference | Davidson, D. | I 92 New/Davidson: 1. Thesis: The details of the mechanisms that lead from speaker to speaker, from subject to speaker, etc., cannot be of relevance to meaning and reference! The understanding of meaning is only determined by the end elements of the conditioning process. a) The networking of the nerve tracts of speakers who mean "the same thing" can be completely different. (>Turing Machine). I 93 b) On the other hand, two speakers can also be completely the same in all relevant physical respects and still mean something quite different. |
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| Decision | Nozick, R. | II 294 The decision process itself is not a discovery of such ((s) of pre-existing) weights, but a lending of relevance. |
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| Actual | Stalnaker, R. | I 31 The theory that only our actual world is actual only makes sense if "actual" means something other than the totality of everything - StalnakerVs: and that does not mean it - I 31 way:((s) a way how things are) is an abstract object, abstracted from the activity of rational actors. I 30 Content / relevance / Stalnaker: but the thesis that only our actual world is real, only has content when "the actual world" means something other than the totality of all that there is and I do not think it does. |
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