Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments


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Author Item Summary Meta data
Rawls I 190
Altruism/Society/Justice/Benevolence/Th. Nagel/Rawls: Thomas Nagel's thought is that a benevolent person is guided by principles that someone would choose if he/she knew that he/she would divide into the many members of a society, so to speak. (See Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford, 1970, pp. 140f.)
Rawls I 191
Rawls: But memories and expectations remain those of individuals. What principles would such a person choose? If the person loves the plurality of persons just as much as he/she loves himself/herself, his/her principles would be characterized through benevolence.
1. it would still be unclear how a person decides,
2. the two principles of justice...
Rawls I 61
1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar
as it is compatible with the same freedom for others.
2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they
(a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and
(b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.
I 191
...are then a more plausible choice than the classical principle of utility.
Benevolence/RawlsVsNagel: the situation is still unclear because love and benevolence are second order concepts. The goods are already given in the situation ((s) it is only about distribution). This shows us that benevolence does not bring a profit in the initial situation of a society to be established. (See Principles/Rawls).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-01-28
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