Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animals McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 142
Animal/McDowell: it is not true that animals are machines. They can be resourceful, gifted, cunning, friendly, etc. They are simply not conscious of themselves. An animal can orient itself in its surroundings without an image of itself.
The animal has to deal with a sequence of problems, but does not understand them as a sequence of problems.
    Rather proto-subjectivity than subjectivity. No "directionality to the world".
---
I 142
Animal/Human/Gadamer: Human: lives in the world Animal: lives in an environment
World: created
Environment: rush of constraints.
---
I 142
Human/McDowell: essential: "directionality to the world". ---
I 144
Human/Gadamer: "free, distanced behavior". - McDowell: emancipation from constraints, reminiscences of theory. ---
I 145
Animal/Human/Marx: human life is nothing if it is not active. - The worker is reduced to his animal functions. ---
I 146
Environment/Gadamer: is essentially alien to the animal. The "rush of things coming across from the world". World: can be owned (appropriated by language).
Environment: can only be inhabited.
---
I 149ff
E.g. Bat/McDowellVsNagel: Nagel Thesis: Bats have a mature subjectivity whose character is beyond the reach of our concepts. McDowellVsNagel: false image of the "non-conceptual content" we might translate into concepts. ((s) know-how)).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Animals Radner
 
Books on Amazon
Daisie Radner Heterophänomenologie: wie wir etwas über die Vögel und die Bienen lernen in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

Perler I 419
Animal/inside world/Radner: one does not have to concede experience to bees! "How is it for a bee to see ultraviolet?" Can be answered in three ways: 1. Use any description, taking an experience of the bees.
2. "If they have an experience ... it is like ...". No obligation to truth, instead conditional.
3. Bees have no experiences: that is, it is also not "like anything ...".
---
Perler I 423
RadnerVsNagel: Nagel avoids the method to imagine, one lives the life of a bat. Nagel: I cannot imagine the life of the bat by adding or omitting anything to my experience ...
Radner: (ditto): Inner-world hetero-phenomenology cannot be undertaken from the viewpoint of the first person.
---
I 424
E.g. J. van Lawick Goodall: Description of disgusting food intake of carnivorous hyenas. RadnerVsGoodall: it does not even come as far as Nagel: it simply imagines that it is mouthwatering for it.
---
I 425
E.g. O.and K. Heinroth: "A bird has no parent duties, but only joys of parenthood, and does only what is "fun" for it." Radner pro: this conclusion is based only on considerations of how birds behave, not on any imagined takeover of the bird's role.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Appearance Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 148
appearance / language / statement / SellarsVsNagel / Rorty: what appears is already language-relative -
VI 480
appearance / being/ RortyVsDerrida: (Wittgenstein and Davidson ditto:) we can do our work without even mentioning this questionable distinction. (appearance/being).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Appearance Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
I 24
Sellars: seem prima facie = to be.
I 26
Seeming/Sellars: Being is more basal than seeming - Seeming is not a relationship between person, thing and property - Sense data should explain seeming - Sellars: this is unnecessary - Experience "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. (Ryle: Success word) - Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming is not a relationship at all.
I 30 ff
Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances. Phenomena conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs).
Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences.
I 32
Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green.
---
I 36
Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming - we must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance. ---
I 38
Seeming/Appearing/Being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have - Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization - b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience". - - -
Brandom I 425
Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like": 1) generic "seems" statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999.
---
Rorty VI 147/48
Appearing/Seeming/Explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Cognition Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all my criticism VsDennett from above applies.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Cognition Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 111
Cognition/explanation/consciousness/cognitive models/Chalmers: Cognitive models are very good when it comes to explaining things like learning and behavior, but not in the explanation of conscious experience. In all that is cognitively explained, the question remains why it is accompanied by something like consciousness.
---
I 112
Cognitive models can certainly cover the psychological side of consciousness (behavior explaining, learning, information processing), but not the phenomenal side of conscious experience. ---
I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows is still everything it needs to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the different functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and Chalmers I 370.
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: There are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all applies my criticism VsDennett from above.
---
I 172
Cognition/Chalmers: it is wrong to assume that it is separate from consciousness, even if it belongs to another sphere (the physical). For example, one has a (physical) perception of something green which is psychologically individualized. On the other hand, we also have perceptions about our consciousness. ---
I 218
Cognition/consciousness/psychology/Chalmers: the coherence between conscious experience and cognitive structures is remarkable. We can recognize principles: Principles: 1. Reliability principle: Our judgments of the second level about consciousness are generally correct.
---
I 219
If I judge that I hear something, then I usually hear something. 2. The principle of deducibility (reversed reliability principle): although many experiences often escape us, we usually have the ability to notice them.
---
I 222/223
3. Principle of structural coherence: conscious phenomenal experiences are always accompanied by (appropriately characterized) psychological consciousness. ---
I 223
E.g. Structural features of the facial field are reflected in our experiences of larger and smaller, brighter, darker, etc. objects, and also in our reactions to them. This also applies to implicit structures such as relations between colors.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Consciousness Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. ---
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. ---
Dennett II 23ff
Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking. ---
Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
---
Metzinger II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. ---
Metzinger II 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious). ---
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.
---
Chalmers I, 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Identity Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 168
Identity / Castaneda: we are contingently identical with our thinking and experience contents (VsKripke, VsNagel) - I 168ff ~ equivalence: weaker tahn identity statements of the first and third person - only equivalent, not identical

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 151
Identity / holism: always description-dependend - VsNagel: false essentialism.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Identity Theory Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Introspection Ryle
 
Books on Amazon
I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object (object) is a myth. - Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge. - (RyleVsNagel) ---
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist. ---
I 221 f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects - but supposing there were, then regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them. - Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Knowledge how Loar
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 142
Wissen-wie/Qualia/Intension/primäre/sekundäre Intension/LoarVsJackson/ LoarVsMaterialismus/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) geht in seiner Kritik tiefer als Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): die Beispiele mit Wasser/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent usw. erlauben immer noch, dass die physikalischen bzw. phänomenalen Begriffe unterschiedliche primäre Intensionen haben. Bsp Wärme und z.B. mittlere kinetische Energie designieren dieselbe Eigenschaft (sekundäre Intension) aber führen gleichzeitig verschiedene Eigenschaften (primäre Intensionen) ein! Aber das wird nicht a priori gewusst. Pointe: dann war Marys Wissen über die phänomenalen Eigenschaften von Farben
I 143
schon ein Wissen über physikalische bzw. funktionale Eigenschaften, aber sie konnte die beiden zuvor nicht verbinden. VsJackson/Chalmers: Weitere Einwände: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: selbst für ein allwissendes Wesen gibt es eine Lücke zwischen physikalischem und indexikalischem Wissen (siehe Bsp Rudolf Lingens mit Gedächtnisverlust liest in der Bibliothek seine eigene Biografie).
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: der Mangel an phänomenalem Wissen ist ein ganz anderer als der an indexikalischem Wissen. Wissen/Indexikalität/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): es gibt hier eine ontologische Lücke.
ChalmersVsNagel: wir können viel direkter argumentieren: es gibt keine vorstellbare Welt, in der die physikalischen Fakten sind wie in unserer Welt, in der jedoch die indexikalischen Fakten sich von unseren unterscheiden.


Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors...
---
I 143
... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
---
I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Mind Body Problem Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 120
Mind-body problem/Nagel: We have currently no conceptual means to even just imagine a solution - because causal explanations of natural science have a certain necessity that is missing here - SearleVsNagel: Science cannot explain why two bodies attract each other. ---
I 146f
Mind-body problem/Searle: causality alone is important: micro (physis) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top) - SearleVsSupervenience: this is superfluous - stability is causally supervenient on molecular structure, but this does not mean that it is epiphenomenal.
---
II 328f
Mind-body problem/Searle: mental states are both caused by the activities of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain (such as water/molecular structure) - There may be a causing and a realization of the same stuff, provided it is done on different levels.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Naturalism Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
Tetens IV 53
NagelVsNaturalism: for naturalism it must remain a complete mystery why the observer does not have the mental experiences, which he observed in others.
Tetens IV 72
NagelVsNaturalism: the language of physics would change its meanings, if it was only used for the description of experiences - TetensVsNagel: according to Nagel the experience should be the immediately known.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979


Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009
Qualia Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 144
Qualia / Dennett: we believe in qualia and the phenomenological because we have made it our own, a certain amount of metaphors.
Rorty VI 145
Quality / Qualia / properties / DennettVsNagel / Rorty: there are no grades, there are only judgments.
Rorty VI 146
Qualia / Dennett: (Smart and Place ditto): How would it look if it were actually nothing more than a combination of electrochemical processes in your brain? - ((s) that would be exactly the same). ((s)> trick question).

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Qualities Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 145
Quality / Qualia / properties / DennettVsNagel / Rorty: there are no grades, there are only judgments.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Representation Kant
 
Books on Amazon
Lanz in Hügli/Lübke, Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Reinbek 1993
I 279 ff
Representation/Lanz: Materialism Vs: (VsNagel, Vs Jackson Vs Kripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about several distinctive skills. One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it - another detects a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (> Identity thesis).
- - -
Brandom I 156
Representation/Kant: is involved in inferential relations between judgements - Hegel: reverses it: assumes experience as inferential activity. - - -
Danto I 211
Kant/Danto: Kant is also representationalist. There is no phenomenon of continuity, which would have explained the continuity of phenomena. Mental Synthesis. We need an x to refer the continuity to it, even if continuity itself would only be the result of a work of the mind. These mechanisms are never present to the consciousness.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Self Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
Stalnaker I 260
Objective Self/Nagel/NagelVsOntological View: if "being me" was to be an objective property, the assumption collapses that it could also be in relation to anyone else. But if it is an aspect of the objective TN, I can ask again "Which of these people am I". No matter to what extent we complete the concept of non-centered world, the fact that I’m TN will be missing. (Page 56) - Stalnaker pro - but: the objective property fulfills two conditions: 1) only TN has it - 2) Only the person who has it can attribute it. - Problem: -"TN’s self-property" is non-rigid. - There are poss.wo. where TN and SK are reversed.
I 262
True Self/Nagel: is not the perspective and has no perspective. (In the non-centric world) - that’s what it is about when I look at the world as a whole and ask: "How can I be TN?" - It’s not about ontology.
I 263
StalnakerVsNagel: the fact that I can imagine a situation does not mean that I could be in it - see Stalnaker.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Self Stalnaker
 
Books on Amazon
I 253
Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: Vsontological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in the wrong way. - Nagel: center position Thesis: there is an objective self - StalnakerVsNagel The semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel thinks - Simple solution: context-dependent or subjective information.
I 255
Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of uncentered possible worlds. - = Self-attribution of property - see Nagel.
I 264
objective self/modest semantic view/Stalnaker: dispenses with subjective content that would be more than self-localization - no realm of subjective facts.
I 269
Then one would have to know what it is like for Napoleon to be Napoleon if all the facts are considered -> see minimal subject.
I 270
Objective Self/StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) - 1) Takes on an extravagant metaphysics - 2) requires an explanation of the special relationship that we still would have to it.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Theories Searle
 
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John R. Searle
I 43/44
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVsTopic-neutral: Digestion needs not an additional state that would have to be described separately. ---
I 121
Nagel: no theory can show the necessity of the identity of pain and physical condition - SearleVsNagel: that is not necessary anyway, e.g. gravitational theory does not show the necessity of gravitation.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Zombies Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
Tetens IV 69
NagelVsZombie problem: we can not imagine: we still evade from front of the car! - TetensVsNagel: you talk too much ab out the behavior and not about experience, which is so important to you.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979


Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009

The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Nagel Vs Armstrong, D.
 
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Frank I 65
NagelVsArmstrong/KripkeVsArmstrong: the epistemic nature of the mental state is certain, i.e. I could have it without necessarily being aware that I have functional states. ShoemakerVsNagel/VsKripke: too idealism-friendly.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Cartesianism Davidson Vs Cartesianism
 
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Avra I 109
DavidsonVsCartesianism/DavidsonVsPhysicalism/Avramidis: his doubts (and also Nagel’s argument) lead to a rejection both of Cartesianism (which is not so reductive) and of the reductive physicalism. Davidson/Nagel/Avramides: both say the impossibility of direct access to the mental lies in the method! Mind/CartesianismVsNagel//Physicalism/Avramides: Important argument: both (C. and Ph.) turn the mind into something objective. And with that in principle into an observation open to a being that has the appropriate skills. I 110 But the arguments of Nagel and DavidsonVsPhysicalism also apply to VsCartesianism. (1979c, p.211)

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Dennett, D. Nagel Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Rorty VI 144
Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness.
Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something.
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person.
First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events.
RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here.
I 145/146
Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence.
      I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd.
VI 147
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture.
VI 149
Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions.
DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be!
NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable.
VI 150
That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel.
VI 151/152
Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral).

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Functionalism Nagel Vs Functionalism
 
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Frank I 64
Subject/Body/Nagel: if I am familiar with my mental states necessaryly directly, i.e. not through perception, but it is only possible to address perception findings as mine through the direct familiarity, then I have a reason not to seek the subject of the psyche in the body.
In addition, I am also in an arbitrary mental state when I have no idea about its descriptive interpretation.
((s) VsNagel: (with Sellars): access only through language).
NagelVsFunctionalism: if he was right, it would necessarily be true of mental states that they would be identical with functional states, but only by chance, that they are mental states, because the latter depends on their causal roles, and not on their inner epistemic nature.
- - -
Nail III 21
NagelVsFunctionalism/VsReductionism: the ordinary concept of the mental already contains the beginnings of a very different conception of objective reality. We cannot understand the idea of ​​a different consciousness if we interpret it in a way that becomes incomprehensible when we try to apply the idea to ourselves.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Theory Jackson Vs Identity Theory
 
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Frank C. Jackson
Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Introspection Ryle Vs Introspection
 
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I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). ---
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. ---
I 221
Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress).
---
I 222
But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Mackie, J. L. Nagel Vs Mackie, J. L.
 
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III 61
Ethics/Objectivity/Nagel: assumption of objective values ​​and reasons can be challenged if a subjective opinion is more plausible. Not even the assumption of a radical falsity of our ethics is contradictory.
Realism then helps, however, to consider certain alternatives more plausible than others.
Realism/Ethics/Nagel: I believe that, in principle, the possibility of realism cannot be proven by anything. We can only refute arguments for its impossibility.
III 62
ArgumentsVsRealism:
1) VsRealism/Ethics/Mackie: petitio principii: if values ​​are something real, they must be real objects of an ontologically fundamentally different kind. Mackie: Thesis: values ​​are not a part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "beings, qualities or relations of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world". (Position).
NagelVsMackie: he is obviously in possession of a very particular image of the world (e.g. without the "non-natural qualities" of Moore).
But the assumption is not correct! The aspect of being bad in the impersonal sense is not a mysterious additional property of pain.
The recognition of values ​​does not mean that they are something occult, but that they are real values!
That means in consequence that our statements about reasons related to these values ​​can be true or false!
III 63
MackieVsNagel: he had shown him in the wrong light: his doubts did not refer to strange entities, but to the reasons themselves. And precisely those reasons are not needed to explain something that happens. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in their existence.
NagelVsMackie: this raises the problem at another level again: petitio principii: the assumption that utility is a criterion for existence.
NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons, is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation!
Best Explanation/BE/Nagel: if we presume that only that is real which needs to occur in the best explanation of the world, we assume that there are no irreducible normative truths.


NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Materialism Nagel Vs Materialism
 
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III 30
Objectivity/Reality/Nagel: with the accepted restriction that we can only detect the specific quality of every experience perspective from the inside, we do not give up the idea of a world as it is created in reality regardless of the appearance for any of us. Nagel: the world as it is also contains appearances and there is no privileged perspective to grasp them.
This is the negation of idealism with respect to consciousness.
The world is neither my world nor is it ours (this does not even apply to the mental world)!
NagelVsMaterialism: ultimately based on a kind of idealism: the idealism of objectivity
Objectivity/Nagel: is not reality, it's just a way of understanding reality. ((s) >Searle: realism as method and condition for forming hypotheses).
III 31
But it is still useful, because the search for an objective understanding is the only way to expand our knowledge. Otherwise we would have to dispense with mathematics, because it cannot be complete.
- - -
Rorty IV 64
NagelVsMaterialism/Rorty: ignores the "consciousness", i.e. the way things look viewed from inside the person. RortyVsNagel: the "view from the inside" allows to see some, but do not all the internal causes of behavior. These causes can be identified under "mental" descriptions. The ego of people are not organs and particles, but mostly their beliefs and desires.
IV 65
Introspection/Rorty: the ability to report does not depend on something being "present to the consciousness", but on that the use of words can be taught! (e.g. you need to know what fever is to find out whether you have it). "Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I"
Def "I"/Rorty: consists of the mental states of a person.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nagel, Th. Dennett Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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II 191
Bat / DennettVsNagel: The title alone directs us on the wrong track: it causes us to overlook all the other ways in which bats (and other animals) can accomplish their amazing performance without it "feeling" somehow for them. We ourselves create a supposedly impenetrable mystery.
How does it feel for a bird on to build a nest ?, Well, how does it feel for us to tie our shoes?

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Nagel, Th. Evans Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I 507
Self-Identification/Understanding/EvansVsNagel: I have already explained implicitly what it means to understand such an identity statement (generality clause). Persons are distinguished from others like ordinary material objects from other material objects. An identity statement does not necessarily make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the way in which the immediate environment is considered. EvansVsNagel: he looked for an impact at the wrong place. It is true that we cannot determine in a non-indexical identity statement whether it is true or not. But why should we assume that everything that is true could be represented in this way? Objectivity/Self-Identification/Nagel: a proposition like [I am t] is not objectively true from the standpoint of eternity. Evans: pro! Such a proposition can indeed only be made by the person himself. ((s) And he does not exist in eternity). But EvansVsNagel: that does not mean that we do not understand what it means that we are identical with the same spatio-temporal objects. Fra I 507/508 Otherwise our thinking about ourselves could not be subject to the generality clause. Evans: We would have to assume then that we had an idealistic conception of the self. Or demand just like Anscombe "I" refers to nothing.
I/Self-Identification/Objectivity/EvansVsNagel: conversely, one could say just like our thoughts about ourselves demand that this connection with the world that is considered to be "objective" is understood, our "objective" thinking about the world also requires that this connection is understandable. Because nobody can be attributed an "objective" model of the world if he does not understand that he designs a model of the world in which he lives! Therefore, I believe that Nagel’s "gap" between the objective and the subjective only seems to exist.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Nagel, Th. McDowell Vs Nagel, Th.
 
Books on Amazon
I 149 +
Bat - Example / McDowellVsNagel: Nagel: Bats have a mature subjectivity, whose character is beyond our terms. McDowellVsNagel: false picture of the "non-conceptual content", which we could translate into terms.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Nagel, Th. Searle Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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John R. Searle
I 120
Thomas Nagel/Searle: presented in his works very powerful arguments against the possibility of any solution to the mind/body problem. His argumentation: We currently have not the conceptual means to even imagine a solution. And from the following reason: Causal explanations in the natural sciences play a certain causal necessity.
I 121
E.g. the behavior of molecules, that cause the being liquid of water: the molecular theory not only shows that systems will be liquid under certain conditions; it does more because it also shows why the system must be in a liquid state. Scientific explanations imply necessity, and necessity implies the unimaginable to the contrary.
Nagel: but we cannot reach this type of need in the case of the relationship between matter and consciousness. No theory could explain why pain is a necessary consequence of certain types of neural firings. We can at any time introduce a situation in which the neurophysiological events have no such consequences. We can just imagine the opposite.
Therefore, not a necessity. Nagel draws the desperate conclusion that our conceptual equipment would require an overhaul.
SearleVsNagel: this argument does not persuade me. Thus, for example, gravitation is explained by the gravitational attraction law, but it is by this not explained to us why bodies must exert gravitational force.
I 123
We create us an image of the need that is based on our subjectivity, but we cannot in the same way create an image of the need of the relationship between subjectivity and neurophysiological phenomena, because then we have already stepped out of subjectivity. Example Supposed, supposed, God or any machine could detect causally necessary relations just like that; then there would be no difference for God or for the machine between matter/matter need forms and matter/mind need forms.
And again, even if we admit that we are not out of both sides of the relationship between consciousness and its and can create an image in such a way as we can of the relationship between liquid and molecular motion, so we could still go indirectly to the causal relations.
I 124
We may someday after all arrive at a theory that provides a causal explanation of consciousness. Nagel has not proven the insolubility of the problem.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Nagel, Th. Sellars Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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Rorty VI 147
To appear/to seem/language/explanation/SellarsVsNagel/Rorty: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by the scientific explanation, in turn, are linguistically relative. What seems to you dependends on how you are accustomed to speak.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nagel, Th. Verschiedene Vs Nagel, Th. Tetens IV 153
Nagel: Erlebnisinhalt kann niemals mit etwas Physischem identisch sein.
Tetens IV 59
Nagel scheint zu schließen. wenn x und y identisch sind, dann muß derjenige, der x wahrnimmt, auch y wahrnehmen. D.h. wenn ein Beobachter die physische Welt wahrnimmt, müßte er auch den Erlebnisinhalt einer anderen Person wahrnehmen, wenn diese identisch wären.
Er nimmt ihn aber nicht wahr, also kann er nicht identisch sein.
Identität/(s)VsNagel: Bsp Wasser und H20 sind identisch, aber man nimmt eigentlich immer nur Wasser wahr. Die Wahrnehmungen müssen nicht identisch sein.
TetensVsNagel: es kommt ja auch noch das Wissen hinzu: wenn jemand weiß, daß er x wahrnimmt, folgt daraus nicht, daß er weiß, daß er y wahrnimmt!
Erleben/Wahrnehmung/Nagel: "..und schließlich empfinden wir den Geschmack von Schokolade..."
IV 60
Erleben/Wahrnehmung/TetensVsNagel: warum sagt er nicht einfach: "indem sich das alles Im Organismus , insbesondere im Gehirn abspielt, ißt und schmeckt der Betreffende Schokolade"?. Dann wäre er nicht so leicht der Versuchung erlegen, die folgende Frage anzuschließen:
Nagel: "Was ist der Geschmack von Schokolade jedoch?"
Tetens: er hätte gut daran getan, nur folgendes zu sagen: "er steckt sie in den Mund und nimmt sie auf spezifische Weise wahr, denn man kann durch Kauen Schokolade identifizieren."
Der Geschmack ist nicht etwas Zusätzliches zum Vorgang des Schmeckens.
(s) DF Tätigkeit statt Gegenstand - Schmecken statt Geschmack ("Verdinglichung").
Tetens: das würde uns auch vor der noch verhänglicheren Frage bewahren: "Wo befindet sich der Geschmack?".
TetensVsNagel: er verrätselt die Frage und Bsp tut so wie ein Blinder, der die Farben in Frage stellen wollte: weil er sie nicht tasten oder riechen kann, wieso kommen sie dann in der Welt vor?
Es sind einfach physische Eigenschaften physischer Dinge in der Welt.
NagelVsTetens: wir haben nicht ohne Grund zwei Sprachen!
TetensVsNagel: richtig, aber die beiden unterscheiden sich nicht darin, daß die eine - die "Empfindungssprache" - näher an der" Realität" liegt als die andere. Tetens IV 72, 73 +
Tetens IV 75
Tetens: Lösung: wo ist da noch ein Rätsel, wenn der Naturalist sagt: "wenn eine bestimmte Wellenlänge reflektiert wird, erlebt man etwas, auf das man in unserer Kultur mit Farbwörtern zu reagieren gelernt hat".





Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009
Nagel, Th. Cartesianism Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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Avramides I 109
Geist/CartesianismusVsNagel//Physikalismus/Avramides: Pointe: beide (C. und Ph.) machen den Geist zu etwas Objektivem. Und damit prinzipiell einer Beobachtung zugänglich für ein Wesen, das die geeigneten Fähigkeiten hat.
I 110
Aber die Argumente von Nagel und DavidsonVsPhysikalismus treffen auch VsCartesianismus. (1979c,S.211)

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Nagel, Th. Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th.
 
Books on Amazon
I 167
Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.)
I 168
on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior.
Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way.
The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it.
This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! "
PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here:
Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of ​​a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN.

Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be
a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may
b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions.
Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type.
Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of ​​TN (Peacocke: constitutive role).
Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person.
Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness.
I 169
E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN.
Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words.
Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness.
PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical.
Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which ​​the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation.
So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?"
For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea".

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Nagel, Th. Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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I 20
Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact.
I 21
Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am.
Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution.
NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter.
StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is
Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953.
Problem: what is the content of the statement?
Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal.
((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth.
Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc..
Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content.
Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties.
Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience.
- - -
I 253
Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation.
Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN".
Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts.
Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete
b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57).
Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory:
NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way.
Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self.
StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful.
I 254
Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is:
1. semantic diagnosis
2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake
4. general problem of subjective viewpoints
5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences.
Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version):
This does not include that
"I am TN" is supposedly without content.
StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting".
semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond.
WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F.
What information is transmitted with it?
I 255
Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w.
Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w.
E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN,
Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object.
Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979).
- - -
I 257
Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then?
Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony.
I 258
StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths".
Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality.
VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away".
Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick.
Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem.
I 259
Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible.
I 260
Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says.
Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world.
Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting.
I 263
Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it?
Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not.
I 264
Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content!
Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Nagel, Th. Nominalism Vs Nagel, Th.
 
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Frank I 133
Nominalism/VsNagel: Standard objection: it does not really make sense to raise questions that cannot be answered on grounds of principle. E.g. what it is like to be a bat. I 134 NagelVsNominalism/NagelVsReductionism: its consequences are intuitively unacceptable. Unlike our realism of the world, of which we indeed distance ourselves verbally, but which we cannot really give up.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Qualia Verschiedene Vs Qualia Tetens IV 50
Wahrnehmung/Tetens: wir unterscheiden Modalität: riechen, schmecken, hören, sehen - und Inhalt (oft als "Quale", "Qualia" bezeichnet). Genausogut können wir vom "Erlebnisinhalt" reden, oder einfach vom "Erlebnis".
Tetens IV 72
Qualia/Farbe/Nagel/Tetens: der Antinaturalist würde sagen, Farbe ist die gesehene Farbe, der Farbeindruck, das kann nie und nimmer mit elektromagnetischer Strahlung identisch sein. Qualia/Farbe/TetensVsNagel: also nehme ich die Farben zugegebenermaßen wahr. Aber bei der Wahrnehmung kann niemand von meiner Beschreibung meiner Wahrnehmung absehen.
Nun könnte ich von Anfang an gelernt haben, auf "der Gegenstand dort reflektiert elektromagnetische Strahlung von der und der Wellenlänge" zu reagieren.
(s)VsTetens: funktioniert nicht a) wegen Sorites, b) (Danto2): gleicher Farbeindruck bei verschiedenen Kombinationen von Wellenlängen.
TetensVsVs: ich müßte zusätzlich gelernt haben, unter gewissen Versuchsbedingungen die Wellenlängen genauer einzuteilen als mit bloßen Auge.
(s)VsTetens: das hilft doch nicht im Alltag?
Tetens: dann wäre ich nie auf die Idee gekommen, zwischen objektivem physikalischem Geschehen und subjektiven Erlebnissen zu unterscheiden.
Tetens IV 71
Qualia/Erlebnisinhalt/Tetens: um nicht Spielverderber zu sein, müssen wir dann nicht sagen "ich sehe etwas Rotes" sondern "ich habe eine Rotempfindung". ((s) Reifizierung).





Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009
Tetens, H. Nagel Vs Tetens, H.
 
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Tetens IV 69
Zombie Problem/Tetens: let us concede for perceptions, for the sake of argument, that they could be strictly separated from their description and the behavior. Naturalism/TetensVsNagel: especially then the anti-naturalist should be consistent and say nothing more about the perception beyond all behavior. Antinaturalism/NagelVsTetens: but the anti-naturalist is not silent by far and declares colors and sounds the content of our experience. In addition, the experienced colors and sounds cannot be anything physical in any way.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Te I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009
Various Authors Kuhn Vs Various Authors
 
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Hacking I 119
Ernest Nagel: Knowledge has a tendency to accumulate - a new theory subsumes older theories. KuhnVsNagel, Ernest.
I 120
Theory/Ernest Nagel: New theories should include older entities (like phlogiston). (KuhnVs: impossible).
II 500
KuhnVsCumulative view: No accumulation of facts, no development towards even more general theories. No non-historical general criteria that decide on superstition. No predictions about how one member brings forth a new element.

Ku I
Th. Kuhn
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Kuhn Vs Accum. of Knowl. Hacking I 119
Camp: Ernest Nagel: pro accumulation of knowledge - KuhnVsNagel, Ernest

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Color Research Jackson, F.
 
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Metzinger II 259
Frank Jackson: "Knowledge Argument" - "Argument des Unvollständigen Wissens: Bsp Farbenforscherin Mary wächst in einem abgeschlossenen Raum auf, einziger Kontakt zur Außenwelt ist ein Schwarz-Weiß-Monitor. Sie lernt alles über Farben, aber nicht, "wie es ist" Farben zu sehen.
These dadurch, dass sie freigelassen wird und zum ersten Mal Farben sieht, erwirbt sie neues Wissen.
VsJackson: die Mehrzahl der Autoren argumentiert, daß das Argument nicht zu dem intendierten Resultat des Existenz nichtï·"physikalischer Tatsachen führe.
Problem: wie der Wissenszuwachs überhaupt zu beschreiben wäre.
Nida-RümelinVsNagel: These die Formulierung "wie es ist" verfehlt den Kern -
II 265
Nida-Rümelin These es läßt sich aus allen diesen Fällen oder Beispielen nicht ableiten, daß eine Qualia-Vertauschung bei funktionaler Übereinstimmung möglich wäre.
II 275
Wissen/Glauben/Nida-Rümelin: These bei phänomenalem Wissen handelt es sich um Wissen im strengen Sinne: nämlich, um Wissen über etwas, das der Fall ist.
II 280
Argument des unvollständigen Wissens/Jackson: These sollte in der ursprünglichen Fassung zeigen, daß es nichtï·"physikalische Tatsachen gibt, d.h. solche Tatsachen, die in physikalistischem Vokabular nicht formuliert werden können.
Pauen I / V 179
Farbenforscherin Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonismus - These 1. Neurobiologisches Wissen ist im Hinblick auf phänomenale Erfahrungen prinzipiell unvollständig - 2. Der Monismus ist falsch, phänomenale Eigenschaften können nicht identisch mit neuronalen Eigenschaften sein! Phänomenale Eigenschaften sind kausal wirkungslose Nebeneffekte mentaler Zustände - Epiphänomenalismus -

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Bat McDowell, J.
 
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I 149 +
Example Bat / McDowellVsNagel: Nagel thesis: bats possess a mature subjectivity, whose character is beyond our concepts.   McDowellVsNagel: false picture of the "non-conceptual content," we could cahnge into terms.
Semantic Analysis Nagel, Th.
 
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Staln I 253
Nagel: center position: there is an objective self - StalnakerVsNagel: the semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel takes - simple solution: context-dependent or subjective information
VsNagel Stalnaker, R.
 
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I 253
Nagel: center position: there is an objective self - StalnakerVsNagel: the semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel takes - simple solution: context-dependent or subjective information.
I 263
Nagel: because the objective representation has a subject, there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that follows from it. Why should from the fact that I can imagine a possible situation follow that I could be in it?.