|Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 550
Imagination/Williams: E.g. "I am in the West Indies" - "someone is in the West Indies" - Evans: there is a difference whether we take an internal perspective or not - but it does not follow that there is such a gap in apparent memories.
Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994