Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptualism Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p" (>facts?) - VsObject Theory - VsConceptualism (concepts for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure) - TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings"
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis - I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete idea. NominalismVsConceptualism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual - NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.-
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable - Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? - 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Object Tugendhat
 
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I 37f
Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications (>Object) - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects - we do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is. ---
I 86
Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: main target. ---
I 88
E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter" but who do you mean by "Peter" - object we do not imagine it, we mean them. ---
I 102
For that we need singular term instead of pictures. ---
I 131
Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. ---
I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach - false: the sentence would correspond to a situation. ---
I 246
Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Possible Worlds Goodman
 
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II Preface (Putnam)
II IX
There are no "possible but not actual" worlds. GoodmanVsFormalism: no formalism for the sake of formalism.
GoodmanVsImagination independent from our theorizing "ontological basement".
---
II 78
We have become accustomed to see the real world as one of many possible. This needs to be corrected: all possible worlds are within the real. ---
Putnam III 144
Versions/Goodman: it is not about different descriptions of "identical facts" - versions are unequal possible worlds, only incompatible versions must refer to different possible worlds - not different languages, so that tables sometimes as aggregates of time segments of molecules ... etc , but we decide to produce a corresponding world - E.g. "Big Dipper" was not created, but made a constellation. - PutnamsVsGoodman: to daring extrapolation: that there was nothing what we have not created. ---
III 147
PutnamVsGoodman: "Big Dipper" is not analytical: if a star perishs, we would further speak of the Big Dipper - but "star" has properties that cannot be accounted for by specifying a list - not to know by that, that we find out what belongs to the Big Dipper. Big Dipper: which stars are included, is rather answered by the linguist - PutnamVsGoodman: the term "constellation" is in the middle. - The constellation remains when all the stars are light bulbs - PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius ourselves - we have not made it a star - we have brought about the term star, and this term applies to Sirius - our term of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, that our language practice made him a bachelor. - We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Terminology Tugendhat
 
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I 72f
Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. ---
I 91
VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". ---
I 162f
Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". ---
I 217
Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. ---
I 337
Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. ---
I 338
Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. ---
I 246
Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. ---
I 266
Definition expulsion Game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro) - ((s) use> truth conditions> meaning. ---
I 276
The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992