Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs Williams Peacocke I 77
Lie/belief/Bernard Williams (B. Williams, "Deciding to Believe", Cambridge, 1973): A creature that manifests its actions in claims, but cannot lie, cannot believe. A belief must be able to be retained. - N.B.: what is retained is the judgment, not the claim. - BennettVsWilliams, B..

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Colour Putnam III 118
On Bernard Williams' approach to the "absoluteness" of the world: Putnam: The world "independent of our experience" is a cold world. Values (as well as colors) are not found in the world, but projected onto the world.
III 118/119
Values are even worse off than colors, because after we discover that they are projections, we lose our ability to use them. This is not the case with colour classifications. They belong more to a biological world than to a "social world". ((s) Connection: PutnamVsWilliams, B., PutnamVs "Absolute World", Vs B. Williams' approach of an "absoluteness" of the world). >Absoluteness.
III 125
Colours: the situation does not become more favourable (objective) if we look at colours instead of heat. Colour vision is not a mere reaction of our physiology and by no means without relationships to objective characteristics of the surface we are looking at. Disjunction/Definition/Putnam: for example, a surface is green if it refuses to reflect a significant amount of red light relative to the other colors (including green). Here the boundaries remain vague, but it explains that different compositions can produce the same colour impression.

III 126
Colors/Putnam: E.g. "Standard Green": no intersubjective stability - but it does not follow that there are no clear cases of green/not green.
III 162
Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences from the individual elements should be transferred to language as a whole. But in fact, different languages do not have the same semantic opposites. One language may have only four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out quickly leads to the conclusion that meanings are reserved for specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for individual "texts".
According to this thesis, two languages never express the same meanings.
Thus even the concept of the sign's meaning, which is detachable from the sign itself, becomes obsolete. (PutnamVsSaussure).

V 114
Colors/Functionalism/Putnam: When we adopt the "functionalist" theory of subjective colors: "a sensation is a blue sensation when it has the role of signaling the presence of objective blue in the environment": this theory captures a meaning of the expression "blue sensation", but not its desired "qualitative" sense. If this functional role were identical to the qualitative character, one could not say that the quality of the sensation has changed. But the quality has changed. In this case, quality does not seem to be a functional state. (Vs Functionalism). >Functionalism.






Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Ethics Geach I 270
Moral/Logic/Geach: often regarded as imperatives, but different logic - "Should I?": Only two possible answers, and these are contradictory - "should I": three: (A) duty, ... (B) right pro, but also contra., (C) Obligation, not ... - ---
I 279
Contradiction/action/moral/ethics/Strawson/Geach: in interesting cases, R is not inconsistent with P and Q itself, but because the contradiction (contradiction) of P and Q follows together - from P and Q and R together follows S and its contradiction ~S, therefore it does not matter if we explain closability (consequence) in terms of inconsistency, or vice versa inconsistency in terms of closability - GeachVsWilliams: even if a contradictory order follows from an earlier given, one will not say that the command recipient had received the order to draw a wrong conclusion. Williams: if no action follows, no practical conclusion was concluded. GeachVsWilliams: vice versa, if the conclusion can be derived, the conclusion exists.


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Ethics Putnam III 113f
Ethics/concepts/Williams/Murdoch: ethical concepts are 1. porous: E.g. "good and right" - more descriptive, less abstract: E.g."cruel", "chaste", and so on - Murdoch: also descriptive components are interest-relative. - VsNon-cognitivism: his division into descriptive/prescriptive does not succeed because one cannot name the components, without even using a word like "cruel" (circular) - Murdoch: World not analyzable into facts and values - Williams: pro, but we can transfer our concepts to each society.
III 116
"Dense"/Williams: E.g. "chaste" can function both as a rating as well as a description.
III 117
PutnamVsWilliams: absurd and still relativistic when "grass is green" is not to be the absolute truth (because I'm projecting colors like values) - values/Putnam: even worse off than colors, because after we figured out that we project them, we lose our ability to use them.
III 128
PutnamVsWilliams: too complicated metaphysical. - Definition ratings/Dewey: arise from a critique of various problem-solving processes.
V 190
Ethics/language/meaning/values/Putnam: E.g. Superbenthamian: Approves the most cruel acts for "the good of the majority" - after a while the language use in reference to "sincere" separates between him and us. - That does not mean that we and the superbenthamian agree about the facts and disagree with respect to the values - we live in different worlds.
V 208
PutnamVsBentham: we have a reason to prefer the poetry to the flea-hopping: the experience of great poetry and its aftermath.
V 282
Ethics/PutnamVsBentham: (E.g. flea-hopping): there is no prejudice to prefer the poetry. The idea that values do not belong to the blocks in the world, and the idea that "value judgments" express "prejudices" are two sides of the same coin - PutnamVsSolipsism: immoral, not everyone is trapped in a solipsistic hell, but we should participate in the discourse.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Laws Williams Putnam III 109ff
Law/reality/B.Williams: Thesis our world has evolved from one without living beings - the laws are the same - PutnamVsWilliams: but new laws: of supply and demand, the psychology - but not in contradiction to physics - Williams: We can apply our imagined analogue of physics also without security in everyday life - PutnamVs: for animals that applies due to entirely different circumstances, they have no "analogue of physics".

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Norms Williams Putnam I 253
Norms/standards/values/Bernard Williams: Norms and values presuppose the perspective of "some social world" - on the other hand (according to Putnam) physics would offer an absolute metaphysical truth. - PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a belief that would be "perspective", lacks any clear meaning - that was water to the mill of deconstructivism.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Person Williams Nozick II 29f
Self/Person/Self-identity/Identity/B. Williams: e.g. two stories together that put us to a mystery: 1st case: one person enters a new body, actually two people exchange their bodies - A-body-person: (now connected with the A-body): has all the memories, knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (earlier, complete) person B - if A could choose which pain should be inflicted after the change, he would choose the A-body for it - because he assumes that he lives in B.
2nd case: someone tells them to endure pain. after that, you will learn that you will undergo a change in your psychological condition - so that you will possess the character of someone else - which frightens you, you don't want to lose your identity and then endure pain. Question: Why did the A-person not have the same fears in the first case? Why is case 1: Transfer of a person to another body - and case 2: something that happens to a permanent person? Why does memory play a role in case 1?
II 31
Difference 1/2: in 2, B does not acquire the memories of A.
Nozick II 29f
Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: e.g. Symmetric case: Outside view: two people swap bodies, A is now in the B-body and decides that B (now in his old A-body) pain should be inflicted instead of him in the new body - inside view (symmetric): You are supposed to get pain inflicted which frightens you, before you should get another character which frightens you even more - you choose the pain for yourself to ward off the loss of the person - other decision, symmetric case - problem: nothing outside influences A's task and acquisition of a new psyche - question: how can then two tasks and acquisitions lead to an exchange of bodies? Williams: Thesis: physical identity is a necessary condition for personal identity.
II 31
Problem: what happens elsewhere can have no effect on whether A continues to live in the A-body. Williams: Thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
Nozick II 32
Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: Principle 1: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of any kind. Principle 2: if it is possible that there is another thing that prevents identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist.
NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong - e. g. Wiener Kreis dissolves - several successor groups emerge - then the identity depends on something that happens elsewhere ((s) whether there are several groups). > "closest continuer.
Nozick II 33
Identity/time/next successor/NozikVsWilliams: but dependence on the existence of other things: whether a group can call itself a Viennese circle depends on whether there are other groups in exile - if two things are equally close to the original, there is no next successor nN. Identity in time: necessary condition: to be next successor.
II 35
If God provided causally for identity in time, he would also have to decide how the factors should be weighted (ship of Theseus).
II 40
It may be that the next successor is not close enough.
II 41
Randomly created copy is not a next successor (because of missing causality) - we could have the second one without the first one.
II 45
Identity in time/problem: overlapping.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Reality Davidson I (e) 90
Reality/World/Quine: proximal theory (the meaning is localized at the nerve endings) shut off from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes/DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one cannot specify what the evidence actually was evidence for.
Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.
Glüer II 126
World/Reality/Reality/Glüer: new: "see change" in contemporary philosophy, revision of the relationship of the human mind to the rest of the world. From the "subjective" to the "objective". On the object side, the world thus, there are no objects that could be represented. Fact/tradition/glower: there are material objects and events, but a true proposition claims not only that they exist, but that they are in a certain relationship to each other, also called fact. >Facts/Davidson.
Glüer II 127
DavidsonVsRepresentation: such a representation relation cannot exist. Because there are no facts! Any attempt to analyze the correspondence of facts and beliefs leads to the fact that we must say that a true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world, with the overall reality. We experience nothing in this way. >Representation/Davidson.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Relativism Putnam VII 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Williams II 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards.
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I (i) 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language.
I (i) 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Speciecism Williams Singer I 69
Speciesism/B. Williams/Peter Singer: (B. Williams, The Human Prejudice, place, year?): B. Williams has defended speciesism in such a way: all our values are necessarily "human values". P. SingerVsWilliams, B.: but this does not exclude developing values that could be accepted by rational beings who can experience empathy with other beings.
More importantly: the fact that these values are human values does not exclude that we should value the suffering of other species less. That is what Williams admits. But what is the decisive point in asserting that our values are human values?
B. WilliamsVsVs: Let us imagine that our planet is colonized by well-meaning farsighted beings who conclude that it is necessary to eliminate us.
---
I 70
Then it would be right to be on our side against these alien beings. In the end, it is a question of "which side are you on?" P. SingerVsWilliams, B.: We have heard this question before, in war, racial conflicts, ethnic or ideological conflicts and in the McCarthy era. We should not take Williams' tribalist approach.
---
I 73
Human/P. Singer: Whether a living being is a human being can undoubtedly be determined by examining the chromosomes. That is not a border that is shifting. However, there is another term "human" introduced by Joseph Fletcher. See Human/Fletcher.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Vagueness Williamson Field II 283
Vagueness/Williamson Puzzles/WilliamsonVsNonfactualism/Field: (Williamson 1994): thesis: for any question there is a simple argument for the conclusion that it has a specific, objective, factual answer. - E.g. Joe is rich or Joe is not rich. - Then there is in each case a fact if he is rich or if he is not rich. Then E.g. Verdi/Bizet is pointless for Williamson. FieldVsWilliamson: E.g. then there must be an inaccessible fact which decides whether the pre-Newtonians mean mass or weight: implausible. ---
II 284
Quantum mechanics: here the Nonfactualism is different.

EconWillO
Oliver E. Williamson
Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966


Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Williams, M. Vs Davidson, D. Rorty VI 230
Skepticism/Davidson: since he has already shown that most of our beliefs must be true, the skeptic is already beaten. Belief/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: did not really show that most of our beliefs have to be true.
M. WilliamsVsDavidson: derives both coherence and correspondence theory from the principle of indulgence.
Principle of indulgence: notion of unproblematic access to certain causal relationships.
Williams: the game is over before it has begun!
VI 231
M. WilliamsVsDavidson : if we do not already have a way to associate coherence with truth, we cannot possibly know that our beliefs are interpretable in Davidson's sense! Williams quotes here Peter KleinVsDavidson: "he can only show that if there are beliefs they are on the whole true".
Rorty: but Klein continues: "For this we would have to know that outside our bodies there are events that are in causal interaction with states of ourselves".
Davidson/Rorty: he would surely agree with the first part, and to the second that (if there are any beliefs at all) he does not need to rack his brains!
VI 232
Skepticism: Mr Williams doubts whether we have any beliefs at all. But this kind of skepticism is not Descartes' or Stroud's! Beliefs/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: (Davidson: most beliefs are true): does not solve the problem of skepticism, but shifts it to the problem of the inscrutability of reference.
Brains in a vat: For example, the external interpreter of the brains in the vat has no reason to believe that his idea of what the brain in the vat is talking about corresponds to "the self-understanding" of the brain in the vat!
VI 233
DavidsonVsWilliams: would ask back: "Why do you think that we (as brains in a vat) did not think that our utterances related to events in the computer? The "self-understanding" is only a variation of the "epistemic situation". (According to Davidson, both are forms of the "schema" in the sense of dualism schema/content).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Jackson, F. Williamson Vs Jackson, F. Stalnaker I 106
Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Def Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson:
(s) for all possible worlds (poss.w.) w and w' if w and w' are descriptively exactly the same, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view.
I.e. the ethical supervenes on the descriptive.
I 107
WilliamsonVsJackson: shows that global supervenience in this sense can also apply if the strong supervenience does not apply: Def uniform property/Williamson/Stalnaker: be a property that is either true of all or nothing. ((s) then possible worlds may differ in that in one all things are u, in the other possible worlds is no thing u).
((s) uniform property(s): e.g. self-identity e.g. difference from other individuals).
U: be the set of uniform properties
N.B.: then U = U' (the closure on the set of U, properties that are definable in terms of uniform properties are themselves uniform).
For example, suppose w and w' are equal in terms of all uniform properties, then w = w'.
((s) I.e. they are equal at all).
So that all possible words which are the same in terms of uniform properties are also the same in terms of all properties! ((s) Because F properties are not yet introduced, see below).
Then the set of all properties supervenes globally on the uniform properties.
But this is not true for strong or even weak superveniences! Because two individuals existing in the same possible world will have the same uniform properties, but may differ in terms of non-uniform properties.
StalnakerVsWilliamson: that is true, but it exploits the gap we have closed in the text. Therefore, it does not affect our outcome.
Gap:
Q: be a trait that applies to some but not all things in world w.
((s) I.e. F is not a uniform property, i.e. there are other properties besides u properties).
f: be some picture of world w on itself that maps everything what is in w F, on something that is not F in w.
w. will be U-indistinguishable from itself relative to figure f, but not {F}- indistinguishable from itself. ((s) Simple, because not all things are F, although all are u.)
Therefore, any set of properties containing F will supervene globally on U.

EconWillO
Oliver E. Williamson
Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Stalnaker, R. Williamson Vs Stalnaker, R. I 159
Identity/Indistinguishability/Timothy WilliamsonVsStalnaker: (1996): Actuality Operator/@/Williamson: if we add it to K, we can prove the necessity of diversity from the necessary identity.
I.e. actual different things are then necessarily different:
Logical form:
I- @ (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y > Nx ≠ y).
I 160
Stalnaker: my independence argument above for necessary diversity was based on two assumptions 1. the extensional logic of identity is the same as the logic of indistinguishability, but
2. in a modal semantics without symmetry condition for the accessibility relation, individuals can be distinguishable in a possible world while they are not in another possible world.
If one cannot "look back", the information about the distinction may be lost.
Actuality Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the actual world.
General: the information about every possible world accessible from the actual world is reflected in the actual world and thus also in every other possible world in the model.
Williamson: general thesis:
I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y)
In our classical system, the universal generalization is invalid and unprovable with this
(∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y)
because the predication implies existence and thus the negation of an identity statement can be true, not because the expressions refer to different things, but because these do not exist at all.
But: the version with the quantifiers within the necessity operator
Ni (∀x)(∀y) (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y)
Will be valid even if the equal sign is defined as indistinguishable. But it will not be provable.
Reason: K + @ is an incomplete quantified modal logic.
Actuality Operator/Stalnaker: Problem: the semantic limitations for its interpretation have consequences that are not reflected in the propositional logic for this operator, consequences that occur when the range may change from possible worlds to possible worlds. There are propositions without identity which are valid but not provable, e.g.
I- @ N (∀x)(Fx > @MFx)
Counterpart Semantics/counterpart theory/necessity diversity/Stalnaker: the absence of the need of diversity in the counterpart theory.
I 161
Is not connected with the limits of the expressiveness of modal logic (it is even missing in S5). The necessary identity is valid and provable here. Rather, the necessary difference cannot be proven with or without the actuality operator.
StalnakerVsWilliamson: therefore I think that his argument does not threaten the thesis,
Thesis: the necessity (or essentiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity.

EconWillO
Oliver E. Williamson
Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966
Stroud, B. Williams, M. Vs Stroud, B. Rorty VI 126
Skepticism/Rorty: "Experience has priority over world knowledge".
VI 227
Michael Williams: the only reason for this view is that otherwise there would be no way to evaluate our world knowledge. This is an unvarnished metaphysical determination. Stroud: "It must be shown how it is possible for us to know things about the world if our sensory experience is compatible with our dreaming.
M. WilliamsVsStroud: You only have to agree to this if you already have a foundation approach. You have to acknowledge that Descartes' so-called "natural order of things" really exists, and with it a context-free epistemic status.
RortyVsWilliams: so far it is good, but he did not succeed, as he claims, in presenting a new "correct theoretical diagnosis".
Should he really make a difference between the outcome of his foundation view and all other approaches? (Dualism subject/object, "spectator theory", striving for certainty, experience as veil, etc.)
VI 228
Williams did not reckon with the most radical critique of this dualism, Davidson: the critique of the distinction schema/content. He misunderstands Davidson when he thinks he is trying to answer the sceptic directly. (Impossible task).
VI 234/235
Objectivity/M. Williams/Rorty: sometimes expresses himself ambiguously (danger: to accept "being like this" of the world). But it only seems to mean that the "truthfulness of an objective statement is something other than what we believe to be true or our justified belief that it is true. For a distinction between "to be justified" and "to be true" as such is not sufficient to reinstate the dualism schema/content.
Independence/M. Williams: the idea that "our experience could be exactly as it is, and yet it would be possible that all our beliefs about the world are wrong."
RortyVsWilliams: there are two meanings of "independent": those who confuse them draw the wrong conclusion from "everyone" to "all". It is true that every single belief can be wrong, but it does not follow that all beliefs can be wrong.

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Williams, B. McGinn Vs Williams, B. I 84
McGinnVsWilliams: materialist metaphysics.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Williams, B. Nozick Vs Williams, B. II 29
Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine
A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A.
Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical.
II 29/30
If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards.
Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2?
What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are?
How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A,
II 31
also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A.
If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche.
Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values ​​result in the exchange of two bodies?
                 Body A / B Body
1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A

2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new

Two principles should explain this:
Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails:
Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x.
If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R!
((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.)
II 32
Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or:
E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle.
Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place.
Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling.
1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort.
2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist!
((s) The first follows from the second here).
NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong.
1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul.
((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.)
In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program.
Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot.
Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere?
((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes).
II 33
Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ...
Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists.
Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things.
Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme").
Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity.
E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity).
Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate.
II 34
Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor.
Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations.
Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation.
Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play.
Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor.
If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor.
Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself!
If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions.
Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions.
II 35
A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused!
Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film!
Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity.
NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things!
Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"?
II 36
Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Williams, B. Putnam Vs Williams, B. III 107
Ethics/relativism/Williams, Bernard: if an approximation of positions is really taking place in ethics, it is not because of a steering by the way things really are, whereas in the sciences this could actually be explained in this way.
III 108
Reality/Williams/Putnam: We can select some of convictions of which one could say that they are maximally independent from our perspective. "The world as it appears to us" is interpreted as "the world as it appears to us in particular".
For such a description only primary qualities should be chosen.
III 263 footnote: Ex further terms can be derived therefrom: Ex "impulse" is defined by "mass" and "speed" whereas "speed" is defined by "time" and "location".
III 109
How would we describe the world and imagine how it would be if there were no observers. In colloquial descriptions we could, of course, also include secondary qualities and speak of green grass and warm weather. According to Williams, we can readily be brought to the conclusion that we only describe how the grass had appeared to observers.
Williams: thesis: our world (with observers) emerged from a world without observers. The laws are exactly the same.
III 110
Therefore a description with primary qualities only should be possible. PutnamVsWilliams: enchanting, but it is true? Through evolution, no new laws of physics have emerged. But our predictions refer to phenomena that are described in the language of physics, not in the language of biology, psychology or economics. Once living beings and societies appear on the scene, actually new laws come to light, but they do not contradict the laws of physics. "Offer" and "demand" can not be described in terms of physics.

III 128
Values/Williams/Putnam: even if it turns out that the color of a surface is an objective property of reflectivity, that does not impair the contrast between color characteristics and values, which Williams wanted to highlight. Putnam: but to demonstrate that the evaluation does not emerge from one eye from the nature of the eye, the complicated metaphysical explanations of Williams are unnecessary.
Def values/Dewey: Evaluation results from the critique of various problem-solving processes.
Absoluteness/Williams: contains ideally a "theory of knowledge and error"; contains both the possibility of the local views, as well as its own possibility. Is being eliminated virtually immediately by Williams: "this view of the world must enable to explain the possibility of their own existence". Later: withdrawal: "... which may be subject to the radical indeterminacy of interpretation ..."
III 129
Austin: "this is the point at which the philosopher says it, and then comes the point at which s_he withdraws."
III 130
PutnamVsWilliams: Problem: for the absolute conception, there is only one way to explain the possibility of local views and their own possibility: an prediction of future occurrences of characters and sounds.
III 135 ff
RelativismPutnamVsWilliams: the outright "truth of relativism" by Williams is not more coherent than the "absolute conception of the world". Williams/truth: rather carefree use of the term. Sometimes something that is "detected by the procedural manners of a linguistic community" (same perspective as Rorty, who Williams considers an opponent).
II 136/137
Truth: According to Williams in the purely academic conflict "not really a problem." He believes that the members of other communities have ethical knowledge, and their beliefs are true, if they use their concepts carefully. PutnamVsWilliams: striking contradiction: Ex "right, her sitting together with her boss alone in the office is unchaste, but we do not consider chastity a virtue". In contradiction to Williams assertion that "true" and "false" could only be used in case of a real conflict.
III 140
PutnamVsWilliams: Opposition: Williams would like to acknowledge the involvement of facts and values, and at the same time hold on to the "absoluteness" of scientific knowledge. Putnam: but that's impossible. It's not possible that science is absolute, but nothing else.
I (k) 253
Norms/values/Bernard Williams: presumes the perspective of "some social world". On the other hand (according to Putnam) physics proposes an absolute metaphysical truth.
PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a conviction that would be "perspective", is lacking any clear sense. That was grist to the mill of deconstructionism.

Rorty VI 64
PutnamVsWilliams/Rorty: "approach to the big picture": purely dogmatic. The notion of absoluteness is incoherent.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Williams, M. Davidson Vs Williams, M. Rorty VI 232
Scepticism: M. Williams has doubts whether we have beliefs at all. But this kind of skepticism is not that of Descartes or Stroud!. Beliefs/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: (Davidson: most beliefs are true): does not solve the problem of skepticism, but shifts it to the problem of the inscrutability of reference.
Brains in a vat/BIV: E.g. the external interpreter of the brains in the tank has no reason to believe that his idea of ​​what the brain talks about in a vat corresponds to "the self-understanding" of the brain in the tank!.
VI 233
DavdisonVsWilliams: would ask back: "Why do you think that we (as brains in the tank) do not think that our comments relate to events in the computer? The "Self-understanding" is only a variant of the "epistemic situation" (Both are forms of "scheme", according to Davidson, in the sense of the dualism scheme/content). Brains in a vat/BIV/M. Williams: We would probably not relate our beliefs to events in the computer.
DavidsonVsWilliams: would retort: Williams only believes ​​that, because he has embarked on the idea that we can know the contents of our intentional states without even knowing their causes.
That would be exactly the foundation idea that Williams criticized!.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Personal Identity Willams, B. Nozick II 29
Williams: These körperliche Identität ist notwendige Bedingung für personale Identität - II 31 Problem: was irgendwo anders geschieht, kann keine Auswirkung darauf haben, ob A weiterhin im A-Körper lebt. Williams: 1. Prinzip: Identität von etwas kann nicht davon abhängen, ob es ein anderes Ding irgendeiner Art gibt.
2. Prinzip: wenn es möglich ist, dass es ein anderes Ding gäbe, das die Identität verhinderte, dann gibt es gar keine Identität, selbst wenn dieses andere Ding nicht existierte!
NozickVsWilliams: beide Prinzipien sind falsch.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Actual-Operator Williamson, T. Stalnaker I 160
Actual-Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the real world. General: the information about any possible world accessible from the real world is reflected in the real world and thus also in any other world in the model.
Williamson: general thesis:
I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y)
In our classical system the universal generalization of it is:
(∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y)
Stalnaker I 161
StalnakerVsWilliamson: so I think his argument does not threaten the thesis, Thesis: The necessity (or materiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Moral Nussbaum, M. Seel Nussbaum, Martha: (Chicago) VsWilliams: falsches Bild moralischer Theorie, Unterschätzung ihres Nutzens.
III 112/113
Sie entwickelt allgemeine Hinsichten der moralischen Beurteilung, die eine sensible Anwendung moralischer Regeln zu leiten vermögen: "die Durchschnittspraxis auf ein höheres Niveau zu heben". These: unser Alltagsleben steckt bereits voller Theorien über das Gute. Ihre Qualität ist aber häufig dubios. Einige handeln von der Minderwertigkeit von Frauen und Schwarzen.
III 113
Moral/Ethik/Nussbaum/SeelVsNussbaum: sie macht einem die Zustimmung schwer, weil sie ihrer eigenen liberalen Moraltheorie widerspricht - spielt sich als Gouvernante auf: Kinder sollten mehr gut und weniger schlechte Gedanken hegen. - Seel: Stattdessen: reflektierte moralische Praxis.
III 114
Viele konkrete Antworten müssen der moralischen Praxis und ihrer Reflexion überlassen bleiben, wie die Aristotelikerin Nussbaum eigentlich wissen sollte. Ihre Rolle als Erzieherin der Menschheit ist moralischer Kitsch.