|Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Francis Bacon on Deceptions - Dictionary of Arguments
Foucault I 84
Deception/Francis Bacon/Foucault: Critique of similarity: Bacon does not dissolve the similarity by the evidence and its rules. He shows it in its flickering.
A) the cave and the theater make us believe that things are similar to what we have learned, and the theories we have formed.
B) other idols make us believe that things are similar. "The human mind presupposes, by virtue of its nature, a greater regularity or equality than it finds later.
And although in nature many things occur only once, or are full of inequalities, the mind still attaches to the things much coherent, corresponding things, and relations which do not exist.
Hence those fictions that the celestial bodies move in perfect circles ... ". These are the idols of the tribe, spontaneous fictions of the mind.
Idols of the market: means the same name for things which are not of the same nature. ((s) > Categories: Greek kato ap agora)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981