|Attribution: statements that provide an object with properties are attributions. See also self-ascription, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Avr J 92
Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. - In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. - But not particular propositional attitudes before language. - PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. - Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice.
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Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. - Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. - E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. - Point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. - ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) - More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. -> narrow statement.
We should not attribute any other concepts if there more narrow ones are available._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983