Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs McDowell I 168
Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that. Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so.
---
I 192
McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. The subject may not even have reasons.
Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either.
---
I 193
McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons". Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square.
---
Rorty VI 179
McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Circularity McDowell I 195
Circle/Peacock/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe that there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is external in the experience? He believes that he must avoid a circle with this.
In order to explain the possession of a concept of observation, we must not, according to Peacocke, regard the content as conceptual.
For example, colors: not only the notion of "red" is presupposed, but, worse, the "concept of possession of the concept "red"" is presupposed.
---
I 196
Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: this only shifts the problem. Why should we actually assume that we are always in a position to explain what it means to have a concept?
For example, the neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks when he thinks that something is red. (That's exactly what Peacocke wants).
Circle/McDowell: the explanation for observation concepts must always be outside the scope of the concepts. (Also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective".
---
I 197
Circle/Experience/Reason/Side perspective/McDowell: because of the impossibility to take the "side perspective" (to set oneself up outside of everything), the circle is not to be avoided, but it is not bad in the case of observation concepts. The problem of motivated thought tends to undermine the motivated thought.
The necessary "side perspective" (external point) undermines the intelligibility of "for the reason that".

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Evans, G. Peacocke Vs Evans, G. I 169/170
Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is.
If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form
"π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of ​​a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object.
Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation".
Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a".
Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of ​​the basic ideas of an object.
Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has.
Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others.
I.e. for material objects type and location.
PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon.
I 171
E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is!
It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans.
In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed.
pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!).
If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space!
pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object.
VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present.
Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient.
Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience".
But in normal cases this is a wrong description!
Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet.
PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry:
Idea/Evans: an idea a of ​​a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of ​​a place in the public space.
Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162).
Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space.
I 172
E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space).
Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all.
Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H.
Then F is the token way of givenness.
Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F".
Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it.
PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which  in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition?
This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject.
PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object.
Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space?
I 173
There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space.
2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas.
PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?".
Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position
Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space!
ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there.
Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true.
The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object.
EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial,
I 174
because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space.
PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject.
E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball:
Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter.
This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space:
PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative.
   
First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups:
a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain".
I 175
b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image.
E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions.
The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role:
"The person with these conscious states."
Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state.
Peacocke pro.
PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because:
I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail!
Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"?
Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I".
Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain":
because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person.
Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness?
E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses").
PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.)
I 176
Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners.
Pain is identified as an element of the objective order.
Then someone can have no adequate idea of ​​these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen.
Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain.
Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person.
Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them.
Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person.
I 177
E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later.
E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.)
Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Fodor, J. Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. I 208
Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values ​​of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L".
PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there.
E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell.
I 209
But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time.
In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from.
Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing.
Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs.
Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about
e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions.
But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands.
Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions:
1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) ​​states.
2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior.

I 215
Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ.
Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C.
Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent.
That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations!
The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ".
The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures.
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".
I 215/216
Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism
b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that
c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and
c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes.
d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties.
VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either:
1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or:
2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts.
Chr. Peacocke
I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Nozick, R. Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. I 133
Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th
I 133/134
I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to.
Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon.
Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person
a) a conditional that they know or is it
b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge?
The first case would be:
a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me
b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me
Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true!
E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom...
ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs:
I 135
1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator.
Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows:
The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I
and he also knows:
Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius.
but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I.
So he is not in the position to judge:
The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me.
I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory.
Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement?
Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations:
1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle.
2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"?
I 136
This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German!
Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem:
The time of the utterance of u "now" = now
Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance
PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language.
Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness.
We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way.
Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though.
Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness?
Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference).
1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead:
Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed.
But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role.
I 137
Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject.
Chr. Peacocke
I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Peacocke, Chr. McDowell Vs Peacocke, Chr. I 192
Concept/experience/Peacocke: prerequisite for the subject to have a concept of a square is the non-conceptual content (the experience).
I 193
This property (the concept) has also a condition of accuracy, which relates to the world. McDowellVsPeacocke: that's no proof that the non-conceptual content is eligible as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. Perhaps the subject does not even have reasons! Ex an experienced cyclists makes the right movements without the need for reasons. A description also does not require reasons. McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: that qualifies neither to assume that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor, that beliefs are founded on experiences "as reasons."
I 194
McDowellVsPeacocke: flatulently abstruse conceptual apparatus: "protopropositional content", "experiential content", etc. McDowellVsPeacocke: he has to dissolve the alliance between reason and language, which has existed since Plato. (One word for both: "Logos") He has to dissolve the tie between the reasons for a subject to think how it thinks and the reasons it can give (articulable reasons). (Absurd).
I 195
Experience/world/McDowellVsPeacocke: Ex Square: reason: "because of what it looks like." This is quite ok and just one reason for a conviction and not merely a "part of a reason ..." Ostension/concept/McDowell: Ex "It looks like ..." - need not be any less conceptual than that for which there is a reason. We can only get the rational relationship under control if we understand it conceptually, even if according to our theory (Evans) the content would be non-conceptual.
Circle/Peacocke/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe, that in experience there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is outside? He thinks he has to avoid a circle.
To explain the prperty of an obersvational concept we can not perceive the contents as conceptual fromthe very beginning (according to Peacocke).
Ex colors: then, not only the term "red" is presupposed but, even worse, the "concept of the property of "Red.""
Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: that only shifts the problem.
Why should we assume that we would always be able to explain what it means to have a concept? Ex neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks if they think that something is red. (This is exactly what Peacocke wants).
Circle/McDowell: the explanation of observational concepts must always be located outside the space of concepts. (also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective."

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Peacocke, Chr. Verschiedene Vs Peacocke, Chr. I 15
"Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property which differs monocular from binocular vision is present, that there is an impression of depth, but depth is a sensual property!
I 16
I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is not purely representative! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representative, there must be sensory content). Depth/perception/concept/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: Depth is never a sensory property:
Concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth:
1. Any depth perception depends on viewing one's visual depth perception as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance from one.
2. Monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations could be indistinguishable and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, produce different veridical visual "depth impressions".
But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different depth sensations, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually seen surface.
PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: this is confirmed by the optical facts, but he only takes into account the bundles of rays falling into a single eye!
In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains depth perception, but also why it decreases at great distances.




Peacocke, Chr. Tradition Vs Peacocke, Chr. I 17/18
Translation/Perception TheoryVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements that seem to conflict with the adequacy thesis (AT) could be translated into statements that do not add any properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. For example, "in order to cover the closer tree, a larger area would have to be pushed between the tree and the observer than for the more distant tree".
PeacockeVsPerception Theory/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this should work against the second kind of example. But does it work against the first?
What should the translation explain?
1. It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and the visual field. That is enough for "above" or "beside".
But the adequacy theory needs more than that! It needs an explanation why something is bigger than something else in the visual field. So. 2. problem: as an access that introduces meanings, the access of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. Example disturbances in the visual field, curved rays ... + ..
Counterfactual: Problem: whether an object is larger in a subject's field of vision is a property of its experience. In the real world counterfactual circumstances are as they wish. An approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception.
I 19
Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the speaker and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: for example: one could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by demanding that it should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: Example Julius, the inventor of the zipper).
N.B.: nevertheless the sentence is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel".
Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the closer tree is larger in the field of vision agrees that a larger piece must be covered to make it invisible.
This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the type of experience does not meet the condition! Just as Bright did not have to be the inventor of the wheel.
PeacockeVsPerception Theory: Translation: does not provide an approach that leaves the possibility open that the type of experience that actually satisfies the conditions of translation might fail.
Russell, B. Peacocke Vs Russell, B. I 131
Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence.
They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence.
And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence.
PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition.
But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker.
2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix.
PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive.
But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience":
PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content".

I 180
Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism.
SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible.
Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents.
Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes.
Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself.
Later: Vs.
Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it).
The salient feature is the idea of ​​relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy.
 I 182
Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness.
For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness
The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object.
"Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not.
This preserves two features of Russell's concept:
1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it.
2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation.
Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought.
PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing).
We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought.
I 183
This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence).

I 195
Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'.
Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information:
Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties:
1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone).
2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context
I 196
with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue:
E.g. Cicero died long ago
E.g. arthritis is painful.
We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts.
Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence.
What kind of a mental state should that be?
It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'.
But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description.
Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object.
Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another.
There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name.
VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent.
PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional.
We must distinguish sharply between
a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and
b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'.
I 196/197
Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude.
((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.)
Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs:
a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that).
E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle':
Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community.
2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language.
You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation.
I 198
b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions.
E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought:
^[self x]^[now t].
But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'!
Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts.
Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'.
c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives.
The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however.
But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally.

I 201
Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones.
This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions.
RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts.

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Shoemaker, S. Peacocke Vs Shoemaker, S. I 145
Demonstratives/VsPeacocke: other extreme perspective: "view of the differing concepts"): according to this view these judgments ("here", "now", "I") are not based on identification, PeacockeVsShoemaker: because there are no q memories in our world that are not memories and this fact is partly constitutive of our concept of self. Q Memories/Shomaker/Parfit: in possible worlds of the kind that are described by Shoemaker and Parfit, our concepts would then not have an application, concepts in such circumstances would be different from ours. I 146 This view would also have to argue that judgments about someone's past, which are based on memory-like images, are non-inferential and that it is doubtful that someone whose non-inferential judgments have no corresponding sensitivity for the causality has a complete concept of the first person.

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Tradition Peacocke Vs Tradition I 4
Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless.
Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content.

I 10
Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below).
Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts!
Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290
Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there.
PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke:
a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic!
"Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances.
PeacockeVsTheory of Perception:
3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front.
Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before!
I 17/18
Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore:
2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail.

I 22
Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube.

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Self Nozick, R. II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (Self) as a property. So not as an object. This solves e.g. the problem of localization and other problems.
Peacock I 133/134
I/NozickVsPeacocke: thesis: the ego is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. Only in this way can we explain why, when we reflexively refer to ourselves, we know that we ourselves are the ones to whom we refer.