Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertive Force | Geach | I 262 Assertive force/assertoric force/Geach: demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one. The assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .."; ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning). Error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept. (GeachVsHume). The sssertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained. VsAttribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. (>assertion stroke). |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Everything he said is true | Geach | I 250f Attribution theory/Oxford: here it was not about description but "confirmation". GeachVs: you can come up with lots of such theories - the really important distinction is between naming and predication. VsAttribution theory: that you condemn a thing, by "calling it bad". But that must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also happen without condemnation; nor can you explain "done deliberately" by attribution of responsibility or characterize "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution Theory | Castaneda Vs Attribution Theory | Frank I 322 Attribution theory/Terminology/Castaneda: his expression of the theory of Chisholm/Lewis, self-attribution. Theory/Terminology/Castaneda: represents what he called dia philosophy: alternative theories can be evolved tgether. CastanedaVsChisholm: VsAttributionstheorie: does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem (SB). I 323 "Unsustainable Fichteanism": Fichte: no consciousness without self-consciousness. I 329 Proposition/Belief/Sself-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2. Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but it lacks a convincing justification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Castaneda Vs Lewis, D. | Frank I 329 Proposition/Belief/Self-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2) Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but there is no convincing justification for that. Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: considers it conceivable that a possible world does not only consist of public physical objects, but also contains subjective referees like I representations and indexical representations. This world could then also include its subjectively colored ways of the circumstance (intension). Then a subject that knows all the propositions would also be able to recognize its own position (propositional knowledge). I 356 Propostional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. "Two omniscient Gods": (slightly abridged original quote): they are omniscient, because they know every proposition. But I can imagine that they suffer from one ignorance: neither of them knows which one he is. There is nothing else to know, they would merely attribute more of the properties they have to themselves. He has this property and his world comrade does not have it, so the self-attribution of this property does not depend on him knowing which one is his world. Thesis: sometimes there are property objects, while propositional objects are not available. Some beliefs and some knowledge cannot be understood as propositional, but can be understood as self-attribution of properties. CastanedaVsLewis: that depends on the relevant meaning that one associates with "property" and "proposition". Therefore, he defines them in his spirit, and creates counter-intuitive premises. I 358 6) CastandedaVsLewis: It also does not readily apply that perceptual knowledge is not propositional. To the extent that demonstrative references take place, it is about the question of whether possible worlds contain volatile and private particulars. 7) the idea that Is, nows and this’s are objects of private knowledge is well founded. CastanedaVsLewis: but they do not have to be inexpressible. It is just the function of quasi indicators to capture the indexical references of other persons by means of interpersonal and non-volatile references. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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