Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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I 21
Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket) - but determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts decisive) - fact possible without believed proposition - problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! - ((S) due to non-existence) - PriorVs: misconception of belief as a relation to facts.
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I 98
Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully" - with me no mention (Tarski left, in quotation marks), only use - only about snow, not about truth - no metalanguage - PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - then one can also think that you think something wrong.
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I 106
Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means) - Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time - then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong - but no "secondary meaning" and "principle B".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


> Counter arguments against Prior
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29