Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Facts Morozov I 118
Facts/truth/fact checking/politics/fake news/Morozov: The Truth Goggles project, developed by an MIT graduate and widely acclaimed in the media, is a step towards automating at least some of the steps involved in verifying the facts. (1)
I 119
If the ((s) examined) article contains one of the more than 6,000 (and growing) entries in the PolitiFact database, these facts are highlighted in yellow while the rest of the text is blurred. When you click on the marked claim, a pop-up window is displayed showing what PolitiFact thinks of this particular claim, i. e. whether it is true, half true, mostly true, mostly false, false, etc., and also provides some contextual information. MorozovVsPolitifact/MorozovVsTruth-Goggles: This brings us back to the double-click mentality:"Truth" sneaks magically into our browsers, while the noble efforts of the truth seekers at PolitiFact and the innovators at MIT usually remain invisible and mostly unexplained. But who will observe the truth seekers and innovators?
Glenn GreenwaldVsPolitifact/Morozov: PolitiFact called it "mostly false that the American citizens are vulnerable to ...
I 120
...assassination" by their own government, after the operative definition of the Ministry of Defence of al-Qaida and the Taliban had been reformulated in a very vague way. As Greenwald noted (...); many prominent lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union shared such views. And yet, PolitiFact chose two supposedly neutral "experts" who, if you can believe Greenwald, are anything but neutral and are simply neoconservatives in disguise. (2) Morozov: Thus, the semi-automatic factual verification offers some solutions - it can reveal factual errors - but these solutions could be at the expense of maintaining ideological frameworks that should be challenged and perhaps even overturned.
I 122
Facts/hypocrisy/Politics/Ruth Grant/Morozov: Grant's Thesis: The blanket condemnation of hypocrisy must be seen as a political deputy, especially if what counts for an honest policy is not a principled policy, but the sincere self-interest of those realists who are in reality only cynics. (3)
I 122
Hypocrisy/Politics/David Runciman/Morozov: Runciman's thesis: Some types of political hypocrisy are even desirable and encouraging. (...) It is not the case that there is more hypocrisy today; it is just that, with a political presence of 24 hours in the media, it is much easier to find. (4) Mendacity/Politics/Martin Jay/Morozov: Martin Jay's thesis: To tell the truth can be a weapon of the powerful while lying is a tactic of the weak. (5) A politics without lies and hypocrisy would not be politics.
Morozov: According to Jay, "Politics, however we choose to define its essence and limit its contours, will never be a completely fibre-free zone of authenticity, sincerity, integrity, transparency and righteousness. And maybe that's a good thing after all." (6)
I 123
Ambiguity/Politics/Debora Stone/Morozov: Stone's thesis: Ambivalence has many positive uses in democratic politics; it is more an art than a science. Ambiguity enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective results and purposes. Without them, cooperation and compromise would be far more difficult, if not impossible. (7)> For example, defining a policy in vague terms could help politicians to get support from many different sides. "Ambiguity facilitates negotiations and compromises because it allows opponents to claim victory from a single resolution ((s) respectively for themselves). (8)


1. see Andrew Phelps, “Are You Sure That’s True? Truth Goggles Tackles Fishy Claims at the Moment of Consumption,” Nieman Journalism Lab, July 12, 2012, http:// www.niemanlab.org/ 2012/ 07/ are-you-sure-thats-true-truth-goggles-tackles-fishy-claims-at-the-moment-of-consumption.
2. Glenn Greenwald, “PolitiFact and the Scam of Neutral Expertise,” Salon, December 5, 2011, http:// www.salon.com/ 2011/ 12/ 05/ politifact_and_the_scam_of_neutral_expertise.
3. Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 180.
4. David Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
5. Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics, reprint ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 180.
6. ibid. ibid., 159.
7. Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).
8. ibid. 159

Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014

Truth Frege V 103
Truth/Frege: is the absolutely basic concept for Frege. The definition of the notion of numbers is about the clarification of the truth conditions for sentences such as "The number of planets equals the number of muses".
V 103
FregeVsTruth Definition: recourse: always presumes the truth of other sentences. ---
Berka I 83
Truth/Frege: 2 types: a) purely logical, from the nature of the argument - b) from experience.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
---
Frege I 48
Truth/Frege: the pursuit of truth allows us to penetrate from sense (intension) to meaning (extension).
IV 33
Truth/Frege: not a sentence is true, but its meaning.
IV 32
Just as a picture cannot be simply true, no idea can be true. - Only in relation to an intention.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Truth Definition Frege V 105
FregeVsTruth Definition/T-Def: regress: always truth of other sentences provided.
IV 20
Truth/definition/T-Def/Frege: Truth cannot be defined. - In a definition you indicate certain features - when applied to a particular case, it then comes down to whether they have been met. - So we came round in a circle.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Truthconditional Semantics Cresswell I 27
Truth conditional Semantics/Meaning/Promise/truth value/truth condition/action/Cresswell: the truth-conditional semantics does not judge, however, why one should say the truth.
(11) I promise to pay you five dollars.

The question of truth/falsehood has nothing to do with the purpose of the statement. We can show, however, that the semantic analysis of the word meanings requires that (11) has a certain truth value
---
I 28
The sentence is true if the speaker promises it. ---
I 29
Language here becomes a rule-directed means of conveying to the listener a representation of the same set of possible worlds (poss.w.), as given to the speaker. Thus, the concept of the possible world stands in the heart of the semantics and is even more fundamental than the notion of truth. ---
II 145
Truth-conditional semantics/Cresswell: Knowing the meaning of a sentence: knowing what the case should be, so that the sentence is true. Non-truth-conditional semantics: E.g. Semantics of the conceptual role/Harman. - E.g. Intention-based semantics/Schiffer. - E.g. speech act theory.
KatzVsTruth-conditional semantics: all equivalent sentences then have the same meaning.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Truthmakers Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: no thing makes sentences true (VsTruthmaker) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs.
II 217 ff
Truthmaker/making true/QuineVsCresswell/Quine: Cresswell poses his metaphysical question as follows: "What is it that makes one physical theory true and another false?"
Quine: I can do nothing but answer with unhelpful realism that it is the nature of the world.

Cresswell, however, helpfully adds that this question is often asked in the epistemological sense: How can we know that one theory is true and the other is false?
That is a completely different question, and it must be taken more seriously. One obstacle still lies in the verb "to know". Does it have to imply certainty, infallibility? Then the answer is that we cannot know.
But if instead we ask why belief in one theory is more justified than belief in another, our question has substance.
A complete answer would be a complete theory of observational evidence and the scientific method.
Cresswell quotes Quine briefly and quickly that the final decision lies with the Court of Arbitration of Experience.
II 218
CresswellVsQuine: "Quine's metaphors about the arbitration will never be executed as far as we feel is necessary". Cresswell compares Quine's view with Russell's logical atomism and rightly finds both incompatible. "Quine does not value a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of any other. Quine: that is correct.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience (!) but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience in that their use is learned by direct conditioning on the stimulation of sense receptors. Moreover, simple observational sentences are in most cases actually independent of each other. QuineVsAtomism/QuineVsRussell: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my view, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the observation propositions. Their connection with the sentences of observation is more mediated and more complex.
II 219
Cresswell burdens me with a realm of reified experiences or phenomena, which stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that affect our nerve endings from real objects of the outside world.
III 57
Def Fulfillability/Quine: a sentence-logical scheme is called fulfillable if there is an interpretation of the letters it contains that makes the scheme true. Otherwise unattainable.
I 425
Facts/Object/making true/Quine: one should not take facts as objects just to have something that makes sentences true.
I 426
Facts: Tendency (though not in those who perceive facts as true propositions) to imagine facts as something concrete. Facts are what makes sentences true. For example, "The King's Boulevard is one kilometre long" and "The King's Boulevard is 50 metres wide" are true. In this case they describe two different facts, but the only physical object that plays a role here is the King's Boulevard. We do not want a quibble, but the fact that the meaning of concreteness in the facts is "concrete", does not make facts particularly appealing to us.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Theory Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory I (e) 96
So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection.
Horwich I 443
Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation."
Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world).
Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism.
Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism.
Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist.
Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism.
Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything.
Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist.
Horwich I 553
Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence").
"true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis.
Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept.
Horwich I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them.
Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition.
We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory).
DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia".
"Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation.
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true".
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world.
RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question.


Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true).

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Rorty, R. Brendel Vs Rorty, R. I 136
Semantic Truth/pragmatist/Rorty/BrendelVsRorty/Brendel: Thesis: Rorty's approach is less radical than he himself claims, and also compatible with a semantic truth-concept. Truth-Def/RortyVsTruth-Def/Brendel: his rejection of a truth-definition is mainly based on his anti-essentialism.
Definition/BrendelVsRorty: is attached to the outdated notion, a definition must capture the "essence". That is outdated nowadays.
Definition/Today/Brendel: modern definition theory does not require the comprehension of an "essence".

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Tarski, A. Frege Vs Tarski, A. Dummett I 25
Understanding / Frege / Dummett: understanding before truth - truth is indefinable (FregeVsTarski)
I 105
FregeVscorrespondence theory: any attempt to define truth is a headless undertaking. If the truth of a proposition were a property, in order to decide its truth, one would have to decide the truth of another sentence! (> regress). FregeVstruth-definition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Truth Criterion Russell Vs Truth Criterion Horwich I 3
Truth criterion/criteria/truth/Russell: when we ask what constitutes the truth or falsity of a belief (constitutes), I do not ask for a criterion. Criterion: is a quality (property), which is itself different from the truth that belongs to all, whatever is true, and nothing else, but at the same time is not identical with truth. It is a hallmark (trademark, characteristic), a relatively obvious characteristic which ensures the authenticity.
((s) Criteria: always there, never absent, never at something else, but unidentical:> Carnap "companion". Many authors:. Unequal definition ((s) E.g. Definition being-an-even-number. Divisibility by 2 (definition against: Criterion: last digit 0,2,4,6 or 8) If it says "all and only... have ...". then it is not yet clear whether the criterion or the essential is mentioned).
Truth/Truth criterion/Russell: But when we say that this and this company has made the product, we do not mean that the product has the right stamp. ("To mean", mean):
I 4
Therefore, there is a difference between truth and truth criterion, and just this distinction is helpful. RussellVsTruth Criterion: I do not believe that truth has such a hallmark. But that is not what I want, I do not want to know which external characteristics truth has, with which we can recognize them but what truth itself is.
Truth/mind/judgment/Russell: what relation has truth to mind? Always on judgments. Thus, truth is mind dependent. ((s) So here truth not as the basic concept).
Nevertheless, it does not depend on the manner in which a single individual judges.
So truth and falsity of judgments has any objective reason. And it is quite natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods as objects of judgments (judgment object).
Russell: that is plausible in the case of truth, but not in falsehood. (1)


1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth-conditional Sem. Stalnaker Vs Truth-conditional Sem. I 46
BenacerrafVsConventionalism/VsTruth-conditional semantics: it is not enough to sprinkle the predicate "true" (T-predicate) on certain well-defined subsets of the propositions. truth conditional/Benacerraf: e.g. suppose we call purely formal those propositions true that contain an even number of horseshoes. This could then be expanded into a "truth theory".
BenacerrafVs: but that such a theory would really be about truth, the explanation would have to pass through reference and fulfillment and would have to contain a depiction of the reference itself. Then we would really need an external explanation of the relation between referencing and reference.
Stalnaker: (per Benacerraf) I agree that a Tarskian T-definition is not sufficient to say that we really talk about truth.
Causale relation/Stalnaker: but it is also not clear whether they saved us from a false semantics. We need to connect to the practice.
Quasi-Realism: should we call the Liberal Platonism like this, simply because he rejects any responses to an external question of the relation between Referring and reference?

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Truth-conditional Sem. Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem. Cresswell II 145
Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 and many other articles). KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics: 1. (Katz 1982): all other approaches except Katz's own reduce meaning to something else, including truth conditions.
VsKatz: his own critique depends on the fact that he already knows that truth conditions are something other than meaning. ((s) So the approaches he criticizes cannot be circular).
CresswellVsKatz: his semantics are not wrong, but they are incomplete.
Semantics/Cresswell: "semantic data": e.g. meaning of sentences, e.g. synonymy of pairs of sentences, etc.
Cresswell II 146
KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: 2. it results in all logically equivalent propositions having the same meaning. Especially in the version of possible world semantics. (1982, 190): Katz acknowledges that there are attempts at a solution. Example Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz's approach seems to demand structured meanings.
Lexical Decomposition/Katz/Cresswell: this is used by Katz to trace meanings back to semantic basic concepts.

Katz I
Jerrold J. Katz
"The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974

Katz II
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz III
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz V
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Various Authors Verschiedene Vs Various Authors EMD II 48
Bivalence/VerificationismVsTruth Conditions/McDowell: the precondition of bivalence is wrong. If the truth value of sentences sometimes cannot be determined in principle, the claim to knowledge that it is either true or false goes beyond competence. From this it would follow that the verificationist is excluded from the point of view that sense is determined by the truth conditions.
Berka I 29
Generality/Peirce: is essential for conclusions. Example VennVsEuler: the circles through which Euler represents relations between terms: they are icons, but they lack generality, so they cannot express sentences.
I 30
Solution/Venn: Venn diagrams, hatching (conventional) corresponds to an additional symbol (>general unit).





EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Truth Maker Versus Horwich I 443
make true / truth-maker / DavidsonVsTruth-Maker: there are no truth-makers.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Definition Versus Horwich I 505
M. Williams per Deflationism -" VsTruth theory: superfluous.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994