|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance.
Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language - philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice.
Grice: contents through intention.
Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories.
Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept.
I ~ 463
Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation.
Truth/Brandom: no relation - truth no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions - instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form - BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences - Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified.
Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property.
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001