Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 182ff
Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance.
I 224
Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language - philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice.
I 226
Grice: contents through intention.
I 410
Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories.
I 412
Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept.
I ~ 463
Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation.
I 461ff
Truth/Brandom: no relation - truth no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions - instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form - BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences - Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified.
I 468
Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

> Counter arguments against Brandom
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29