Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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I 182ff
Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance.
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I 224
Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language - philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice.
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I 226
Grice: contents through intention.
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I 410
Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories.
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I 412
Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept.
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I ~ 463
Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation.
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I 461ff
Truth/Brandom: no relation - truth no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions - instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form - BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences - Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified.
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I 468
Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-21