Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptual Realism Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
Martin Seel criticism Die ZEIT April 01
HabermasVsBrandom: "conceptual realism" (conceptual realism: (HusserlVs) concedes the concepts real existence. The world is designed as our cpncepts require - turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down - instead of confrontation with the contingent world that must prove itself in the formation of adequate terms, a mere replica takes the place of in-themselves-existing contents - BrandomVsHabermas: discards the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Conceptual Realism Habermas
 
Books on Amazon
Seel III 149
Conceptual realism/HabermasVsBrandom: his "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human knowledge - to the point of confrontation of a mere replica of selfcontained contents - SeelVsBrandom: more pragmatist than pragmatism - BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom rejects the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a conceptual free outer world.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Facts Austin
 
Books on Amazon
I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (pro Brandom, VsAyer) - to each true statement, there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact.. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements - but Brandom: T = true statement (in the sense of "aserted") (Brandom I 841) - AyerVsAustin AyerVsBrandom.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Facts Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 466ff
Definition Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory) Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p.
---
I 469
E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards.
---
Rorty VI 179 ff
Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought.
Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially.
RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion.
---
Brandom I 476
Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. ---
I 477
Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. ---
I 866
Negative Fact/Brandom: no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions - also> conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. ---
Seel2 III 149
Definition Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain) - KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: - Conclusion from thinking to being.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Facts Esfeld
 
Books on Amazon
I 187 ~
Facts / DoddVsMcDowell: McD confuses Freges facts as true propositions with Wittgenstein s facts as the compounds of the world. - (also VsBrandom) - (> Strawson: "set-like things")

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Facts Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Horwich I 453
Fact / Strawson / Davidson: both authors: facts are ad hoc inventions, which can not refute skepticism. - Solution / Davidson: Tarski’s fulfillment - (word-world) - Instead of "correspondence". - instead of sentence / world. - ((s) Because only whole sentences can be true.) - radical interpretation: single words with pieces of the world - not sentences with "facts." - Fulfillment / Davidson: problem: it is not a basis for translations, but a byproduct of it. Rorty VI 198 Def fact / Brandom: something assertible. - Inferential making true - RortyVsBrandom: that is as if I would describe Moliere "soporific power" as inferential. - Then also "assertible" won’t help. RortyVsinferentialism.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Inferentialism Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 205
Inferentialism/BrandomVs: the following varieties: 1) content construed only as representation - 2) quality of the inference only formal - 3) rationality only instruments (purpose-means-justification) - Brandom: Thesis in favor of strong inferentialism, VsHyper-inferentialism: according to which the inferential structure is always sufficient for the content. ---
II 45
Inferentialism/Brandom: Definition weak inferentialism: inferential structure is a necessary element for defining the conceptual - Definition strong inferentialism: an ample inferential structure is sufficient to explain the conceptual content - Definition Hyper-inferentialism: a closely understood inferential structure is sufficient - Definition ample (considering the circumstances, not only subject) - Thesis: here a strong inferentialism is represented - closer to holism than to atomism.
Newen/Schrenk I 165
VsBrandom/Newen/Schrenk: A: how can inferentialism explain the compositionality? - "It is set to full sentences, because there are inferences between them -" Solution/Brandom: distinction singular term/predicate - B: how does it explain reference and truth? ---
I 166
ad B: Reference/Brandom: Formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences remains intact when terms are replaced by coreferential terms - Truth/Brandom: twists the definition in a way that truth characterizes the inferential concept. - For this purpose, he looks at the position of sentences starting with "It is true" in our network of inferences.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Nature McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I, 123 et seq
Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. ---
I 118
Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws.
The forces are partially part of the second nature.
Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress.
But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature.
---
Rorty VI 212
McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world.
In addition, this gives a rational freedom.
McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nature Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. - VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge.
VI 214
World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner. I 215 it does not merely call on us to judge.
VI 434
Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Norms Esfeld
 
Books on Amazon
I 164
Norms/standards/Esfeld (VsBrandom): the world, not social practices!

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Reality Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 190
Truth/reality/Brandom: believes, however, that (...) can be reconciled with the assertion that "the objects and the comprehensive world of facts are as they are, no matter what anyone believes!" RortyVsBrandom: that incompatible with pragmatism. ((s): if that is compatible with Searle, Brandom's position is incoherent in itself.)

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 179 ff
Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed on the basis of the concept of inference. "Inferentialist" explanations of the terms do not work.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sensory Impressions Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 179 ff
Sensations/Brandom: omit all, if they do not comply with judgments. Similarly, all other "contents of consciousness". - inferences instead of representation - McDowellVsBrandom: Representations cannot be reconstructed from inferences.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
World/Thinking Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 188
Rorty: Brandom: thought and speech give us a perspective access to a non-perspective world. (Goes beyond Nietzsche, Goodman, Dewey). ---
Brandom I 474
World/Thinking/Language/Fact/Brandom: words form a separate and largely independent realm within our world - 1) nonverbal facts could be the same, even if the verbal facts about the world were different - 2) signs could be the same, even if the non-verbal facts were quite different - Solution: our discursive practices are not so isolated from the world. - Important argument: the nonverbal facts may be the same, although our discursive practices were different, but not vice versa! - Because the practices are not things like sounds or words that could be specified independent from the objects. ---
II 63
Reality/Thought/World/Brandom: the difference is expressed in our use of words such from or about. ---
Martin Seel Die ZEIT April 2001
World/Brandom: paragon of the facts, regardless of whether they are detected. There was a world without concepts, but there was never a world without facts - KantVsBrandom/Seel: Vs inference from thinking to being - although we cannot think it other than conceptually, it does not need to be constituted conceptually.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Ayer, A. J. Austin Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (VsBrandom, VsAyer) for every true statement there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements.
(Brandom pro, AyerVs).
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Ayer, A. J. Russell Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
VI 85
Description/sentence/Russell: occurs an (certain) identification in a sentence, this sentence does not have a constitutive element, which corresponds to the labeling as a whole. ---
VI 86
Example Three parts: "Scott," "is" "the author". Here "the author" is not a constitutive part of the sentence. reason: Usefully is a sentence which can be negated.
E.g. useful: "The unicorn does not exist", "the largest finite number does not exist".
But one could not say if the unicorn would be a constitutive part of the sentence.
Russell: Then the unicorn cannot be part of any fact.
So statements are no facts. (VsAustin, VsAyer, VsBrandom).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Block, Ned Quine Vs Block, Ned
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Quine I 425
QuineVsBrandom: Occasionally willingness to identify facts with true propositions.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Brandom, R. Davidson Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 194/195
Intentionality/DavidsonVsBrandom/Rorty: nonconformity! It is enough to speak of reference!

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Brandom, R. Esfeld Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 181
pragmatischer Realismus/Esfeld: jenseits des traditionellen Gegensatzes von metaphysischem Realismus und Relativismus. EsfeldVsBrandom: nicht begriffliche Züge machen einige unserer Überzeugungen wahr. (Das entspricht der Tradition)
Welt/Hegel: hat selbst begriffliche Züge! (>McDowell pro).
Esfeld I 187
Tatsache/DoddVsMcDowell: (1995): McDowell verwechselt eine Fregesche Sicht von Tatsachen als wahrer Propositionen mit einer Sicht von Tatsachen, aus denen die Welt besteht!
I 188
Tatsache/EsfeldVsBrandom: dieser Vorwurf kann auch Brandom gemacht werden, wenn er Tatsachen mit dem Inhalt wahrer Behauptungen identifiziert und fortfährt: "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist, eine Konstellation von Tatsachen". (I 476 477). Esfeld: ich vermeide den Begriff, um Konfusion zu vermeiden.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Brandom, R. Field Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
II 149
Reference/Index/Field: Georgej is identical with the reference from Mary’s Term "George" on occasion Z.
This allows me to say ... "what Mary referred to on occasion Z ...".
Demonstratives/Field: the approach works accordingly for demonstratives.
Problem: I cannot put my own use of "this" in the place of Mary’s use.
Solution/Field: an index suh as E.g. "This Mary, Z"
Brandom: this is a means of incorporating Mary’s use of the expression into her own language. ((s) What is incorporated is the foreign use).
FieldVsBrandom: This looks as if there were a non-deflationary concept of reference, ((s) thus determined by the content?) that could be applied to Mary’s pronoun, and that our anaphorically dependent phrase gets its reference from there. But I believe that his model is very close to ours of incorporation.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Brandom, R. Habermas Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Seel III 149
HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of thinking by Hegel upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human knowledge. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replication of so-being contents.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Brandom, R. Kant Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Thinking/World/Kant: Warns against the conclusion from thinking on the being! (KantVsBrandom). That we cannot think differently of the conceptual world, does not mean that it would be conceptually ordered in itself. The Earth has always been round, but what always existed was not the fact but the earth with its round shape. Martin Seel in Die Zeit April 01.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Brandom, R. McDowell Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Brandom, R. Rorty Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 195
De re/objective/subjective/Brandom: (according to Rorty): with de re attributions he wants to re-introduce the old distinction subjective / objective. Ex Mary thinks of a cow that it is a deer.
VI 196
RortyVsBrandom: instead: distinction between better and worse tools. Not "real properties". Progress/Brandom: more and more true assertions about the outside world.
Progress/RortyVsBrandom: ever better tools for ever better purposes. Brandom does secretly fancy a "bird's eye view", that he himself had declared impossible.
Norm/RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsKant: as Kant, Brandom endeavors too much to reach a compromise where none is tolerated! So he ends up between two chairs. When he says:
VI 197
"In our standards, the interest to represent things right is invested from the outset", then he is being interpreted differently by aggressive realists like Searle than by well-meaning pragmatists. Truth/Brandom: what corresponds to non-persons.
SearleVsBrandom: would ask him how he knew what these non-persons expect and deserve.
VI 198
Def fact/Brandom: "something claimable" (neologism of Brandom). There is the act of claiming, and there is "the alleged". Facts are not the "true alleged" but the claimable. Facts make assertions true. However, inferential!
VI 198/199
RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsInferentialism: that's like when I call Molière Ex "soporific power" (vis dormitiva) inferential, to make it seem beyond any suspicion. But that tells us nothing more than with the combination of two clauses: If something has soporific force, it will put people to sleep. "The claimable" is of no use to us, not even inferentially!
Reality/knowledge/world/BrandomVsRorty: it has paradoxical consequences, if one denies that there were truths regarding photons before the appearance of the word "photon". Ex chain of reason:
1. five million years ago there were photons.
2. It was then the case that there were photons.
3. It is true that it was then the case that there were photons.
4. It was then true that there were photons.
Rorty: of course, there is nothing to criticize about that, yet there were philosophers who did!
Heidegger:
Truth/person/reality/world/knowledge/existence/natural laws/NG/Heidegger/Rorty: "before Newton, Newton's laws were neither true nor false". (sic).
Rorty: Heidegger might have said: "Because the truth is a property of sentences, and since vocabularies are created by people, the same applies to truths."
Truth/Rorty: property of sentences!
RortyVsBrandom: Heidegger and I according to Brandom: paradoxical assertion, but perhaps it is just as paradoxical if Brandom denies dogs and toddlers convictions (unless in the "secondary meaning").

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Brandom, R. Searle Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Searle III 153
Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves
2. they are never exhaustive
3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious!
(SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!)

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Brandom, R. Seel Vs Brandom, R.
 
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Martin Seel
SeelVsBrandom: Who wants to ensure objectivity solely by inter-subjectivity, loses the sense of how much dependet the interchange between the subjects is on the existence of independent objects. Die ZEIT April 01
(s) But he does not! S. I BrandomVsintersubjectivity

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Brandom, R. Strawson Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 193
Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsBrandom: it is never irrelevant to distinguish between a fact and a corresponding true statement. Example of the fact that my wife bore me at midnight twins and the statement that I made 10 minutes later about this birth. Statement/Strawson: there are natural, practical limits to the ability to produce statements.
Correspondence: what is more natural to correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? ((s) Interestingly, Strawson does not say it reversely! He wants to avoid that facts appear as necessary postulates).
Fact/Strawson: Z of course they correspond to each other: they are made for each other. If one removes statements from the world one also removes the facts. But by this the world is not poorer.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Brandom, R. Meixner Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 115
Proposition/MeixnerVsBrandom: ihre besondere Nähe zur Sprache führt dazu, dass gewisse Unterscheidungen getroffen werden, die bei der Gleichsetzung mit Sachverhalten (st.o.a.) zu falschen Identifizierungen führen. Tatsachen sind nicht "wahre Aussagen".

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Brandom, R. Newen Vs Brandom, R.
 
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NS 163
Justification/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: may be an entailment in the opposite direction. E.g. expecting thunder when there was lightning.
NS I 164
4) as a contact with the world: language entry rules (entry rules) and exit rules. As inferential roles. a) language exit rule: actions are referred to as adequate practical conclusions, e.g. "The pot is boiling over" >urges for the action of taking it from the stove.
b) Entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and the own body states. This leads to perception reports.
VsInferentialism/VsBrandom/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: 1) People make mistakes or they are differently well-informed or differently clever. Does that then not mean that people must assign different meanings to utterances?
Solution: a certain externalism: sentence meanings do not depend on the individual speaker, but is the product of social interaction.
Vs: 2) there are certainly known errors related to probabilities for which many people fall. Problem: how to avoid collective errors becoming meaning-constitutive?
VsBrandom: Problems:
A: how can semantic inferentialism explain compositionality? B: how can it explain the concepts of reference and truth which, after all, still play a central role?
NS I 165
Ad A: inferentialism is committed to whole sentences, because only between them there are entailments. To explain the inferential role of the whole sentence Brandom must explain how it arises from the inferential roles of the components, and how these components are identified. E.g. distinguishing singular terms and predicates.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Coherence Theory McDowell Vs Coherence Theory
 
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Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Davidson, D. McDowell Vs Davidson, D.
 
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I 42
McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.)
I 41
McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)).
I 168
Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so.
I 172
Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control.
I 86
Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs).
I 124
The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such.
McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable.
I 216
McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons.

Rorty VI 205
McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible.
Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson).
VI 206
McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good.
VI 207
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world.

Rorty VI 213
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world.

Rorty VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education").
To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world.
McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom.
Rorty VI 217
McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact).

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Habermas, J. Brandom Vs Habermas, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Seel III 149
HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human insight. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replica of in-themselves-existing contents BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom refutes the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
McDowell, J. Dodd Vs McDowell, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Esfeld I 187
Natur/McDowell: ist nicht mit dem identifiziert, was in der modernen Wissenschaft anerkannt wird. These McDowell tritt für eine partielle "Wiederverzauberung" (reenchantment) der Natur ein, um den Aspekt der physikalischen Welt zu erfassen, aufgrund dessen die physikalische Welt nicht außerhalb des begrifflichen Bereichs liegt. DF.
Die Wissenschaft selbst kann diesen Aspekt nicht erfassen. Sie ist vielmehr ein Hindernis dafür, daß wir sehen, daß die Welt aus Tatsachen besteht, die der Inhalt unserer wahren Überzeugungen sind.
Tatsache/DoddVsMcDowell: (1995): McDowell verwechselt eine Fregesche Sicht von Tatsachen als wahrer Propositionen mit einer Sicht von Tatsachen, aus denen die Welt besteht!
I 188
Tatsache/EsfeldVsBrandom: dieser Vorwurf kann auch Brandom gemacht werden, wenn er Tatsachen mit dem Inhalt wahrer Behauptungen identifiziert und fortfährt: "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist, eine Konstellation von Tatsachen". (I 476 477). Esfeld: ich vermeide den Begriff, um Konfusion zu vermeiden.

Dodd I
J. Dodd
An Identity Theory of Truth Basingstoke 2008

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Representation Brandom Vs Representation
 
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I40
VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes).
I125
BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression!
I 132
Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough."
I 292
Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.)
I 404
BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege)
I 405
2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel.
4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates.
I 412
BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role.
I 690
Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental.
II 69
Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
Rorty VI 181
BrandomVsRepräsentation/Rorty: statt dessen: "richtige inferentielle Verbindungen zwischen Behauptungen herstellen". Wenn es uns gelungen ist, ein logisches und semantisches Vokabular zu verwenden, brauchen wir nicht zusätzlich zu erklären, wie sie an ihre "psychischen Kräfte" gekommen sind.
Repräsentation/McDowellVsBrandom: Repräsentation kann nicht anhand des Folgerungsbegriffs rekonstruiert werden. "Inferentialistische" Erklärungen der Begriffe funktionieren nicht.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Brandom Vs Various Authors
 
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I 205
The approach advocated here is critical of three views: Vs 1) that the content is construed exclusively in accordance with the model of the representation of facts.
2) that the quality of the inference solely according to the model of formal validity,
3) that rationality is construed only according to the model of reasoning based on means or purposes.
I 338
Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom pro Relativism
I 340
Beliefs: make a difference for what we say and do. They can only be understood in a context of social linguistic practice. First-person reflection is the internalization of third-person reflections. (Vs "privileged access").
I 542
BrandomVsFormalism: of course it is not the case, that something would be propositional in content only by virtue of its relation to accuracies in the inferential practice. Formalistic error: equals all accuracies of inference with logical correctness.
I 822
VsTradition: so far, a clear distinction could be made between semantics and pragmatics only by largely overlookeding anaphoric phenomena.
I 826
BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of score keeping practices.
II 13
VsBrandom: characterized as super-rationalist by others. The meaning of it all stems from the role in language use.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Inferentialism Versus Seel III 149
HabermasVsBrandom: "conceptual realism"

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001