Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I 82ff
Of course, we can be wrong in some of our judgments about what is inconceivable and what is not. It is possible that a statement whose falsity we could not imagine still may be untrue. Mere external information about how we got there to hold the statement to be true is not enough.
We may also have imagined something right, but later find out that we have described our actions incorrectly.
I 87~
Imagination: not even temporarily can we "bracket" the basic thought that the contraposition is valid and replace it with the purely psychological observation that we consider the falsity of this statement unimaginable (DescartesVs, see Nagel.)
I 88
NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled thought.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to Imagination



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-22