Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 186
Language: from our ability to learn the native language very quickly, does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of learning ability.
Reason: as in other areas, the language ability is probably designed modular. There is no reason to believe that our reasoning ability is able to see through the operation of these modules.
I 187
There is no reason to believe that we even possess a second-level cognition, which grasps the first level performance.
I 232
Gene/McGinn: must include a marking of human grammar, so as to generate an innate language ability. (> Chomsky).
Whether linguistics could read this genetic information one day, depends on whether the reason is able to give an account of what represents the genes already, and that is not necessarily true.
It could be that the grammatical encryption does not happen de dicto, but only de re.
But probably de dicto if the physical realization of the same grammatical properties may vary in different organisms.
II 53
McGinn pro Chomsky: pro innate language modules.
II 71
Our language is useless when it comes to see the world as it is, as the eye cannot speak. E.g. functional analysis: what makes the kidney efficient as a filter system, it makes it as inefficient as the pumping system at the same time.

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vern├╝nftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? M├╝nchen 2001

> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Language

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30