Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Language | Black | II 13 Languages/Black: different if speakers do not understand each other. >Understanding. II 16 Talk/Black: prevalence over writing. >Speaking, >Writing. II 20 New: no fully articulated thought possible without symbolic representation. >Representation. Words/Malinowski: the same part and equivalents of the action. >Actions, >Words. II 31 Language/Black: Text linear - thinking nonlinear. >Texts, >Thinking. II 30 Linguistics/Black: the tradition boasts about not considering the "impure meaning". II 63 BloomfieldVsTradition: phonemes must be compared with respect to meaning - only if the examiner finds out which statements are similar and which different in their meaning, he can learn to recognize the phonemic differences. Nevertheless, Bloomfiled per purely formal linguistics/per Ockham: meanings should not be used without need. One should rather rely on differences in meaning than on substantive meaning details. II 74f Language/Black: an infinite number of sentences is possible. - Therefore language is an open system like e.g., chess, chemical compositions, tunes. ((s) For the discussion whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) II 87 Def Language/Black: too complex to be definable - Features: anchored in speech - speech act is targeted and self-regulating. Language is an institution (language community) - system built on units - meaning supporting, effect triggering, pliable II 130 Language/Locke/Black: for transmission of thoughts - (ideas). >Thoughts, >Imagination. II 161 VsLanguage/Berkeley: knowledge is confused and obscured through abuse. Locke: ditto. Whitehead: incomplete, only a transitional stage. Risk: false confidence in them. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Examples from literature: Swift: Gulliver: abolition of all words ... II 166 Sartre: disgust: Roquentin wants to withdraw into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language Rules | Field | II 178 Language rules/Carnap/Field: determine the truth value by denotation and extension. >Truth value, >Denotation, >Extensions. II 178 Indeterminacy/truth value/Field: even with sentences in which the reference of names or predicates is questionable, there may be a perfect distinct truth value. - Even if it is useless to ask for the reference. >Reference. FieldVsLanguage rules: then, the fact that it makes sense to speak of truth, does not depend on language rules that determine the truth value by denotation and extension. >Truth/Field, >Sense, >Senseless. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language Rules | Fodor | II 121 FodorVsLanguage Rules: 1) The adoption of rules says nothing about its form and content. 2) No one has ever sufficiently described a language, although there has been lots of comparisons: with recipes, logical rules, rules of a game, dancing rules, etc. 3) A comparison cannot explain itself. Hence, the comparison to a linguistic rule would have to specify exactly to which characteristics of the supposed rule it refers. >Circular reasoning, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Rules, >Explanation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Chisholm Vs Kant | II 57 Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: closer to Kant than most. Also synthetically a priori: Chisholm pro. II 58 But in terms of the form of the sentences in which s.A. may occur: VsKant: very different ontological framework. Content: I. distinction synth./anal. II. Property theory III. Involvement of properties (with anal. judgments) ChisholmVsLanguage-related view. IV. Property inclusion and property existence. Result: SauerVsChisholm: Thesis: neither a conception of sA nor one of the analyticity seem to be fundable with Chisholm’s property theory. II 60/61 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there exist non-analytical a-priori propositions of the form "All S is P". Synth a priori/VsKant: He gives the E.g.: "Space is three-dimensional", but this is contradicted by Riemann. Kant’s criterion of "strict generality" can therefore not imply the form "All S are P". II 62 Synth a priori/ChishomVsKant: Much more phenomenological than Kant, who overlooked in fatal restrictedness the material (synthetic) a priori. Husserl: "contingent a priori" (e.g. color sets). II 76 Analytic/Synthetic/Kant/Sauer: for Kant the distinction serves only to prepare the question: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" That is the question of the "third party" on which reason is based and to recognize the predicate as belonging that is not in the concept of the subject. ChisholmVsKant: asks on the other hand, how truths of reason a priori propositions are possible. I 77 SauerVsChisholm: it is difficult to see where the specific significance of a s.A. should lie, as he conceived it. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language Rules | Chisholm Vs Language Rules | II 69 Truth/Truth conditions/Tarski/ChisholmVsLanguage rules: the part right of "bic" formulates a necessary condition for the truth of the sentence to the left. But it does not refer to language rules, but to something non-linguistic. Therefore, we cannot say of any sentence that it is true only because of the way we use the words. The way the T-scheme stands, a T-sentence does not express a relation to something non-linguistic, so that one must first be able to replace it with it with one that does that. It is Tarski’s definition of "X is true" by "Every thing fulfills X". II 71 VsLanguage rules: common accusation: only conventional, arbitrary. ((s) only list). |
Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Language Rules | Quine Vs Language Rules | XI 75 Analyticity/QuineVsLanguage Rules/Lauener: Suppose we had different language rules which do not determine sentences as analytic, but as true. Then we can define analytic as a statement. If how is only true by this rule. ((s) no longer circular. "Only according to this rule": Not empirical). QuineVs: this is not progress, because the rules to which we refer, are distinguished from other rules only by the fact that they figure on a particular page in the section "language rules". No award of a subset of truths in L is in itself more a semantic rule than any other. If Def analytic: is to be: "true because of language rules": then no truth of L is analytic under exclusion of another. (Two Dogmas, p. 35). ((s) This does not distinguish a particular rule). XI 76 I.e. the rules are only useful for the determination of "analytic" if we already know what the term means! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ordinary Language | Black Vs Ordinary Language | II 207 Everyday language/Austin: Passed the long test of survival of the fittest, finer distinction than theoretically designed artificial languages. II 208 VsOrdinary language, Phil.der/Black: it is intellectually conservative. II 161 VsLanguage/Black: There is a long tradition to rebel against alleged or actual deceptions by language: E.g. Logan Pearsall Smith: "I stood there for a while, thinking about language, about its perfidious meanness and its inappropriateness, about the shamefulness of our vocabulary and how the moralists have spoiled our words by infusing all their hatred of human happiness in the words like in little poison bottles." "Logophobia"/Abhorrence of language/BerkeleyVsLanguage: "most of the knowledge is confusedbvand darkened by the misuse of words; since the words so much oppose understanding, I am determined to make as little use as possible of them and to try to involve them bare and naked in my ideas." II 162 LockeVsLanguage: was so impressed by the errors, the darkness, the mistakes and the confusion which is caused by the bad use of words that he wondered if they contributed more to the improvement or prevention of knowledge. (Essay Book III, Chapter XI Section 4). WhiteheadVsLanguage: it is incomplete and fragmentary, it only represents a transitional stage beyond the monkey mentality. Main risk for philosophy: false confidence in the appropriateness of the language. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Brigham Young: I long for the time in which the pointing of a finger or a gesture can express every idea without expression. (1854) Swift: (trip to Balnibarbi): ... the project of the second professor was aimed at abolishing all words ... II 163 The smartest followed the new method to express themselves through the things they carry in a bundle on their backs ... III 166 SartreVsLanguage/Black: "disgust": Roquentin tried to retreat into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tradition | Schiffer Vs Tradition | I 265 Meaning/Schiffer. Thesis: There is no meaning theory. (All have failed). Language Philosophy/SchifferVsLanguage Philosophy: proceeds from false premises. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Fraassen I 56 FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Ramsey-Sentence | Versus | I 56 FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
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