Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Consciousness Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. ---
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. ---
Dennett II 23ff
Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking. ---
Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
---
Metzinger II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. ---
Metzinger II 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious). ---
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.
---
Chalmers I, 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Consciousness Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 103
Consciousness/Block: a zombie can have consciousness - SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content - but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside. ---
I 112
Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural. ---
I 124f
Consciousness/McGinn: is a kind of substance - the substance itself is recognized by introspection - but we cannot recognize the connection in principle - SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain - 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. ---
I 149
Space/Time/Consciousness: Asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle). ---
I 153f
Fulfillment Conditions/Searle: properties of the objects are fulfillment conditions of my experiences, therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective) -Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression. ---
I 168 ff
Consciousness/Searle: has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection - Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism. ---
I 198 ff
Background: Skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?) - the same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds - background: is not itself intention, "to be assumed" not explicit propositional content, not explicit belief (objects are fixed) - Network: additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself) network intentional, no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Consciousness Bieri
 
Books on Amazon
Metz I 65ff
Consciousness/Leibniz/Bieri: it is the factory as a whole which is responsible for consciousness. ---
Metz I 66/67
Consciousness/Bieri: not laws are the problem, certainly there are some. - Problem: why they exist, what in the brain makes it necessary that a person experiences anything? - Unlike gravity: consciousness is a system property. ---
II 61
Consciousness/Bieri: is no uniform phenomenon. Inner drive, inner control, awareness, sensitivity ability (in any case not the same as self-awareness). Discriminative behavior, appropriate to a situation, coherent over a period of time, "integrated".
Some mental states are verbalizable, others are not.
Consciousness in the cognitive sense, however, does not appear to be something intellectual that is impenetrable.
---
II 64
Experience/Riddle: the experience is the mystery, not its representation. Consciousness/du Bois Reymond: "cannot be explained from its material conditions".
BieriVsdu Bois Reymond: why should it be? - Thesis: it is also not explained by the material conditions, if we know (which we do not now) all the material conditions.
Consciousness/Leibniz: it is the "factory as a whole" that is responsible for consciousness.
---
II 74
Explanation/Bieri: it always means revealing a certain kind of relationship. Puzzle/consciousness/Bieri: we have no idea what would be a solution, an understanding.
But it would be very strange if there was a special relationship here, which does not exist anywhere else. (VsMcGinn).
If there were a being that shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand it, we could not comprehend it.

Bieri I
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007

Genes McGinn
 
Books on Amazon
I 235
McGinn: Genes have representation abilities without semantics. Genes/McGinn: 2nd possibility: that it is less useful for the brain to develop a potential solution to our philosophical problems than it is for the genes (genetic code).
Genetic Code/Genes/McGinn: contain principles encrypted by the genes
Principles that go beyond the reach of human reason and yet answer some of the bewildered questions of reason?
((s) VsMcGinn: from all these arguments that it would be highly useful it does not follow that it is).
Obviously, the genetic code is a rule for the construction of animal bodies including the brain and mind.
---
I 228
Genes/McGinn: one of their most amazing features is the ability to store information. Likewise, the ability to copy the entire reproductive process. Errors occur only very rarely. That means that genes are virtually incapable of learning! Environmental changes lead to virtually no change in the construction rules for the next generation, no matter how disastrous they may be. Only random mutation.
While the reason is a paragon of flexibility, genes are the culmination rigid behavior.
---
I 229
McGinn: thesis, it could be that the genes (discussed above) have solved our philosophical problem, at least partially. Because firstly, they must have already solved the purely physical problems of the construction: i.e. they represent plans for the construction of the body, and secondly what is true of the body, also applies to the mind. As far as a mental feature is biologically sound, genes must contain instructions for building organisms with this feature. (Building consciousness, also the I, freedom of will, intentionality, all kinds of knowledge.).

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Materialism McGinn
 
Books on Amazon
II 30 f
Materialism/Mind: Thesis: There is not more to the mind than there is to the brain. "Brain is all the mind needs". The mind consists of flesh, it is flesh. ---
II 31f
Once the nature (or God) had planted neurons in our brains, no further work was necessary to provide us with consciousness. And that is not because neural processes cause consciousness processes, but because neuronal processes are processes of consciousness.
---
II 32
It is also not true that consciousness processes are only one aspect of neuronal processes, but the state of consciousness is no more or less than its neural correlate. E.g. pain is simply reduced to physical processes, both of which are not only correlated, but identical. Granted, pain looks different in the introspection, but: introspection is merely a source of errors. ---
II 32
The true nature of pain can only be disclosed by observing the third person. The mind is the brain in disguise, the genie is the lamp, although it may look different. ---
II 33
McGinnVsMaterialism: Intuitive Answer: if materialism is right, I am in spite of everything not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia ((s) because the physical processes remain the same). According to materialism we would all be zombies who pretend to have a consciousness. From this follows an argument VsMaterialism: E.g. assuming I knew all there is to know in neurological terms about your brain. Would I know all about your mind then? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. ---
II 33
How can both be declared identical then: MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one thing and knowledge about facts is another. Maybe I know all about your brain, but my knowledge is based on certain ideas (concepts). Materialism insists on that all mental facts are brain facts, that we cannot translate notions of mental facts into notions at the level of brain facts. ((s) A translation would have to perform a level change). E.g. All facts about water are facts about "H2O", although the words "water" and "H2O" do not mean the same thing. They are not synonyms.
McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to distinguish between mental and physical concepts without requiring a distinction at the level of facts.
What distinguishes the idea of ​​pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that in the focus of both concepts there are quite different properties, and thus we cannot say that both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the notion that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations, however, is based in turn on that there are facts relating to manifestations which cannot be explained with brain facts.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chomsky, N. Dennett Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 513
Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even Fodor. Also McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian.
Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould.
I 533
Cognitive lock / DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world.
I 534
Consciousness / DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today.   Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret.
I 556
DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for "strong AI".

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Fodor, J. Dennett Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 533
Cognitive Barrier/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings.
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today.
I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret.
Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. eye of the frog: reports about meaning too vague if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Dennett.
I 571
Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply cannot distinguish what was the selectioning environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says. Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the uncertainty that Fodor criticizes is in reality the material with which evolution works, its condition. (the "borderline cases").
I 571
Meaning/Meaning/Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the view that there must be something in particular which the frog’s eye "means" is simple essentialism.
I Lanz 299
DennettVsFodor: denies Fodor’s assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing personal states. Thus, Dennett denies their feature: Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). - - -
Rorty I 279
DennettVsFodor/Rorty: two subjects can absolutely believe the same thing, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Accordingly, no conclusions are required from the propositions of the processors to the propositions which the subject believes. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricists, the causal process does not need to comply with any conclusion chain, which justifies the opinions of the person. Explanations may have their private character, justification is public in as far as disagreements of different people on the functioning of their tricky minds neither refer nor should refer.
D.C. Dennett
I D. Dennett,Darwins gefährliches Erbe, Hamburg, 1997
II D. Dennett, Spielarten des Geistes, Gütersloh, 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Materialism McGinn Vs Materialism
 
Books on Amazon
II 33
McGinnVsMaterialism: intuitive answer: if materialism is right, I am despite all not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia! ((S) Because the physical processes remain the same.) - According to materialism we would all be zombies who imagine to have a consciousness.
II 34
That leads to an argument VsMaterialism: Ex assuming I know all about your brain what there is to know in neurological terms. Then, do I know all about your mind? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How then both can be declared identical? MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one matter and knowledge of facts is another matter.
McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to discriminate between mental and physical concepts without demanding a distinction at the level of facts.
What differentiates the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that the focus of both concepts are quite different properties, and thus we can not say, both properties are identical.
The materialist is forced to introduce the idea that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations in turn is beased on the fact that in relation to manifestations there are facts that they can not be explained by facts about the brain.
II 42
McGinnVsMaterialism: he tries to construct the mind from properties that are not suitable for it. He assumes that enough drops of neuronal water will light the fire of the mind.
He's right that some property of the brain is responsible for consciousness, but he is mistaken about the nature of this property.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
McGinn, C. Dennett Vs McGinn, C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 533
Cognitive Barrier/Dennett Vs McGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings.
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today.
I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret.

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
McGinn, C. Field Vs McGinn, C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 76
Metalogic/Modal Operator/Logic/Field: "it is logically possible that" should be primitive and as understandable as negation or existential quantification. Is this legitimate? Certainly not in physics.
Physics/Field: only describes the current world, not possibilities! One should not call on "facts about possibilities". (Field: but that’s a matter of taste).
Metalogic: this looks quite different:
Def Logic/Field: is the science of what is possible!
Possibility/Field: is intimately connected with logic, in a manner in which it is not connected to physics.
Provability/Field: it is more natural to explain it in terms of the possible existence of sign chains than of a current existence of an abstract sequence of abstract analogues of such signs (symbols).
Consistency/Absence of Contradictions/Field: isn’t semantic consistency of the theory of discrete linear orders not explained more naturally in terms of the possible existence of entities than by the current existence of an ordered pair whose first element is an infinite set and whose second element is a subset of the Cartesian product of this set with it itself?
Entailment/Field: it can be doubted in the way of Lewis that set theoretical explanations of the logical entailment are incorrect, because it also allows inconsistent elements as consistent elements. E.g. "There are married bachelors".
Metalogic/Field: Basic concept: modal operator "It is logically possible that" McGinn: even: "It is physically possible that" (FieldVsMcGinn).
I 77
Metalogic: However, I do not completely welcome the introduction of the concept of possibility itself into the metalogic.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
McGinn, C. Verschiedene Vs McGinn, C. Metz II 74
consciousness / puzzle / Bieri: we have no idea of what would count as a solution, as understanding. But it would be very strange if it were a special relationship here that exists nowhere else. (BieriVsMcGinn) If there were a being who shows us this strange relationship, we would not understand, we could not understand.




McGinn, C. Cresswell Vs McGinn, C.
 
Books on Amazon
II 160
Belief/McGinn/Cresswell: (McGinn 1982, 216): combines two elements:
1) the causal element
2) the truth conditions. Cresswell: he seems to represent that at least some sentences with propositional attitudes depend on representations in the whole sentence.
Representation/Belief/CresswellVsMcGinn/CresswellVsFodor: I have put forward good reasons in the text above for the fact that no specific representations are involved. For these are "in the head", and therefore private, and therefore not accessible to the speaker ((s) to the speaker, who attributes a propositional attitude, e.g. "Ralph believes ...").

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984