Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Stalnaker I 260
Objective Self/Nagel/NagelVsOntological View: if "being me" was to be an objective property, the assumption collapses that it could also be in relation to anyone else. But if it is an aspect of the objective TN, I can ask again "Which of these people am I". No matter to what extent we complete the concept of non-centered world, the fact that I’m TN will be missing. (Page 56) - Stalnaker pro - but: the objective property fulfills two conditions: 1) only TN has it - 2) Only the person who has it can attribute it. - Problem: -"TN’s self-property" is non-rigid. - There are poss.wo. where TN and SK are reversed.
I 262
True Self/Nagel: is not the perspective and has no perspective. (In the non-centric world) - that’s what it is about when I look at the world as a whole and ask: "How can I be TN?" - It’s not about ontology.
I 263
StalnakerVsNagel: the fact that I can imagine a situation does not mean that I could be in it - see Stalnaker.

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to Self

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29