Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 119
Self-Presentation / Chisholm: "Cartesian" Properties: e.g. being sad, think of a golden mountain - even "reddish feeling" - possession involves considering - difference: self-presentation / self-oriented: a self-presenting property will not be considered and is therefore not self-presenting - universal properties not sp: E.g. the property to be so that there are stones - s.p.: e.g. ponder and think - Def consciousness: a thing is conscious if it has a s.p. property
I 128
Self / Chisholm: a person uses the notion of a self, but not an idea of ​​herself - it is not true that when a person is pondering her attribution of being sad, that she has not only an idea of sadness but also an idea of herself.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Self



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-17