Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Acquaintance Chisholm
 
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 120
Acquaintance / Chisholm: "epistemic familiarity" ("epistemically close") - even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description - II 125 "e. familiarity" only in special cases sufficiently: the purely referential ones.
II 123
Reference / acquaintance / description / BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two kinds of unitary relation - that corresponds to the problem that the user can do both, attributional or referential reference.
II 124
BrandlVsChisholm: his error lies in the equation of "knowing" of objects with a knowledge which we can acquire in a purely linguistic way.
II 124
epistemically close / Chisholm: more relationships to objects - it only appears to me - also know that .. - BrandlVs: but that s only theoretical knowledge! - II 125 sufficient only in purely referential cases.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Actions Pauen
 
Books on Amazon
V 282
Actor’s causality / Chisholm / Pauen: (1978) (following Kant): the subject must be able to be the author of a causal chain. "Unmoved mover" -> freedom - PauenVsChisholm: Problem: education and inheritance, as well as wishes and needs question the autonomy.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Attribution Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 641f
Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor - Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution - WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues - DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities.
Strawson I 127
StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution - ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed - ((s) Strawson: perhaps only theoretical possibility that has to be presumed.)
I 141
Attribution/Gap/Strawson: no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears - solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others - I 142 Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Change Simons
 
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I 134
Change/Event/Simons: actually events cannot change. - Exceptions: E.g. the confrontation became more heated. - E.g. The wedding party was moved into the house. - Solution: in reality, we are talking about the involved continuants.
I 135
Change/Simons: change in one variable (vector or scalar, e.g. acceleration) is a measure of change, not change in itself.
I 176
Change/Simons: but it is the whole continuant, not just a part that has these different properties in succession. Attribution/Change: it follows that the attribution of properties to a continuant normally must specify the point in time as well.
I 193
Part/Change/Flux/Shift/SimonsVsChisholm: if a small part is cut off a table, then this is not a table. - ChisholmVsVs: it is: because it was there before, it must be a table. - Solution/Quine: out of the many simultaneously entangled sums that could all be a table only that one should count as a table which is not embedded in the others. - -Tables are meant to mutually exclude each other.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Counterfactual Conditionals Wright
 
Books on Amazon
I 32
Counterfactual Conditional/Unreal Conditional Sentences/Law-likeness/Goodman/Wright, G. H.: the problem of unreal Conditional Sentences is an immediate critique of the concept of natural laws accepted in the positivist tradition. The problem is dealt with in classical essays by Chisholm and Goodman. (R. M. Chisholm, "The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional", Mind 55,1946). (N. Goodman, "The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals", JP 44, 1947). Wright, G. H.: Simplified representation: sometimes our belief that q would have been the case, if p hadn't been the case, is based on our belief in a lawful connection between the (generic) proposition p and q. Not every universal implication linking the two could act as a reason. Therefore, the question is how to characterize legality.
H. G. von WrightVsGoodman/H. G. von WrightVsChisholm: the concept of the unreal conditional sentence is involved itself in the distinction between legal and "accidental" connection. Therefore, it cannot be clarified with their help.
Conclusion/Wright: Necessity and not universality is the hallmark of law-likeness.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Epistemic/ontologic Chisholm
 
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I 113
Epistemic/Evauate/Chisholm: - epistemic terms: E.g. What is reasonable? - Restraint? - E.g. if agnosticism is not more reasonable than theism, then theism is more reasonable.
I 115
Epistemic levels - as atheism: hold suspected for something - be acceptable - beyond a reasonable doubt - evident - certainly - (applies to propositions).
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 47-52
Epistemic terms/Chisholm: basic concept: more reasonable than; acceptable, certainly, evident - SchrammVsChisholm: when objectively reasonable, then independent from the subject, then independent from accepting, even from knowledge, etc. - it must also be possible that the subject act according to what it does not believe - even against evidence! - Solution/Chisholm: self-presentation "factual component": the subject agrees - SchrammVs: Dilemma a) an objective rationality lacks factual components - b) when the subject is consenting the concepts do not obey the epistemic logic - Schramm: always something new is "more reasonable".

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Essentialism Chisholm
 
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Simons I 272
Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: results from his commitment to mereological constancy - SimonsVsChisholm - Chisholm: E.g. table stump + plate - a particular table can only be built from this stump and this plate.
I 273
Superposition/Simons: s. of the parts guarantees not the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum - which also leads to interrupted existence - This int. exist. sees Chisholm as a problem - but he is only committed to the adoption of essential parts - e.g. not to glue instead of nails, etc. - Simons thesis: there must be an essential part.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Ethics Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 277
Ethics: criterion must not presuppose the accuracy of further purposes - therefore question of the ultimate purpose.
II 279
Ultimate Purpose/Moore/Brentano: "The best you can do" (sum of good) - requires immediate evidence - we must first know how to recognize good.
II 276
Ethics/Chisholm: intuitive approach - Vs: obscure absolute values - Object of value predicates is always a fact.
II 286
Intrinsic Value: is only established if reflection of all good and bad is known in all possible worlds - KollerVsChisholm: it is wrong to look for the criteria only in the purposes.
II 295
Pareto Principle/Strong/Ethics/Koller: the condition where at least one individual is better off and none is worse off is always preferable - Vs: this is controversial and not evident.
II 297
VsAltruism: in a shortage of means mutual benevolence is limited - therefore usually no matching assessment of situations.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Ethics Prior
 
Books on Amazon
I 78
Ethics / Chisholm: requirement: some situations require certain actions, even if no one pleads for - PriorVsChisholm: but that requirement cannot be fixed in the situation, such as a statement in a question.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Extensionality Simons
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II 185
Extensionality/Quine: space time points instead of "durable goods" - SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) not learnable - Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects (> entia sukzessiva) - SimonsVsChisholm: better accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter - more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. ---
Simons I 3
Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place - then we are dealing with continuants. continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event - (see below) everything that can have mass.
---
I 11
Extensional mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: characteristic property: relationship "part-of-or-identical-with" corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship - Overlapping: can be used as the only fundamental concept - limiting case: separateness and identity. ---
I 105f
Part/VsExtensional mereology/Simons: 1. whole sometimes not one of its own parts - 2. sometimes not transitive - 3. existence of "sum-individuals" not always guaranteed - that means, since the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong - 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. ---
I 106
5. provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects - Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". ---
I 117
Extensionality/Simons: is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle - Proper parts principle. ---
I 28
Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y - solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat) - ((s)intentionality, intentional mereology?) - Simons: coincidence of individuals: temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually) -> superposition: at the same time in the same place.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
I, Ego, Self Chisholm
 
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I 23
I/Chisholm: Being oneself is not a property. - from this follows: false: "x has necessarily the property to be identical with x" - instead: "for every x applies necessarily ..." - there is no property "to be identical with x". ---
I 41
I/Anscombe: the thing from whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc. - ChisholmVsAnscombe: explains I by demonstrativum. ---
I 43
I/CastanedaVsChisholm: pro propositions of the first person as concrete things with finite existence - never possible to express or capture foreign I-propositions. ---
I 46f
I/Self/Chisholm: it is not certain that each person can comprehend their own individual nature - emphatic reflexive:/Chisholm: "he himself" - the non-emphatic are a special case of the emphatic - E.g. it does not matter whether the engine controls the enginge, or the engine controls itself - in this case no non-emphatic reflexives are possible - but difference: whether the doctor treats the doctor or the doctor treats himself - difference whether psychological or nonpsychological predicates are applicable - if at all psychological ones are possible, then not understanding the "he-himself" expression as a special case of the ordinary expression de re, but vice versa. ---
I 73
I/Russell/Chisholm: the biography to which this belongs - now: the time of this - here: the place of this - now/Chisholm: does not pick out an identifiable property, which should that be? - to express that the present is the only existing time, one needs "now" or a synonym - time: conjunction of events or facts. ---
I 74
I/ChisholmVsAnscombe: tries to explain their use of "I" by their use of "this" ("I am this thing") - Vs: but with this she cannot explain my use of "I" - ChisholmVsAnscombe: we need no demonstrativa (like Brentano: no identifying properties). ---
I 78
"We are F"/Chisholm: not always conjunction "I am F and you are F". ---
I 184
I/property/Chisholm: even if I do not have an individual nature, some of my properties are essential to me: perhaps my being-a-person.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Intensions Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 379
Chisholm (according to Quine): intensional vocabulary (e.g. "important", "denote", "synonymous") is not easy to eliminate by other terms - Gavagai: approval not by rabbits, but through belief in rabbits! (intensional) - QuineVsChisholm: stimuli, not belief (stimuli are not intensional). ---
I 381
Brentano: intensional expressions are not reducible. (Quine pro)> indeterminacy.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Objects (Material Things) Chisholm
 
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I 257
Res/Aquinas/Duns Scotus: "thing", transcendental, convertible with the beings (ens) - Brentano: Reism (late): abstractions, universals, negations, facts, forms, fictions: are not things. ---
Simons I 2
Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) are logical constructions of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. - Flux: Problem: changing objects cannot be regarded as identical with themselves according to the extensional mereology - Solution/Chisholm: thesis the actual are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from immutable objects - VsChisholm: other solution: processes (with temporal parts ) instead of objects (continuants). ---
Simons I 120
Object/Thing/Object/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy": objects in the original sense: - entia per se: cannot change - in the derived sense: entia per alio: subject to the flux, but only by being consulted successively through different entia per se, which differ in their parts.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Properties Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I, 380f
Features /properties/ CastanedaVsChisholm: 1.take properties to be subjects of predication - 2 quantifies over them - I 382 devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated in the case of cumulative citations.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Properties Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
I 20
Properties/Chhisholm: Problem: E.g. ""french" is not applicable to itself": here one cannot say that it has the property, not to itself ... otherwise paradox - solution: "... has not the property ... "- not every predicate is a property - so not every sentence expresses a proposition. ---
I 24
Properties/Chisholm: no conjunctions: E.g. "wise and bigger than this man" is not a property - "living opposite" is not a property. ---
I 170
Properties/Chisholm: "greater than" no property, not even "greater than z", etc. - no predicative expression containing free variables has a property as meaning. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 67
Properties/Chisholm: is not a conjunctive property: E.g. e(thinking and (non-thinking or thinking) would not be a conjunctive property of the partial properties of e(thinking) - Involving: a involves b iff b is a partial property of a. ---
II 75
Synthetic apriori/SauerVsChisholm: from the standpoint of property inclusion, there seems to be no synthetic apriori - under the one of property existence no analytic apriori - since aprioricity implies necessity, because the equivalence between necessity and existence exists in all possible worlds, there can be no Chisholm-apriori. ---
Frank I 362
Properties/Chisholm: the non-comparative form is basic: one thinks that something is red before one thinks two things are the same red.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Quasi-Indicator Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 163 ff
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... -
I 165
Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions) - Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" -
I 321
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that prop Once upon beziehen- on propositions ChisholmVs / LewisVs: ment Zust not primarily based on propositions, but relation between subject and a property that is attributed it directly - CastanedaVsChisholm : attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem.
I 430 ~
Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator - PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..."
I ~459ff
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Reference Chisholm
 
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I 51
Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. - 1. the one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2. He must understand propositions and facts; - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attribution. ---
I 133
But not yet self-consciousness: in addition, knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 112/113
Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience.
II 24
really / Rutte: 1 this way of appearing, - 2 arranged in the way it appears - 3rd the right causation - reality must be distinguished from the outside world.
II 105f
Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign - BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy - directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. ---
II 107
"Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. ---
II 108
Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance) - QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Self- Ascription Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 117
Self-ascription / indirect ascription / Chisholm: corresponds to Russell: knowledge by acquaintance / by description - Chisholm: then ultimately everything is attributive reference (for direct ascription) - Patently: then there is a uniqueness relation alone by self-ascription - if the existence of the object is secured.
Frank I 19 ~
Self-ascription / Chisholm: I can very well be wrong in interpreting my self-ascription.
Frank I 261 ~
Self-ascription / VsChisholm: a toddler does not judge first, that it recognizes the mother and then ascribes the judgement to himself.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Syntheticity Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 60
Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs. ---
II 61
Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants. ---
II 62
Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs. ---
II 72
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory. ---
II 73
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - but: see below. ---
II 74
If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists. ---
II 76
The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.)

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Terminology Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 325
Guise Theory/Castaneda: "Theory of ontological formations". Draws ontological consequences from the semantic discovery that private references have uneliminable meaning (non-substitutability) and from the intensionality conditions - not between thinking and the world, but primarily reference of thinking - because the private must no longer be excluded from the object area - furhtermore to thinking and world can remain typically propositionally structured. (VsLewis/VsChisholm).
I 337f
"Doxastic Accusative"/Castaneda: avoids facts as objects - thinking episodes are individuated by their accusatives - accusative: an attribute, not a thing.
I 386 ~
Doxastic Accusatives/Castaneda: Problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too big - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle road: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals.
I 463ff
Guise/CastanedaVsFrege: consubstantiation: sameness of Oedipus' father and Oedipus' predecessor on the throne - VsFrege: every singular term, denotes an object in each use - no varying denotation - designs one-dimensional, not like Frege: two-dimensional: purpose and object.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Attribution Theory Castaneda Vs Attribution Theory
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 322
Attribution theory/Terminology/Castaneda: his expression of the theory of Chisholm/Lewis, self-attribution. Theory/Terminology/Castaneda: represents what he called dia philosophy: alternative theories can be evolved tgether.
CastanedaVsChisholm: VsAttributionstheorie: does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem (SB).
I 323
"Unsustainable Fichteanism": Fichte: no consciousness without self-consciousness.
I 329
Proposition/Belief/Sself-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities).
This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above).
Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation).
2. Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues.
CastanedaVsLewis: but it lacks a convincing justification.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Carnap, R. Chisholm Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Carnap VIII 164
Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules.
Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact.
Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement.
Chisholm II 68/69
Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S.
II 71
Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chisholm, R.M. Austin Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Sellars I XVI
Uncorrectability/AustinVsLewis, Cl.I./AustinVsChisholm: it is wrong to believe that statements about how a speaker conceives something are excluded from error. One cannot deceive oneself with regard to his own ideas, but mistakes can occur in the description of one's own ideas, recognition and memories.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Chisholm, R.M. Kant Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Chisholm II 62
Synthetically a priori/Chisholm: E.g. Everything square has a shape Everything red is coloured
Nothing red is green
the same shape as the analytical propositions.
KantVsChisholm: different in form!.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chisholm, R.M. Putnam Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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IV 178
Ziff: semantics that does not contain "intentionality" as undefined basic concept. ChisholmVsZiff: such a "behaviorist" semantics is impossible.
PutnamVsChisholm: even if this were true, it would be irrelevant. Even if any semantic theory is successfully applicable to human language, it must be shown why it would not apply to machines.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Chisholm, R.M. Rorty Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Richard Rorty
Frank I 600
Sensation/aboutness/RortyVsChisholm: a sensation is not "of" something! Also not "of" something red! - though thoughts are. inner perception/Rorty: although everything mental is internally perceptible and vice versa.
But it is not a feature of the mental that Ex the perception of an upset stomach is not considered a case of inner perception, because the object is indeed physical.
I 601
So we can only determine introspection if we have previously clarified the concept of the mental.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Verschiedene Vs Chisholm, R.M. Chisholm I 169
Herbert HeidelbergerVsChisholm: scheitert beim Versuch, Meinungen der re mit Hilfe von Meinungen de dicto zu erklären: Bsp AG ein Tisch mit zwei Gegenständen, einer Schüssel und einem Korb. Ich werde nun aufgefordert, den wertvolleren der beiden wegzunehmen.
Ich halte den Korb für wertvoller.
Angenommen daß ich weiter weiß, daß beide Gegenstände nicht den gleichen Wert besitzen.
Aber anders als ich angenommen habe, ist in Wirklichkeit die Schüssel der wertvollere Gegenstand.
Heidelberger: da ich weiß, daß der wertvollere Gegenstand der wertvollere Gegenstand ist, muß ich nach Chisholms Erklärung der Meinung de re sowohl von der Schüssel als auch von dem Korb meinen, daß dieser Gegenstand der wertvollere sei.
Doch dann wären wir darüber hinaus gar nicht in der Lage zu erklären, warum nun der Korb und nicht die Schüssel wertvoller sein soll.
Heidelberger: es muß eine Erklärung für das eine Objekt geben, die nicht auf das andere Objekt anwendbar ist.
Chisholm: Heidelberger hat recht in Bezug auf meine frühere Theorie, meine jetzige löst das Problem jedoch: enge/weite Bedeutung.
I 170
Das Subjekt nimmt den Korb wahr und meint, es sei nicht nur der Korb sondern auch der wertvollere Gegenstand. "Der Korb ist so, daß das Subjekt ihn als ein Ding identifiziert, von dem es meint, es sei nicht nur der Korb, sondern auch der wertvollere Gegenstand."





Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chisholm, R.M. Peacocke Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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I 119
Constitutive Role: E.g. of "the person who and has such and such experiences and thoughts": here there are two possible misunderstandings:
1) E.g. in Chisholm:
PeacockeVsChisholm: confusion of general and particular. Anscombe: "I am this thing here": i.e. the person of whose action this idea of ​​an action is an idea, etc."
ChisholmVsAnscombe: that explains their use of the first person, but not my use!
Peacocke: a distinction general/particular is implicit in our constitutive role.
Particular: The particular constitutive role is specified by the conscious states of a person at a given time.
General: the general constitutive role can be viewed as the function of thinking people and times on the associated individual constitutive roles.
PeacockeVsChisholm: E.g. so there is a general recipe for the various particular constitutive roles of [self] (notation) for the two thinkers Anscombe and Chisholm. This defines the general constitutive role. And the same also goes for two thoughts by Chisholm at two different times.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Chisholm, R.M. Hintikka Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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I 197
Intentionality/Hintikka: I can best show in my criticism HintikkaVsChisholm that it has different dimensions: Various criteria for intentionality by Chisholm turn out to be criteria for different dimensions of intentionality.
Terminology: "referential opacity": this is what Chisholm calls the failure of the substitutivity of identity (SI).
Non-Extensionality/Chisholm: this is what he calls the failure of substitutivity of sentences on the basis of shared ​​truth values. This is not a criterion of intentionality for him, because the concept of necessity also violates the non-extensionality.
Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: at first we look at those criteria of Chisholm’s that are about the order of quantifiers and intentional operators: This is shown by the failure of the following implications:
(1) a believes that every individual F-t > a believes of every individual that F-t.
(2) vice versa
A formalization of (1) would be
(3) Ba (x)F(x) > (x)(Ey) (x = y & Ba F(y))
(4) formalization of (2) correspondingly vice versa.
I 198
HintikkaVsChisholm: his explanations of his own criteria are not entirely clear. Chisholm: it may be that you mistakenly think of an incomplete set of things that it contains every individual, and vice versa, you can mistakenly believe that complete set does not include all individuals.
Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is clearer: (i) there may be individuals that do not exist in the world of someone’s beliefs
(ii) there may be individuals in the world of someone’s beliefs that do not exist in the real world exist.
HintikkaVsChisholm: he does not see that the failure of (1) and (2) can occur in a much deeper way:
E.g. the values ​​of the bound variables are politicians in California and I believe that they are all lawyers. Suppose also that I have no beliefs about what kind of other politicians there are, except the ones that I know. In particular, there is no set of politicians of which I believe that they exhaust the class of politicians.
Question: does it follow that I believe that every politician in California is a lawyer? No, it does not follow. ((s) The belief of an absence cannot be inferred from the absence of a belief).
HintikkaVsChisholm: according to its criteria, that would have to follow!
Solution/Hintikka: there is a set of politicians about whom I have no belief, but I do not doubt their existence or their being lawyers. The question of what I do believe about them does not arise.
Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: here it means that there are elements of the actual world, which are not linked with my belief worlds by any world lines.
Important argument: it does not mean that they do not exist in the worlds of belief, only that the question of their existence or nonexistence does not arise there.
World lines: cannot be extended in that case:
Chisholm: limits himself to nonexistence in doxastic possible worlds (belief worlds).
HintikkaVsChisholm: For me, on the other hand, it is about the possibility to draw world lines, namely in this case from alternative possible worlds back to the real world ("home").
I 199
Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: his criteria are a mixture of my criteria (b) (i), (ii) and (d) (i),(ii). They get their plausibility rather from (d) than from (b). Nonexistence/World Lines/Definability/HintikkaVsChisholm: the collapse of world lines represents a much deeper divide between possible worlds than nonexistence.
Nonexistence/Hintikka: is considered by contemporary philosophers as much decisive.
Def Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm is an
operator intentional p iff. p(S) is contingent for every value of "S".
HintikkaVsChisholm: this is unreasonable: then there would be no intentional concepts at all!
E.g. p = John believes that S = (S1 & ~S1).
I.e. for a belief concept to be intentional, it must be possible, according to Chisholm, to believe an explicit contradiction.
Contradiction/Hintikka: you cannot explicitly believe a contradiction, only implicitly. ((s) >Cresswell: if you do not understand what proposition is expressed by a conflicting sentence.)
Chisholm/Hintikka: certainly means something else: even if John does not believe an explicit contradiction (S1 & ~ S1), there are many logically equivalent sentences that are logically wrong, but that John can believe.
I 200
HintikkaVsChisholm: but even then his criterion is not met: because then it is no longer the contingency of p(S), but the failure of the logical equivalence which is to guarantee the substitutivity of identity (SI). SI/Hintikka: if it is abandoned, I can at the same time assert the logical falsity of
(5) John believes that (S1 & ~S1)
and assert the contingency of
(6) John believes that S2
as well!
Intentionality/HintikkaVsChisholm: in contrast, we need a concept of intentionality which excludes logical omniscience.
Def Intentional/Hintikka: is then a concept iff. logical equivalence does not guarantee the SI in a context that is governed by this concept.
Proposition/Sentence/HintikkaVsChishom: therefore we cannot assume that we can save Chisholm’s criterion by assuming propositions instead of sentences as values ​​of "S" ((s) because propositions are by definition understood sentences, and therefore John would have to have explicitly contradictory beliefs when we attribute propositions to him).
Solution/Hintikka: logical equivalence no longer guarantees substitutivity of identity (SI).
Hintikka: we can further analyze this corrected version of Chisholm’s criterion ((s) only implicit contradictions credible, no contradictory propositions):
Equivalence/Hintikka: we can distinguish between those logical equivalences that allow SI in epistemic contexts, and those who do not (> Lit. Hintikka 1974 Logic and language games). +...

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Chisholm, R.M. Skepticism Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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III 43
Selbstpräsentation/VsChisholm: Bsp Kopfweh-zu-haben-scheinen ist bei uns selbstpräsentierend. Skeptizismus/VsChisholm: könnte fragen: wie weißt Du, daß das Kopfweh-zu-haben-scheinen notwendigerweise so ist, dass, wenn Du es zu haben scheinst, auch evident ist, daß Du es zu haben scheinst?
mögliche Lösung/Chisholm: ein weiteres Merkmal F anführen, das alle solche Zustände gemeinsam haben. Das würde den Skeptiker freuen.
SkepticismVs: würde dann wiederum fragen: woher weißt Du, daß alle diese Fälle die Eigenschaft F haben?
Lösung/Chísholm: die Antwort ist eben: "Ich scheine,…", "ich glaube…", ich weiß,…daß Kopfweh-zu-haben-scheinen selbstpräsentierend ist“.
III 71
Axiom/SkepticismVsChisholm: woher weiß man, daß bestimmte Propositionen axiomatisch sind? Man kann nicht wissen, daß eine Proposition ein Axiom ist, ohne eine Erfahrung der Wahrheit dieser Proposition zu haben. ChisholmVsVs: diese Prämisse ist falsch.
III 72
Verallgemeinerungsthese/Skeptizismus/Chisholm:… . r. ist eine Proposition, die bewirkt, daß p die Bedingungen erfüllt, die in q angegeben sind.
Problem: wenn das wahr ist, weiß niemand etwas!
Fehler/ChisholmVsSkeptizismus: die Verallgemeinerungstheorie müßte ja auch q und r wiederum angewendet werden. Regreß.
SkepticismVsVs: mit deinem Einwand gegen mein allgemeines Prinzip setzt Du doch voraus, daß wir doch etwas wissen. (petitio principii).
ChisholmVs: aber indem Du Dein allgemeines Prinzip bejahst setzt Du voraus, daß wir gar nichts wissen, petitio principii.
Lösung/Chisholm: (VsSekpticism, der sich auf ein ganzes Gebiet bezieht): wir haben in der Tat das fragliche Wissen, daher ist jede Theorie, die das Gegenteil impliziert, falsch.
Chisholm, R.M. Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Chisholm II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-criticism: mess of facts and complexes.
There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus.
Simons I 1
Extensional Mereology/Simons: is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM.
Individuals calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals).
VsCEM: 1. Claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory.
Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives.
Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc.
Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the
Extensional mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory).
Problem:
1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times.
I 2
2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to:

Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism: Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has.
Vs: problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential).
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies.
Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): after the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves.
1.
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high.
2.
common solution: replacement of the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts.
SimonsVs: hence the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument.

CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. Also in:
Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies.
Part/Simons: is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses.

Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants.
I 3
continuants/Simons: may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place.
I 175
Temporal part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsalle/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: also continuants can have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. continuants/Simons: thesis: do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
I 187
SimonsVsChisholm: if he is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions.
I 188
strict connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum.
Chisholm: himself asks this question for the example a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks.
I 189
Chisholm Thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example.
Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology.
I 192
Def succession/Chisholm:
1.
x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’
(ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’
(iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a.
Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest.
w: be in it the common part e.g. in altering a table
SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table!
ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table.
Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table!
I 193
SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! Example Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously).
Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm).
I 194
Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a all the time is an A, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case.
And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A!
SimonsVsChisholm: so his definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle!
Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive.
Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution.(>Wiggins 1980, 30ff).
mereological constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity.
E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely.
Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stand for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year.
SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis:
I 195
To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: this is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins).
SimonsVsChisholm: seine These hat zur Folge dass die meisten Menschen meist ihre meisten Begriffe falsch gebrauchen, wenn das dann nicht überhaupt immer der Fall ist.
I 208
Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from the Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship".
Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism.
A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use!
interrupted existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap.

I 274
SimonsVsChisholm: according to his principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chisholm, R.M. Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Chisholm I 43
CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist.
Frank I 330
Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution.
I 332
Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting.
I 333
Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought.
I 338
Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window.
I 375
Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax.
Fra I 380
Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Lycan Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Cresswell II 183
Selbstzuschreibung/Boer/LycanVsLewis/LycanVsChisholm: (Boer/Lycan (1980, 445) der Begriff ist alles andere als klar. Selbstreferenz/Lakoff/Cresswell: (Lakoff 1972, 639): Bsp „Ich träumte ich wäre Brigitte Bardot und ich küßte mich“. (Stechow 1982, 43-45).

Lyc I
W. G. Lycan
Modality and Meaning

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Chisholm, R.M. Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Frank I 260
Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism.
I 261
Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate.
Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules.
I 262
Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) (Humpty Dumpty). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind.
Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution).
I 263
Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self disclosedness of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre).
E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level).
Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Meixner Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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I 49
Def continuant/Meixner: zeitlich dauernde, singuläre Individuen, die höchstens räumliche Teile haben. Keine zeitlichen Teile! Deshalb keine Akzidentia. zeitliche Teile/Meixner: viele Individuen haben aber zeitliche Teile, die Akzidentia!
Individuum/moderne Ontologie/Meixner: (VsChisholm?) viele moderne Ontologen vertreten aber die These, dass alle existenten Individuen zeitlich Teile haben. Danach ist ein materielles Individuum nicht zur nicht zur selben Zeit an zwei verschiedenen Orten, sondern auch nicht als ein Ganzes zu verschiedenen Zeiten am selben Ort! ((s) Das Individuum ändert sich dann ständig, von Zeitpunkt zu Zeitpunkt, d.h. es ist nicht dasselbe in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten. (>Lewis: "fragil").).
"Vierdimensionalismus"/Meixner: die These, dass Individuen aus drei räumlichen und einer zeitlichen Dimension bestehen. MeixnerVs.
Unabhängig von Dimensionen kann man auch sagen: alle Individuen haben raumzeitliche Teile, das gilt in jedem Bezugssystem! Und in jedem BS lassen sich raumzeitliche Teile wiederum in räumliche und zeitliche zerlegen.
I 49/50
Relativitätstheorie: legt den Vierdimensionalismus bloß nahe, impliziert ihn aber keineswegs! zeitliche Teile/Meixner: wir als Individuen haben keine zeitlichen Teile! nur unsere Lebensgeschichten haben zeitliche Teile.
Wir sagen nicht "er erstreckte sich von..bis", sondern "er lebte von..bis.."
Wir sagen nicht "eine frühere Phase von mir war Handwerker"; sondern "in einer früheren Phase meines Lebens war ich Handwerker"
Wenn wir sterben, sterben wir als ganze Individuen, Es stirbt nicht nur die letzte zeitliche Phase.
Bsp der Gegenstand X existiert zu t1 und ist F. Das ist aber keine Identität von X und F, sondern die Exemplifikation von F durch X.
((s) haben/sein: haben einer Eigenschaft ist nicht Identität mit der Eigenschaft.)
Und X existiere auch zu t2, aber nicht F.
VsMeixner: Wenn nun der Dreidimensionalismus richtig wäre, dann wären beide, X zu t1 und X zu t2 mit X identisch. Folglich wären X zu t1 und X zu t2 miteinander identisch!
Sie sind aber nicht miteinander identisch, denn einmal ist X F, das andere Mal nicht F.
MeixnerVs: Lösung: aus der Annahme des Dreidimensionalismus folgt nicht, dass X mit
X zu t1 oder X zu t2 identisch wäre! Zwar ist X als Individuum als ein Ganzes anwesend, aber er ist sowohl von X zu t1 als auch von X zu t2 verschieden, denn diese Entitäten existieren anders als X nicht zu mehreren Zeitpunkten.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Essentialism Simons Vs Essentialism
 
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I 272
Mereological essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: disarmingly simple example by Chisholm: (1976,146) E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same.
Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub.
Simons: this is the only example of "Person and Object".
I 273
As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table:
N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c])
everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...".
Simons: different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected.
Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)!
I 275
SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom.
I 276
(...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites (...)
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change.
I 278
Most of the objects of science Ex stars, planets, organisms, volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a Middle way: against could between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally:
Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "Normal style", "Normal thing", "Normal piece of music").

I 338
Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) Individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (They are still useful).
Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori.
E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada.
Continuity: but helps to exclude discontinuous sums. E.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Fichte, J.G. Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G.
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 211
Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"...

I 244
Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference.
Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Kant, I. Chisholm Vs Kant, I.
 
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II 57
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: closer to Kant than most. Also synthetically a priori: Chisholm pro.
II 58
But in terms of the form of the sentences in which s.A. may occur: VsKant: very different ontological framework.
Content:
I. distinction synth./anal.
II. Property theory
III. Involvement of properties (with anal. judgments) ChisholmVsLanguage-related view. IV. Property inclusion and property existence. Result:
SauerVsChisholm: Thesis: neither a conception of sA nor one of the analyticity seem to be fundable with Chisholm’s property theory.
II 60/61
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there exist non-analytical a-priori propositions of the form "All S is P". Synth a priori/VsKant: He gives the E.g.: "Space is three-dimensional", but this is contradicted by Riemann. Kant’s criterion of "strict generality" can therefore not imply the form "All S are P".
II 62
Synth a priori/ChishomVsKant: Much more phenomenological than Kant, who overlooked in fatal restrictedness the material (synthetic) a priori. Husserl: "contingent a priori" (e.g. color sets).
II 76
Analytic/Synthetic/Kant/Sauer: for Kant the distinction serves only to prepare the question: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" That is the question of the "third party" on which reason is based and to recognize the predicate as belonging that is not in the concept of the subject. ChisholmVsKant: asks on the other hand, how truths of reason a priori propositions are possible.
I 77
SauerVsChisholm: it is difficult to see where the specific significance of a s.A. should lie, as he conceived it.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Objectivity Chisholm Vs Objectivity
 
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II 105f
Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism.
II 107
"Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality.
II 120
Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense.
II 120/121
Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute.
II 123
Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game.
II 124
Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference.
II 125
VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy".
II 126
Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X.
II 128
BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Possible Worlds Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds
 
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I 49
Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge.
Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.).
I 53
StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above).
I 58
Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote:
Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible.

II 20
Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London)
E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something.
Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999))
Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element.
Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects.
StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer.
But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought!
Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition.
I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance.
Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing.
Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe.
II 21
E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing.
Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen.
poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state.
Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w..
StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that.
StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing.
Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because
E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume.
Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels).

II 134
Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one.
Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything).
Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space.
II 135
But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief.
Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves.

II 144
Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has.
((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property)
Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria.
LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons:
1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless.
2. even without counterpart it would not work because
Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions.
II 145
V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live.
StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives.
Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space:
logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w..
Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it.
Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate.
Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual.
Lewis also admits this.
Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no.
Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable.
Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers.
Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions.
Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state.
II 146
StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people.
Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples:
E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine:
a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?"
Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then.
When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated.
Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about.
Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed.
b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice)
Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock.
StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is.
Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated.
E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!".
Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered.
II 147
Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated:
Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i.
Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties.
Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit).
Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself.
Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object.
Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt.
That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry)

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Ryle, G. Chisholm Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I 69
Privileged access/ChisholmVsRyle: each of us has it: every person is so that they can attribute certain properties directly to themselves. (s) VsChisholm: uses the term "self" here, although he declared it impossible to form propositions with it. But these are no propositions that "carry their location with them" ((s)), but rather sentences that contain the reflexive pronoun in general. Chisholm: However, we have not explained privileged access by the use of "I" as many philosophers do, but vice versa I 70 Use of the first-person pronoun through direct attribution.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Universals Nominalism Vs Universals
 
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Frank I 261
Nominalism/VsUniversals/Attributes/Properties/Quine: ontological: attributes have no clear identity conditions. Epistemic/Heckmann: our cognitive approach to attributes is unclarified. In the end, they are entities which elude the natural world of creation and decay whose mode of being therefore excludes that they have a causal influence on us (or we to them). Question: Why should we be able to know anything about such entities at all? Solution/Chisholm: attributes as undefined basic concept. (>Ontology). Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contrast to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the meaning of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but this is no approach to universals of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first before expressing it with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate, use it in compliance with the rules.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
mereol. Variability Versus I 275
mereologischer Essentialismus/Chisholm: alle Teile notwendig -" SimonsVsChisholm: einige wesentlich, andere nicht -"
mereol. Essentialism Pro Simons I 208
mereological essentialism: Pro: Chisholm - Vs: Simons: e.g. Ship of Theseus: initial coincidence of matter-constancy and functional constancy.
I 275
mereological essentialism / Chisholm: all parts necessary - SimonsVsChisholm: some essential, others not.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
mereol. Essentialism Versus Simons I 272
mereological essentialism: Chisholm per - SimonsVs
I 275
mereological essentialism / Chisholm: all parts necessary - SimonsVsChisholm: some are essential, others are not.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Essentialism Chisholm, R.
 
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II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: These Chisholm hat von Brentano einen mereologischen Essentialismus geerbt, mit dem ich nicht übereinstimme. Ich werde aber diese Ideen benutzen, um eine leicht abweichende Interpretation von Wittgensteins Tractatus zu geben. Wittgenstein selbst war nicht so klar in bezug auf Tatsachen wie es scheint. Selbstkritik: Durcheinander von Tatsachen und Komplexen.
Zwischen dem späteren Wittgenstein und Brentano liegen Welten, aber es gibt Berührungen zwischen Brentano und dem Tractatus.
Simons I 2
Chisholm/Mereologischer Essentialismus/Simons: Chisholm vertritt den mereologischen Essentialismus: These kein Objekt kann andere Teile haben, als es aktual hat. Vs: Problem: zu erklären, wieso normale Gegenstände nicht modal starr (alle Teile wesentlich) sind. Lösung/Chisholm: These (erscheinende) Dinge (appearances) ((s) alltägliche Dinge) sind logische Konstruktionen aus Objekten, für die der mereologische Essentialismus gilt. Lösung/Chisholm: These die tatsächlichen sind mereologisch konstant und die Erscheinungen wieder logische Konstruktionen aus unveränderlichen Objekten. SimonsVsChisholm: der Preis ist zu hoch.
Simons I 275
mereologischer Essentialismus/Zwischenposition/Chisholm/Simons: es gibt noch eine weitere, die Chisholm ablehnt: daß einige Teile wesentlich sind und andere nicht. Das ist meine Position. ChisholmVsSimons: alle Teile sind notwendig.
Simons: These einige Teile sind wesentlich (nicht notwendig!).

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Individual Meixner, U.
 
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I 49
Individuum/moderne Ontologie/Meixner: (VsChisholm?) viele moderne Ontologen vertreten aber die These, daß alle existenten Individuen zeitlich Teile haben. Danach ist ein materielles Individuum nicht zur nicht zur selben Zeit an zwei verschiedenen Orten, sondern auch nicht als ein Ganzes zu verschiedenen Zeiten am selben Ort! (s) Individuum ändert sich dann ständig, von Zeitpunkt zu Zeitpunkt, d.h. es ist nicht dasselbe in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten. (>Lewis: "fragil").
Continuant Simons, P.
 
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I 175
Zeitlicher Teil/continuants/Mereologie/SimonsVsalle/SimonsVsChisholm: These auch continuants können zeitliche Teile haben! D.h. sie sind nicht mereologisch konstant, sondern mereologisch variabel. continuants/Simons: These müssen auch nicht ununterbrochen existieren. Das liefert uns eine überraschende Lösung für das Problem des Schiffs des Theseus.
I 351
Continuant/Existenz/Simons: ob ein continuant existiert (E!) steht und fällt mit der Frage, ob es Ereignisse gibt, die sich zu der Form einer Lebensgeschichte zusammenfinden. Genidentität: ist selbst nicht hinreichend für die Existenz eines continuants via Integration von Ereignissen in eine Geschichte. Sie kann die Vereinigung nur unterstreichen.
Continuant/Simons: These hat ontologische Priorität gegenüber dem Leben.
Sortal Simons, P.
 
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I 195
Sortal concept / Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts, which are subject to the conditions that determine what is to count at one time or over time as one thing or as several things are rather true of mereologically constant objects (Chisholm ) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: his thesis is that most people mostly use their concepts in a wrong way, if not always.