Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 216
Representation/Wright: in contrast, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles have to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction.
I 284
Understanding/representation/Wittgenstein: Understanding is rather to be explained by a "sense for" something than by representation of something, or through perception (Wright: e.g. humor).
  Wright: does the perhaps sub-cognitive not disappear if we formulate it metalinguistically?
Rorty VI 41ff
Representation/Wright: not merely permissible formulation but philosophically correct, two-digit approach of the truth predicate. (DavidsonVsScheme/contents (3. Dogma): "true" may not be two-digit).

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26