Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognition | Rorty | VI 46/47 Cognitive condition/Wright/RortyVsWright: for him, a speaker should function like a well-oiled machine. - This is traditional epistemology according to which prejudice and superstition are just sand in the works. >Epistemology, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Thinking. According to Wright we would have to recognize the right functions a priori. - Through knowledge of the content. PragmatismVsCognitivity: nothing more than contingent consensus. - For them, content is not important. >Content, cf. >Cognitive psychology, >Pragmatism. VI 51 Cognitition/cognitivity/cognitive/fact/Wright/Rorty: Wright’s cognitive commandment: Advantage: We do not need reified facts. - Instead: Reference on range of possible causes. ((s) Cognition makes facts superfluous.) Vs: Problem: that presupposes a concept of the mode of operation of a representation machine. VI 429f Cognitition/language/Rorty: cognition is not possible without language. - Therefore there is a gap between sensation and cognition. Certainly there is a causal continuity between experience and thought - but it also exists between nutrition and thinking. >World/thinking, >Representation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Existence | Field | I 80 Necessary existence/KantVs/Field: nothing can be negated with all its predicates, and nevertheless leave a contradiction. - (VsOntological proof of God). >Proofs of God's existence. Existence/Field: should not be part of the logic. - Therefore, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic. - Otherwise, too many properties would have to be assumed. >Infinity, >Properties. I 155 Semantic/syntactic/singular Term/Denotation/Ontology/FieldVsWright: it is not built into the syntax that, e.g. The singular term "4" denotes. - (i.e. that the number is an object). Just as little as "God". - So syntax cannot be the criterion for existence. >Syntax, >Semantics, >Proofs, >Criteria, >Singular terms. I 167 Existence/Ontology/FieldVsWright: existence does not follow from "explanation of the term", otherwise God's existence would follow from the explanation of the term "God". >Explanations. Term explanation is only conditionally: "if there is a God, he is omnipotent". Cf. >Omnipotence. Solution: the term-introducing theory must not be true - existence generalization. >Introduction, >Existential generalization. False: from self-identity no existence can be concluded, only in the reverse direction. >Identity, >Self-identity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Justification | Field | I 44 Justification/FieldVsWright: one can justify any belief by a stronger belief, from which it follows. >Stronger/weaker, >Beliefs. II 366f Rationality/justification/Field: pro a lower threshold: then good induction rules and perception rules count as a priori weak. >Rationality. Coherence theory/Field: Coherence theory has a higher threshold for rationality. >Coherence, >Coherence theory. Our rules are not considered reasonable before the user has not shown by a combination of deduction, induction and perception, where the combination varies from case to case, that these rules are reliable. >Covariance, >Reliability, >Reason, >Sense, >Senseless, >Rules, >Deduction, >Induction, >Perception. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mathematics | Benacerraf | Field I 20 Mathematics/Identification/Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965)(1) Thesis: There is an abundance of arbitrariness in the identification of mathematical objects with other mathematical objects. >Numbers, >Sets, >Arbitrariness, >Equations, >Identification. E.g. numbers: numbers can be identified with quantities, but with which? Real numbers: for them, however, there is no uniform set theoretical explanation. You can identify them with Dedekind's cuts, with Cauchy's episodes,... I 21 ...with ordered pairs, with the tensor product of two vector spaces, or with tangent vectors at one point of a manifold. >Real numbers. Facts: there does not seem to be a fact that decides which identification to choose. >Nonfactualism. Field: the problem goes even deeper: it is then arbitrary what one chooses as fundamental objects, e.g. amounts? Field I 21 Basis/Mathematics/Benacerraf: one can assume functions as fundamental and define sets as specific functions, or relations as basic building blocks and sets as a relation of additivity 1. (adicity). I 23 Mathematics/Indeterminateness/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright: (1983)(2): Benacerraf's Paper creates no special problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "Nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any amounts are they. >Singular terms, >Reference. WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies to the singular terms, which stand for the quantities themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms, which stand for rabbits! FieldVsWright: this misses Benacerraf's argument. It is more against an anti-platonic argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems impossible to explain how we have to refer to them or how we have beliefs about them. According to Benacerraf's argument, our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" forms a sequence of distinct objects under the relation we call "<". (less-than relation). But that's all. Perhaps, however, our use does not even determine this. >Mathematical entities. Perhaps they only form a sequence that fulfills our best axiomatic theory of the first level of sequences. That is, everything determined by the use would then be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets. >Numbers, >Sets. 1. Benacerraf, P. What Numbers Could Not Be, The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, S. 47–73. 2. Benacerraf, P in: Paul Benacerraf/Hilary Putnam (eds.) Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2. ed. 1983. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ontology | Field | I 166 Logic/Ontology/Crispin Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptual necessity" - from a conceptual explanation. >Necessity, >Equivalence, >Explanation. If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx. FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God. Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...". --- II 102 Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of mind/Field: in the philosophy of mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology. --- III 3 Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it). >Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities, >Mathematics, >Physics. III 4 I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. ((s) That is, the assumption that the unobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist). >Platonism, >Unobservables. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Rorty | I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Syntax | Field | I 155 Semantic/syntactic/singular term/denotation/ontology/FieldVsWright: it is not incorporated into the syntax that the singular term "4", denotes. - ((s) That means that the number is an object). - Just as in E.g. "God." - So syntax cannot be the criterion for existence. >Semantics, >Existence, >Non-existence, >Ontology, >Singular terms, >Denotation. II 359 Syntax/Field: syntactic formulations do not need the concept of the extension. >Extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski | Wright | Rorty I 38ff WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Wright: there are two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. >Truth, >Assertibility. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. --- Wright I 85 VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable. (Vs Platitude: assertion = putting something forward as true). >Bivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Decidability. WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme). >Deflationism, >Disquotation. There are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps. >Multivalued logic, >Truth value gaps. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Terminology | Wright | I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. I 108ff Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. ad I 115ff Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benacerraf, P. | Wright Vs Benacerraf, P. | Field I 23 Mathematics/Uncertainty/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright (1983): Benacerraf's paper does not create a particular problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any, sets they are. WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies for the singular terms representing sets themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms that stand for rabbits! FieldVsWright: this goes past Benacerraf's argument. It is aimed more against an anti-platonist argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems to be impossible to explain how we refer to them or have beliefs about them. According to Benacerraf's argument our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" form a sequence of distinct objects, under the relation that we call "<". (less than-relation). But that's all. But perhaps our use not does not even determine that. Perhaps they only form a sequence that satisfies our best axiomatic theory of the first stage of w sequences. I.e. everything that is determined by use, would be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets. Wright (s): Thesis our standard use is not sufficient for the determination of the mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright). I 24 VsWright: but the assertion that this also applied to rabbits is more controversial. A bad argument against this would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| De re | Wright, von Vs De re | Hughes I 162 Def de re/Hughes/Cresswell: a well formed formula (wff) a containing a modal operator expresses a modality de re if the range of a modal operator from a contains a free occurrence of an individual variable, otherwise a expresses a modality de dicto. WrightVsDe re/Hughes/Cresswell: (and other authors): wanted to eliminate de re in favor of de dicto. one should be able to construct a well formed formula (wff) a' to each well formed formula (wff) a, which does not contain a modality de re and whose equivalence with a can be proved. Hughes/CresswellVsWright: that does not even seem possible with propositional calculus + S5. But apparently nobody has proved that it is impossible. Wright's strategy can be called the "principle of predication" (the term does not come explicitly from him). |
Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Field, H. | Wright Vs Field, H. | Field I 43 Anti-Platonism/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): claims that modal considerations undermine my version of the anti-platonism. Because I take mathematics and the existence of mathematical entities (mE) as consistent, and consistency as the modal basic concept (possibility), I would be bound to think that it is wrong that there are mathematical entities - that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent wrong". ((s) "There could just as well have been mathematical entities, i.e. empirical question"). Contingent/Wright/HaleVsField: is not logical, and thus something other than "neither logically true nor logically contradictory". And that makes Field's position absurd. WrightVsField: where should Fields "contingency" be contingent on? For example, according to Field, the actual world contains no numbers, but it could have contained some. But there is neither an explanation for why not, nor would there be an explanation if there were numbers. FieldVsVs: if the argument were good, it would be equally valid against (nonlogical) platonism, for which mathematics goes back behind logic. Then the denial of all mathematics would be logically consistent and therefore "contingent". But this is a confusion of the different meanings of "possible". Analog: For example, if the existence of God is logically consistent, and there is none, then it is contingent wrong that there would be one. Problem: the atheist has no access to what the contingent is supposed to be on. There would be neither an explanation for the existence nor for the non-existence. There are no favorable conditions for God's existence and no unfavorable ones. (>Anselm, 2. Ontological argument). But WrightVsField: has even more interesting arguments: 1. without the assumption that mathematics consists of necessary truths, the view that mathematics is conservative (preserving) is unjustified. I 44 Analog: without the assumption that mathematics is true, the assumption that it is consistent is unjustified. Justification/FieldVsWright: You can justify any belief by a stronger belief from which it follows. (>Strength of Theories). Wright and Hale would have to show that Platonism has better reasons for the necessary truth of mathematics than Anti-Platonism has for assuming that mathematics is conservative (or consistent). And it is not certain that this is true. WrightVsField: 2. Anyone who represents both: a) that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent false" and b) that mathematics is conservative, can give no reason not to believe in mathematical entities! Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that any internally consistent combination of nominalistic statements is also consistent with mathematics. Then no combination of nominalistic statements can provide an argument against belief in mathematics (ontology). WrightVsField: how then can there be any reason at all not to believe in mathematics? He has no proof of his own nominalism. It follows that Field cannot be a nominalist, but that he must be an agnostic. FieldVsWright: this one misjudges the relevance that I attribute to the question of renunciability and indispensability. Conservativity: does not automatically show that there can be no reason to believe in mathematics. To succeed with VsPlatonism, we must also show that mathematics is dispensable in science and meta logic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Wright Vs Kripke, S. A. | Esfeld I 122 Inferentialism/I-You-Relationships/Brandom/Esfeld: Problem: even a community could be arbitrary. The fact of consent could be confused with the right of consent. This is sometimes put VsKripke. WrightVsKripke: formerly: the community itself is no authority. (No longer represented today). McDowellVsWright: whatever seems right to us is right! But that only means that we cannot talk about "right" here! Solution/Esfeld: I-You-Relationships: are symmetrical: I 123 this leaves room for the possibility that the community as a whole can err. Social Holism/Pettit: the human is dependent on the existence of other people in terms of thinking and rules. (And it is always about relationships of individual people to each other). VsCollectivism: which assumes that the community as a whole exerts an influence on its members. (>Method/Wright). I 124 Pettit: social holism is a contingent thesis about the actual practices of us humans. Esfeld: our reconstruction should apply to all possible worlds. Private following of rules/Pettit: has been left open by him! One can also continue to be a member of a community in isolation. Social Holism/Esfeld: does not imply that a person who becomes isolated no longer has any beliefs! I 125 Nevertheless, the concept of "correct" following is then no longer applicable. N.B.: once the customs of the community are internalized, one can argue that real feedback is no longer indispensable! I.e. there is a metaphysical possibility that the constituents of a holistic system are no longer ontologically dependent on other individuals! For example radical Robinson who spends his whole life in isolation: Kripke: is liberal about such a case. We could take it into our community and apply our criteria to it as well. (s) But also vice versa? I 126 EsfeldVsKripke: we cannot be so liberal here. It is also questionable whether the assertiveness conditions for rule sequences are really fulfilled. One can argue that Kripke's position includes direct or indirect interaction. Private Rule Following/Esfeld: neither the truth conditions nor the assertiveness conditions are fulfilled. Wright I 264 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Rule Following/Kripke: in Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": destroys any possibility that rules and meanings include real limitations. Wright: in the end there is the attempt to stay afloat with the Charybdis. (Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. So no "general real objectivity".) I 265 Quietism/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: is in any case committed to quietism: for unrealism (that there are no facts concerning any rules) must inflate to a comprehensive unrealism. I 266 Then there are no relevant facts in the matter anywhere. If there are no substantive facts about what sentences say, then there are also no facts about whether they are true or not. An unrealism of meaning must therefore entail an unrealism of truth. WrightVsKripke: that is however attackable: however, it is not an error of sublimation (raising to a higher level) of the rules. If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then it is a humanized platonism no less than the superobjectified version. McDowell's Skylla does not belong to the scene of Kripke's dialectic. It could only appear if the opponent is denied a point of view. Thus, the assertions in the first person would be presented as inferential but the fact is that the knowledge of earlier meanings is for the most part not inferential and has no clearly recognizable epistemology. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| McDowell, J. | Wright Vs McDowell, J. | I 260 Def "Platonic Scylla" 1. Some justification must be found for something that, completely independent of human abilities, determines the real direction that a rule follows, 2. It must be explained how we are supposed to be in any cognitive connection with this "real direction" at all. This is the corresponding Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": the view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. Thus no "general real objectivity". Solution/McDowell/Wright: the "fully satisfying intermediate position": insight that the only thing that is wrong with the Scylla is that objectivity must be assessed from an external perspective. Rules exist only within a practice that is maintained by the fact that the participants agree. I 261 Moral/Ethics/McDowellVsNon-Cognitivism: assumes an impure construction of ethical facts and objectivity (Scylla). As if the moral facts were "there" independently of the evaluative point of view. Fact/Wright: but also the appreciation of any fact requires a point of view! Realism/Anti-Realism/Wright: in this debate the realist represents the side of the Scylla, the anti-realist the side of the Charybdis. I 262 This debate is now being undermined by the "fully satisfying intermediate position". There has never been a debate, only a misunderstanding of what the interaction of our mind with an objective content requires. (In McDowell only implicitly). WrightVsMcDowell: this is not convincing at all: if the debate is to be undermined, the opponents must remain clearly tied to the horns. Realism must therefore always include supereobjectivation and the anti-realism must always be presented as an escape from it. But there is no solution in this way. For example, the question of whether cognitive coercion applies a priori has no essential connection to a hyperobjective concept of facts, and therefore no obligation to an external point of view. I 263 McDowellVsWright: one could reply that any distinction under the aegis of cognitive coercion would be our decision. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that opposites of objectivity could be "there" in a more solid way than, say, the requirements of addition. I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: wants to open escape routes from the debate. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Various Authors | Searle Vs Various Authors | III 26 Function/SearleVsWright, Larry: Larry Wright: Thesis: the function of X is Z means: 1. X exists because Z does it. 2. Z is a consequence (or result) from the fact that X exists. SearleVs: if this was correct it would eliminate the observer relativity of function. E.g. the heart has the function to pump blood because it pumps blood and the explanation for the existence of hearts in the evolution is that they actually pump blood. IV 188 Linguistics/John R. Ross: Performative (deletion-) analysis 1970 (1). (SearleVsRoss). IV 190 Deletion/Redemption: when an anaphoric pronoun precedes an emphatic reflexive, the former may be redeemed if it is dominated by the NP, with which it is in an anaphoric relationship. IV 191 Deep structure: If F but not G exists in the surface structure, there is a deep structure of S in which G exists, even if it is redeemed in the surface structure. SearleVs: No valid conclusion form. From the fact that F and G are normally present simply does not follow that where the one is the other must exist in the deep structure. Nevertheless, it is an extremely successful conclusion form. Why? It allows us a simpler representation of the data. IV 192 We only need one rule instead of two. Searle: But this impression is based on an unexamined assumption: Assumption: "The rules for the distribution of syntactic elements may mention only syntactic categories." Example (1) "Honestly, you are drunk" (2) "Probably it will rain." ("Honestly" does not seem to work here as sentence adverb. Here it has been asserted (1) it made both syntactically and semantically necessary to postulate an underlying verb of saying in the deep structure. E.g. But not in (3) "He has admitted his guilt honestly". There is nothing to be further specified. IV 193 SearleVsDeletion analysis: implausible conclusion: has as consequence that in an important proposition you could of "say" only comprehend an illocutionary act by saying that you performed it. Because the deep structure of each proposition contains an "explicit image represented performative verb". This is counter-intuitive. I think there is a much simpler explanation: IV 194 Speaker and listener have shared knowledge and rules for speech acts. This allows us to explain certain syntactical forms without accepting the deep structure. Pragmatist Analysis/Ross: further development: certain elements are present in the context of the speech act and syntactic processes can refer to them. IV 195 SearleVs: this hardly differs from the performative analysis. SearleVsRoss: Confusion of mention and use: he confuses the speaker with the "I" which refers to him, the listener with the "you", and the act with the verbs that they specify. IV 196 Of course, the formulation of the rules that mention the speaker, listener and acts will use these expressions. Ross makes this error because he is under the spell of assumption that the rules are allowed to only mention only syntactic elements. If we give this up, our alternative theory becomes more easy: 1. We use independently motivated semantic and "pragmatic" knowledge 2. We do not have to postulate redeemed syntactic elements. 1. John R. Ross, On Declarative Sentences, in: R. A Jacobs/P. S. Rosenbaum (Eds) Readings in English Transformational Grammar, Waltham Mass 1970 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wiggins, D. | Wright Vs Wiggins, D. | I 231 Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition: If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X. Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum. I 233 WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme: For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P. I 234 Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12. (ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of. Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure! I 235 Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them. The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence. WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do: Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"! Then it just says: I 235/236 "for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers. Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules. ((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.). I 237 WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner. Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed. I 238 Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive. According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable): (i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable. (ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P. Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition. However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Wright, von Vs Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 83 Ethics/Kripke's Wittgenstein/WrightVsKripke: someone might get the idea and transfer Kripke's results to moral considerations. Commandments and prohibitions would have practically no content anymore. Any action and its opposite would be permissible. StegmüllerVsWright: in fact, Kripke could have chosen this example. It can also be found in Hume! Skepticism in ethics would read: "There are no objective values". "Norms do not exist". |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wright, Cr. | Field Vs Wright, Cr. | I 23 Mathematics/Indeterminacytainty/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright: (1983): Benacerraf’s paper creates indeterminacy not a particular problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any, quantities they are. WrightVsBenacerraf: this is also valid for the singular terms that represent the quantities themselves! And according to Quine also for singular terms that stand for rabbits! FieldVsWright: this goes past Benacerraf’s argument. It is aimed more against an anti-platonist argument: that we should be skeptical of numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems to be impossible to explain how we refer to them or have beliefs about them. According to Benacerraf’s argument our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" form a sequence of distinct objects under the relation that we call "‹" (less-than relation). But that’s all. But perhaps our use does not even determine this. Perhaps they only form a sequence that fulfills our best axiomatic first level theory of ω-sequences. I.e. everything that is determined by the use would be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would then also apply for quantities. Wright/(s): Thesis: Our standard use is not sufficient for determining the mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright). I 24 VsWright: but that this would apply for rabbits is more controversial. A bad argument against it would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Wright, Cr. | Frege Vs Wright, Cr. | Field I 166 Existence/Logic/Context Principle/Frege/Wright: the natural view is that simply an implicit existence assumption is built into ( =), i.e. the assumption that if Fx is a (finitely instantiated) concept, there will be a thing, so that x:Fx. And that is conceptual and not logical. I 167 FregeVsWright/Wright: he would say, however, that the fact that it is possible to form a sortal concept of a number by reference to concepts of a higher-order logic, is enough to reveal implicit existential stipulations in the statements whose truth we can regard as necessary and sufficient for statements about numerical equality. (?). (>Sortal). Wright: So there are no existence assumptions! The existence of x:Fx for a given Fx is no assumption, but a question of the truth of statements in higher-order logic. Form of thought: higher-level truth instead of existence of objects. Which view is correct? Context Principle/Frege/Wright: (p. 148): does x simple smuggle existence in, or does the principle (as Frege would prefer) discover a real definition? Wright: neither! Field: its intermediate position consists in that it is not pure logic, but a disambiguation from which existence flows. Ontology/Existence/Explanation/Logic/FieldVsWright: this is just as mysterious and criticism of this approach corresponds to the criticism of the ontological proof of God: The existence of God also does not follow from the disambiguation of the word "God". |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Wright, Cr. | McDowell Vs Wright, Cr. | I 205 Quietism/Wittgenstein/McDowell: not worrying, just the exoneration from the question of how things are absolute and independent of common ratification. McDowellVsWright: tmistakenly assume that Wittgenstein supplanted the questions of arithmetic. In fact, he only wants to drive out the "eerie feeling" associated with it. Ex The idea that from a certain point of the addition onwards, the accuracy is not dependent on the approval of the general public, could "look mysterious." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wright, Cr. | Peacocke Vs Wright, Cr. | I 102 Def Verification/Wright: (("Strict Finitism", 1982) the concept "is a phrase that can actually be verified": at first, we believe the truth of a proposition due to certain studies, later we question the belief. The basis on which we question it must accept the presupposed conditions as true in order to maintain the initial investigation procedure. Peacocke: this is similar to our condition of epistemic possibility. Difference: Wright's criterion also includes unobservable particles. The fact that the instrument is functioning properly is then one of the presupposed conditions of the investigation procedure. I 103 Wright: his approach also includes the possibility that past-sentences can actually be verified. It is presupposed that the memory is functioning properly, in accordance with the supposed correctly functioning perceptual apparatus. Peacocke: for me it's about concepts, not about propositions, and I use properties of demonstrative perception judgments. Memory/PeacockeVsWright: no way of givenness of objects (intension), which is made available by memory seems to be connected to the same strict observation concepts. The ability to form memory images is not required by the observation concepts! |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| mathemat. Entities | Wright, Cr. | Field I 23 Wright (s): our standard use is not sufficient for the determination of mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright). I 24 VsWright: but that this could be true also for rabbits, is more controversial. A bad argument against it would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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