Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson | II 135 DavidsonVsScheme/Inhalt -DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation immer in Bezug auf ein Schema! - DavidsonVsSense data theory Der Unterschied zwischen dem Interpreten und dem L-Sprecher besteht nicht in dem was sie sehen und fühlen, sondern in dem was sie suchen und für relevant halten. Anomal Monism: mental event tokens sind als einzelne je identisch mit physischen event tokens, ohne daß jedoch mentale event types nomologisch identisch wären mit types physikalischer Ereignisse. Entsprechung auf Einzelebene, nicht auf Typenebene. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Causal Theory of Reference | Rorty | IV ~ 41 Causal theory of reference VsRepresentation (according to Rorty). >Causal theory of reference/Putnam >Representation. I 317 Reference/Intentionality/Rorty: the conventional "intentionalist" conception of linking words with the world is wrong and philosophically fateful in individual cases! >World/thinking, >Word meaning. Against this conventional intentionalist conception there is a new "causal", "realistic" reference theory. (Causal theory of reference). The conflict owes itself to an ambiguity of "reference". (a) Relationship of facts (b) purely intentional relation, where the object does not need to exist. Let us call a) "reference" (philosophical) and b) "talk about" (common sense). Ad b) "Talk about": in a world where there are no competing scientific theories, without the criterion of Searle and Strawson we can cheerfully talk about things, even fictions. We would really talk about the things that make most of our opinions true. >Reference/Strawson, >Referene/Searle, https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Truthmakers. I 318 For example, if there were a Mr. Lenz who in reality accomplished 99 percent of Mr. Müller's deeds, then we would want to say that in reality we are talking about Lenz. Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: If you confuse this term "really talk about" with the term of reference, you can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. >Goedel/Schmidt case/Kripke. Rorty: In my opinion, the problem doesn't arise at all. The only factual question here is the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. >Nonexistence, >Fiction. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Facts | Davidson | Glüer II 126 DavidsonVsRepresentation/mind/object - (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: There are no facts. (Frege ditto: all true sentences have the same meaning: conformity with all the facts of the world). ("Big fact"). >Representation/Davidson. Fact/Davidson: there are no facts - because we have to say, any true belief agrees with all the facts. - (> Frege: all true sentences mean the same thing - or for any true proposition p it is possible to use any other true sentence.) >Truth value, cf. >slingshot argument. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Idealism | Danto | I 201 Idealism/Danto: radically questions the entire building of representationalism. Here there is only the relationship between subject and idea, so only two components. cf. >G. Berkeley, >World/Thinking, >Ideas, >Representation. I 228 ff IdealismVsRepresentationalism; But Kant is also a representationalist. >I. Kant. Idealism: Again, it may well be that all is in the mind, but not every representation can be true. >Mind, >Truth, >Knowledge, >Contradictions. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Propositions | Rorty | Rorty VI 190 Representation/Brandom/Rorty: Brandom wants to save representations against Davidson, who threw it out with the bath water. VI 191 DavidsonVsRepresentation - VsVs: propositional content is not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation. >Representation/Davidson, Representation/Brandom, Propositions/Davidson, Propositions/Brandom. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Propositions | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function. >Content. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. >Representation, >Language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I XVIIff SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property. Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences. Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Truth conditions. I 14 Propositions: have their truth values essentially. Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese) Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented. I 49f Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms. Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory. Propositional theory: says 1) that "p" is a real object variable 2) that propositions are their values. Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY". But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations. >Pain, >Mental representation. "Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow. Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism. >Platonism. I 51 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white. Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. I 52 Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white. Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows. >Omniscience. Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Reality | Davidson | I (e) 90 Reality/World/Quine: proximal theory (the meaning is localized at the nerve endings) shut off from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes/DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one cannot specify what the evidence actually was evidence for. Rorty VI 63 ff World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves. Glüer II 126 World/Reality/Reality/Glüer: new: "see change" in contemporary philosophy, revision of the relationship of the human mind to the rest of the world. From the "subjective" to the "objective". On the object side, the world thus, there are no objects that could be represented. Fact/tradition/glower: there are material objects and events, but a true proposition claims not only that they exist, but that they are in a certain relationship to each other, also called fact. >Facts/Davidson. Glüer II 127 DavidsonVsRepresentation: such a representation relation cannot exist. Because there are no facts! Any attempt to analyze the correspondence of facts and beliefs leads to the fact that we must say that a true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world, with the overall reality. We experience nothing in this way. >Representation/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Representation | Brandom | I 155f Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation > de re attribution. Other authors on attribution. I 900 Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting. >Content. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (>metaphysics). --- Bandom I 127 Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map. >Practise, >Experience, >Error, >Deception, >Correctness. VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. I 126 Representation is not an expression. I 130 VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. Cf. >Understanding. I 145 BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. I 404f Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented. four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" >Reference, >Meaning. 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts >Extension, >Intension. 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel >de re 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. >Judgment, >Inference, >Correctness. I 412 ~ BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 482 Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. I 719 Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. >Propositional content, >Intentionality. I 719f Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain.Cf. >Map example, >Natural signs/Armstrong. b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. I 722 Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one. >Propositional content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Danto | I 281 Folk PsychologyVsRepresentation Teilhard > Eccles (representation materialism) > Tipler > Omega Point. >Teilhard de Chardin, >Eccles/Popper, >F. Tipler, >Omega Point. I 283 Representation Materialism: (Eccles, Popper) thesis: the r.m. maintains that there are 2 types of matter in the universe, representational and non-representational. >Matter. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Representation | Davidson | Glüer II 126 Davidson: there is no representation that could be true/false. - Beliefs are true if they are caused properly. >Facts/Davidson. Davidson I (e) 96 DavidsonVsSchema/Content - DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation always in relation to a schema. >Conceptual scheme. - DavidsonVsSense data theory Glüer II 126 Representation/DavidsonVsPresentation Mind/Object - (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: there are no facts. ((s) Like Frege: all true propositions have the same meaning: conformity with all facts of the world/"great fact"). Cf. >Slingshot-Argument. Glüer II 127 There are no facts that could be represented. - We do not know anything through the demand for correspondence. Glüer II 127 Representation/Externalism/DavidsonVsRepresentation: Davidson replaces private representations by intersubjectively accessible objects. - These are as public as the meanings. Rorty VI 190 Representation/Brandom/Rorty: would like to save them from Davidson, who has thrown them out. DavidsonVsRepresentation. VsVs: propositional contents are not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation. >Propositions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Esfeld | I 136 ~ Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive. >Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes. Representation/Descartes: 1st A belief represents things. 2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism). >Beliefs, >Realism. Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content. Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions. >Jerry Fodor. I 144ff Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation? >Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics. VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head. >Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Representation | Husserl | I 36 Representational Content/Husserl: 1. sensation (perception) - 2. phantasm (ideas) - 3. character (conceptual, symbolic thought). >Content, >Content/Husserl. Tugendhat I 86f Representations: HusserlVsRepresentations: I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not to an image. Even Hegel states logically here: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being arises but not an image. TugendhatVsIdeas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them. >Imagination, >Meaning (Intending). Tugendhat I 94 WittgensteinVsHusserl: Husserl wrongly assimilated statements about the inner to those about the outer world. >Inner world, >Outer world. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Representation | Locke | Arndt II 209 LockeVsrepresentation / (s): Linguistic proxy not a figure - the objectivity of all linguistic meaning is constituted only by language. >Language/Locke, >Idea/Locke, >Reality/Locke, >Perception/Locke, >Mind/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Representation | Putnam | Rorty VI 63 PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: parts of what we call "language" or "mind", penetrate so deeply into the so-called "reality" that "pictures" of something "language independent" must fail. --- Putnam III 38 Representation/PutnamVsDavidson: that the word "cat" refers to cats is not simply due to the causal relationship. The word stands in many causal relationships. It is just the case that I would not use the word, if there were no cats. Instead of representation one might assume fundamentally an evolutionary role. >Roles. --- V 17/18 Representation/reference/Putnam: mental images arise as little as normal pictures in a necessary connection with the represented (otherwise no mistake would be possible). E.g. Martians (who know no trees) are faced with a tree image. The internal mental images are then no representations. One who recites unfamiliar words, for him they refer to nothing. Thoughts have no intrinsic connection to something outside - but they possibly have connections. >Reference/Putnam. --- I (h) 209ff Representation/Putnam: a representation is not a magic connection between a phenomenological character and denoted objects - there is no intrinsic connection. >Intrinsic. Problem: brains in a vat: without intrinsic connection, one could say that the word "vat" with inhabitants of vats that come up with the idea, "we are in the vat!" refers to phenomenological manifestations of vats and not to real vats (and also in the case of "brain" and "in"). Problem: if a real vat were to collapse, the people could not use their "vat" word anymore. But that would be a connection between a vat and every word they use and no distinctive connection between real vats and the use of the word vat. Putnam: the truth conditions of the inhabitants of vats would be something like that they are in the vat in the image. And that is what is wrong if they think it (although they are in the vat, (s) because they have not learned the use in their environment.) >Brains in a vat/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Rorty | I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". >Language of thoguht, >Sentences, >Content. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of a conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. >Meaning, >Judgments. Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I 15 Representations/Schiffer: representations realize mental states- - Mental representations are in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Mental states. I 275 Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs. - As representational states beliefs have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure. >Truth values, >Beliefs/Schiffer, >Sentences. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Representation | Wittgenstein | Rorty IV 10 WittgensteinVsRepresentation: The descriptive language functions do not represent. >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sensory Impressions | Hume | I 20 Impression/Hume: an impression forms the mind in different ways to build the subject. Interior impression: is self-perception. HumeVsRepresentation: the association conditions cannot represent. Rationalism/Deleuze: rationalism had abandoned this insight. (But Hume is not entirely VsRepresentation.) >Mind/Hume, cf. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Rationalism. I 106 Impression/sensation/Hume: an impression represents nothing, because nothing precedes it. >Representation, >Sensation. I 141 Sensation/impression/Hume: problem: a sensation cannot explain why this impression and not another was selected. ((s) Because nature (or the perceptual world) is not just opposed to the subject and imposes itself, but is partly constituted by the subject.) I 142 Solution: progress: searches the inventory and selects in a constitutive manner. I 147 There are two ways: The first way directs the mind to pleasure/displeasure. The second way directs the mind to the idea of the object, which it constituted itself. >Idea/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Singular Terms | Tugendhat | I 102 Singular Term/Tugendhat: we need it because we cannot imagine object, but we mean them. >Meaning (Intending). VsRepresentation - instead: propositional content. >Representation, >Propositional content. I 338f Singular Term/Tugendhat: difference to predicate: we cannot say analogously, the singular term 'a' stands for those object that if the predicate 'F' applies to it, the assertion 'Fa' becomes true. >Truthmakers. I 338 Then the object "a" would be the indistinguishable of all other objects to which the predicate 'F' also applies. Singular terms form equivalence classes. >Equivalence classes. I 414 Singular Term/Tugendhat: can stand for 4 types of objects: 1. demonstrative expressions: "this mountain" 2. description with location 3. other clear relation E.g. "the murderer of Schmidt" (not perception but relative feature) 4. by a single characteristic: E.g. "the highest mountain". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| States of Affairs | Brandom | I 690 State of Affairs/Brandom: facts and truth conditions are dependent on judgment and assertion - (VsMetaphysical Realism). >Facts, >Truth conditions, >Judgment, >Assertion. I 690 BrandomVsRepresentation: the facts cannot be understood before claiming or judgment - pro representation: contents have required a representational aspect - but representation is not fundamental. >Representation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| World/Thinking | Nagel | Rorty IV 41 Nagel: For Wittgenstein any idea which we can form of an independent reality, must stay within the limits of our life. Nagel (with Kripke): Wittgenstein can not be reconciled with realism. >Realism, >Imagination/Wittgenstein. Rorty IV 41 ff Causal theory of referenceVsRepresentation. >Representation, >Causal theory of reference. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block, Ned | Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me. We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us. Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red"). ((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.) ((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".) Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have. Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block. Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism. StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience. However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one. Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content. Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Naturalism | Dummett Vs Naturalism | Putnam I 148 DummettVsRepresentation/DummettVsNaturalism/Putnam: What then is the understanding of the own mental representations? The "Knowing of the truth conditions" leads to recourse or to the recognition that some characters need to be understood without the correspondence theory. If there were "thought characters" without language that we could compare directly with the uncomprehended reality, then the understanding of the characters would have to be preceded by a "grasping of the truth conditions". Absurd! |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Representation | Folk psychology Vs Representation | Danto2 I 281 Folk Psychology/Danto: was an attempt to eliminate representations. Thread: Folk PsychologyVsrepresentation - Action, experience, drawing conclusions involve representations. |
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| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Davidson Vs Representation | I (e) 93ff Scheme/Content: came into play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing! With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection. Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible". Glüer II 126 Davidson: There are no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact"). Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly. II 127 A true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world. Horwich I 454 Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the main criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation". Horwich I 454/455 Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: if we do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world. At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons). Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning". Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 194 DavidsonVsRepresentation/Rorty: encourages us to cultivate our "realistic intuitions" (Crispin Wright). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Field Vs Representation | Field II 57 Representation/Field: the reason why many authors are VsRepresentations: they overestimate the neuro-physiological obligations. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Hume Vs Representation | Hume I 20 Impression/Hume: the peculiarity of self-perception or inner impressions lies (effect of the principles) in training the mind to become the subject in different ways. Rationalism/Deleuze: it is precisely this insight that rationalism had jettisoned: Hume's philosophy is an exaggerated criticism of representation (HumeVsRepresentation). HumeVsRepresentation/Deleuze: Hume does not criticize the association relations, but the representations, precisely because they cannot represent the association relations. I 105 On the other hand, the mind does not serve the representation of nature. The perceptions are the only objects (VsRepresentation). I 106 HumeVsRepresentation: the imagination is not representation of an object, but of an impression. The impression is not representative, because nothing precedes it! It is innate. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Representation | Husserl Vs Representation | Tugendhat I 86 HusserlVsRepresentations: especially imagination: I imagine the Cologne Cathedral directly, and not an image that stands for it. I 87 Now one can also understand the medieval view: the content that the intellect has before is ultimately not an image, but if one takes away all certainty, the concept of the being results. (Hegel also assumed this at the beginning of "logic".) |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Representation | Pinker Vs Representation | I 353 Ideas/PinkerVsRepresentation/Pinker: we shape very detailed images in our mind, e.g. if we are to imagine how the ears of a dog are shaped. I 356 Pinker: I am skeptical when cancer patients are to imagine the destruction of their tumors. Mental Image/Pinker: is rejected by many philosophers because of problems with homunculi and recourse. (Also BehaviorismVsMental Images, VsRepresentation). In reality, the computer theory of the mind makes it quite easy: a mental image is simply a two-and-a-half dimensional sketch (curved surface, wherein depth is neglected). It is simply called up from the long-term memory. This is how many AI programs are constructed. I 357 E.g. "An equilateral triangle stands on a circle": these words do not represent any points in the visual field, they express relationships. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Representation | Rorty Vs Representation | Esfeld I 143 Beliefs/Representation/Davidson (1990, p 303, 304.): denies the representational feature of beliefs and belief states in general. DavidsonVsRepresentation: is set to correspondence theory, which is incomprehensible. Esfeld: but you can still hold on to intentionality as something that is simply characteristic for beliefs and GZ. Inferential Semantics: simply has the task to use its conceptual tools to reconstruct representation. By rejecting this, you come closer to the position of Rorty: RortyVsRepresentation: there are only social practices, but no epistemic relation to the world. (Rorty 1998, p. 128, 130) >Beliefs/Rorty. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Representation | Castaneda Vs Representation | Frank I 461 Guise Theory/CastanedaVsFrege/CastanedaVSRepresentations: (conception of "I" as a representation): (i) does not allow a semantic intermediary between a singularly referring expression and its referent (ii) it eludes psychological intermediaries between person and object (iii) removes the Fregean referent from the semantic order (iv) sets objects entities as referents, called individual guise, which are objectively almost analogous to Frege’s individual senses. (v) provides an analysis of Frege’s primary objects as systems of individual geguises. (vi) such systems are doxastic objects: they reach belief and thought, but not by singular reference, i.e. they are not the semantic endpoints. I 462 (vii) thought and beliefs only reach such doxastic objects by guises, as pictured systems of guises, and perhaps by general reference, i.e. by means of specific, non-substituting quantification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Vs Representation | Rorty, R. | I 280 Representation/RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not merely a confusion of images and propositions, but a general confusion of cause and effects and conclusions. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not psychologists. |
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