Dictionary of Arguments

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Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Dennett I 599
Searle, Fodor: E.g. freezing (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. Dennett: splitting hairs.
Fodor IV 14
Intentionality/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: Property T*: a belief only has it when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. - E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red. - Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has prop T* in relation to my thoughts. - Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red. - Another problem: change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. - Vsintentional laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich.
IV 127f
Belief not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality - instead: Representations.
IV 130
Intentional assignment: not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic - Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states - constitutive of faith: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p - but objects of intentional states may be contradictory.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor IV
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-23
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