Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
A priori Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 269 ff
RortyVsFodor: A priori: Fodor s thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we may at any time be wrong about it, so that we may be wrong about something that is priori. (> Kripke).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Bridge Laws Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 135ff
DavidsonVsFodor: no covering laws - anomalous monism: token correspondence, not type-correspondencs - no nomological identity of mental events with physical events - nevertheless token identity! (ontological monism)

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Chinese Room Pauen
 
Books on Amazon
V 149f
Chinese Room / Searle: (1980) (VsFodor) would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is in principle unsuited - VsTuringtest - functional features are no guarantee of importance - V 151 VsChinese room: the occupant does not take into account the situation - and no previous questions - can not detect repetitions - the system is not capable of learning - the smallest deviations cause devastating affects.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Competence Katz
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 12
Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable.
Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things:
A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect.
B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence.
---
Cresswell I 12
Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Computation Peacocke
 
Books on Amazon
I 215
Computation / Peacocke: possible without syntax - without Mentalese, causal relations and order are enough - representation / Fodor: necessary for computation - PeacockeVsFodor: not necessary - (Peacocke representation is somehow the same as syntax)

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Computer Model Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
IV 143/44
The analogy with the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer related interpretation. (The simulations). According to the latter it defines a sequence of states of the computer, the former enables the scientists to interpret it as a representation of physical states or physical reality. ---
IV 144
Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction, if we only knew the computer available interpretation of it.
---
IV 144f
Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate after the computer related reading. ((S) Because the computer has no knowledge of the outside world.) ---
IV 144f
GoodmanVsFodor: Fodor's theory can not explain how we know what new phrases represent nor what familiar phrases represent. The role of the lexicon has emerged to serve other purposes.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Consciousness Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 162
DavidsonVsFodor: the scientification of psychology turns into a quest for inner propositional states that should be independent of the rest of the world. Dennett: consciousness/Fodor: "No one has the slightest idea how something material may be conscious. Nobody even knows just how it would be to have such an idea." Even if you think you understood the question, you are wrong.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Content Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Black I 171
"Naturalization of content"/representation/Schwarz: the naturalization of content is, thesis: that mental representations are so far as to be clause-like, so that one can explain their content compositionally. (See Fodor 1990). LewisVsFodor: fundamentally missed: only the causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if the desire for e.g. mushroom soup is beautifully composed of desire for soup and desire for mushroom. Because on the opposite it is a mushroom soup desire, if it plays exactly this causal role, no matter what it is composed of. (1994b, 320f)
One can equally well imagine beings who do not represent clause-like (see Armstrong 1973, Chap. 1, Braddon Mitchell/Jackson 1996, chapter 10f).
Lewis's theory is also intended to be valid for these worlds, as well as to explain what determines the content.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Features Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 47
Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. ---
I 48
For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112; Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994. In particular Katz and Fodor (1963), R. Lakoff (1971), Schank, (1975), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976).
Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis.
Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).
Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Incommensurability Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 161f
Incommensurability/Putnam: even before Kuhn in Saussure: basic units of language cannot be determined from the sounds -> Whorf: if individual languages have many quite different color predicates, then the meaning is reserved for individual languages . -> Idiolect > DerridaVsWhorf: the meanings are not only individual languages but reserved for the individual texts. -> Deconstruction - DerridaVsSaussure: the concept of the sign can be completely forgotten. PutnamVsDerrida: he misunderstands Saussure's project of a theory of meaning.
---
III 165
Solution/Putnam: maintaining concept of meaning equality, but realizing that it may not be understood as in the sense of self-identity of objects and signified. PutnamVsDerrida (How VsFodor): "meaning equality" is interest relative, and presupposes a normative judgment on rationality in a situation.
---
V 157
Incommensurabilityy/PutnamVsFeyerabend: it is contradictory to state, Galileo's concepts are incommensurable and then to describe them in detail afterwards. - One must also understand the old language to be able to say that the predictions are identical.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Indeterminacy Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 35/6
See here: Proposition: This "relativism" contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real". ---
I 36
Strangely, however, these conclusions have been drawn by some: e.g. John Searle: it would be incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to correctly interpret the same thoughts or utterances of one person. ---
I 36
Just as numbers can capture all empirically significant relationships between weights or temperatures in an infinite number of different ways, so a person's utterance can capture all the significant characteristics of the thoughts of another person in different ways. Jerry Fodor also argues that the holism or the indeterminacy of translation is a threat to realism regarding the propositinal attitudes.
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 49
DavidsonVsFodor: the same mistake: indeterminacy of the translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. The indeterminacy of the translation also applies when all data are available. (Quine). There is in principle more than one translation manual.
Indeterminacy of Interpretation/Davidson: There are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Davidson: Solution: we must cease to regard an utterance as belonging to a particular language and no other. Rather, we should identify languages with Truth-theories. The indeterminacy loses its scariness.
---
Dav I 57
Relativity/Davidson: is not an indeterminateness at all. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 46
Translating uncertainty/Quine/Davidson/Glüer: also exists when all data are available - there is in principle more than one translation manual. ---
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy of interpretation/Davidson: there are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy/Davidson/Glüer: 3. types 1. The logical form: empirically equivalent theories (e.eq.th.) can identify predicates, singular term etc. differently - 2. the reference: empirically equivalent theories can be assigned to different referents- 3. the truth: the same sentence can have different truth values for empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 49
Problem: how can both sentences be appropriate? - Solution: we must not regard an utterance as belonging to only one language. - Instead: identify languages with Truth-theories.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Lawlikeness Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 58
Law/Fodor: "lawlike" for him is a basic concept, not property of sentences, but the relationship between universals - therefore terms are not themselves intentional - PutnamVsFodor: they are intentional! - Fodor fails with extensions of analytical (scientific) definitions with necessary and sufficient conditions for cats. ---
III 60
E.g. "Super billionaire"/Putnam: for the triggering of characters the meaning of the word is crucial - the word is already interpreted.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Learning Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in: Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Lanz I 303
Learning/Fodor: acquisition of the mother tongue: presentation and testing of hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the congenital "language of thought" (mentalese). ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one cannot learn new concepts in a certain sense.
If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere.
Does a sentence in the "language of thought" have to be stored for every tacitly held opinion? This would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage was not enough, the sentences would have to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the connections must be transparent to the organism (though not to consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese).

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Meaning Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 56
Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell : FodorVsPutnam : These: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor : problem with the ascription:I will have to have the same representation in the head - it must have the same belief as the one he has - ( see above : meanings are not representations ) -
IV 57
meaning / Quine : not from speaker meaning , not acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean - it can not distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later -- so there are no analytic sentences- there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning” -
IV 117
meaning / truth / Davidson : a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his belief - so we can not conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we can not do it the other way around -
IV 121
belief ascription / attribution of meaning / Davidson theory: information about the shape of the words , which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here - adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning - we need information either about his belief - or about the meanings - ( (s) key Passage ) - Fodor / LeporeVsLewis : then the primacy thesis is implausible - (PT : " the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription " )-

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Mentalese Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have accepted. What is crucial is that with regard to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question of "how exactly do the internal representations represent the reality" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Newen/Schrenk I 132
Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: thinking takes place with mental representations. - E.g. fuel gauge, causal connection. - Mentalese: as rich as natural language, but purely internal, symbolic, purely syntactic symbol manipulation - only in connection with propositional attitude - VsFodor: a) regress.
I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the prevalence of thought cannot explain the normativity of thinking with the help of social institutions such as the language - c) there are also beliefs without representation: E.g. chess computers: -brute force- then: -I should the queen out of the game early.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mentalese Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 272
Representation / Mentalese / Fodor / Rorty: in relation to Mentalese the skeptical question "how exactly are the representations of reality?" cannot be asked. - There is no gap - RortyVsFodor "language of thought": epistemological discoveries would only be possible if there was a processors vocabulary between the scientific vocabulary and colloquial voc. such that discoveries of truth were made possible about things in general. The language of thought or any code cannot have an honor status, (not even for Fodor) as a mere code is no means of distinguishing the true from the false.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Mentalese Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 73
Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa - (on the content of thoughts) - Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening - neural state: also exists if false - no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. - Harman: Thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. - Lewis: Language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) - other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought) - Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality - this can be explained without public content. - SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled.
---
I 76
Mentalese/Relation Theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? - Problem: Mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (circular) - also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). ---
I 282
Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language - solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese - public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken - problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences - fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here - e.g. "state with the same content". - Problem: Speaker could believe sentence only under additional assumptions - this only with reference to content - that does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. - Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief.
---
I 78
Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; "flounders snore". - Problem: must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. ---
79
Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences. - For this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain - problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions - solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content - truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C
- Problem: needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). - truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists - so we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. - Problem: only under optimal conditions - SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible.
---
I 87
Mentalese/Charity Principle/ch.p./Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. ---
I 83-90
Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. ---
L 189
SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. - Schiffer: I can agree with that. - 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. - Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification - E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. - then the sentence means that, but is not compositional - N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced - (SchifferVsReductionism - ((s) mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano) - E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + +

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Perception Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 255
FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectancy system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent of the physical uniformities of stimuli among one another.
Rorty I 255
RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe be so abstract at all? Presumably, we must be able to identify similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this. E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the contents of a package of chocolate cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: so if we talk about "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires the postulation of other control systems or they are not learned at all.
Either 1) infinite regress, because what is true for recognition would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back at Ryle: people have an ability that they have not learned.
Rorty I 269
Fodor: rehabilitates the traditional British theories of perception: "it is an empirical question whether psychological processes are computer processes! If they are, our perception must work in a way that a description of the environment that is not done in a vocabulary whose terms represent values ​​of physical variables, is calculated on the basis of a description made in such a vocabulary.
I Rorty 269
Fodor: why shouldn t there be stimuli for the whole organism? Then you could discover a stimulus variant "bottle". Perception: requires the choice of an independent vocabulary for the representation of the inputs. Fodor s thesis: all perceptual knowledge is transferred by the activity of sensory transducers.
Rorty I 269
Fodor: if we do not want to realize the talk of the information processing, we need to use something that our subject need not necessarily know as its input. Rorty question (see above): could it turn out that the input is not completed on the retina but half way or elsewhere? Fodor presumes: yes, it jsut depends on which design of the black box the organism can best be considered to be split into converter and processor, so that the best theory comes out.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Perception Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 257
Perception/RortyVsFodor: supposing, we needed an abstract recipe for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the recipe has to be abstract? Probably because we have to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of a "non-abstract" recipe, because each recipe must be able to provide this. E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative variations of the contents of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
---
I 257
Rorty: So when we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of acquisition of control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned.
Either 1. infinite regress, because what applies to the recognition would also apply to learning.
Or 2. We end up back at Ryle: the people have a non-learned ability.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Privileged Access Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 42
Quine: privileged access - DavidsonVs. - - -
Frank I 630
First person authority / Davidson: indubitable - yet we explore everything in the third person perspective - Twin Earth / Putnam: third-person perspective: it is not sure if contents of the first person are recorded - Solution / Fodor: narrow content: internal condition with no relationship to the outside world - wide contents: relations with the outside world. - DavidsonVsFodor.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Propositional Attitudes Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
I 20
A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb. DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words.
---
I 22
If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned. ---
I 104
Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna". ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 127
Propositional attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - (> Externalism). ---
Avramides I 102f
Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason). ---
Dav I 22
Propositional attitude/content/meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once. ---
I 23
Propositional attitude/belief/reference/content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term. ---
I 39
Propositional attitudes/object/content/belief/desire/Brentano: no internal object different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist - Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality irreducible to brain states. ---
I 97
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective - access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 127
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Propositional Attitudes Churchland
 
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Patricia Churchland
Cresswell II 55
Causal role/Fodor/propositional attitudes/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that belief and wishes play in behavior. This is understood in terms of manipulating formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) does not do justice to half-conscious and unconscious attitudes.
---
II 56
Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: what would that kind of entities be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Example: (3) Fodor believes that meanings are in the head.
Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Supposed that meanings are internal representations.
Problem: (3) can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning. If we do not accept this, there is no problem with propositional attitudes at all.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Reference Putnam
 
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Horwich I 395
Theory of reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: might refute that - (but not a theory of meaning). ---
Putnam III 52f
Counterfactual Conditional/reference/Representation/Fodor: Thesis: to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditionals. Asymmetric dependence - Cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. ---
III 54
Reference by causal attachment to the world. So also through images and mockups. - If not by cats, then not by pictures of cats. ---
III 56
Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". - N.B.: ultimately dependent on real cats. ---
III 57 Fodor: if not pictures, then also not cats as a trigger. - PutnamVs.
---
III 61
Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x - FodorVs. that leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. ---
III 64
PutnamVs: E.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". - A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence - because there is no world with witches - however, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. - N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law. - (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). ---
III 65
PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. ---
III 69
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause - otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior - but right vice versa - (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). - FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?) - PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. ---
III 78
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: cannot reduce them with the help of the terms law, counterfactual conditionals, causality. ---
III 133
Reference/Fodor. according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference: individual sciences or everyday language causality. ---
III 140
Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. It cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. ---
III 208
Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. - It is only subject to causal restrictions. ---
V 75
Reference: Thesis: Input is shaped by concepts. - There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. ---
V 79
Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): Problem: what actually is reference - Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. ---
I 34
Reference: if it is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. ---
I 35
Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed markings - Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. ---
I 65
Reference: in logic: that what corresponds to the description - Field: has shown that this does not fulfill the task. ---
I 67ff
Primitive Reference/Putnam: E.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): in fact, feelings of the beings themselves - amounts to causal theory of reference - when expanded to absent, past, future objects not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. ---
I 69
Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic) - that would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. - It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers - N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. ---
I 70
Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. - +> Gricean intention> Intention. - - -
Rorty I 312
(According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this.
---
Rorty IV 20 ff
Rorty: relation/Putnam: early: only causal theory of reference (not intentional). Can save us from relativism. ---
Rorty VI 123
Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: The description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vsdifferentiation "Intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reliability Theory Schiffer
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 83
SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow". Coal - (for Mentalese) - even under "optimal conditions" - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. ---
I 83ff
Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/Relation Theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect. - Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to Arthritis that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). - Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). - Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff (a preferred balance of) the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function, this is neither sufficient nor necessary. - We do not know by which attribution function the speaker goes. - Like > Quaddition. ---
I 87
Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics : There is no difference between two attribution functions (a) correct addition, b) Quaddition). - Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. ---
I 104
SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations "arthritis"> shmarthritis. - Solution: there must be an "excellent role". ---
I 104
Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - probability that M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. - (S), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) ---
I 105
Field: if functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Representation Cresswell
 
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II 50
Meaning / Cresswell: Thesis: meanings are not representations, neither internal nor other - CresswellVsFodor - although that is a strong tradition in the AI research.
II 160
Belief / Representation / Cresswell: representations are in the head (private) - therefore not accessible to the speaker who attributes the propositional attitudes - therefore belief should be something else.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Representation Fodor
 
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Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations (representations) represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Fodor IV ~ 122
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts.
IV 124
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: Representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude - but the content must not depend neither metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. -
IV 126
Representation/Tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. - so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. - Representations are not used for anything - Computation/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality.
V 128
Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. - the representations themselves are also inaccessible to RI.
IV 127f
Interpretation: Objects not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc.
IV 201
Representation/Neurophysiological/Mind/Brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red as aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its diagrams. - (VsConnectionism).
Newen/Schrenk I 133
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations - VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. - Representation: preconceptual - e.g. spatial orientation.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation (Presentation) Fodor
 
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Rorty I 269 ff
Rationality/Fodor/Rorty: rationality: at least some properties of the language of thought must be represented in the language of thought, because the ability to represent representations is probably a necessary pre-condition for the ability to manipulate representations in a rational way. ((s) makes language of thought unnecessary: self-reference could also be implemented differently. One would only have to postulate something that is self-referential.)
Rorty I 269 ff
Fodor: representations in the processors are not pictures, but propositions in relation to which the subject has attitudes. Unless they fall under Sellars critique of the empirical fact concept. However, these representations are not necessarily propositions in relation to which the subject has attitudes. Rather, the attitudes of the object lead to the propositions.
Rorty I 269 ff
DennettVsFodor: two subjects can absolutely believe the same, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Thus, it requires no conclusions from the propositions of processors to the propositions the subject will believe. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricist concept, the causal process does not require any chain of inferences to suit it and to justify the opinions of the person.
Explanations may have a private character, justification is public in as far as differences of opinion between different persons do not refer to the functioning of their tricky heads nor should refer to it.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation (Presentation) Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 245
RortyVsFodor: he confuses two meanings of "representation": I can be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning, for which this is not true.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Semantics Brandom
 
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I 297
Brandom's thesis understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. ---
II 145
Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions). ---
II 146
Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics ((s) otherwise circular?) - epistemology is its suitable working area. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics - justifying "the correctness of e.g. if A is located east of B, B is located west of A" - by the meaning of - west - and - east -". ---
I 162
West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski s truth concept too weak) - "correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Semantics Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
I 6
Semantics/Semantic theories/Gärdenfors: two traditions:
A) Realistic theories: deal with whole sentences and takes the building blocks (individuals and predicates) as given.
B) Cognitive theories: they are more concerned with individual words and their meanings. They place people in the center.
---
I 277
VsFodor: the cognitive approach is directed against modular theories such as those of Fodor (Fodor 1983). ---
I 198
Semantics/Gärdenfors: I assume a general cognitive framework to reach conclusions in relation to semantics. Most of the other authors instead assume generalizations about a limited set of linguistic data.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Situations Katz
 
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Eco II 118
Situation/Semantik/Katz/Fodor/Eco: nach Katz und Fodor dürfen die semantischen Komponenten, um interpretiert zu werden, nicht von der Situation oder dem Umstand (die sie settings nennen) abhängen dürfen, in denen der Satz ausgesprochen wird. Sie zeigen nämlich, verschiedene mögliche Lesarten auf, die Theorie will aber nicht festlegen,
II 119
wie und warum der Satz ihn dem einen oder dem anderen Sinn gebraucht werden muss. Eindeutigkeit/Katz/Fodor: die Theorie kann zwar erklären, ob ein Satz verschiedenen Sinn hat, nicht aber, unter welchen Umständen er seine Zweideutigkeit verlieren muss.
EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. Wenn man bei den distinguishers Halt mach, dann ermisst man nicht alle Konnotationsmöglichkeiten des Lexems.
2. Sowohl die semantic markers als auch die distinguishers sind Zeichen oder Zeichengruppen, die dazu dienen, das Anfangszeichen zu interpretieren. (>Problem der Interpretation).
3. Der Stammbaum von Katz/Fodor erkennt die gewöhnlich von einem Wörterbuch festgelegten Intensionen an. Der Code fällt also mit dem Wörterbuch zusammen. Die Existenz von besonderen Konventionen und Codes, die etwa andere Verzweigungen vorschlagen, wird nicht
II 120
berücksichtigt, ebenso wenig wie die Tatsache, dass in ein und derselben Gemeinschaft verschiedene Formen der Verzweigung nebeneinander bestehen können.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Eco I
U. Eco
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Subjectivity Davidson
 
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I 101
Subjectivity/Davidson: it is a mistake to assume our subjective states could be independent from the rest of the world in that way as they are. ---
I 103
Subjectivity/fulfillment/short-beaked echidna/porcupine/hedgehog/Fodor: fulfillment by subjective condition: thought about animals that meet certain general criteria (exactly the ones we use for the decision). ---
I 104
DavidsonVsFodor: these states do not exist - instead: history of learning the word. ---
I 105
Subjectivity/stitch: scientific psychology: mental states are rather propositional, but not in direct connection with wishes, beliefs , etc. - but for the explanation of behavior, subjectively only as characteristic for the person - this must not be able to state the state. ---
I 105f
Subjectivity/Davidson: Summary: 1. Mental states identified by a social context - as sunburn by the sun - 2. Nevertheless, both physical - 3. That mental states are identified by causal relationships with the objects is essential for communication. 4. VsSeparation Scheme/content: Cartesian: mind passive observer - 5. no "objects of thought" - thoughts are private, yet they belong to the common world - the mere possibility of thoughts demands common standards of truth and objectivity. ---
Frank I 626ff
Myth of the subjective/DavidsonVsPrivate Language: according to the myth each subject looks at his private objects - Vs: Ideas only have truth conditions when they represent something, that is, when they are interpretable.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Verificationism Esfeld
 
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I 62 ~
Holism / FodorVsQuine: Verificationism refers to Verbal - confirmation holism in cotrast contrast on cross-language: propositions - EsfeldVsFodor: beliefs combine both.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002


The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fodor Vs Analyticity
 
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IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Gradual Analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded.
IV 185
Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well.
Question: Is this also possible with systematicity (Systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity together?
Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts?
E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa.
E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?.
E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John?.
29 IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: You may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (camp), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages ​​are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity:
IV 245
E.g. "Brown Cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar".
Fodor/Lepore IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions?. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!".
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Burge, T. Stalnaker Vs Burge, T.
 
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II 171
Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term?
II 187
Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975m Fodor 1981a
Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987
Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983.
Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states.
Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects.
Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation.
II 188
Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically.
Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties.
Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence
StalnakerVsFodor:
a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers.
But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis.
Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis.
StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis.
Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor:
Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g.
h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up,
II 189
t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior.
StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic).
II 193
Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose.
II 194
Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow.
Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself.
Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and
II 195
I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal?
2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content?
3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts?

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Chomsky, N. Dennett Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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I 513
Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even Fodor. Also McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian.
Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould.
I 533
Cognitive lock / DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world.
I 534
Consciousness / DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today.   Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret.
I 556
DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for "strong AI".

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Collins, A.W. Fodor Vs Collins, A.W.
 
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Cresswell II 157
Sentence/Reason/Mental Object/Collins/Cresswell: (Collins 1979, 225f) Thesis: sentences are mental particulars. ((s) VsCompositionality). Problem: but everything that can have a truth value (true value) must be a universal.
Mental Events/Collins: here we need temporality.
Truth/Collins: the carriers of truth and falsehood need propositionality instead of temporality. (CollinsVsFodor).
Cresswell: this corresponds to Frege’s distinction between idea and thought.
FodorVsCollins: He is right, but if we believe something, then there is a representation in us that semantic properties.
CresswellVsFodor: he makes use of a confusion of object and content.
Belief/Relation Theory/Fodor/Cresswell: his proof that belief is relational (1981, 178-181) is in fact a proof that "believes" relates a person with a content (not an object).
Belief Object/Fodor/Cresswell: Fodor also has other arguments for belief objects.
Object/Content/Cresswell: I just want to say that once this distinction has been made, it does not answer the question what the "content" is that objects are described. (Order/Distinction: if A and B are different, a description of A does not help to understand B).
II 159
Belief/Collins: (1979, 420): Thesis: can be no internal state, because if I want to find out if I believe p, this is indistinguishable from the procedure that I would use to determine p and different from the procedure I would use if I’m in a particular internal state or not. Semantics/Stages/McGinn/Cresswell: McGinn (1982) Thesis: Semantics has several stages. Lately, this thesis has found several followers.
Cresswell: this certainly involves a distinction between the object and content. Because then it is about two things: the explanation of truth conditions and explanation of the role of linguistic thinking in our mental life.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Compositionality Fodor Vs Compositionality
 
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IV 64/65
Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W.
Problem: if it’s really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language! I.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But:
Non-Compositional Language/Non-Recursive/Recursive/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like
It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc., but not:
"Snow is white and grass is green" or
"Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc.
We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences.
It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white.
So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect).
IV 66
E.g. Suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary".
1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold"
2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary".
We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1.
Nevertheless: if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his statements.
Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound chains.)
Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold?
T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. grass is green.
Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none.
It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem:
 IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!"
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Dennett, D. Fodor Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Dennett I 570
Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. Eye of the frog: reports about meaning are too unexact if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply can not distinguish what was the selecting environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says.
- - -
Fodor/Lepore IV 142
Def Normativism/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: a being should be represented as one that has such intentional states as they are appropriate in the circumstances. And the wishes that match its interests. There are two directions as to why it should be related to the theory of interpretation: 1) because some of attribution principles should be normative, 2) at least some of the principles are idealized and heuristic. They will not be met by intentional systems of flesh and blood. Fodor/LeporeVsDennett/VsNormativism of intentional states: we question both. ad 1) So now, what principles? Here, Dennett does not differ from Davidson and Lewis.
IV 143
Let’s consider the following Principles of Charity/PoC: 1) principle of truth: necessary, intentional attributions are mostly true. (Davidson, Lewis, Dennett)
2) consistency principle: necessary, most intentional attributions are coherent. (Davidson, Lewis, Dennett)
3) containedness principle, unity principle: neccessary; if a creature believes P and P contains Q, one must assume that it believes both (only Davidson)
4) adequacy principle: most creatures want for themselves what is good for them. (All authors).
IV 144
Evolution Theory/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: his evolutionary assumptions are dubious:
IV 145
The fact that a system has been selected evolutionarily does not mean that all of its subsystems are as well! It is not obvious that a system which believes most things correctly has a development advantage! (see Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason). Note
5)> IV 145
VsDennett: it is simply not true that if we find a being with an intentional structure, it must exist because of a selection.
IV 146/147
Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) so the hermeneutic status of attribution of intentional attitudes (to us) seems to be derived from the corresponding hermeneutic status of attribution of biological functions (to mental states). Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 2) It is not clear what purposes the thesis of the theory of interpretation (that there are no intentional states) will serve in biology.
IV 150
Forecast/Forecast Capacity/Predictability/Consistency/Rationality/Explanation/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: The possibility of forecast does not need to be based on the assumption of rationality, it can also simply be based on identified regularity.
I 154
Normativism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but his normativism is based on the principle of charity. Vs: but the evolutionary argument makes the relation between interpretation and charity contingent.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dodwell, P.C. Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 258
Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer.
I 259
VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware.
The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine.
I 259
Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value.
I 260
The idea of ​​a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them.
DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements!
Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (see Brandom).
Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual.
Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs).
I 261
Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway)
Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls.
Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside.
Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology:
As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character.
I 262
No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology!
Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain.
(Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.)
RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea:
I 263
if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement:
Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain.
The latter is doubtful.
RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself.
Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs.
Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle.
I 263/264
It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?").
I 265
Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid.
I 266
For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills:
RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations.
At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs).
Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature.
Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes.
Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Brandom Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 731
BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle.
II 12
Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor.   BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states.
Esfeld I 71
FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below. - - -
NS I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: kehrt die herkömmliche Semantik um. Statt wie die Semantik anzunehmen, dass die Korrektheit des Schlusses Bsp „Wenn Princeton östlich von Pittsburgh liegt, liegt Pittsburgh westlich von Princeton“ durch die Bedeutung von „östlich“ und „westlich“ zu begründen,
NS I 162
Führt er eine kopernikanische Wende durch: Brandom: These: „westlich“ und „östlich“ erhalten ihre Bedeutung gerade, weil sie in solchen Folgebeziehungen vorkommen. Das ganze Netz von Satzäußerungen, in denen die Worte vorkommen, und auch die entsprechenden Handlungen konstituieren den begrifflichen Gehalt der Worte.
Inferentialismus/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: sieht nicht Wahrheit und nicht Referenz als fundamentale bedeutungskonstituierende Einheiten an.
Korrektheit/Brandom: welche Folgerungen aus welchen Äußerungen korrekt sind, wird pragmatisch über die durch implizite Regeln geleitete soziale Praxis festgelegt.
Bedeutung/Holismus/Brandom: die Bedeutung von Begriffen und Äußerungen erwächst aus ihren inferentiellen Rollen zu anderen Begriffen und Äußerungen, daher sind sie nicht atomistisch sondern holistisch. (BrandomVsFodor).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Fodor, J. Churchland Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Patricia Churchland
Lanz I 303
Learning / Fodor: represent and examine hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the innate "language of thought" (Mentalese): acquisition of the native language. ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one can not learn new concepts in a certain sense.
If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere. Must then for every opinion also a tacit record be saved in the "language of thought"? That would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage would not be sufficient for the sentences to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the links must be transparent for the organism (though not the consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese).

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014
Fodor, J. Davidson Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 36
DavidsonVsFodor/Dennett/Kaplan/Stich: I for my part believe that the concepts of the belief, desire, intent, etc. are not suitable for a science of the type of physics. One of the reason for this is that mental states are identified in part on the basis of their causes and effects. The same is true, however, for human behavior. Therefore, I see no chance to offer scientific explanations in terms of it. Not to describe behavior as a law in analogy to physics. Even Jerry Fodor thinks (like Searle) that holism or the indeterminacy of translation constitutes a threat for the realism with respect to the prop. att.s
DavidsonVsFodor: The same error: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal.
II 139
A suitable law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. Whether there can be such a bridge laws, according to Davidson is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori.
II 135
The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and physicalistic discourse show a general incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates essentially include normativity. Therefore, no bridge laws possible. (> anomalous monism, > have incidents of reasons, not caused).
Anomalous monism/AM: mental incident tokens are as individual each identical with physical incident tokens, but without mental incident types being nomologically identical with the types of physical incidents.
II 147
Fodor: Mental or physical incidents are covered by different laws, i.e. they have different effects. That means, intentionalist descriptions mark a causally important difference.  DavidsonVsFodor: To say that this difference is ultimately owing to the physical nature is absurd, because the causal relations are description-independent.
- - -
Rorty VI 162
Mind/Davidson/Rorty: false concept of the mind: with private states and objects. Source of the harmful dualisms scheme/content, objective/subjective
VI 163
DavidsonVsFodor/Rorty: the scientific nature of psychology turns into a search for internal propositional states that should be independent of the rest of the world.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Dennett Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 533
Cognitive Barrier/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings.
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today.
I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret.
Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. eye of the frog: reports about meaning too vague if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Dennett.
I 571
Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply cannot distinguish what was the selectioning environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says. Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the uncertainty that Fodor criticizes is in reality the material with which evolution works, its condition. (the "borderline cases").
I 571
Meaning/Meaning/Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the view that there must be something in particular which the frog’s eye "means" is simple essentialism.
I Lanz 299
DennettVsFodor: denies Fodor’s assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing personal states. Thus, Dennett denies their feature: Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). - - -
Rorty I 279
DennettVsFodor/Rorty: two subjects can absolutely believe the same thing, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Accordingly, no conclusions are required from the propositions of the processors to the propositions which the subject believes. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricists, the causal process does not need to comply with any conclusion chain, which justifies the opinions of the person. Explanations may have their private character, justification is public in as far as disagreements of different people on the functioning of their tricky minds neither refer nor should refer.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Goodman Vs Fodor, J.
 
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IV 141
GoodmanVsFodor: Contemporary theorists assert that language proficiency is based on a dictionary and a grammar inside the consciousness. (Chomsky, GoodmanVs) The mental dictionary defines the meaning of the individual words. The mental grammar defines the manner in which the meanings of significant word sequences are derived from the meanings of their constituents.
IV 143
As if the consciousness were a digital computer. The charm lies in the seductive analogy to everyday machines and even the computer. According to Jerry Fodor, the computer is the only model of consciousness at our disposal. But introspection does not bring us even remotely close to a verification: the proponents of the view to be tested admit that access to the internal code is a deeply unconscious process. The reason for the belief that it does occur is that it is embedded in a high-performing linguistic theory. We are to believe that speakers "have access" to an internal syntactic and semantic code, and that is due to an analogy to the mutual attraction of bodies. I can know that ’elm’ and ’beech’ are separate classes of deciduous trees without having an idea of how to tell them apart.
Goodman: my language proficiency is not endangered by my ignorance. I can connect with other members of the linguistic community to fill my gaps. In addition, the knowledge in question is not primarily linguistic, here is rather botanical or biographical.
Fodor gives in on this point, and draws the conclusion that the dictionary is referentially opaque. His entries define the concepts in which we think, but not what we think about.
IV 144
The analogy to the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer-like interpretation.
I 145
Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. - Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction - But according to Fodor, this is exactly our situation in terms of sentences that we understand. - Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate according to the computer-like reading. Fodor’s theory can neither explain how we know what new phrases rep nor what trusted ones rep. The role of the dictionary has emerged to serve other purposes. The linguists cannot explain understanding of metaphorical language.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Fodor, J. Harman Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Cresswell II 160
Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: the language of the thoughts is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56).

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Fodor, J. Lewis Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Block I 215
Pain/Lewis (VsFodor) can be analytically understood as a condition with a certain causal role. (Functionalism). Functionally uncharacterized condition, not a functional state. For example, a functionally uncharacterized brain state. "Pain" can then pick out a neurophysiological state. So he is committed to the assertion that to have pain = the state of this certain causal role.

- - -
Schwarz I 171
"Naturalization of the content"//Representation/Schwarz: Thesis: Mental representations are insofar alike sentences that their content can be explained by compositionality. [in dass mentale Repräsentationen soweit satzartig sind, dass man ihren Inhalt kompositional erklären kann.] (vgl. Fodor 1990). LewisVsFodor: principally misguided: only causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if, e.g. the wish to eat mushroom soup, is the beautiful addition of the wish for soup and the wish for mushroom. Because if it is reversely a wish for mushroom soup if the wish plays the exact causal role, regardless of how the wish is constituted. [grundsätzlich verfehlt: nur kausale Rolle im Alltagsleben (Verhalten) ist relevant. Selbst wenn Bsp der Wunsch nach Pilzsuppe sich wunderschön aus Wunsch nach Suppe und Wunsch nach Pilz zusammensetzt. Denn ist es umgekehrt ein Wunsch nach Pilzsuppe, wenn er genau die kausale Rolle spielt, egal, woraus er sich zusammensetzt.] (1994b,320f)
Imagining creatures which do not represent like sentences. [Man kann sich genauso gut Wesen vorstellen, die nicht satzartig repräsentieren] (vgl. Armstrong 1973,Kap 1, Braddon Mitchell/Jackson 1996, Kap. 10f).
Lewis' theory shall also be valid for this possible word, and shall also explain what determines the content.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Fodor, J. Pinker Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 46
PinkVsFodor: his concept of module is too strongly delimited. Better Chomsky: "mental organ", tailored for specific functions.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Fodor, J. Putnam Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Pauen V 228
Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs.
---
V 229
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens.
E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts.
The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors.
Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes.
---
Putnam III 56ff
Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). ---
III 57
This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really?
VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!?
If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical.
FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind.
---
III 58
VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional).
---
III 59
Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference.
The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions.
---
III 60
E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible.
FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions.
---
III 61
But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs).
FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics.
---
III 62
FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches.
---
III 63
A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks.
---
III 67 ff
Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. ---
III 68
Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language.
According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks.
---
III 69
PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. ---
III 70
FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality).
---
III 71
Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values.
---
III 73
Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. ---
III 74
FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics.
FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal."
---
III 78
Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). ---
III 79/80
PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects.
---
Putnam I 269
Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Rorty Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 245
Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply.
I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of ​​the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of ​​a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned!
Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)
I 277
Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>Kripke).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Searle Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
FN
I 283
SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)
- - -
III 139
Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor).
To enable: should therefore be a causal concept.
Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here.
III 142
Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Fodor, J. Williams, B. Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Putnam III 106 ff
WilliamsVsFodor: materialistische Weltanschauung, während er durchaus einsieht, dass Fodors Reduktionismus des Intentionalen auf das Nicht Intentionale aussichtslos ist. Williams lehnt Kuhns Gedanken der Inkommensurabilität ab.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Fodor, J. Schiffer Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 80
SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it.
infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong.
Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever Fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear
1. that they will never be fulfilled
2. that we have no idea what they should be
3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary
4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…)
I 81
SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?.
Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!.
I 82
Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Fodor, J. Peacocke Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 208
Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values ​​of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L".
PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there.
E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell.
I 209
But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time.
In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from.
Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing.
Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs.
Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about
e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions.
But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands.
Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions:
1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) ​​states.
2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior.
- - -
I 215
Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ.
Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C.
Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent.
That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations!
The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ".
The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures.
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".
I 215/216
Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism
b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that
c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and
c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes.
d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties.
VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either:
1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or:
2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Fodor, J. Cresswell Vs Fodor, J.
 
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II 53
Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say".
---
II 54
CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. ---
II 55
Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said
Causal role/Fodor/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes.
---
II 56
Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) Meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then Fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in Fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsFodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has.
---
II 159
Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Fodor, J. Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
II 176
Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48):
C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth,
C’: by myself in the actual world.
Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.).
So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions.
StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer.
II 177
StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C.
C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin.
Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled.
StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property.
StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property.
My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, ....
Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable.
narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else?
StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found!
Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content.
- - -
II 180
Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject.
Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject!
StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play.
Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content.
StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content.
Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…)
- - -
II 188
Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically.
Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties.
Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence
StalnakerVsFodor:
a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers.
But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis.
Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger.
StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis.
Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor:
Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g.
h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up,
II 189
t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle.
StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic).

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Fodor, J. Vendler Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 240
A priori/Fodor/Katz: die Methoden der Bestätigung und Widerlegung können weder den Philosophen vor dem Linguisten auszeichnen, noch den Philosophen selbst. A priori/VendlerVsFodor: dieser ist sich der Schwierigkeiten nicht bewusst, die sich aus der Behauptung ergeben, philosophische Aussagen seien a priori gültig.
Wenn Fodor und Katz recht hätten, würde die wissenschaftliche Linguistik dahin tendieren, die linguistische Philosophie zu ersetzen.
I 241
Linguistik/VendlerVsFodor: kann niemals dieselben Methoden wie die Philosophie haben. Sie hat auch einen anderen logischen Status. Philosophie der Sprache/Fodor/Katz: sollte nur als Philosophie der Linguistik konzipiert werden.
Das wird von Katz später widerrufen.

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Fodor, J. Pauen Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Pauen V 223
VsFodor/Pauen: unjustified preferential treatment of the computer analogy over the neural networks. It is disputed whether mental representation must always have a language-like form. Stock: Kosslyn/PomerantzVsFodor: pictorial representation.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Newen Vs Fodor, J.
 
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NS I131
Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis
2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm.
Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
NS I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states.
Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax).
It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories.
VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language.
NS I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early."
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed.
Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills.
- -
NS I 160
Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional.
Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate.
VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow."
NS I 161
Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case.
VsFodor:
1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried.
FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept!
Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Fodor, J. Ramsey Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Schurz I 215
Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/Verstärkung/verstärkt/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Vorschlag, den CS zu verstärken: indem der Theorie unterstellt wird, sie würde implizit postulieren, dass die Referenz ihrer theoretischen Termini (TT) in der actual world eindeutig bestimmt sei. Pointe: damit wird der analytische Gehalt einer Theorie durch folgende lokale „Definitionen“ mit Hilfe bestimmter Kennzeichnungen der TT dargestellt:
Kennzeichnung als Definition/Lewis: Bsp τi bezeichnet das i-th term des eindeutigen n-Tupels von Entitäten, das in der actual world die Behauptung T(X1,...Xn) erfüllt. (1970.87f)
PapineauVsLewis: seine These, dass wissenschaftliche Theorien mit Existenz und Eindeutigkeitsbehauptungen für die Referenz der TT einhergehen, ist selbst dann zweifelhaft, wenn sie realistisch interpretiert wird. Instrumentalistisch: ist sie unhaltbar. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5).
Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition per Deskription (Beschreibung, Kennzeichnung) sind nicht vollwertig, sondern nur partiell, weil sie die Extension der TT nur in solchen möglichen Welten bestimmen, in denen die zugrundeliegende Existenz bzw. Eindeutigkeitsannahme erfüllt ist.
I 216
TT/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: die Bestimmung der Bedeutung der TT ist zirkulär. Def semantischer Theorienholismus/Schurz: These: die Bedeutung der TT wird durch die Bedeutung der Theorie bestimmt.
Lösung/Ramsey-Sntence/RS/CS/Schurz:
RS/CS/Holism/Bedeutung/Zirkel/Schurz: die Methode der Konjunktion von RS und CS ist die Lösung für den Vorwurf der Zirkularität von FodorVsHolismus.
a) Einerseits: ist wegen der Kompositionalität die Bedeutung von T(t1,...tn) durch die Bedeutung der TT (nebst der Bedeutung der anderen Begriffe von T) bestimmt,
b) Andererseits: folgt aus dem semantischen Theorienholismus, dass die Bedeutung der TT durch die Bedeutung der Theorie bestimmt ist.
FodorVs: das ist ein Zirkel
RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Lösung: der Ramsey Satz R(T) lässt sich verstehen, ohne eine unabhängige Bedeutungskenntnis der TT vorauszusetzen, und der CS bzw. die Lewis Definitionen fügen hinzu, die Bedeutung der TT liegt darin, jene Entitäten zu bezeichnen, die die Behauptung der Theorie erfüllen.
((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): besagt, dass die Bedeutung der TT in der Bezeichnung der Entitäten liegt, die die Theorie erfüllen.)

Rams I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Lewis, D. Dennett Vs Lewis, D.
 
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I Lanz 299
DennettVsFodor: Fodor denies the assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing persons states. Therefore Dennett denies their feature. Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis).

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
McGinn, C. Cresswell Vs McGinn, C.
 
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II 160
Belief/McGinn/Cresswell: (McGinn 1982, 216): combines two elements:
1) the causal element
2) the truth conditions. Cresswell: he seems to represent that at least some sentences with propositional attitudes depend on representations in the whole sentence.
Representation/Belief/CresswellVsMcGinn/CresswellVsFodor: I have put forward good reasons in the text above for the fact that no specific representations are involved. For these are "in the head", and therefore private, and therefore not accessible to the speaker ((s) to the speaker, who attributes a propositional attitude, e.g. "Ralph believes ...").

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Mentalesese Peacocke Vs Mentalesese
 
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I 212
PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. Disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra).
There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone!
Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs!
It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present.
"Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them.
Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious.
I 213
Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa.
In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required!
There is only the modus tollendo ponens.
PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations?
If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese.
Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse).
It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately.
Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax).
I 213/214
Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module.
Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states.
This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.")
The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself.
I 215
Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessarily apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Ordinary Language Fodor Vs Ordinary Language
 
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II 123
FodorVsOrdinary language: das zwingt den Philosophen der Alltagssprache, immer mehr bei den Intuitionen Zuflucht zu suchen.
II 124
Insbesondere wird er in Anspruch nehmen, Anomalien intuitiv zu erkennen und zu sagen, ein philosophisches Problem sei dann gelöst, wenn Anomalien erkannt seien. (Cavell behauptet das!). FodorVsCavell: Widerspruch: er meint also, dass es in der philosophischen Praxis darauf ankommt, Wörter nicht falsch zu verwenden und zugleich meint er, dass er mit Hilfe der Intuitionen entscheiden kann, wann ein Wort falsch gebraucht wird.
Wenn es intuitiv auch klar sein mag, wann ein Wort anomal ist, so genügt es für philosophische Zwecke nicht zu wissen, dass es anomal ist, es kann aus vielen Gründen anomal sein, von denen einige nicht fehlerhaft sind!
Bsp Wenn man dem Metaphysiker vorwirft, dass er die Sprache falsch verwendet, wird er zu recht antworten: "Na und?"
Außerdem können wir von einer Bedeutungstheorie nicht verlangen, dass sie jede Äußerung, die ein theoretisch ungeschulter Sprecher anomal nennt, auch von der Theorie so bewertet wird.
II 125
Die Theorie sollte vielmehr nur semantische Verletzungen bestimmen.
II 126
FodorVsIntuitionen: Entscheidungen über Ungewöhnlichkeiten (Anomalien) sind in keiner Weise zu extrapolieren, wenn sie sich nur auf Intuitionen gründen. Dann haben wir gar keine Theorie, sondern nur überanstrengte Intuitionen. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary languageVsFodor: könnte kontern, dass wir das Prinzip ignoriert hätten, ähnliche Fälle mit ähnlichen Methoden zu behandeln.
FodorVsVs: das geht an der Sache vorbei: die relevante Ähnlichkeit angeben heißt gerade, genau die Erzeugungsregeln zu bestimmen.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Ordinary Language Positivism Vs Ordinary Language
 
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Fodor II 118
PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties.
II 123
FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions.
II 124
In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused.
Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty!
E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?"
Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory.
II 125
The theory should rather only determine semantic violations.
II 126
FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods.
FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules.
III 222
Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements)
Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations.
Type III Statement: Generalizations.
Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world).
Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language).
Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act.
Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense.
III 223
Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Physicalism Cresswell Vs Physicalism
 
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II 163
CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReductionism: I do not see how principles of semantics could somehow be traced back to principles of physics or psychology - CresswellVsFodor/CresswellVsToken physicalism.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Esfeld I 62
FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both.
Fodor II 114
Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar.
Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely:
IV 52
Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.).
IV 76/77
Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note
IV 237
13> IV 157 o
Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!.
IV 218
Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Ryle, G. Fodor Vs Ryle, G.
 
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II 118
Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking.
Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.
Rorty I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here you have make do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it’s just the notion of ​​the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this!. Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned!
Either 1) the infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have a unlearned ability.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Reductionism Versus Cresswell II 163
CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReduktionismus: ich sehe nicht, wie Prinzipien der Semantik irgendwie auf Prinzipien der Physik oder der Psychologie zurückgeführt werden könnte -" CresswellVsFodor/ CresswellVsTokenphysikalismus -"

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Representation Versus Cresswell II 53
CresswellVsFodor: Bedeutungen sind keine Repräsentationen irgendeiner Art -"

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
Chinese Room Pro Pauen I 149
Chinese room/Searle: SearleVsFodor.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Representation Cresswell, M.J.
 
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II 50
Bedeutung/Cresswell: These Bedeutungen sind keine Repräsentationen, weder innere noch sonstige. CresswellVsFodor.
II 53
prop Einst/Fodor: (Fodor , 1981, 177 -" 203, 177): These prop Einst müssen als Relationen zwischen Organismen und internen Repräsentationen aufgefaßt werden.
II 54
CresswellVsFodor: semantisch aufgefaßt, ist seine These falsch.
II 185
Repräsentation/Bild/Sober/Cresswell: These bildliche Repräsentation ist nicht so verschieden von sprachlicher, wie man oft denkt.
Meaning Fodor, J.
 
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Cresswell II 56
Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: Thesis: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor: Problem: for an attribution of a thought I have to have the same representation in my head - it must be the same belief as the one he has - (see. above: meanings are not representations ).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Counterfact. Condit. Fodor, J.
 
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Put III 52f
Counterfactual conditional / reference / Fodor: Attempt to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditional principles. "Asymmetric dependence".   (trigger of singular assertions (characters) of "Cat").
  III 58
  VsFodor: that is not convincing. It might be better to say that the characters would sometimes be triggered. Then you could object that the thesis is too weak. You would probably say that the proposition could be true, but is not "law-like".
Mentalese Fodor, J.
 
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Cresswell II 55
Mentalesisch/prop Einst/Fodor: These ein Glaubenssatz ist ein Satz in der Gedankensprache des Sprechers. CresswellVsFodor: Problem;: dann müssen der ursprüngliche Sprecher und der Sprecher der Zuschreibung denselben Satz in Mentalesisch in ihrem inneren System haben;
Newen/Schrenk I 131
Mentalesisch /Sprache der Gedanken/Gedankensprache/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literatur 9-8): These das Medium des Denkens ist eine Sprache des Geistes (-žlanguage of thought-œ). Viele empirische Phänomene sind nur mit Annahme von mentalen Repräsentationen erklärbar, Bsp wahrnehmungsbasierte Überzeugungen.
I 132
Sprache/Fodor: zu ihr gehören Kompositionalität und Produktivität. Denken/Fodor: These das Denken ist so angelebt, daß es alle Kerneigenschaften der natürlichen Sprache (von Intentionalität bis Systematizität) auch schon hat. Denken findet mit mentalen Repräsentationen statt. Bsp Benzinuhr, Tankanzeige, kausale Verbindung. Mentale Repräsentationen werden durch Hirnzustände realisiert.
I 215/216
Mentalesisch/Fodor: (Language of Thought, S.199) These man kann keine Konstruktion von Psychologie geben, ohne anzunehmen, daß Organismen eine sachgemäße Beschreibung als Instantiation (Verkörperung) eines anderen formalen Systems besitzen: "Sachgemäß" erfordert: a) es muß eine allgemeine Prozedur für die Zuschreibung von Zeichenformeln (assigning formulae) zu Zuständen des Organismus geben
b) für jede prop Einst muß es einen kausalen Zustand des Organismus geben, so daß
c1) der Zustand als Relation zu einer Formel interpretierbar ist und
c2) es nomologisch notwendig und hinreichend ist, (oder kontingent identisch) dafür, diese prop Einst zu haben.
d) Mentale Repräsentationen haben ihre kausalen Rolle kraft ihrer formalen Eigenschaften.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
Propos. Attitude Fodor, J.
 
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Cresswell II 53
Propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): Thesis: propositional attitude must be conceived as relations between organisms and internal representations.
II 54
CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Mentalese Harman, G.
 
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Cresswell II 160
Gedankensprache/Mentalesisch/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) These die Sprache der Gedanken ist einfach die öffentliche Sprache,. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56).
Schiffer I 74
Mentalesisch/Harman: (1978, 58) These es ist aber nicht unplausibel, anzunehmen, daß unsere inneren Zustände der Repräsentation -"Elemente und Struktur haben, in einer Weise, die analog ist zu der Weise in der Sätze Elemente und Struktur haben".

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Semantics McGinn, C.
 
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Cresswell II 159
Semantik/Stufen/McGinn/Cresswell: McGinn (1982) These Semantik hat mehrere Stufen. In letzter Zeit hat diese These mehrere Vertreter gefunden. Cresswell: dazu gehört sicher eine Unterscheidung zwischen Objekt und Inhalt. Denn dann geht es um zweierlei: um die Erklärung von WB und Erklärung der Rolle, die linguistisches Denken in unserem mentalen Leben spielt.
Cresswell: These die WB von Sätzen mit prop Einst werden bestimmt durch die Inhalte der Daß-Sätze. Das ist das einzige, um das es mir geht.
Inhalt/Repräsentation/CresswellVsFodor: ich bin überhaupt nicht überzeugt, daß Repräsentationen in Inhalten von prop Einst involviert sind.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Mentalese Rorty, R.
 
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I 277
Mentalese/ a priori / Fodor / RortyVsFodor: Fodor s thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we may at any time be wrong about it, so that we may be wrong about something priori for us. (> Kripke).

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mental Objects Collins, A.W.
 
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Cresswell II 157
Sentence / reason / mental object / Collins / Cresswell: (Collins 1979 225f) sentences are mental particulars ("causes" = reasons?). ((s) Vs compositionality).   Problem: anything that can have a truth value must be a universal.
  mental events / Collins: here we need temporality
  Truth / Collins: the carrier of truth and falsehood needs propositionality instead of temporality . (CollinsVsFodor).
  Cresswell: corresponding Frege’s distinction between idea and thought.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988