Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Dennett I 599
Searle, Fodor: E.g. freezing (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. Dennett: splitting hairs.
Fodor IV 14
Intentionality/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: Property T*: a belief only has it when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. - E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red. - Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has prop T* in relation to my thoughts. - Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red. - Another problem: change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. - Vsintentional laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich.
IV 127f
Belief not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality - instead: Representations.
IV 130
Intentional assignment: not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic - Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states - constitutive of faith: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p - but objects of intentional states may be contradictory.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-04-26