Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||
| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead. | |||
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Books on Amazon |
I 15 Chisholm thesis: primacy of intentionality before language. - - - Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 115 Intentionality / Brandl: that does not explain the attributive use ("Whoever it is") - instead use is explained by our knowledge of the language, therefore the primacy of intentionality is questionable. II 218 Primacy of the intentional / Chisholm: to understand the reference of language by the reference of thinking - Wittgenstein: Vs, but not unique. - II 219 linguistic turn: only shifts the problem - intentionality / Wittgenstein: W. has such aspects in his thinking, too. |
Chi I R. Chisholm Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chi III Roderick M. Chisholm Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23