|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Chisholm II 171
Identity/Simons: Thesis: differentiated objects may well have all parts in common: E.g. I and my body (ChisholmVs).
Simons I 113
Identity/individual/whole/part/whole/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that involves that whole are identical if they have the same parts, excludes those part-whole relations, in which the organization (organization, (s) internal structure) is involved - e.g. different sentences can consist of the same sentences - two I) and must not be identical if they have the same parts. - E.g. building committee = Personnel Committee - E.g. family Robinso = basketball team Robinson - E.g. Person/its body - N.B.: this is not about relations among themselves.
Definition coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a <_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004