Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Epistemology Vollmer I XX
EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz - two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory) - Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory) ---
I 16
Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective - with Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. ---
I 59
Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically - in contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water - VollmerVsLorenz: misleading terminology - solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil. ---
I 73
Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses. ---
I 173
Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? ---
I 293
Definition He: (1983.30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject - a) construct an internal image, b) compare the model with the stored engrams c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection - our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information - Stegmüller: three-digit relation: subject recognizes object as image. ---
I 296
Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge - knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. ---
I 310
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Identity Politics Klein Brocker I 933
Identity Policy/Naomi Klein: KleinVsIdentity Politics: it has provided capitalist exploitation with "great brand content and excellent marketing strategies": "If diversity was what we wanted, the brands seemed to say, then we would also get diversity"(1). Out of "voluntary blindness" the women's and civil rights movement had renounced its "radical economic foundations" through identity and representation politics: "We were so busy analysing the projections on the wall that we did not notice how the wall itself was sold".(2)


1. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Toronto 2000. (Tenth Anniversary Edition with a New Introduction by the Author, New York 32010.) Dt.: Naomi Klein, No Logo! Der Kampf der Global Players um Marktmacht – Ein Spiel mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern, Frankfurt/M. 2015 (zuerst 2001) p. 123
2. Ibid. p. 136


Christine Bauhardt, „Naomi Klein, No Logo! (2000)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Identity Theory Kripke Frank I 32
Mental/Physical/Kripke/Frank: Teaches the diversity of the logical subjects of the physical and the psychic - I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalistic one (semantic structures).
Frank I 32
KripkeVsIdentity theory: will not go further than that an identity between syntactic and semantic structures would, if at all, be based on the fact that the semantic is not without the syntactic, but this does not sufficiently determine it through the syntactic - which is a variant of the supervenience thesis.
Frank I 114
KripkeVsIdentity theory: conceivable that a psychic event (e.g. pain) occurs without a physical event - hence the two are not identical - it is not an essential property of the sensation of pain to be a psychic event - it is rather only an accidental property.
Frank I 123
KripkeVsIdentity theory: it asserts a contingent identity - however, as it is necessary, we cannot speak of a deception if we try to imagine that the identity statement is false! - It could have turned out that pain is not C fiber stimulation: this is no analogy to heat/molecular motion - we pick out heat because of its contingent property that it feels a certain way - we pick out pain by the necessary property to feel like pain - KripkeVsLewis: causal role suggests the misconception that the cause of pain is contingent.
Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Theory Quine II 209f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imaginable: pain without a brain condition - this is difficult to exclude for materialists. - QuineVsKripke: that is only difficult if the materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.
X 88
Identity Theory of Logic: Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory
Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x)))" ((s) symmetry of identity)
are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth.
Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates.
Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? See >Equal sign.
Identity/Logic/Quine: because of the logical truth you do not want to count identity to logic, but there are also reasons to associate it with logic:
X 89
The identity theory is complete, there are complete proof procedures for the quantum logic with identity. Identity Theory/Axioms/Goedel: if you add the axiom

(1) x = x
and the axiom scheme

(2) ~(x = y . Fx . ~Fy)

to a complete evidence procedure for the qunatum logic, this results in a complete evidence procedure for the quantum logic with identity.
Universality: this characteristic of identity theory also makes it closer to logic than to mathematics: it treats all objects without bias.
This suggests that identity theory and quantum logic are particularly fundamental.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Identity Theory Rorty Frank I 579
Identity Theory / Rorty: no strict identity but relationship the way it is between existing and not existing entities - his "disappearance" version shall replace the "translation theory" (Smart, Armstrong) - ultimately the language practise is crucial
Rorty I 136
Identity Theory / Rorty: RortyVsidentity theory also Vsidentity of body and mind - Solution: materialism without identity theory.

Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Theory Searle I 54
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: if it was true that C-fiber stimulation is pain, then the identity would be necessary - such as the one from heat and molecular motion - but it does not seem to apply, that pain is necessarily a certain brain state - Kripke: objection of common sense (Butler): nothing mental can be equated with anything non-mental, without skipping the mental - SearleVsKripke: Kripke is still a dualist. ---
I 56
Token/Token-identity theory/(Lewis)/Searle: cannot say as a materialist, that the commonality of people who believe that Denver is the capital of Colorado, is precisely this intellectual property because the materialist denies this - solution: function of neurophysiological state. Cf. >Type/Token-Identity. ---
I 56
SearleVsIdentity Theory: skips the mind - mind just there, and no problem at all. - LeibnizVsIdentity Theory: not all properties are identical: some are just physical, some mental.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Identity Theory Jackson Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Representation Pauen Pauen I 57
Representation/Unit/Wolf Singer/Pauen: representation of unity needs not to be a uniform representation - because the connection between different aspects is represented by synchronous firing.
I 217 ff
Representation/Pauen: Problem: naturalization of intentionality - I do not violate any laws of physics, if I confuse a cat with a dog - problem: the failure of the explanation would cast doubt on the existence of mental states. - Asymmetry: representation stands for an object, but not vice versa, the object for a representation - R are parts of the language of the mind - computer analogy: Symbols - propositional position: relations to symbols.
I 226
Causality problem: presentation in the absence of the object.
I 232
Representation/causal theory/VsDretske/Pauen: E.g. sunburn no representation of the sun.
I 233
E.g. indigestion no representation of spoiled food.
I 235
But a failure of strong naturalization does not result in an argument VsIdentity theory.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Kripke Vs Armstrong, D. Frank I 121
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: Does not fulfill this easiest requirement: Pain must be felt as pain, otherwise it is not a pain! Causal role: e.g. intention elicits action, pain, behavior when in pain. Identity theories/KripkeVsLewis/KripkeVsArmstrong: Usually assume that stimuli and causal roles change a particular brain state to a particular psychological state. This suggests erroneously that the representatives claim that this causation is contingent. Or that the identity of this brain state with different mental states is random.
Identity theory:
1. X is a brain condition 2. The fact is contingent that pain is being caused by a particular stimulus. (This sounds quite plausible after all) and evokes a certain behavior.
The brain state can now also exist without causing the appropriate behavior.
Thus, it seems that 1) and 2) claim that a certain pain could have existed without having been pain.
Identity/KripkeVsIdentity theory: if x = y, then x and y share all their properties. Including their modal characteristics.
E.g. if x is the pain and y is the brain state, it is an essential property of x to be a particular pain and an essential characteristic of y to be a particular brain state!
If the relationship between the two is indeed identity, then y needs to correspond to a particular pain, and x needs to correspond to a particular brain condition, namely y.
Both statements, however, seem to be wrong.


Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Eccles, J.C. Pauen Vs Eccles, J.C. Pauen I 52
Def Psychons/Eccles: the smallest elements of mental states. Their activity only changes the probability of the release of transmitters. Therefore no conflict with energy conservation. Solution: quantum-mechanical deviations. (>Consciousness/Penrose). Eccles/Pauen: with this he approaches substance dualism again! Psychons are not properties, but independent entities that instantiate consciousness.
Only dualism can ensure the free will (like Popper).
Eccles/Popper: Thesis: the self-conscious mind is busy actively modifying brain events in accordance with its interests.
Def Attachment Problem/Pauen: in view of the diversity of neuronal activity, the consistency of the first-person perspective can be explained only by the intervention of a conscious mind, but not by the neuronal activities.
I 53
Attachment Problem/Pauen: there are now concrete neuro-biological proposals for a solution. Attachment Problem/Eccles: brings empirical evidence: Libet. "Ability of self-conscious mind" to perform "temporal tricks".
Mind/Consciousness/Brain/Experiment/Benjamin Libet/Pauen: e.g. weak skin stimuli are only registered after 0.5 sec, but are dated back to the time when they actually occurred.
Mind/Brain/Experiment/Kornhuber: even in the complete absence of physical stimuli neuronal activity can be caused solely by mental processes.
EcclesVsMaterialism/EcclesVsIdentity Theory: unscientific superstition.
PauenVsEccles: it is unclear whether the undisputed effects of the ideal world 3 on the physical world 1 can only be explained under the assumption of the existence of autonomous mental processes.
E.g. If a glass breaks while a soprano singer is practicing, this explanation is inadmissible in any case!
I 54
E.g. congresses have undisputed physical procedures, but they can all be explained intra-physically. E.g. the energy balance in the congress center. The mere discovery of a new method does not bring the scientists together. Only if acts of will were found that cannot be explained neurobiologically, the position of the monists would be shaken.
I 55
VsEccles: he claims to possess such evidence, but the experiments by Libet and Kornhuber do not yield that: the results could only be evaluated as products of autonomous mental acts if physical causes can be excluded, and the experiments did not show that in the least. Since the brain has the ability to maintain activity for long periods even without external stimuli, also seemingly "spontaneous" reactions can be explained neurobiologically.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Identity Theory Burge Vs Identity Theory Frank I 673ff
BurgeVsIdentity theory: pro externalism: does not discredit the token identity theory, but the type-identity.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Theory Functionalism Vs Identity Theory Lanz I 287
Identity Theory/Lanz: identity theory identifies types of mental states with physically characterized types of brain states. According to this, a certain type of mental state (e.g. "having pain") must always be realized in the same neural structure.
FunctionalismVsIdentity Theory/Lanz: this is empirically implausible:
1. The brain has the ability to compensate for damage to its parts by other parts taking over the failed functions. (Split-Brain).
2. Two beings could be realized physiologically very differently (robots, Martians) and still have the same beliefs, wishes and expectations.
Horwich I 423
FunctionalismVsIdentity Thesis/PutnamVsIdentity Theory/Harman: must be rejected because of cases of e.g. reversed spectra. (Harman: elsewhere ("Conceputal role semantics", Notre dame Journal.of.Formal Logic, XXIII,2 April 1982, 242ff) Vs). Facts/Values/Rationality/Harman: the philosophical tradition assumes that morality and evaluation seem to depend in a different way on one or other set of standards (principles) than rationality does.
Rationality/Harman: their principles are different from those of logic. (Not that I know which they are). They are also not explicitly accepted by anyone. We basically assume that humans are thinking in the same way. (reason the same way).
Principles: their existence allows us to understand the considerations of others.

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Identity Theory Kripke Vs Identity Theory I 175 ~
KripkeVsIdentity thesis: C-Fibers, God would additionally need to let us feel the stimulation as pain. No identity - Physical truths necessary: e.g. heat = molecular motion - but no analogy to mind-brain identity. In the case of the C-fibers stimulation, God would additionally need to let us feel this stimulation as pain and not as a tickle or warmth or nothing at all. Identity is not the relation between these two phenomena!
KripkeVsIdentity thesis: C-fibers: God would additionally need to let us feel the stimulation as pain. No identity.
Additionally, God would need to make the human an inventor when he creates him. That is not the case regarding pain: If the phenomenon exists at all, no further work should be required to make it become pain.
Lanz I 284
Excursus: Digression: Def need/Kripke: Such assertions of identity, where both expressions designate rigidly. E.g. "Water is H20." Water could not have been anything else. It is essential for the water that it is the material with the atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water. E.g. Twin Earth: We can imagine qualitative (epistemical) identical situations in which the clear liquid in our lakes would be something else.
The reason is that we have the reference of rigid designators ("water", "H20") which determine the non-rigid designators (description: "the clear liquid in our lakes").
KripkeVsIdentity theory: "Pain" and "brain process X" are rigid designators. As such the sentence "Pain is the brain process X" is a necessary true sentence.
So the identity theorist must explain how the illusion may come about that the sentence is contingently true.
This explanation is not possible! It would demand that a situation is imagined which is identical with the one in which our brain process X does, however, not feel like pain but is pain nevertheless! (Wrong.)
If pain does not feel like pain, it is not pain!
The essential characteristics of pain and brain processes are different.
Therefore, pain cannot be identical to brain processes.

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Identity Theory Popper Vs Identity Theory Vollmer II 96
Eccles/PopperVsIdentity Theory: it is incompatible with the theory of evolution. If evolutionary advantages are realized already in the physical givenness, the "internal aspect" of consciousness, of the psychical world is no longer needed. Because if the physical structures already have this benefit, then the advantage would also exist if the structures did not have this inner aspect. (>Epiphenomenalism); more entries for >Eccles/Popper.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Identity Theory Rorty Vs Identity Theory Frank I 581
RortyVsIdentity Theory: a) translation version: Smart (see below) b) behavioral materialism (Ryle, Armstrong) both are unsatisfactory
Translation Theory/Armstrong: a statement about the mental is translated into a statement with the subject term: "a state that is capable of producing the following behaviors"
RortyVs: if so, it is hard to see why we had dualistic intuitions.
Anti-dualism is only superior to dualism if it can help explain dualism.
Fra I 587
VsIdentity Theory/Rorty: even if it relieves us of certain entities, it does not relieve us of the assumption of the relevant properties. Brain processes do not have the property "yellow", so for that we need something else. Solution Smart: "Something is going on inside me that is similar to what goes on when I see something yellow". ("Translation"/similar to Armstrong). >Identity Theory, >Type-/Token Identity, >Dualism.


Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Theory Ryle Vs Identity Theory Pauen I 89
RyleVsIdentity theory: category error: refers to inner events to explain outward behavior. PauenVsRyle: harmless practice like "interface", "data highway".
It is by no means always a mistake to use a term outside its normal context.
Of course, Ryle also accepts metaphors, but he has no useful criterion for distinguishing permitted metaphors from impermissable ones. Even the everyday language transcends everything that Ryle considers to be permissible.
Disposition/VsRyle: E.g. even with headaches, someone could refrain from taking a tablet. E.g. one could take an umbrella to give it back to someone without believing it rains. One could fast in spite of starvation, etc. I could enter a music store to buy notes for someone else, etc.
I 90
When asked for reasons, it is impossible to arrive at a complete list. This would, however, be necessary if the meaning of a mentalistic expression is actually to be understood in the disposition analysis. Each of these sentences also contains a mentalistic expression.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Identity Theory Searle Vs Identity Theory I 52
SearleVsIdentity theory: a) common sense puts the identity theory in the following dilemma: Assuming that the theory is actually empirically true: then there must be logically independent from each other features of each concerned phenomen that clearly characterize this same phenomenon in two different ways: as that is identified on the left side of the identity statement, on the other hand, as it is identified on the right side (Stevenson 1960)(1).
Then there must be two features: pain features and neurophysiological characteristics.
We understand such a statement because we understand as follows: one and the same event has been identified with the help of two types of properties.
Dilemma: either the pain features are subjective, mental, introspective features - if they are this, then we have not really gotten rid of the mind. We will still have to deal with a variety of dualism.
Otherwise, if we understand the word "pain" in a way that it does not describe a subjective mental feature, then the meaning of the word remains completely mysterious and unexplained.
I 53
As with behaviorism the mind is skipped here again. Either the identity-theoretical materialism merges the mind, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is wrong; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism.
Smart wanted to describe the so-called mental features in a
"Topic-neutral" vocabulary that left the fact of its mindness unmentioned (Smart 1959)(2).
SearleVsSmart: but that one can talk about a phenomenon without mentioning it's essential characteristics, does not mean that this phenomenon exists, or does not have these essential characteristics.
Technical objection VsIdentitätstheorie: it is unlikely that there is a for each type of mental state one and only one type of neurophysiological state.
Yet it seems too much to ask for that anyone who believes that Denver is the capital of Colorado has a neurophysiologically seen identical configuration in his brain. (Putnam 1967(3) and Block and Fodor 1972(4)).
I 54
We do not rule out the possibility that in another species pain is perhaps identical to any other types of neurophysiological configuration. In short, it seems too much to ask for that each type of mental state is identical to a type of neurophysiological state. 3. Technical objection derives from Leibniz law.
LeibnizVsIdentity theory: if two events are identical if they share all their properties, then mental states cannot be identical with physical states clearly, the mental states have certain characteristics, do not have the physical states. E.g. my pain is in the toe, while my corresponding neurophysiological state ranges from the toe to the brain.
So where is the pain really? The identity theorists had not such a big problem with this.
They stated that the analysis unit is in reality the experience of pain and that this experience (together with the experience of the whole body image) presumably takes place in the central nervous system. Searle: so you're right.
4. more radical technical objection: Kripke (1971)(5): Modal argumentation: if it were really true that pain with C fiber stimulation is identical then it would have to be a necessary truth.


1. J. T. Stevenson, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to J. J. C. Smart, Philosophical Review 69, 505-510
2. J. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56
3. H. Putnam, “The Mental Life of Some Machines” in: H. Castaneda (Ed) Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, Detroit MI 1967
4. N. Block and J. Fodor, What psychological states are not; Philosophical Review 81, 1972
5. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Identity Theory Verschiedene Vs Identity Theory Lanz I 280
VsIdentity Theory: Sensations cannot be identical with brain processes, because one can know that one feels something certain without knowing that the corresponding brain process takes place. Complete ignorance of neurophysiology does not prevent anyone from being a good everyday psychologist.
Identity/Leibniz: (VsIdentity Thesis) all characteristics must be shared. Popular argument against the identity thesis: if one finds characteristics that possess mental phenomena, but not the supposedly identical neural states or processes, one believes that the thesis is done.
For example, pain can be like stabbing, neuronal events cannot, thoughts can be astute, neural states cannot, my memory picture of the Eiffel Tower has shape, form and color, but not the neural state, thoughts cannot be localized, but neuronal processes, etc. Allegedly, a category mistake is made here.
VsVs: confusion of word and object, word meaning (description) different, nevertheless the object can be the same.
Te I 45
Mind/Brain/TetensVsIdentity Theory: the answer to the question: "are mental states brain states? In the end it turns out to be more complicated: on the one hand, they are revealed as causes of behaviour:
Te I 145
No identity due to psycho-physical laws, the same behavior can be accompanied by different brain states (>Davidson). On the other hand, we refer to interaction patterns that include the attribution of mental states. In this respect, it makes no sense to say that we only refer to brain states. So there is no unambiguous answer for an identity of both states.
Te I 147
TetensVsIdentity Theory: this leaves out the effectiveness of the attributions of mental states for interactions.
Vollmer I 108
Identity Theory/Monism/Vollmer: most important monistic theory: mind is a function of the central nervous system that only emerges at a certain evolutionary level. Representative: Feigl, Armstrong, Smart, Place, Bunge, Lewis.
Function/Explanation/Evolution Theory/Vollmer: by evolution one can explain a function only if this function means a selective advantage.
For example memory, representing function of our central nervous system, simulation function.
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: there is an evolutionary argument: if mental processes are identical with physical processes, then the selective advantage of mental processes must be an advantage of physical processes at the same time.
But then this advantage would also exist if the physical processes had no internal aspect at all. The biological significance (and selective advantage) would be ensured without any psychological by-products (>epiphenomenalism).
Then the whole internal aspect, that the world somehow feels to us, is unexplained, superfluous. Then why did it develop at all?
Vollmer II 89
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological processes are subjective, but undeniable! In this respect it is easier to doubt the existence of matter (>Descartes).
II 90
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. For example, a cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid.
VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical.





Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Identity Theory Loar Vs Identity Theory I 15
VsType-Identity Theory/Type Identity/Loar: has often been rejected by physicalism in recent years in favor of the weaker token identity. (stronger/weaker). Loar: but there are correlation theories that are even weaker and these are too weak. For example that each mental state corresponds to one or more physical states.
Type Identity (see below chapter 4): relativized to an individual at a certain time, there can be such a thing.
1. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: if there are token identities between propositional attitudes and physical states, then there are also type correlations. I.e. beliefs and desires are among the causes of movements and physical events have only physical causes.
I 16
Systematic Role: but we need it in addition: B is of a type that has a certain position in the system of state types of subject z, which are connected to t by certain counterfactual condition relations. Qualities 2. level: are involved here, a) of the persons, b) of the tokens of belief.
Problem: this is very cumbersome. Can we not accept a weaker theory? With qualities of the 1st level? Example B's systematic role then consists partly in its possible interactions with other attitudes.
Problem: in order to characterize types of attitudes, we have to abstract from their systematic roles.
Abstraction: but does not work with counterfactual properties of the 1st level. ((s) because they are always related to a certain individual).
I 17
Problem: then one should already have the concept of belief (circular). This is exactly the problem of analytical behaviorism. Solution/Loar: we go one level higher: quantification over types of the 1st level. For example, there are state types from z to t, which are organized counterfactually in this and that way.
Token-Identity: here the physical token B must fulfill the predicate: "x is a belief that p" i.e.
Systematic Role: from B to t must correspond to the position of this predicate in the belief-desire theory. However, the sR must be identified with a property of the 2. level! I.e. a property. The one that results from type-type relations for a person at a time t.
Property 2. Level/Loar: here "believe that p".
Mental state: is then identical to state types of the 2. level.
VsIdentity: a correlation, which is not an identity, between mental state types M1...Mn and physical state types 1. level P1...Pn can then have this logical form: z is in Mi power of a state of the 1. level with the systematic role involved in Mi and Pi is that state 1. level.
On the other hand:
State 1. level: can be described by "z's belief that p to t". This has for z this or that systematic role to t.
Identity Theory/Loar: with this one can rightly say that mental states are identical with physical states of the 1. level.
N.B.: but one also needs the former sense of "mental state" to be able to express that two living beings are in the same mental state.
2. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: does not require token identities.
Thesis: if belief and desire are causes of behavior, there must be psychophysical type correlations for individuals at certain times.
N.B.: the argument is based on the consideration that no theory is immune to being irrelevant in terms of explanation.
I 18
E.g. by future science. Question: what status should assumed beliefs and desires have to explain behaviour? Are they still relevant? Only justification: that the old theory makes some distinctions that make the new theory true. Loar: Thesis: in any case, we will still need psychophysical correlations, relativized to persons and times.
Revisionism/Loar: for example, suppose one wanted to argue that no scientific finding could ever prove that we have no belief and no desires.
I 19
Question: could anything at all falsify this attitude? Probably only knowledge about behaviour. Belief Desire Theory/Loar: for them there are two possibilities, which status they have as theory:
a) its truth logically follows its systematization success (this is instrumentalism with its perverse use of "true").
b) it is to be interpreted realistically, i.e. that its truth does not logically follow from its systematization success. They are then empirical like physical theories.
Problem: we have a dogmatic dualism in which the theory could not be refuted by any degree of success in scientific explanation of behavior.
Worse: with the argument about the conditions for the characteristic(s) it is not clear at all that the theory has a coherent interpretation.
Stronger/Reduction: the requirement that the states are permanent even if not unchangeable and similarly organized in other individuals.
Weaker: only relativization for times. Advantage: we do not need to demand an a priori fitting of our theory to the structure of theoretical psychology.
Reduction: not every theory that explains the success of another theory reduces it. I.e.
Confirmation: a theory is not its elimination.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Identity Theory Jackson Vs Identity Theory Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation).

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Identity Theory Pauen Vs Identity Theory Pauen I 109
Identity Theory/Pauen: simple explanation of the origin of consciousness: simply as neuronal processes. E.g. Buddenbrooks is not just a novel, but also Mann's first work.
VsIdentity Theory/Pauen: this makes it counterintuitive how neuronal processes are supposed to explain the origin of the work.
I 110
Multiple RealizabilityVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: the identity theory cannot explain how different neural patterns can bring about the same state of consciousness. Explanation GapVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: ("Explanatory Gap Argument"): (Joseph Levine): in view of the multiple realization the two levels (mental, neuronal) gape but too far apart.
In addition, experience is considered with regard to the mental state.
Identity/Wittgenstein/Pauen: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say it of one thing is meaningless.
I 113
Identity/Pauen: identity assertions which go beyond the trivial, are always hypotheses.
I 77
Def Identity Theory/Pauen: first and third person are equal ranking, precursor: Spinoza, parallelism. Def Type Identity Theory: all mental states of a certain mental type are at the same time states of a particular neuronal type and vice versa.
Highlight: 50s, then decline.
VsTyp Identity: cannot explain multiple realizability.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Identity Theory Newen Vs Identity Theory Newen I 168
Nature/Essential/Kripke/Newen: E.g. original meter shows that objects (or substances) have essential and non-essential properties. E.g. Essential: that water is H2O. Therefore, the proposition is a necessary truth a posteriori.
Identity Theory/Philosophy of the Mind/Newen: Thesis: mental states are identical with physical states.
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: (modal argument): identity is always necessary identity.
But: E.g. zombies could we similar to us, but not feel pain.
I 169
If this is possible, identity is no longer a necessary identity, and therefore no identity. Identity TheoryVsVs: could argue that the necessary identity applies only to humans.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Kripke, S. A. Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. Putnam I 247
Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality":
Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25).
Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies?
Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region.
KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region!
QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague.
Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.
LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).).
Putnam: so there are three questions:
1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region?
2) Is the matter identical to the fields?
3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions?
Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is!

Quine II 209 ff
Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic.
Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models.
II 210
They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify?
The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling:
"As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160)
QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be.
Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow.
Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states.
... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality.
QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning.
II 210f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Lewis, D. Putnam Vs Lewis, D. I Lanz 291
Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). ---
VI 437
"Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world".
Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam.
N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference.
LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*.
Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis.
PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head".
PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech.
---
Schwarz I 149
"New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes.
LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy.
---
Putnam III 176
Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world.
III 177
Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world.
Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high.
Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made?
III 178
PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. ---
Putnam I (g) 187
Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened.
I (g) 201
E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this.
Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure.
Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true.
PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction.
I (g) 188/189
The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism.
And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true".
"It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense.
I (g) 189
Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D. Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. Metz II 274
Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge.
Lewis I 9
ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts!
II 213
LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation.
II 214 ++
2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself.
II 216
Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar
II 221
VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help!
II 222
Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it!
II 223
VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule.
II 224
VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language.
II 225
VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action.
II 226
VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought.
II 227
VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention.
II 227
VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity.
II 228
VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences.
II 229
VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population!
II 229
E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L".
II 232
VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages!
II 233 +
VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement?
II 234
VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products.
II 235
VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated.
II 237
VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust!
II 238/239
VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible.
II 240
VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary!





Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Materialism Verschiedene Vs Materialism Lanz I 285
VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory: three objections: 1. In contrast to the usual theoretical entities (genes, electrons), we have direct, introspective access to our own mental states. The assumption of their existence does not seem to depend on their explanatory role.
Lanz I 283
2. Sensations have qualitative characteristics that cannot be captured by causal analysis. For example, sweet/sour taste: clear qualitative difference, regardless of what their causal roles may be. (> Qualia problem). 3. (VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory): a purely causal analysis cannot explain the characteristic of intentionality. (Propositional Attitutede).
Materialism uses representation theory (VsSpeech Act Theory).
Stalnaker I 19
Zombie/Awareness/Stalnaker: one cannot say that there are possible worlds (poss.w.) with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. Problem: all materialists agree that there are possible worlds that the dualist calls "zombie worlds", they are even metaphysically possible!
Stalnaker: but the conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility only works if one assumes that materialism is wrong. And therefore the thinkability of zombies does not provide an argument VsMaterialism. The general picture goes like this:
"Consciousness": refers to a quality that we find within ourselves and that we may know because we have it. But the fact that we are conscious does not provide any particular access to the nature of that property.
Stalnaker I 239
VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: simple argument against him: that it is imaginable or conceptually possible that zombies exist. Some conclude that zombies are metaphysically possible.
Problem: if there are possible worlds that are physically exactly like the actual world,
I 240
only that there is no consciousness, then it follows that consciousness does not supervene on the physical! VsMaterialism: if consciousness does not supervene on the physical world, materialism is wrong.
I 242
Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: any materialist who believes that we are conscious beings must believe that the real world is the z-world, but deny that the z-world is a zombie world. This is the reason for A and B materialists to claim that the zombie world is metaphysically impossible: that some of the possible worlds that come into consideration as a candidate for a zombie world (the z-world) are not a zombie world.
Metaphysics/Imaginability/Lücke/VsMaterialism: if this is correct, materialism can no longer defend itself against the zombie argument that tries to drive a gap between imaginability and possibility. Namely that there are possible worlds that are imaginable, but not metaphysically possible.
I 243
MaterialismVsVs: each materialist will agree with all three philosophers that the z-world is not only imaginable, but also metaphysically possible. Metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: the question is not whether a situation is metaphysically possible, but whether, if it is, it is correctly described.
VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: the argument against it depends decisively on whether the z-world is a zombie-world. This cannot depend on innocent talk (semantics). It is about what world we live in.
Solution: we need more details about the z-world.
z-World/Stalnaker: we have defined it in terms of the actual world. And since we are not omniscient, we may argue about how the actual world should exactly and physically be (and so is the z-world). But these remain empirical questions.





Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Shaffer, J. Lewis Vs Shaffer, J. I (a) 9
ShafferVsIdentity theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while the neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neuronal events are also abstract. Whatever emerges from considerations about experiences as an argument for non-spatiality, should also apply to neuronal events.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Various Authors Vollmer Vs Various Authors II 169
Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then?
II 170
Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method.
II 97
DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually!
Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage.
Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn).
II 98
VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated.
2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated".
Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence.
I 40
VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it.
I 293
VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject.
VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong.
VollmerVsProjection Theory
II 90
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory.
VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties).
II 92
Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing.
II 93
VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory:
System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure.
Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon).
II 94
None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks.
I 282
VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism.
Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Identity Theory Versus Horwich I 422
HarmanVsIdentity Theory

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Identity Theory Papineau, D. Metzinger II 305
Papineau: per Identity Theory. My goal is to explain away the intuitions VsIdentity Theory.
II 310
Identity / explanation / Papineau: identity need not be explained! Identities are no answers to why-questions.

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996