Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Simons, P. Wiggins Vs Simons, P. Simons I 216
Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro,
WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle:
Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time.
Simons: where does this lead?
rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology.
Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…)
I 217
SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants.
Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space").
Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts.
Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification.
SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price.
I 218
But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy.
I 220
WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties.
Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.).
(s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time).
I 221
Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.)
Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region
Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions.
Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity.

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Wiggins, D. Simons Vs Wiggins, D. I 130
Event/Mereology/Relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow.
Relation to the space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them.
Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): Events are "dual" to continuants in this regard.
SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy space and continue as well.
Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts.
But not as events involves continuants. E.g. increase in the intensity of a magnetic field.
Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial.
Event/localisation: localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them.
Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes.

I 221
Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up):
I 222
Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable. (This is an epistemic problem). epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting, because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words. (No distinction without difference).
Simons: Example two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem.
Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them:
E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment.
E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts. Here we assume in addition uniform wave velocity.
E.g. (Shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector".
Here we have a means of identification: causal paths.
I 223
WP/Wiggins: pro: Space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particular) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to be determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B t. Simons: pro illustration by reference to ED.
SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc.
VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances.
Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions.
SimonsVsVs: still the answer is owed if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means. E.g. separate causes or uniform speed.
Wiggins/Simons: is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in his own container. If it is so his principle (WP) is correct.
These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the space (illustrating, mapping).
Sortal concept/Simons: (for a continuant) tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions". ((s) meaning linguistically!).
Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions. ((s) meaning intensional).

I 260
Nec/Wiggins: predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading:
"Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for
"the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical"
correct:
"(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293).
SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests so himself.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Essentialism Chisholm, R. II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: Thesis: Chisholm has inherited from Brentano a mereological essentialism with which I disagree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not as clear about facts as it seems. Self-criticism: confusion of facts and complexes.
There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are overlaps between Brentano and the Tractatus.
Simons I 2
Chisholm/Mereological Essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents mereological essentialism: thesis: no object can have other parts than it has actual. Vs: Problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential). Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things are logical constructions of objects to which mereological essentialism applies. Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: the actual ones are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from unchangeable objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high.
Simons I 275
Mereological Essentialism/Intermediate Position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That is my position. ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary.
Simons: Thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!).

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
mereolog. Essentia Plantinga, A. Simons I 275
Mereological Essentialism/Middle Way/Intermediate Position/Plantinga:
Thesis 1.
for each x and y: if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessary so that x is a part of it at one time or another.
ChisholmVsPlantinga.
Simons: this is nothing but WME:
WME (N)(x ‹‹ y › N(E!y › (Et)[x ‹‹t y]))

Thesis 2.
For each x. y and t, if x has y as part to t, then x necessarily has y as part to t.
New: this is temporally rigid mereological essentialism:
Mereological Essentialism/intermediate position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That's my position.
ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary.
Simons: thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!).

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Object/Property Burke, P. Simons 205
BurkeVsSimons: (Burke 1980 394ff): thesis: the type of an object is a function of its properties (qualities). coinciding objects must have the same characteristics - SimonsVsBurke: a folded sofa bed has other than the bed.
I 204
Burke: thesis: different materials properties can not be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: but, eg different committees have the same members.