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Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently (> rule Following).
Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. - Other problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn.
If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. - Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived.
Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws.
Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem.
If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. - But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again.
Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". - Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. - Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. - Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. - Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994