Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chance | Armstrong | III 32 Def Chance/Armstrong: = probability to t. Ojective chance: property of having a certain chance (higher-level property). Ramsey/Mellor pro, Ramsey/MellorVsArmstrong: VsLaws of Nature as relation between universals. ArmstrongVsVs: "objective chances" are ontologically questionable, universals avoid it. >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Universals/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. III 34 Chance: logical possibility in re (instead determinist law: necessarily de re). - These forces must be understood as bare powers: their nature seems to exhaust itself in their manifestation. I.e. they cannot be understood a posteriori as the result of an empirical study, as a categorical structure S. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russell, B. | Wessel Vs Russell, B. | I 14 Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time. I 15 And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought). WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world. The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs! Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly. I 123 Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality". I 123/124 Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens). Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica(1): took over from Frege. "Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence. Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica(1): p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication). WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal! Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence: Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q. Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator. Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-. Subjunction: > refers to facts. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Various Authors | Russell Vs Various Authors | Wessel I 14 Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of thinking: it does not matter that we think in accordance with laws of thinking, but that the conduct of affairs corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe, when we believe in the principle of contradiction, is not that our consciousness is constructed like this, but this belief relates to things, not only to thoughts. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time, a tree would be a beech and also no beech. We believe that if the tree is a beech, that it cannot be no beech simultaneously. --- I 15 And even if the belief in the principle of contradiction is a thought, yet the law of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact that relates to the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think, does not guarantee that the principle of contradiction cannot be wrong (that shows that it cannot be a law of thinking). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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