Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Chance Armstrong
 
Books on Amazon
III 32
Def Chance/Armstrong: = probability to t - objective opportunity: property of having a certain chance (higher-level property) - Ramsey/Mellor pro, Ramsey/MellorVsArmstrong: VsLaws of Nature as relation between universals - ArmstrongVsVs: "objective opportunities" ontologically questionable, universals avoid it   III 34 Chance: logical possibility in re (instead determinist law: necessarily de re) - these forces must be understood as bare powers: their nature seems to exhaust itself in their manifestation. I.e. they cannot be understood a posteriori as the result of an empirical study, as a categorical structure S

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Russell Vs Various Authors
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Wessel I 14
Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of thinking: it does not matter that we think in accordance with laws of thinking, but that the conduct of affairs corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe, when we believe in the principle of contradiction, is not that our consciousness is constructed like this, but this belief relates to things, not only to thoughts. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time, a tree would be a beech and also no beech. We believe that if the tree is a beech, that it cannot be no beech simultaneously.
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I 15
And even if the belief in the principle of contradiction is a thought, yet the law of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact that relates to the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think, does not guarantee that the principle of contradiction cannot be wrong (that shows that it cannot be a law of thinking).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999