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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Inequalities | Nozick | Gaus I 229 Inequalities/Nozick/Lamont: [a] problem internal to ownership-based libertarianism is what to do about past injustices. >Injustice, >Justice, >Society, >Property, >Liberalism. Libertarianism is widely interpreted as advocating a change to a laissez-faire system with government functions limited to minimal taxes for police, defence, and a court system. >Libertarianism. This interpretation, however, is a mistake for the majority of libertarian theories. Although right libertarians do believe such minimal government is ideal when there has been no injustice, current holdings of goods and land are not morally legitimate under libertarianism if they have come about as a result of past injustices. Given that such past injustices are systemic to any current society, libertarians have difficulty justifying any move towards a more minimal state, unless they can specify some way of recognizing and rectifying past injustices first. >Minimal state. Nozick:. As Nozick noted with his own theory: „In the absence of ta full treatment of the principle of rectification) applied to a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it.“ (1974(1):231) LamontVsNozick: The treatment Nozick requires, however, is simply beyond our capabilities. We know every existing society is systematically infected with past injustice including theft and forcible seizure of natural resources. So, for instance, even if we could discover all the ways in which the majority of natural resources were unjustly acquired, we have no way of knowing what the distribution would look like if the injustices had not occurred. A theory can make a serious contribution to ongoing debate and policy only if it can offer a realistic proposal for rectifying past injustice, or if there are other resources in the theory for recommending distributive principles which do not depend on an entirely clean slate. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberty | Sen | Brocker I 880 Freedom/Sen: "substantive freedom": a theory of political together and for each other, which justifies cosmopolitan duties of the currently living people towards their fellow world, environment and posterity from the principle of individual freedom. Brocker I 884 The foundation of our social reality must be the free choice of everyone on the value and worth of their options. Economics must therefore be conceived from the idea of freedom.(1) See >Markets/Sen. Sen therefore wants to clarify the question of suitable parameters for economic success through social debates and "public discussion"(2). Econometric goals should be defined democratically - and not vice versa technocratic measures should dictate economic policy. Instead of hiding economic value measures in the premises and axioms of econometrics, they should be made visible, discussed in public and approved or rejected by "responsible social choice".(3) Which values and goals should take precedence must be renegotiated from society to society, from place to place and from time to time - in the interest of freedom. >Utilitarianism/Sen. Brocker I 886 Freedom manifests itself not only in a choice between (given) alternatives, but always also in the choice of (potentially better) alternatives and in the search for them. Therefore Sen appreciates the tradition of the theories of "positive freedom".(4) SenVsNeoliberalism: misunderstanding theories of negative freedom, says Sen, that it is often less a matter of private control over spheres of action than of their design. Brocker I 887 Sen does, however, form a coalition with defenders of negative freedom in so far as he, like this dictatorship, rejects any kind of happiness dictatorship that promises people life chances at the expense of their civic freedoms. The right to property and ownership, for example, may in no case be treated as equivalent to the right not to be tortured or killed. (5) Such differentiations, however, are denied if libertarians treat both rights equally as "ancillary conditions" of individual freedom. >Neoliberalism/Sen. SenVsNozick: a freedom protection that only pays attention to procedures, never to final results, can produce counter-intuitive results. I 888 Negative Freedom/Sen: Why (...) is the theory of negative freedom still so widespread despite its obvious shortcomings? A purely formal concept of freedom is easier to quantify and fit into a mathematized economy. One simply counts options and identifies every increase in them as a gain in freedom. SenVsNegative Freedom: Every election decision must "not only be judged in terms of the number of available choices, but its attractiveness must also be assessed".(6) A purely formal theory of freedom therefore runs nowhere. Brocker I 889 Not only are a few good options certainly preferable to a selection from countless hideous possibilities; often it is quantitative reduction that leads to qualitative improvement of options. (7) Having access to meaningful options also clearly stands and falls with the possibility of evaluating one's own preferences and life chances in coordination with others and changing them in collaboration with them. Tripartite Freedom Model/Sen: 1. aspect of possibility, which focuses on our life chances, 2. aspect of process: examines how these come about. 3. "substantive freedom": here these two aspects are combined. Def Essential Freedom/Sen: 1. political freedom, 2. economic institutions, 3. social opportunities, 4. transparency guarantees and 5. social security(8). 1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, S. 44 2. Ibid. p. 100. 3. Ibid. p. 137 4. A.Sen, Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge, Mass./London 2002, S. S. 509 5. Ibid. p. 636 6. Sen 2000 p. 146 7. Sen 2002, p. 602 8. Sen 2000, p. 52-54 Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Rationality | Nozick | Nagel I 196 Robert Nozick: evolution-theoretical explanation of human reason. (Naturalistized epistemology). Suggests a reversal of the Kantian depending on the facts of reason. >Naturalized epistemology, >Naturalized epistemology/Quine. Reason is a dependent variable which is formed by the facts". >Reason/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant. Nagel I 199 NagelVsNozick: I must be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is compatible with the proposition that I proceed according to the rules of logic, because they are right - and not only because I am biologically programmed to this behavior. (This also applies to mathematics). >Evolution, >Logic, >Selection, >Behavior. The only form that rational thinking can take, is the insight into the validity of arguments based on what they say. >Argumentation. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Nozick, R. | Nagel Vs Nozick, R. | I 196 Robert Nozick: Thesis: Evolution theoretical explanation of human reason. (Naturalistic epistemology). Proposes a reversal of the Kantian dependency on the facts of reason. "Reason is a dependent variable which is shaped by the facts. Reason gives information about reality, because reality shapes reason, and because it selects what appears as "obvious"." "The evolution theoretical explanation itself is something where we get by leveraging reason to support the evolution theory. I 197 Therefore, this interpretation does not belong to the initial philosophy, but to our current scientific opinion." NagelVsNozick: that is no guarantee that the thing is true at all, or necessary. There could also have been a different adaptation to evolution. Nor is it a justification of reason. I.e. the whole thing is not circular. I 199 NagelVsNozick: I must be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I act upon the rules of logic, because they are right and not only because I'm biologically programmed to this behavior. (Also applies to mathematics). I 200 The only form that can really assume rational thinking is to understand the validity of arguments based on what they say! I 201 This is not to deny the importance of our thinking for survival. (Although there are a lot of species that have lived on happily without this capability). VsRealism/Ethics/Nihilism: nihilism tries to portray it as a discovery that there are no objective values. Then all positive value statements must be false. Only of people in the world it could be said that it is anything of importance to them. III 64 NagelVsNihilism/Ethics: that is tempting from the objective point of view, but it is a misconception to presuppose that objective judgments can only be made from a distant point of view. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Nozick, R. | Verschiedene Vs Nozick, R. | I 378 Minimal State/Nozick: Rights/Nozick: the human has the right to self-destruction. Other people are untouchable. Taxes/Nozick: there is no abstract total social benefit. Therefore, millionaires should not be taxed. I 379 Utilitarianism/Nozick/Rawls: both reject all utilitarian considerations and calculations! Life: only a creature with the ability to plan its own life can have a meaningful life. Property: the individual is its own property and not that of another. Otherwise one could, for example, remove its kidneys on demand. Reason: the individual would not have worked them out itself. The free market with private property rights will ensure the effective use of scarce resources and encourage inventiveness and new thinking. This is the reason why those who have fewer resources available because they have already used others are not really worse off. I 381 For example, suppose one person's life could only be saved by violating another person's property right, for example over a certain medicine. Nozick: in certain extreme cases, his principle that the property of others is absolutely inviolable can be relaxed. VsNozick: unfortunately, deals nowhere with how the moral status of these rights is founded. Question: if the right to property has the same moral value as the right to self-determination, the plausibility of the starting position is endangered. If the second has priority over the first, the argumentation is inconclusive, because the inviolability of property is a necessary precondition for the rejection of any form of state. I 383 Distribution/Nozick: there is no allocation or distribution of goods just as there is no allocation of spouses in a society. The just distribution therefore depends on the way in which the property came into the hands of the owner, that is, on its prehistory. (Most other theories about distributive justice deal only with the result of distribution or the key: e.g. Rawls' principle of difference). Justice: a) original acquisition: appropriation of "masterless" goods. b) transfer of possessions. I 384 1. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of just appropriation shall be entitled to that property. 2. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of equitable transfer from someone who is entitled to the property shall be entitled to the property. 3. Claims to possessions arise only through (repeated) application of rules (1) and (2). c) Correction of injustices. Dealing with thieves, fraudsters and perpetrators of violence. Question: how can the sins of the past be corrected again? VsNozick: he deals with this complicated problem on less than one and a half pages. He only says that this is an important and complicated problem. Distributive justice/Nozick: Difference: structured (historical) principles/non-structured (non-historical) principles. I 384/385 "Natural Dimension": distribution according to performance (historical). Historical: according to intelligence or race. E.g. Basketball fans pay completely overpriced prices to see their star. Nozick: this must be seen as completely fair, since it happens voluntarily. The appearance of injustice arises only if, on the one hand, individuals are granted a free right of disposal over their goods and, on the other hand, it is demanded that the distribution resulting from the exercise of this right should have taken place in accordance with the original structured and result-oriented distribution principle. Nozick: there can be no enforcement of result-oriented principles or structural distribution without permanent interference in people's lives! In order to maintain a certain structure, the state would have to intervene again and again. I 386 VsNozick: Question: why does he assume that people in the state of the original distributive justice V1 have absolute freedom to deal with their possessions at their own discretion (to buy overpriced baseball tickets)? A right which, according to the structural theories, they supposedly have based on their assumptions V1, yes, a right they do not even possess! Contradiction. The question is more complicated than it seems: Goods/Nozick: are seen by Nozick as a kind of mass entry to the common catering of all. VsNozick: this systematically ignores the demands of the workers from their own production. Nozick unfortunately gives himself a systematic discussion of this problem of competing demands. |
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| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Nozick, R. | Brendel Vs Nozick, R. | I 251 Knowledge/Nozick/Brendel: Thesis: two additional conditions: Counterfactual conditional to exclude randomly true beliefs. 1. If p were wrong, the subject would not believe that p. I 252 2. If p were true, the subject would also believe that p. Brendel: this refers to unreal situations that are "closest" to the real situation. For example, if everything in my environment looked the way it does, I would not believe that I was there if I was not there. For example, if someone cannot tell a Bordeaux from a Muscat, he does not know that drinks a Bordeaux when he does. BrendelVsNozick: cannot deal with the possibility of accidentally true beliefs: for example, I am in the vat and I think I am in the vat because the evil scientist suggests that to me. Nozick: that would not be knowledge. Because I am not "sensitive" to this truth, it could have generated any other belief in me. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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