Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Arm III 161
Properties / Shoemaker : thesis what makes a prop be prop is their ability to contribute to the causal powers of the things that have this prop - the connection between a prop and possible effects is a necessary one - that is epistemically justified : they are known only by their effects - BoydVsShoemaker: identity of the prop not only by its effects , but also by their causes - - - Armstrong : all prop are nomically connected with other prop - inactive prop are also prop.
Arm II 85
Properties / Shoemaker : e.g. that my ballpoint pen is no longer 50 miles south of something is no real change of properties, or to be the prop so that Ford is president , is not a real change if Ford is no longer President - III 8 Armstrong / Place / Martin: all per objective prop "in the" Object.
I Stalnaker 92
Properties / Shoemaker / Stalnaker : Thesis: all properties are causal powers - then the causal laws of the properties are essential .


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Shoem I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996


> Counter arguments against Shoemaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties ...

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-23