Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Epiphenomenalism Jackson
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Boatman I 152
Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982, 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities.
Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena.
Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen.
SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P.
---
I 153
But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all?

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Existence Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 54
Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement - can only be avoided by greater complexity - Arbitration: method - question of existence is question of evidence. ---
I 300
Existence: Category is dependent on the point of view, but not the existence of the objects E.g. time period. ---
I 316
Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms. ---
I 402f
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli weak is a argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension.
---
II 173
Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? Medieval logic: Yes - Modern Times: No (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity). ---
VII 110
Existence/Ontology/Quine: only values of ​​bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities. ---
VII 167
Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation. ---
VIII 31
Existence/Quine/(s): ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote? ---
IX 29
Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element - ((s) an existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something. ---
IX 33
Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes - existence of a means being an element of J (universal class) - the property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something - Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if J is a something - if we postulate the existence of J, i.e. J e J, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then J is not real, J e J. (s) Absurd. ---
IX 176
Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - no: even classes are not created by description. ---
IX 218
Existence/Quine: for NF plus extreme classes: the property of being a qunatity: ---
IX 221
Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF, becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF said "{x: Fx} e J", we now have to say "^uFu e UJ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "UJ"). ---
Lauener XI 128
Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification - its logic is that of the existence quantifier. quantifiers: only receive meaning when the values ​​of the variables are identifiable - Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values ​​of the variables are precisely the objects. ---
Lauener XI 130
Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable - because a predicate is an open sentence - predicate variables only exist freely - everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Generality Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 10
Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). ---
I 238
Plural: abstract singular terms: "lions are dying out" - Disposition "eats mice" (31). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not properties! "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would apply to classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 415
Properties: not every general term necessarily speaks of properties or classes - properties and classes acceptable as values ​​of variables. ---
IX 194~
Universality/Quine: ambiguous: a) different indices applicable - b) undivided quantification throughout an exhaustive universal class. ---
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/universality/Quine: These basic statements are general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - one cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the precondition of the use of singular sentences.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Properties Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." ---
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless. ---
I 218
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> Cassirer) -> Properties a) commonality b) Scattered clumps? ---
I 217
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. ---
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness". ---
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. ---
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties. ---
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). ---
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. ---
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. ---
II 129f
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
---
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property). Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
---
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Locke, J. Quine Vs Locke, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 411 ff
Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties)
I 412
For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is.
So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property.
Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about".
Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties!
Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply.

V 59
Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words.
Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke).
Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same?

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Properties Quine Vs Properties
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 215
We have seen that the appearance of abstract singular terms cannot be separated from that of abstract general terms ("virtue is rare"). Already a mass term has something of the hybrid appearance of the abstract singular term. E.g. "water" rather designates
1) a common characteristic of different puddles and glass filling levels than
2) a scattered part of the world that consists of those puddles.
I 216
Mass terms are archaic remnants from the first phase of language acquisition, preforms of abstract singular terms. The difference between the "red" that is said about apples and the "red" that is said of their outside has no meaning. "Red" becomes the name of a property that is not only lumps and drops of a homogeneous substance, but also in common with apples.
This abstract object can no longer be put aside as easily as the water property was put aside by giving 2) (common property) preference over 1) (dispersal).
I 217
Because even if we have learned to construe water as a distributed concrete object, we tend to additionally permitting an abstract object like "redness". This analogy then spreads beyond the the mass terms up to terms with strictly divided reference. Therefore, roundness and sphericity. Every general term leads to an abstract singular term.
The usefulness of abstract terms is mostly in the abbreviation of cross-references: E.g. "The same is true for Churchill", "Both plants have the following property in common". Only that in such cases the cross-reference merely refers to word structures. But we stubbornly tend to objectifying what has been said again by establishing a property instead of talking only of words.
QuineVsProperties: Many thoughtless people insist on the reality of properties for no other reason than that both plants (or Eisenhower and Churchill) "must admittedly have something in common"!
I 218
Properties: In as far as talk of properties has its origin in such abbreviated cross-references, the putative properties probably do not correspond to simple abstract terms, but to longer expressions. E.g. "being equipped with spikes in clusters of five." Properties: Cassirer: "Properties are remnants of the secondary deities of a disused faith".

X 94
Properties/Predicates/Propositions/Individuation/QuineVsFrege: also the conception of the first logician is untenable: properties behave just like propositions.
X 95
Properties/Quine: behave to predicates or open sentences like propositions to sentences. One cannot, just like with propositions, distinguish individual properties. Sets: can be distinguished due to the principle of extensionality.
Principle of Extensionality: two sets are identical if they have the same elements.
Open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine two different sets, but they can be based on two different properties.
Properties/Identity: for two properties to be identical, the corresponding open sentences must be synonymous. And that is not possible because of confusion.
Solution/Some Authors: Sets as values ​​of "F".
Quine: nevertheless, predicate schematic letters should not be regarded as quantifiable variables.
Predicate/Quine: predicates have properties as their "intentions" or meanings (or would have them if properties existed), and they have sets as their extensions. But they are neither the name of one nor of the other.
Intention: of a predicate: property
Extension: of a predicate: set.
Name: a predicate is never a name, neither of its intention (property) nor of its extension (set).
Variable/Quine: quantifiable variables, therefore, cannot take the place of predicates, but of names.
W.V.O. Quine
I Quine Wort und Ggegenstand Stuttgart 1980, Reclam
II Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt/M 1985, Suhrkamp
III Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt/M 1978
IV Oliver R. Scholz "Quine" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrh., Reinbek 1993
V Quine Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
VI Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn (Schöningh) 1995
VII Quine Form al logical point of view Cambrinde 1953
IX Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Vieweg 1967
X Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
XI Henri Lauener Quine München 1982
XII Quine Ontologische Relativität
Sprechen über Gegenstände,
Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie