Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Inverted Spectra Shoemaker Stalnaker I 19
Qualia / exchanged spectra / Shoemaker / Stalnaker : tried to reconcile the visibility reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind - StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible.
Stalnaker I 233f
exchanged spectra / Shoemaker Paradox / Stalnaker : four people , partly differently wired / without backup system. - Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time . - Solution / Stalnaker : two different identity criteria. - Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria. - Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity - Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together - I 236 the addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms . - Problem : subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character . - I 237/8 The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia .

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Properties Shoemaker Arm III 161
Properties / Shoemaker : thesis what makes a prop be prop is their ability to contribute to the causal powers of the things that have this prop - the connection between a prop and possible effects is a necessary one - that is epistemically justified : they are known only by their effects - BoydVsShoemaker: identity of the prop not only by its effects , but also by their causes - - - Armstrong : all prop are nomically connected with other prop - inactive prop are also prop.
Arm II 85
Properties / Shoemaker : e.g. that my ballpoint pen is no longer 50 miles south of something is no real change of properties, or to be the prop so that Ford is president , is not a real change if Ford is no longer President - III 8 Armstrong / Place / Martin: all per objective prop "in the" Object.
I Stalnaker 92
Properties / Shoemaker / Stalnaker : Thesis: all properties are causal powers - then the causal laws of the properties are essential .

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Qualia Shoemaker Stalnaker I 220
Qualia / common sense / Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, but also locally comparable. - VsFrege-Schlick view - Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is meaningless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent at all something communicable - StalnakerVsShoemaker. per "old-fashioned" Frege-Schlick view.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Self- Consciousness Armstrong Frank I 62
Selfconsciousness/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: self-consciousness is a perception of our own mind. NagelVsArmstrong: psychological states are not perceived, but "directly experienced".
ShoemakerVsArmstrong: self consciousness is no perception, it can not be seen from reflection that it is me. >Self-Identification, >Perception, >Self-Knowledge/Psychological theories.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Eliminativism Shoemaker Vs Eliminativism Stalnaker I 227
Utility theory/utility/scale/calibration/von Neumann/Morgenstern/Stalnaker: E.g. someone prefers duck before salmon and salmon before oatmeal A > B > C. Refinement of the scale: one asks the person whether he prefers to have B or prefers to have a 50/50 lottery ticket for A v C.
Does he select B, it means that B moves closer to the left on his scale, closer to A. This can be repeated for the things at stake in the lottery and thus ever further refinements can be concluded.
General: preferences between the lottery tickets define numerical values for the utility
But the scale is a conventional: every linear transformation of this scale provides an equivalent, that represents the same facts about the subjective preferences.
Question: does it make sense to compare preferences interpersonally?
I 228
Utility/Stalnaker: but here it is not about felt pleasure (as a "quality experience"). The numeric values do not represent facts about relations between people. Analogy/Stalnaker: the position VsInterpersonal comparisons is analogous to the question whether grams would be greater or smaller than kilometers.
Pointe: that we cannot say this is not because there were facts that were hidden from us.
qualitative/intentional/Stalnaker: if we oppose intentional to phenomenal (qualitative) states, it is clear that utility belongs to the intentional side.
Utility/analogy/Stalnaker: the question whether one can compare utility interpersonally is complicated and interesting. It is also about whether it is more likely that apply it to social groups.
I 229
Utility theory/von Neumann/Morgenstern//Stalnaker: should not be regarded as eliminativistical. According to it there are really facts about the preferences of those represented by the numbers but because the zero point and the units are arbitrary, interpersonal compare have no sense. StalnakerVsShomaker: I am afraid he takes the side of common sense VsFrege because he assumes that Frege is an eliminativist. ShoemakerVsEliminativism.
Qualia/secondary qualities/Shoemaker: thesis: we need qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach is capable of this as well.
RelationismVsQualia.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Shoemaker, S. Armstrong Vs Shoemaker, S. Arm III 161
Properties/Shoemaker: Thesis: what makes a property a prop. is its ability to contribute to the causal powers of the things that have this prop.
III 162
ArmstrongVsShoemaker: his argument seems to be his only one. In addition, from the premise that natural laws (LoN) are necessary it cannot be concluded that invalid properties are not prop. Could there not be prop. that are ineffective with nomic necessity? Or two different prop with the same linkages? >Identity Shoemaker: can only say here that we have no reason to accept that.
Properties/Reduction: but Shoemaker could defend his argument by saying that prop. are nothing more than nomic connections with other prop. Nomically empty ones are no prop. at all, then.
This is the position that prop. are purely forces.
ArmstrongVs: regress, because it also applies to other prop.
(s)VsArmstrong: E.g. The fact that computer files have "docking sites" ("hooks") does not lead to regress, either! Or e.g. the fact that viruses have hooks and receptor sites).
ArmstrongVsVs: but that only applies to the point of view that prop. consist of nothing other than the ability to enter into these relations.
Property/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: if no prop. is anything isolated, nothing logically independent of the system (nomic network)
III 163
Can it then turn into something by entering the system? (>Swinburne, 1980, S 313 29, see above, here: Chapter 8.3). ArmstrongVsShoemaker: if an ontology of pure forces is rejected, Shoemaker only has his epistemic argument.
But that is better this way than an unacceptable ontology. I want to show that the theory that LoN are necessary is ontologically unacceptable.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Shoemaker, S. Block Vs Shoemaker, S. I 188
Psycho functionalism/Block: (see above I 167): E.g. brains in a vat, paralysis: it is an empirical question of what is regarded as input and output.
I 188
Now, diseases might even change the neural input! Then it is a matter of (arbitrary) decision which malfunctions are regarded as changes in mentality, and which are attributed to the periphery!. BlockVsShoemaker: with that ("paradigmatic person") he withdraws to psycho functionalism. No common knowledge tells us anything about what can be paradigmatically embodied "without changing its structure". Sorites/Brains in a vat/BIV/Block: suppose we take away gradually one gram of brain after another. At what point do we get something that can no longer be "a paradigmatically embodied"? This is not only a conceptual issue, but an empirical one!.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Shoemaker, S. Dawkins Vs Shoemaker, S. Frank I 644
DavidsonVsIncorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty/DavidsonVsShoemaker: I will ignore the incorrigibility and put something less powerful in its place: something that comes to terms with the authority of the first person. Important Point: Shoemaker does not combine incorrigibility with a kind of knowledge, but with a class of expressions (instead of propositions as meanings).
Explanation/Davidson: this could lead to an explanation of the authority, if the class of the corresponding expressions could be specified purely syntactically ((s) otherwise circle).
DavidsonVsShoemaker: unfortunately it does not work! The speaker must know that he uses the privileged kind of sentence! If he does not, he does not use the language correctly.
Fra I 645
What would be considered as such an abuse of language? Precisely asserting a proposition for which no such authority exists. Perhaps this is true, but this only repeats the uninformative and unfounded assertion that attribution of mental predicates is a language convention.
DavidsonVsShoemaker: from the point of view of the interpreter this means that the interpreter should interpret self-attributions in a way that they come out as true. According to Shoemaker, the point of view of the interpreter is the only one that we can take, and that robs the principle of independent application: our only reason to say that the speaker occasionally enjoys special authority is that we are ready to treat his expressions as a self-attribution! But this was the initial problem.

Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111

Da I
R. Dawkins
The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976
German Edition:
Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996

Da II
M. St. Dawkins
Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Shoemaker, S. Evans Vs Shoemaker, S. Frank I 540
Memory/Evans: There is also memory activity on a non-conceptual level: that of the information system (perception state). E.g. It seems that something was the case in this or that way. These are no freely floating images whose reference to the past is read into them by the subject.
I 542
ShoemakerVsEvans: the impression that memory-based judgments about oneself are free of identification is based on a linguistic triviality: we would not say of a person whose information comes from someone else "he remembers". EvansVsShoemaker: but it is not true that the freedom of identification is a mere illusion: EvansVsStrawson: rather, he exposes himself to the accusation.
Fra I 543
Of taking advantage of the linguistic phenomenon, when he tries to prove the freedom of identification in question looking at the extraordinary utterance "I remember clearly that this memory took place, but did it take place in me?". Memory/Shoemaker: Memory-based judgments depend on identification and are therefore not immune to misidentification: E.g. we can imagine that the apparent memories of a person were in reality causally derived from other people (false memory). E.g. complete duplicate of a person (clone). (s) too absurd to be a convincing example.
Fra I 544
Shoemaker: "Quasi Memory": "Q memory". E.g. if there are such false memories, then it seems to make sense to say "someone stood before a burning tree, but was it me?" EvansVsShoemaker: even if this is possible, it does not follow that normal judgments must be based on an identification! It’s not about distinction: "someone stood ... I was the one".

Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Shoemaker, S. Martin Vs Shoemaker, S. Armstrong II 86
Properties/MartinVsShoemaker: the image of a property as a mere ability to produce other properties is absurd even in a realistic view of properties. Just as it is absurd to state something purely dispositional and not categorical as the perceiver of a counterfactual conditional, so it is absurd to state something purely categorical and not dispositional. Something that Thomas Aquinas calls a "pure act".
MartinVsThomas Aquinas: this is a logical fiction.
"Pure"/Martin: nothing is pure.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Shoemaker, S. Peacocke Vs Shoemaker, S. I 145
Demonstratives/VsPeacocke: other extreme perspective: "view of the differing concepts"): according to this view these judgments ("here", "now", "I") are not based on identification, PeacockeVsShoemaker: because there are no q memories in our world that are not memories and this fact is partly constitutive of our concept of self. Q Memories/Shomaker/Parfit: in possible worlds of the kind that are described by Shoemaker and Parfit, our concepts would then not have an application, concepts in such circumstances would be different from ours. I 146 This view would also have to argue that judgments about someone's past, which are based on memory-like images, are non-inferential and that it is doubtful that someone whose non-inferential judgments have no corresponding sensitivity for the causality has a complete concept of the first person.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Shoemaker, S. Stalnaker Vs Shoemaker, S. I 19
Qualia/inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: tries to reconcile the recognition of inverted spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. It is about the relation between consciousness and representation - between the intentional and the qualitative content of an experience.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: I defend the old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative characteristics of the experience between persons are meaningless (meaningless) ((s) >Wittgenstein, bug example).
Qualia/Stalnaker: it is not about to eliminate them (to "quinete") but to accept them as plausible and understandable part of a purely relational structure.
Thesis: the comparability is possible because our concept of qualitative character is linked conceptually to the representational content.

I 235
Shoemaker's paradox/Stalnaker: is the whole story coherent? Could α and β so be "combined differently"? Solution/Stalnaker: the contradiction could be avoided in two ways: one could
a) to reject the identity statement 5
b) the identity statements 1-4.
Ad a): leads away from functionalism to a purely physicalist approach for qualia, subjective distinguishability is then no longer a criterion. Phenomenal experiences can systematically look the same, while they are not. This view would make a decision necessary, on which general level you wish to define physical types. And it is not clear on what basis one should decide this.
I 236
Problem: for that one would have to probably identify qualia with very fine-grained distinct physical properties. These may differ in details which are not perceptible to us. E.g. the physiological development of the brain during aging in a person would lead to other perceptions that would however subjectively remain the same perceptions of the person! ((s) distinction without difference).
Ad b): (to reject identity statements 1-4): that is Shoemaker's position.
Shoemaker: thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for qualia. Then e.g. (see above) Alice's and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ.
Stalnaker: does this correspond to the common sense view?
StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: subsequent changes in perception but also in the memory system of a person, but also counterfactual unrealized possibilities would change the qualitative character of the experiences of a person.
E.g. assume that Bertha has a flexible brain, when a part is damaged another part takes over the work.
Alice: her brain is less flexible, in case of damage to the qualitative character of her perceptions change.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: even if the central realizations are the same and even if the damages never occur, it would seem that Shoemaker's response implies that the qualia would be different because of the different connections with potential alternative implementations of the experiences.
These differences may be purely intrapersonal: suppose Alice previously had an equally flexible brain like Bertha, but with age it lost its flexibility: Shoemaker seems to imply that the qualitative character of Alice's experiences of colors changes with changes in the potentiality of her brain, even if it is inaccessible to the introspection.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Qualia Theory Pro Stalnaker I 19
Qualia/vertauschte Spektren/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: versucht, die Erkennbarkeit vertauschter Spektren mit einer funktionalistischen und materialistischen Theorie des Geistes zu versöhnen - StalnakerVsShoemaker: pro altmodische Sicht, daß Vergleiche des qualitativen Charakters der Erfahrung
I 220
Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: These Qualia sind intern, intrinsisch, lokal aber auch vergleichbar - dagegen: Frege/Schlick-Sicht These Qualia sind nicht vergleichbar, weil es sinnlos ist anzunehmen, daß Bsp vertauschte Spektren überhaupt etwas Kommunizierbares darstellen - StalnakerVsShoemaker. Pro -žaltmodische-œ Frege/Schlick-Sicht

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Qualia Shoemaker, S. Staln I 220
Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, local but also comparable. Against: Frege/Schlick view. Qualia/Frege/Schlick-View/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is pointless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent something communicable at all.
Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal experiences are pointless.
Staln I 229
Qualia/Secondary Qualities/Shoemaker: Thesis: we need Qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach can do that too.
RelationismVsQualia.
I 233
Interpersonal Identity/Qualia/Functionalism/Shoemaker: thesis: functionalism alone is not sufficient for interpersonal comparisons. Solution/Shoemaker: to explain identity in terms of the identity of the physical properties that realize the Qualia. ((s) So not only the causal role? ("whatever...-"). >Shoemakers Paradox.
I 236
Shoemaker: Thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character, because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for Qualia. Then Alices and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ (see above). Stalnaker: corresponds to
I 239
Dualism/Stalnaker: Thesis: it is part of the physical character of things that they have non-physical effects. If they didn't, they would be physically different. If that is true, the possibility of possible worlds with zombies would be ruled out from the beginning.