Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Nelson Goodman on Properties - Dictionary of Arguments

I 47f
Properties/Goodman: many philosophers/Goodman: many philosophers assert that the intrinsic qualities of a text are different from it, and not included in it, but put it in a relationship with other texts who share these properties with it.
Goodman: the expressed darkness by the image is peculiar to the image. Also a poem that expresses the darkness, is metaphorically dark (exemplification).
I 47f
Definition Exemplification/Goodman: the possession of properties is no exemplification. Also, the reference of what possesses must be related to the possessed property. It is a kind of referring, but different from denotation (or description or representation).
I 81
Properties/Goodman: in order for a work to be a case of "pure art", of "symbol-free", it cannot, according to this view, neither represent something, nor express something. But if we express the thing like that, then of course, all properties that a picture or some other work has - are themselves the property to represent a person or something else - characteristics of the image and not properties of something in the external.
Extrinsic/intrinsic/properties/Goodman: the difference is not working, because every object and each image has both types of properties.
I 145
If we abstract from all the features that are responsible for disagreement between truths, we have nothing left but versions without things without facts, without worlds.
I 162
Since "property" is usually closely related with "predicate", I often use the term "feature". This is a reminder that not all descriptions are linguistic.
II 65
It does not matter how essential a property is, but how it relates to the manifest property. The problem of disposition is to define this type of connection.
III 112
Art/works of art/Goodman: since the exercise, training and development of our abilities to distinguish between works of art are visible aesthetic actions, the aesthetic properties of an image not only include those which we find when looking at it, but also those that determine how we should look at it.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties ...

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-01-25
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration