Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Counterfactual Conditionals Fraassen
 
Books on Amazon
I 13
Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false.
I 115f
Counterfactual Conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there - 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there - contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. - VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction - material conditional: "either B or not A". - Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional - Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: Bizet/Verdi.
I 118
FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent) - Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals - Therefore they are a criterion for laws - FraassenVsGoodman: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Counterfactual Conditionals Wright
 
Books on Amazon
I 32
Kontrafaktische Konditionale/Irreale Bedingungssätze/Gesetzesartigkeit/Goodman/Wright, G. H.: das Problem der Irreale Konditionalsätze ist eine unmittelbare Kritik der in der positivistischen Tradition akzeptieren Auffassung von Naturgesetzen. Das Problem ist in klassischen Aufsätzen von Chisholm und Goodman behandelt. (R. M. Chisholm, „The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional“, Mind 55, 1946). (N. Goodman, „The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals, JP 44, 1947). Wright, G. H.: vereinfachte Darstellung: manchmal gründet sich unser Glaube, dass q der Fall gewesen wäre, falls p nicht der Fall gewesen wäre, auf unseren Glauben an eine gesetzesartige Verknüpfung zwischen den (generischen) Propositionen p und q. Nicht jede beliebige universelle Implikation, die die beiden verknüpft, könnte als Grund fungieren. Daher ist die Frage, wie Gesetzesartigkeit zu charakterisieren sei.
H.G. von WrightVsGoodman/H. G. von WrightVsChisholm: der Begriff des irrealen Konditionalsatzes ist in der Unterscheidung zwischen gesetzmäßiger und „akzidenteller“ Verknüpfung selbst involviert. Daher kann er nicht mit deren Hilfe geklärt werden.
Fazit/Wright: Notwendigkeit und nicht Universalität ist das Kennzeichen von Gesetzesartigkeit.


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Grue Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
IV 31
> Grue / CarnapVsGoodman: "red", etc. are purely qualitative predicates, - ’grue’, etc. are positional predicates - GoodmanvsCarnap: the distinction qualitative / positional is relative to a perspective on a respective base language. - This could also include grot / reen as basic predicates, then "red" and "green" would have to be interpreted in relation to a time - IV 32 then the attributions "qualitative" / "positional" was reversed - there is no perceptible color change: who understands "green" in the sense of "gred" understands understands "color" in the sense of "blolor": things of equal blolor are those which are gred etc.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Grue Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 290
Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: marginal problem - the initial question is much too vague - you can easily find a property of language "grue bleen" which is not a property of a "languange like German" - e.g. the predicate "being similar", only applied to objects rather than to qualia - Chomsky: there is no point in time t such that we can predict of objects that they will not be similar - they could be the similar if both were green - it is a property of natural languages ​​that they behave more like German than like "grue bleen" - but language concepts such as "German" are too vague to satisfy Goodman’s criterion - we cannot explain why the learner does not acquire grue as basis for generalisation - that certainly follows from the sensory system.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Individuals Simons
 
Books on Amazon
I 28
Individuals cannot be atoms - atoms would be all identical because they have the same parts (namely none) - Solution: Proper Parts Principle/strong/SSP/strong supporting-Principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z, which is part of x, and separated by y - problem: the interval [0,1) is not part of the interval (0.1] (or vice versa) but no part of [0,1) is separated from (0,1] - I.e. that overlapping intervals do not always have a unique product - but extensionality demands that two overlapping individuals have a maximum common part - solution: if x and y overlap, then all parts of the overlapping part are parts of x and parts of y. ---
I 109
Individual/SimonsVsGoodman (Leonard): not every still so abstract concept (plural term) should correspond to an individual - but: to have identity conditions for every individual, is an excessive demand. - That does not work in everyday life.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Language Acquisition Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 281
Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. ---
I 283
Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. ---
I VsGoodman 285
Learning a second language is not that different. ---
I 299
Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. ---
I 324
Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association - ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Possible Worlds Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
II Preface (Putnam)
II IX
There are no "possible but not actual" worlds. GoodmanVsFormalism: no formalism for the sake of formalism.
GoodmanVsImagination independent from our theorizing "ontological basement".
---
II 78
We have become accustomed to see the real world as one of many possible. This needs to be corrected: all possible worlds are within the real. ---
Putnam III 144
Versions/Goodman: it is not about different descriptions of "identical facts" - versions are unequal possible worlds, only incompatible versions must refer to different possible worlds - not different languages, so that tables sometimes as aggregates of time segments of molecules ... etc , but we decide to produce a corresponding world - E.g. "Big Dipper" was not created, but made a constellation. - PutnamsVsGoodman: to daring extrapolation: that there was nothing what we have not created. ---
III 147
PutnamVsGoodman: "Big Dipper" is not analytical: if a star perishs, we would further speak of the Big Dipper - but "star" has properties that cannot be accounted for by specifying a list - not to know by that, that we find out what belongs to the Big Dipper. Big Dipper: which stars are included, is rather answered by the linguist - PutnamVsGoodman: the term "constellation" is in the middle. - The constellation remains when all the stars are light bulbs - PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius ourselves - we have not made it a star - we have brought about the term star, and this term applies to Sirius - our term of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, that our language practice made him a bachelor. - We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Sets Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Sets/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: we may no longer need any other universals if we allow sets. Because you can do almost anything with sets that mathematics needs. Armstrong: he believes in universals, but not in sets!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: for science we need more universals than sets, for example probability and necessity.
---
I 95
Universals/Sets/Predicates/Bigelow/Pargetter: if a predicate does not correspond to a universal, e.g. dogs, we assume that they correspond to at least one set. Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: but even then we cannot assume that each predicate corresponds to a set!
Set/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, there is no set X containing all and only the pairs for which x is an element of y. (paradox).
Universal Set/Universal Class/Bigelow/Pargetter: can also not exist.
Predicate: "is a set" does not correspond to a set that contains all and only the things it applies to! (Paradox, because of the impossible amount of all sets).
Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are still glad if we can assign something to most predicates, and therefore set theory (which originates from mathematics and not from semantics) is a stroke of luck for semantics.
Reference/Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: set theory helps to impose more explanatory force on the reference in order to formulate a truth theory (WT). It remains open which role reference should play.
---
I 371
Existence/sets/set theory/axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: none of the following axioms secures the existence of sets: pair set axiom, extensionality axiom, union set axiom, power set axiom, separation axiom: they all only tell us what happens if there are already sets. Axioms/Zermelo-Fraenkel/Bigelow/Pargetter: their axioms are recursive: i.e. they create new things from old things.
Based on two axioms:
---
I 372
Infinity axiom/Zermelo-Fraenkel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (normally formalized to contain the empty set axiom). Stands for the existence of a set containing all natural numbers according to von Neumann. Omega/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our mathematical realism, the sets in the sequence ω are not identical to natural numbers. They instantiate them. That is why the infinity axiom is so important.
Infinity axiom/Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: the infinity axiom has real ontological significance. It ensures the existence of sufficient sets to instantiate the rich structures of mathematics. And physics.
Question: is the axiom true? For example, suppose a quality of "being these things". And suppose there is an extra thing that is not included. Then it is very plausible that there will be the qualities of being "those things" that apply to all previous things plus extra things. To do this, these properties must first be available. Moreover, if we are realists about such properties, such a property can count as an "extra thing"!
---
I 373
This ensures that if there is an initial segment of, the next element of the sequence also exists. Infinity: but requires more than that. We still have to make sure that the whole of ω exists! I.e. there must be the property "to be one of these things", whereby this is a property instantiated by all and only by Neumann numbers. That is plausible in our construction, because we use sets as plural essences (see above) to understand.
Problem: we only have to guarantee a starting segment for the Neumann figures. That should be the empty set.
Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: how plausible is their existence in our metaphysics?

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Quine Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Carnap VII 151
Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! (?)
However, if in the case of the lexicon (?) we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 154
Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of ​​the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate.
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Lanz I 271
QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories!
I 272
There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. ---
Newen I 123
Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically.
I 124
Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap).
Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli.
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities:
1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval
2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection.
This only applies for occasion sentences.
I125
Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers.
QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words.
- - -
Quine I 73
QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way.
I 74
Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference:
Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet.
Quine: theory has primarily to do with records,
Carnap: to do with terms.
- - -
I 466
For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general?
I 467
This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas?
However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers.

Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts.
It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form.
QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".)
Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania."
- - -
IV 404
Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself).
IV 416
QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? - - -
V 28
Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities.
V 29
Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning.
QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences.
V 30
Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.)
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms.
QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role).
- - -
VII 40
But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience.
QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values ​​are revised in the same sense.
- - -
X 127
Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter.
Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect:
1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything.
2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation.
Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory.
QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world.
Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate.
X 133
We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge!
- - -
XI 99
QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences.
XI 129
Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values ​​of the variable.
Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values ​​of variables.
To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination).
XI 130
Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence.
XI 138
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference.
XI 142
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.
- - -
XII 69
QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope.
Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity.
Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G."
- - -
XII 89
Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).)
Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic.
XII 91
Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction.
Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts.
QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement.
XII 92
QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities.
But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts.
CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions.
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession.
2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization.
Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed.
Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism:
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences.
Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts!
Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories.
pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.
- - -
NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.
- - -
NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Counterfactual Conditional Fraassen Vs Counterfactual Conditional
 
Books on Amazon
I 115
Counterfactual Conditional/Co.co./Causation/Cause/Lewis/Fraassen: Under certain circumstances, after all, it is logically correct to say: whenever "A is the cause of B" is true, it is also true that if A had not existed, B would not have existed either. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsLewis: Problem: E.g. Assuming, if the alarm had not gone off, David would have not woken up; we will concede that, however: if he had not slept the night before, he would not have woken up! Problem: it should not be the cause of his awakening that he went to sleep. Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual conditional sorts out the nodes in the causal network, while "because" points to specific factors. Relevance: E.g. falling asleep is not relevant for waking up at a certain time, even though it is a necessary condition. Not every necessary condition is relevant. Context-Dependent/Fraassen: every theory of causality must explain what is discarded as unimportant. And this is done in relation to context. This, in turn, is objective. That much context dependency must always be. Problem: there is still much more of it if we are dealing with counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FrassenVsLewis: in science, there is nothing that corresponds to counterfactual conditionals with their extreme context dependence: Science is not context-dependent. Ceteris Paribus/Fraassen: the factors that are held fixed are in the mind of the speaker! They are speaker-dependent! And it depends on the broader context, whether what I silently presume collides with the situation or not. E.g. The match is dry.
I 118
E.g. Danny is interested in women. Would he be a lesbian if he were a woman? Solution: the content of "ceteris paribus" is not only determined by the one sentence and the specific situation, but also by factors of context. FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditional (if they are, as I believe, context-dependent). Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/LoN/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is or at least a law-like statement. Because only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsGoodman: this idea needs to be reversed: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, then, because they are context-dependent. Law/LoN/Fraassen: the concept of law does not point to any objective distinction in nature. Counterfactual Conditionals/Explanation/Fraassen: nevertheless, I believe that counterfactual conditionals are suitable for explanations, but that means that explanations are crucially context-dependent.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Davidson, D. Putnam Vs Davidson, D.
 
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McDowell I 177
PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds we utter will be far more than mere "expression of our subjectivity". - - -
Putnam III 154
Incompatibility/Language/Theories: (Goodman and Davidson find that so exciting): point, line, border, etc. are used differently in the versions. E.g. "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not quantities, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes either there is no world, or we live in more than one.
Davidson: the actually recognized phenomenon of equivalent descriptions somehow contained a logical contradiction.
PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another.
- - -
Putnam I 263
PutnamVsGoodman/PutnamVsDavidson: E.g. point: we should just give up the notion that the various sentences about the point as a concentrically shrunken sphere or space portion preserve something that is called their "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. Use Theory/Putnam: here there is no need to decide whether a such a change of use is a change of meaning!
((s) E.g. sinus in analysis or in elementary trigonometry. Kursbuch 8 p. 80, Waismann).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Goodman, N. Armstrong Vs Goodman, N.
 
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Arm III 58
Vsglue/VsGoodman: one has argued that "glue" has a substantial relation to the time t and green does not. GoodmanVs: cannot be shown here. Armstrong: if it is a purely formal argument in terms of logical possibility, then it must be irrelevant: the observed emeralds are green. The observed emeralds are glue. The mathematics are the same!
Regularity theory Vsglue/Armstrong: the reg. th. would have to be refined here to sort out pathological predicates like glue. Armstrong: But in my opinion, it needs universals for this.

Arm II 5
Dispositions/properties/Goodman: more properties than we usually think are dispositional. E.g. saying that something is hard is as much a statement about potentiality as saying that it is flexible. E.g. the color red: prop of reflecting light under certain conditions! non-dispositional prop/Goodman: E.g. those which describe events: the manifestations of the dispo., breaking, bending, dissolving.
VsGoodman: Problem: assuming just that has the consequence that it makes no sense to ascribe a disposition which has no manifestation.
Mellor: E.g. then it must be considered absurd that the safety regulations of a nuclear power plant are based on the known disposition of exploding which these regulations are designed to prevent.
II 6
It would then be absurd to assume that the measures have no basis, as long as they do not fail.
Arm II 65
Law statement/Goodman: universally quantified disposition statements (universal counterfactual conditionals) are only necessary for the length of time (period), in which the disposition is required at all. ArmstrongVsGoodman: (like common sense) law statement must not be limited in time.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Goodman, N. Chomsky Vs Goodman, N.
 
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Noam Chomsky
I 287
Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure).
But we have no empirical evidence.
---
I 288
ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language.
Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language.
GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages".
---
I 289
ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. ---
I 290
Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German".
E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia.
Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other.
But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen).
Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen".
Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German.
This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples.
As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill.
---
I 291
ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.)
Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system.
Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment!
---
I 292
Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Goodman, N. Danto Vs Goodman, N.
 
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Arthur Danto
I 128
Goodman: "Primary Extension": the class of things to which a term refers. - "Secondary extension": Unicorn then includes all the unicorn-images and a unicorn-descriptions that constitute our understanding of unicorns. Only this is the basis for our understanding of the difference of unicorns and mermaids. (otherwise zero class). Meaning / DantoVsGoodman: but this gives us no theory of meaning of images. For how can we distinguish images of images of images? ((s)> Appropriationists).

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Goodman, N. Davidson Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
Putnam I 259
"Conceptual relativity"/Putnam: (1987): E.g. points in space can be regarded as a concrete particulars that make up the space (as the last components of the space) or, alternatively, as "mere limits" (Kant). Both can be formalized ins a geometrically adequate way.
Goodman: considers these two versions to be "incompatible", at the same time he considers both to be right!.
DavidsonVsGoodman: (1974): two incompatible statements cannot both be true according to logic. (Quine too). It is incomprehensible to say that both versions are true.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Goodman, N. Putnam Vs Goodman, N.
 
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III 145
Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte!
III 146
Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is.
III 147
If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other.
The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major".
III 148
That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one diesapperaed, we undoubtedly still spoke of tUrsa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously.
Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist.
The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list!
No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star.
In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain!
III 149
Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius.
Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor!
Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true.
- - -
III 154
Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one.
Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction.
PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another.
III 157
Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark.
- - -
I 257
Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit.
Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"!
PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun.
It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars.
Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation.
We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same.
Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation!
Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists.
I 257/258
The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"!
Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"!
Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Goodman, N. Quine Vs Goodman, N.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Putnam I 259
QuineVsGoodman: of two true versions I can sometimes take one and sometimes the other, but I have to say at any time that the other one is false, or face self-contradiction. Goodman: the two versions can simply not be true in the same world! But the same accuracy of both versions shows precisely that they are true in different worlds.
Putnam I 260
QuineVsGoodman: this is a violation of the principle of austerity. - - -
Quine II 123
Ways of Worldmaking/Goodman/Quine: motley bunch. We are currently experiencing a renaissance Leibniz' thoughts, so philosophers revel in a continuum of possible worlds. That Goodman keeps himself out of that is one of his virtues. In Goodman's View all worlds should be real! More like versions. There is no one world whose versions they would be. He would prefer to be satisfied with versions and jilt the world or the worlds. He appreciates the creative component of the natural sciences: even the simplest law is a generalization that goes beyond the individual cases.
II 123/124
The observation itself also contains a creative element: We overlook properties that do not interest us. We perceive figures in broad outlines and complain about discontinuities. We fill out and complete. At the opposite extreme, theoretical physics, creativity is one part observation, ninety-nine parts conceptualization.
Can't there be a radically different conceptual structure to which all observations correspond, but that could not be translated into our scheme? Our own theory and that other one would be two world versions. Of the world? What would the world be? We should recognize both and leave it at that.
Quine: This is sure to alienate a large number of readers, not me! But he pushes on, to where I no longer will go:
Other world version: that of common sense that does not reflect a world of atoms and core particles, but one made of sticks, stones, people and other brutish objects.
Further, fragmentary world versions: The styles of different painters. Accordingly, he opposes the world of Rembrandt to the world Rouault or Picasso. Even in abstract painting and music there are versions. How is that possible when they represent nothing?
They refer in a different way. They serve as a pattern of interesting features and qualities. Significant continuity between exemplification and depiction as well as between depiction and description.
QuineVsGoodman: one has the impression that this series of worlds drowns in absurdities.

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Goodman, N. Searle Vs Goodman, N.
 
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John R. Searle
III 175
E.g. Mini world: SearleVsGoodman: we are already ahead of something on which we draw boundaries.
III 176
SearleVsGoodman: we make descriptions that match either the real world or not. We do not do "worlds". E.g. maps projection: according to one Greenland has a larger, according to the other a smaller area than Brazil.
III 177
So do we have here two models, both of which are true, but incompatible? No! The Mercator projection is simply inaccurate as to the relative size of Brazil and Greenland. It is a well known fact that certain models distort certain properties. Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be said without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be said without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course there are always problems of vagueness, uncertainty, family resemblance, open texture, context dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, with definiteness of the theory by the evidence.
But these are features of our systems of representation, not the representation independent reality! Truth in a schema is a property of the scheme! No real inconsistency.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Goodman, N. Wittgenstein Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
II 185
Symptom/WittgensteinVsGoodman/Wittgenstein: does not explain the meaning.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Goodman, N. Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. Vorwort Putnam II IV
Einige PhilosophenVsGooodman: Sie schätzen seine Abhängigkeit von der tatsächlichen Geschichte der vergangenen induktiven Projektionen in der Kultur nicht. Sie sagen: eine gültige induktive Ableitung dürfe keine disjunktiven Prädikate enthalten. PutnamVs: dies funktioniert nicht: disjunktiv sein, ist vom Standpunkt der Logik aus ein relationales Attribut von Prädikaten. Ob ein Prädikat disjunktiv ist, hängt von der Wahrheit einer Sprache ab.
Sainsbury V 129
glau/SainsburyVsGoodman: Mangelnde Verankerung zu beklagen, wäre eine zu starke Blockade zukünftiger wissenschaftlicher Innovation! Intuitiv ist der stärkste Mangel des Prädikats "glau", daß es nur kraft der Tatsache zutrifft, daß die Gegenstände bereits untersucht sind.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 358
perfekte Fälschung/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): These: daß ich später vielleicht in der Lage sein werde, einen Unterschied zu sehen, den ich jetzt noch nicht wahrnehme, konstatiert für mich jetzt einen bedeutsamen ästhetischen Unterschied. Es läßt sich nicht folgern, daß das Original besser ist als die Kopie, wohl aber wird es ästhetisch höher bewertet.
((s) Im Original liegt ja auch die Erfindungsleistung. Aber die Kopie könnte gestalterisch gelungener sein.)
I 359
Römer: die Untersuchung von Fälschungen sollte demnach nicht erst bei der Frage nach dem Verhältnis zum Original ansetzen, sondern schon bei der Repräsentation, die wir nach Goodman herstellen (d.h. wir kopieren nicht ein Konstrukt oder eine Interpretation). Def echte wissenschaftliche Fiktion/Vaihinger: 1. Widerspruch zur Wirklichkeit bis hin zum Selbstwiderspruch
2. Vorläufigkeit
3. ohne Anspruch auf Faktizität 4. Zweckmäßigkeit.
RömerVsGoodman: seine „wissenschaftliche Fiktion“ einer perfekten FÄ beseitigt nicht die Hierarchie Original/FÄ. Er zieht auch keine Konsequenz aus der ästhetischen Differenz auf das Darstellungssystem. Wenn eine perfekte FÄ im Kontext von Originalen erscheint, wird ihre Echtheit eher bestätigt.
I 360
Dann ist die Fälschung ein Produkt des Repräsentationssystems genau wie das Original, nur daß sie gegen die herrschende Moral verstößt. Fälschung/Klaus Döhmer: (Ende 70er): These: Fälschung bedient sich legitimer künstlerischer Methoden unter Veränderung ihrer Zielsetzung, damit ist sie keine objektiv-materiale, sondern subjektiv-intentionale Kategorie. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95).
Römer: das kommt einem Paradigmenwechsel gleich: Fälschung als methodisches Problem.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 406ff
Def Fälschung/Bolz: Fälschen: bewußt unechtes für echt ausgeben. Frage: wem wird damit geschadet? Direkt dem Sammler/Museumsdirektor, indirekt dem Kunsthistoriker. perfekte Fälschung /BolzVsGoodman: es gelingt ihm nicht, deutlich zu machen, daß im Begriff des Originals keinerlei Überlegenheit gegenüber der Fälschung mitgesetzt ist.
Es geht nicht um echte Qualität sondern um durch Herstellungsgeschichte geprägte Echtheit.
407
Aura/Bolz: um zu erklären, warum das für den ästhetischen Genuß von Bedeutung ist, müßte Goodman eigentlich auf den Benjaminschen Begriff der Aura zurückgreifen.
(Bolz pro Aura).
Aura/Bolz: führt nicht zur Opposition Original/ Fälschung, sondern von Einmaligkeit/technischer Reproduzierbarkeit.
- - -
Putnam I 256
Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: fragt: ergibt sich aus Goodmans Philosophie die Konsequenz, dass wir die Sterne geschaffen haben?" Goodman/Putnam: G. antwortet: nicht so wie der Ziegel brennen, aber im gewisser Weise sind sie schon von uns erschaffen. Wir haben nicht den großen Bären erschaffen, aber wir haben daraus eine Konstellation gemacht.





Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Goodman, N. Bigelow Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 47
Quantities/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: it could be that we, if we allow quantities, do not need any other universals anymore. Because almost everything that mathematics needs can be done with quantities. Armstrong: in contrast believes in universals, but not in quantities!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: for science we need more universals than quantities, E.g. probability and necessity.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Goodman, N. Simons Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 108
Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSumme: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else.
I 109
Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s, Goodmans’ among others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual".
Individual/Goodman: has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity.
Individual/Goodman: analogous to such abstract quantities each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resultant thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world.
SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish:
a) The existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not
b) The one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions.
I 110
Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory exists in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable. (see below).
Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets).
((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.)
Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions.
Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world.
Part-relation/Simons: there may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator.
Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"?
I 111
Sum/mereology/Simons: Suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. - - -
I 284
"Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between simple part and essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks:
Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind.
Normality/Aristotle: called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing.
Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: Wolterstorff 1980, 56) this one applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place.
Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece.
GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all the pieces identical.
I 285
Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: represents here a hard metaphysical line, adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language.
Solution/Simons: musical performance have no strict identity conditions.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Goodman, N. Stegmüller Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 33
grue/VsGoodman/Stegmüller: man könnte entgegnen, dass es einen wahrnehmbaren Farbwechsel geben müsste. Aber: GoodmanVsVs: wer "green" im Sinne von "bleen" versteht, versteht auch "color" auf eine Nichtstandard Weise als "blolor": wobei Dinge von gleicher blolor solche sind, die "bleen" usw. sind. (>emerabines are grue, rubalds are bleen).

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Goodman, N. Wessel Vs Goodman, N.
 
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I 323
WesselVsGoodman: Thesis: Wessel akzeptiert nur einen kategorialen Term: Gegenstand "g". (und seine Synonyme). Damit kann man die normativ semantischen Tafeln vereinfachen. Das widerspricht der Annahme einer Vielfalt von Welten.
Wessel: es gibt nur eine Welt. WesselVsPossible worlds, per actualism
Goodman muss verschiedene kategoriale Subjekttermini zulassen.
Status eines sing Term a und eines kategorialen Terms b für die gilt: a hat die Aufgabe, einen einzelnen Gegenstand zu bezeichnen, der kein Gegenstand ist.
Wessel: für mich gilt, dass a in diesem Falle kein Term ist.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Quine, W.V.O. Goodman Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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IV 21
Quine: individuation is determined by a bunch of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (of identity) and its derived "same" and "other". GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to declare that the interpretation of these particles can not be made without consideration of the places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems.
IV 22
E.g. sunset. Whether we see the same thing as yesterday, depends on whether we are employed with the identification of suns or sunsets. (> description).
Quine V 30
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to a finally mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I am, unlike the two, satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary of which some of the physical basic predicates were initially learned by using the dispo way of speaking. (Heuristic role).

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch.
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars pro representation (!!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Goodman Vs Various Authors
 
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I 81
GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties.
II Preamble Putnam IX
GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of ​​an ontological basement independent from our theorizing
II 10
It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science.
II 67
The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German.
II 70
(s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music.
III 81
Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything.
III 224
GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself.
III 228
GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Possible World Versus Wessel I 323
MöWe/WesselVsGoodman: These Wessel akzeptiert nur einen kategorialen Term: Gegenstand "g". (und seine Synonyme). Damit kann man die normativï·"semantischen Tafeln vereinfachen. Das widerspricht der Annahme einer Vielfalt von Welten.
Wessel: es gibt nur eine Welt. WesselVsMöWe, pro Aktualismus (Lager).
Goodman muß verschiedene kategoriale Subjekttermini zulassen.
Abb. 317, II. 5: Status eines sing Term a und eines kat. Terms b für die gilt: a hat die Aufgabe, einen einzelnen Gegenstand zu bezeichnen, der kein Gegenstand ist. (Einhorn?).
Wessel: für mich gilt, daß a in diesem Falle kein Term ist.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
grue Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
Schurz I 219
glau/CarnapVsGoodman: Bsp Carnap: These nur qualitative Prädikate sind induzierbar (projizierbar) -žglau-œ ist ein Def -žpositionales-œ Prädikat: es nimmt in seiner Definition auf den Zeitpunkt t0 Bezug -" GoodmanVsCarnap: man kann eine gleichermaßen ausdrucksstarke Sprache mit grot/rün als Grundprädikaten einführen - SchurzVsCarnap: positional/qualitativ kann man durch Unterschied in ostensiver Erlernbarkeit unterscheiden -" Induktion/Goodman: Lösung: ei Induktion müssen wir wissen, was konstant blieb- das sind die qualitativen Merkmale -" -žgrot-œ bleibt beim Wechsel konstant! -" aber damit haben wir Anti-Induktion betrieben -

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006