Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Deflationism: collective term for theories that conceive truth as a property of sentences, not as something that should be realized (> pragmatism). The basis for deflationism is the scheme of Tarki’s definition of truth like "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also disquotationalism, theories of truth, truth definition, meaning theory, meaning holism, holism, prosentential theory, translation, pragmatism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Crispin Wright on Deflationism - Dictionary of Arguments

I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation.
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I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. - Tarski: disquotation is sufficient.
Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common.
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true".
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
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I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard.
b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
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I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity.
But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
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I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative.
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I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität).
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I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", >"minimalism".
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I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright).
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Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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