Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actions Wright Ad I 32
Wright/(s): relates action to gain the status of a property of truth: the assertibility: legitimate assertibility. - (VsDeflationism): Wright: "minimalism".

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

All Field II 238
all / Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) there could be a contradictory, yet undiscovered property that should not be included under "all properties" - here the dft-operator would in turn help.) - VsDeflationism: one could simply say "..all .. " is true iff "..any ... "- Vs: in addition you need the dft-operator (definite-Op)_ conditions are requested - but not indicated - Field: ditto for higher level quantification.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Deflationism Dummett Brandom I 471
Redundancy Theory/Dummett/Brandom: presupposes the content of the non-semantic assertion in view of which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant. DummettVsDeflationism: therefore propositional content cannot be explained by truth conditions - (although everything has truth conditions). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Deflationism Field 91
Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist.
---
I 108
VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" - ---
I 110
Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. ---
I 113
Deflationism/Field: does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement - Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A.
---
II 104
Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions. ---
II 108
Deflationism/Field: Main point: that he does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. ---
II 114
Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that he does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. ---
II 116
Deflationism/Gavagai: for him there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. ---
II 117
Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. - Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent. ---
II 118
Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the Deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. ---
II
Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not. ---
II 127
VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist ..." (> Strawson) 2. He cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success)
3. He cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse
4. He cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages
5. He gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true")
6. He cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa
7. He cannot explain learning.
---
Ad II 260
Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For him, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Deflationism Putnam Williams II 502
Deflationism/Metaphysical RealismVsDeflationism/Putnam: the deflationism may not regard sounds as representations by virtue of a reference relation - it must represent meaning through assertibility conditions - but conditions are no noise - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (although this picture is sympathetic): Meaning/Putnam: better in terms of appropriate use in the situation - ((s) instead of community). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Rorty VI 32
Def Deflationism: the view, Tarski’s work encompasses all the essential features of truth. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.
VI 39
WrightVsDeflationism/Rorty: (like Davidson, but for different reasons) Wright not even mentioned the duty to achieve the truth - that leads to renewed inflation - because one standard need not be met with the other.
VI 40
WrightVsTarski: he has not succeeded to specify a standard.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Deflationism Wright I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. ---
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. - Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common.
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true".
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
---
I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
---
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
---
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. ---
I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität). ---
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=minimalism&erweiterte_suche_2=Wright&x=0&y=0">"minimalism". ---
I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). ---
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Knowledge Field I 83
Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: no knowledge about what does not follow. - Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). - ((s) About that was no conclusion of something). - ((s) Consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion.) Field E.g. a knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge.
Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. - Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. - VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical.
---
I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. ---
I 93
Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong) - Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. - Then it would be categorical knowledge. - E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. - Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions.
---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another?

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Minimalism Wright I 52
Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P,
(ii) "P" says that P,
(iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true,
(iv) the validity of the modus tollens,
(v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" -
recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism)
I 102f
Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth.
I 225
Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate.
I 267ff
Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth.
I 271
Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism.
I 285
Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Redundancy Theory Dummett Brandom I 471
Redundancy theory/Dummett/Brandom: presumes the content of the non-semantic assertion against which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant - DummettVsDeflationism: therefore deflationism cannot explain the propositional content through truth conditions - (although everything has truth conditions).
III (a) 13
Truth/Redundancy Theory/Dummett: the singular term which appears in P, has its indirect reference object in "It s true that P, i.e. its meaning - E.g. "A unicorn has one horn": without truth value - but "It is true that a unicorn has one horn": false - divergence of "P" and "It is true that P".
III (a) 17
Redundancy Theory/Dummett: indicates that our explanation states the whole meaning of "true and" false" - problem: if we accept the redundancy theory, the explanation is obstructed by the truth theory - ((s) because it requires a bivalent logic.)
III 226
Redundancy Theory: the thesis, that the equivalence thesis provides an exhaustive explanation of the truth concept. - Equivalence thesis: "P is true" comes out at the same thing as "p" - DummettVs: does not explain the understanding of linguistic meaning, there must be something that goes beyond this, because we understand the special meaning of "is true".

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Second Order Logic, HOL Field I 37
Second Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence - quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true. - Vagueness refers to the A. ---
II 238
Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? - no: e.g.: everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets) - it does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties" - ((s )> "Everything he said") - all/N.B./Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) there could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties." E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help.) - VsDeflationism: could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... - Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (definitive-Op), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. - Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). ---
III 39
First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. ((s) Instead of an axiom via a set, a schema for all elements?) - Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. (> unintended model). ---
III 92
2nd Order Logic/Field: we have that at two places: 1. At the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have ---
III 93
The "complete logic of the part-whole relation", or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums" - 2. The binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: Goodman's sum: its logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than").

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Tarski Field I 33f
Tarski/Field: According to him the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". - b) There are no mathematical entities (m.e.) like quantities. - ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. ---
II 124
Tarski/Truth: unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. - Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. - (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. - Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. - Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. - TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) - Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or".
---
II 125
Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. - This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. - Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: it is not important for it. - (> Compositionality). ---
II
Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. ---
II 142
Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. ---
Soames I 477
FieldVsTarski/Soames: hides speech behavior. - Field: introduces primitive reference, and so on. -> language independence. - SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. - FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Soames I
Scott Soames
"What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Soames II
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999
Vocabulary Field II 237
Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? - Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence.
---
II 267
Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. ---
II 355
Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: having non-standard models. - Solution: extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". - FieldVs: that is cheating. - New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. - it would be cheating to assume that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism).
---
III 9
Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. - Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Friedman Vs Davidson, D. Horwich I 498
Korrespondenztheorie/Kausaltheorie der Referenz/Michael Friedman/M.Williams: (wie Boyd mit der Verläßlichkeit unserer Methoden befaßt): wenn Wissenschaft als rationales Handeln gerechtfertigt werden muss, muss es möglich sein zu zeigen, dass es eine enge Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit gibt. ((s) Lager: Friedman: „substantieller W Begriff, VsDeflationismus),. Lösung/Friedman: ein statistisches Gesetz für die Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit. Dies leiten wir von unseren psychologischen und physikalischen Theorien und den Theorien darüber, wie der Geist durch Interaktion mit der Umgebung zu Überzeugungen kommt, ab.
Friedman/M. Williams: weil er Wahrheit innerhalb von Gesetzen verlangt, scheint das einen substantiellen W Begriff zu verlangen.
DeflationismusVsFriedman/M. Williams: aber das stimmt nicht. Und das könnte auch gar nicht sein: Das Zitattilgungsschema liefert die Mittel für semantischen Aufstieg und auch semantischen Abstieg: d.h. Wahrheit kann immer wegparaphrasiert werden. So kann man Friedman paraphrasieren. Bsp
Für jedes p, wenn p durch unsere Methoden bestätigt wird, dann wahrscheinlich p.
((s) ohne Wahrheit).
M. Williams: das involviert Quantifikation über Propositionen oder Sätze (statements). Verwandt mit „Alles was er sagte“, und dafür gibt es ähnliche konventionelle Lösungen.
Wahrheit/FriedmanVs: kann damit aber nicht ad acta gelegt werden: das Zitattilgungsschema allein zeigt nicht den Sprachgebrauch (s.o.).
Kompositionalität/W Theorie/Friedman: These WT verlangt eine kompositionale WT.
Wahrheit/Deflationismus/M. Williams: das heißt aber nicht, dass ein reicherer (substantieller) W Begriff benötigt wird! Das zeigt der Fall von Davidson (s.o.).
Selbst Validierung/Selbst Bestätigung/Überzeugung//Wissenschaft/FriedmanVsDavidson/M. Williams: Friedman These: Selbst Validierung ist möglich. Aber dazu darf nicht angenommen werden, dass unsere Erklärung, wie Referenz bestimmt ist, von vornherein garantiert, dass unsere Überzeugungen wahr sind.
Pointe: d.h. dass Friedman keinen substantiellen W Begriff aus der Tatsache herleitet, dass Wahrheit in Gesetzen vorkommt. (?).
Statt dessen argumentiert er für einen „realistischen“ Ansatz .für Referenz.
I 499
substantieller W Begriff/Friedman: ist dann ein Abfallprodukt davon! Selbst Validierung/Friedman/Zirkel/M. Williams: erscheint zirkulär, weil wir die Methoden gebrauchen, die bestätigt werden sollen.
Ähnlich;:
VsPutnam: Kausaltheorie der Referenz: setzt die Verläßlichkeit voraus, die sie erklären will.
Lösung/PutnamVsVs: es ist nur eine Art „Check der Konsistenz“.
Lösung/Friedman/M. Williams: es ist kein Zirkel, weil nicht von vornherein garantiert ist, dass es unsere besten Theorien sind, die die Verläßlichkeit garantieren.
Wissenschaft/Friedman: eine wichtige Aufgabe ist es zu zeigen, wie Wissenschaft nicht ihre eigene Belegbasis unterminieren kann. Wie Quine sagt:
Wissenschaft/Quine: verteidigt sich von innen, gegen ihre Selbstzweifel.
Friedman/M. Williams: das sieht so aus, als ob Friedman Raum für einen allgemeinen Skeptizismus schafft. Das wird klar wenn er unterscheidet:
a) Kausaltheorien der Referenz
b) Theorien die auf dem Prinzip der Nachsicht basieren, (Davidson).
Referenz/Davidson/M. Williams: nach Davidson ist die Zuschreibung von Referenten eine Sache der Methode unserer Interpretation.
Verläßlichkeit: d.h. dass wir auf Dinge referieren, über die wir verläßlich berichten können ist keine empirische Tatsache, die wir aus „unseren besten Theorien“ ableiten.
Kausaltheorie/Referenz/Friedman: dagegen: spezifiziert Referenz durch Überlegungen, die unabhängig von Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze die wir zufällig akzeptieren, sind.
Überzeugung/FriedmanVsDavidson: das läßt die Möglichkeit offen, dass die meisten (oder alle) unserer Überzeugungen falsch sein könnten.
I 500
Wahrheit/Friedman: dann haben wir etwas signifikantes (substantielles?) gezeigt, wenn wir zeigen, dass unsere Methoden meist wahre Überzeugungen liefern. Aber das geht nur mit der Kausaltheorie, denn sie erlaubt diese selbst kritische Kraft, die am Ende die Selbst Rechtfertigung liefert. Skeptizismus/Friedman/M. Williams: diese Selbstkorrektur ermöglicht Friedman dadurch, dass er allgemeinen Skeptizismus zuläßt.
M. WilliamsVsFriedman: das ist pervers, so wie man eine Krankheit erwirbt aus Freude daran, sie zu kurieren. Außerdem setzt er eine Menge voraus, z.B. die Existenz „unserer induktiven Methoden“, oder die kausale Definition von Referenz.

Econ Fried I
Milton Friedman
The role of monetary policy 1968

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Brandom Vs Deflationism I 467
Deflationism is in danger to undermine itself. Fact: Snow is white
No fact: no fact is claimed when we say "It is true, that snow is white".
NS I 163
Truth Meaning/BrandomVsDavidson: the return from meaning to truth could only succeed with a stronger concept of truth that is not available. (BrandomVsDeflationism, BrandomVsTarski). Conclusion relations/Brandom: three types of conclusions that illuminate meaning:
1. those that commit to further beliefs (e.g. deductive conclusions).
2. those that allow (inductive and deductive)
3. those that exclude.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Deflationism Davidson Vs Deflationism Horwich I 457
Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form:
I 457/458
Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds:
Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with:
Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to:
Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently.

Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Rorty VI 32
Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases! >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Deflationism Field Vs Deflationism I 102
Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true.
Field II 126
VsDeflationism/Field:
1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which ​​requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves
has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme.
DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that
II 127
Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful.
3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections.
4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages.
5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true").
6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives.
7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others.
FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical.
II 135
Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way.
II 137
Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens).
II 138
VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Wright Vs Deflationism I 26
Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric? Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "Minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient.
Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common!
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes.
WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards.
I 35
Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example "It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T.
This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability).
It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible.
Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.)
I 47
VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all.
I 48
InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain) DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P)
I 53
Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism).
I 97
WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness. With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible.
The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Deflationism Brendel Vs Deflationism I 35
Deflationismus/BrendelVsDeflationismus: gibt mit der Ablehnung eines philosophisch gehaltvollen W-Begriffs gleichzeitig die semantische Eigenschaft von Wahrheit mit auf. a) Prosatz-Theorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit ist überhaupt keine Eigenschaft
b) Redundanztheorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit hat nur syntaktische Funktion. (Disquotationstheorie: dito, Quine: dito (> semantischer Aufstieg)).
BrendelVsDeflationismus: kann gar nicht auf einen semantischen W-Begriff verzichten. Ohne ihn ist er unverständlich. (s.u.). Daher kann er auch nicht Basis für den Begriff des Wissens dienen. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation Putnam VII 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism).
Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.
---
Horwich I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
Horwich I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true).
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Horwich I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme).
Horwich I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
Horwich I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
Williams II 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
Williams II 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Field Vs Frege, G. I 89
Knowledge of Consistency/FregeVsDeflationism: (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, §95): We can only determine that a concept is consistent by first producing something that falls under it. (Frege, p. 106). FieldVsFrege: this is obviously not literally correct: E.g. we can see that the concept of a "winged horse" is consistent without producing such a horse. But you can weaken the argument: then it acknowledges that there is knowledge of possibility that does not arise from a knowledge of actuality, but from the reflection of the logical form of the concepts.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Grice, P.H. Field Vs Grice, P.H. II 223
Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy.
Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well.
Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role.
FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it.
II 224
Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation.
Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless.
Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation.
VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)).
VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Proof Theory Deflationism Vs Proof Theory Field I 100
VsDeflationismus: Problem: wie rechtfertigt man die Nützlichkeit des Schließens auf metalogischer Ebene statt auf der Objekt Ebene? Beweistheorie: hier insbesondere gibt es gar keine Objektebene!
Objektebene: hier machen die Aussagen keine Referenz auf Sätze oder Formeln. Oder abstrakte Analoga davon wie Propositionen). Und damit auch nicht auf Axiome, Schlußregeln oder Ableitungen.
Problem: wie können wir dann die Anwendbarkeit (Nützlichkeit) von beweistheoretischem Schließen zeigen?
I 101
DeflationismusVsBeweistheorie: da diese mit mathematischen Entitäten arbeitet, kann der Deflationist nicht annehmen, daß wir überhaupt Wissen von ihr erhalten. Wie kann der Deflationist dennoch ihre Nützlichkeit zeigen? 1. wir müssen die normalen Definitionen beweistheoretischer Begriffe zurückweisen und welche ohne Referenz auf mathematische Entitäten (mE) finden.
a) wir brauchen eine hinreichend kraftvolle Theorie aktualer Inskriptionen, ohne Modalität: mit einer solchen Theorie könnten wir Begriffe wie "e ist eine wohlgeformte Inskription", "e und f sind typ identische Inskriptionen" , "d ist (eine Inskription, die) eine Ableitung (enthält in bezug auf System F)",
sowie verschiedene Prädikate von Inskriptionen, die diese strukturell beschreiben (z.B. von einem bestimmten Inskriptions Typ A zu sein). Das könnte in Logik 1. Stufe ausgeführt werden.
b) wir müssen eine modale Extension schaffen: in der wir z.B. "A ist ableitbar" verstehen als "es ist möglich, daß es eine Ableitung gibt, deren letzte Zeile eine A-Inskription ist".
VsPlatonismus: also nicht: "es existiert aktual ein bestimmter Typ abstrakter Sequenzen abstrakter Analoga der Symbole.
Field: damit soll kein neuer Typ von Möglichkeit neben logischer Möglichkeit eingeführt werden außer wenn wir sie aus strikter logischer Möglichkeit plus anderen akzeptablen Begriffen definieren können.
Problem: 1. logische Möglichkeit ist gänzlich anti essentialistisch. (?). ((s) Nimmt nichts als wesentliches Substrat an? Als Wesen, als Entität?)
Field: das bringt ein Problem für die Übersetzung von Sätzen, wo "ableitbar" im der Reichweite des Quantors liegt. (s) "Es gibt etwas, (eine Entität) das ableitbar ist".
Field: Bsp "er äußerte eine ableitbare Inskription" wäre immer falsch in einer naiven Übersetzung.
I 102
Lösung: substitutionale Quantifikation. (ungleich Kripke/Wallace). 2. Problem: die Konsistenz mit axiomatischer Beweistheorie ist nicht hinreichend für Beweisbarkeit im normalen Sinn: Unvollständigkeits Theoreme liefern Fälle von unbeweisbaren Formeln, wo die Behauptung, daß es einen Beweis gibt konsistent ist mit der Beweistheorie.
Lösung: für die Beweisbarkeit von A ...Existenz eines Beweises kompatibel sein mit einer (nominalistischen oder platonistischen) Beweistheorie die in einer kraftvollen Logik aufgestellt ist, die Ableitungen ausschließen kann, die nicht echt endlich sind. z.B. eine Logik mit einem Quantor "es gibt nur endlich viele" oder mit substitutionalem Quantor.
stärker/schwächer/(s): stärker: eine Logik, die unendliche Ableitungen ausschließt.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true.
CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white.
CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Why (28) instead of
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Or
If snow is white, then…
CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____").
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true.
CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English?
VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors.
Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB).
Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here.
I 346
VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs
Mary: that's surprising, but true.
(31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being
Mary: that is profound and it is true.
Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization!
VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way?
CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true".
CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition).
What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs.
Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act.
I 347
The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.)
CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts.
Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto).
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic.
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example
(32) John: Some dogs eat grass.
Mary: You believe that, but it's not true.
Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs).
I 348
However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference.
N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property.
VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin.
Example: a child says
I've got 15 logs
That is right.
I 349
Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use.
I 349
Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property).
CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic".
Moreover:
Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn).
Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing.
Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts.
Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
I 456
and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions.
Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements.
Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds.
Instead:
Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true).





Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Wright, Cr. Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other.
Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive.
RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations.
1) to justify actions, and
2) another obligation to do the right thing.
It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another.
Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed.
Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation."
VI 41
"Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration.
RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given?
E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard.
VI 42
I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart.
VI 42/43
Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property".
Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences.
VI 45
Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input."
VI 46
Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse!
VI 46/47
Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines!
Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner.
What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content).
VI 48
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale.
VI 48/49
Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it.
Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term.
VI 50
WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell.
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral).
Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general".
Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell).
We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion.
Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction.
Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint".
World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution.
VI 52
True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson).
VI 56
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Deflationism Versus Field I 91
FregeVsDeflationismu

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Versus Horw I 498
M. Friedman per substantial role of truth - truth is demanded within laws - FriedmanVsDeflationism.
Prosentential Theory Versus Horwich I 456
PutnamVsDeflationism - PutnamVsGrover.
Truth = Property Pro Horwich I 431
Truth / Putnam: is a property - PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Versus Horwich I 456
PutnamVsDeflationism - PutnamVsGrover -
Horw I 502
Truth / Putnam: must be substantial - that is, have an explanatory role - (s) Difference theory or truth of a theory - Putnam: otherwise > cultural relativism.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Non-Factualism Boghossian, P. Brandom I 469 +
VsNon-Factualism/BoghossianVsDeflationism: Thesis: the n.-f. of deflationism is incoherent.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Truth Quine, W.V.O. Horwich I 502
Truth / Putnam: must be substantial. Otherwise, it leads to cultural relativism. ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property PutnamVsDeflationism).
Put V 10
Putnam: truth and rationality are intimately linked. Rational acceptability is the only criterion for what is a fact. Eg It may well be rational to accept that a picture is nice. And to that extent, it is also a fact that the image is beautiful.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Minimalism Wright, Cr. Read Logik III 49
Minimalist Theory of Truth/Minimalism: Wright, et al. Wright Thesis: the assertion that truth is not a substantial property cannot explain essential features of the concept of truth, especially that it differs from justified assertiveness.
Wright: Thesis: truth goes beyond assertiveness in that it is stable (once true, always true) and absolute (without degrees of justification).
III 243
Def Minimalism: if it is possible in any form, it shows that this thought is confused. He attributes objective truth values without assuming an additional range of objects. (Minimalism is the thesis that there is nothing more to say about truth than what is contained in the truth scheme.) (>Wright) Rorty/Truth/Wright: Thesis: truth is an independent norm. (sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro variant of minimalism with truth as an independent norm alongside a mere property of sentences.