Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actions Wright
 
Books on Amazon
apropos I 32
Wright / (s): relates action to gain the status of a property of truth: the assertibility: legitimate assertibility - (Vsdeflationism): Wright: "minimalism"

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

All Field
 
Books on Amazon
II 238
all / Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) there could be a contradictory, yet undiscovered property that should not be included under "all properties" - here the dft-operator would in turn help.) - VsDeflationism: one could simply say "..all .. " is true iff "..any ... "- Vs: in addition you need the dft-operator (definite-Op)_ conditions are requested - but not indicated - Field: ditto for higher level quantification.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Deflationism Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
Brandom I 471
Redundancy Theory/Dummett/Brandom: presupposes the content of the non-semantic assertion in view of which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant. DummettVsDeflationism: therefore propositional content cannot be explained by truth conditions - (although everything has truth conditions).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Deflationism Field
 
Books on Amazon
91
Deflationism/Knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist.
---
I 108
VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel. ---
I 110
Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. ---
I 113
Deflationism/Field: does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. - Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement - Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. ---
II 104
Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions (tr.c.) are central for meaning and content - Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions. ---
II 108
Deflationism/Field: Main point: that he does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. ---
II 114
Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that he does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. ---
II 116
Deflationism/Gavagai: for him there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. ---
II 117
Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. - Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic rise. ---
II 118
Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the Deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. ---
II
Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the WB p", or not. ---
II 127
VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist ..." (> Strawson) - 2. He cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) - 3. He cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse - 4. He cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages - 5. He gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") - 6. He cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa - 7. He cannot explain learning. ---
Ad II 260
Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For him, it is senseless to ask why - "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.)

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Deflationism Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 502
Deflationism/Metaphysical RealismVsDeflationism/Putnam: the deflationism may not regard sounds as representations by virtue of a reference relation - it must represent meaning through assertibility conditions - but conditions are no noise - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (although this picture is sympathetic): Meaning/Putnam: better in terms of appropriate use in the situation - ((s) instead of community).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 32
Def Deflationism: the view, Tarski’s work encompasses all the essential features of the truth.
VI 39
WrightVsDeflationism / Rorty: (like Davidson, but for different reasons) Wright not even mentioned the duty to achieve the truth - that leads to renewed inflation - because one standard need not be met with the other - VI 40 WrightVsTarski: he has not succeeded to specify a standard.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Deflationism Wright
 
Books on Amazon
I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "swelling" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory).Thesis truth no property, only a means of disquotation. ---
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations - Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. - (> Rorty,> Brandom).
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's presumption).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism/E.g. Goldbach's presumption: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski also, E.g. "Everything he said is true."
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
---
I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
---
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
---
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. ---
I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität). ---
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", "minimalism". ---
I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (realism?). ---
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the Z-T-principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Knowledge Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 83
Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: no knowledge about what does not follow. - Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). - ((s) About that was no conclusion of something). - consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion. - Field E.g. a knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge. - Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. - Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. - VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical. ---
I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. ---
I 93
Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. - Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong) - Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. - Then it would be categorical knowledge. - E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. - Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions. ---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Thesis: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another?

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Minimalism Wright
 
Books on Amazon
I 52
Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P, (ii) "P" says that P, (iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true, (iv) the validity of the modus tollens, (v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" - recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism) ---
I 102f
Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth. ---
I 225
Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate. ---
I 267ff ~
Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth. ---
I 271
Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. --
I 285
Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Redundancy Theory Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
Brandom I 471
Redundancy theory/Dummett/Brandom: presumes the content of the non-semantic assertion against which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant - DummettVsDeflationism: therefore deflationism cannot explain the propositional content through truth conditions - (although everything has truth conditions).
III 13
Truth/Redundancy Theory/Dummett: the singular term which appears in P, has its indirect reference object in "It s true that P, i.e. its meaning - E.g. "A unicorn has one horn": without truth value - but "It is true that a unicorn has one horn": false - divergence of "P" and "It is true that P".
III 17
Redundancy Theory/Dummett: indicates that our explanation states the whole meaning of "true and" false" - problem: if we accept the redundancy theory, the explanation is obstructed by the truth theory - ((s) because it requires a bivalent logic.)
III 226
Redundancy Theory: the thesis, that the equivalence thesis provides an exhaustive explanation of the truth concept. - Equivalence thesis: "P is true" comes out at the same thing as "p" - DummettVs: does not explain the understanding of linguistic meaning, there must be something that goes beyond this, because we understand the special meaning of "is true".

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Second Order Logic, HOL Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
2nd Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence - quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true - vagueness refers to the A. ---
II 238
Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? - no: e.g.: everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets) - it does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties" - ((s )> "Everything he said") - all/N.B./Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) there could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties." E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help.) - VsDeflationism: could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... - Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (definitive-Op), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. - Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). ---
III 39
First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. ((s) Instead of an axiom via a set, a schema for all elements?) - Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. (> unintended model). ---
III 92
2nd Order Logic/Field: we have that at two places: 1. at the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have ---
III 93
the "complete logic of the part-whole relation" (see Chapter 4), or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums" - 2. (in Section B, Chapter 8): the binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: - Goodman's sum: its logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than").

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Tarski Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 33f
Tarski/Field: According to him the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". - b) There are no mathematical entities (m.e.) like quantities. - ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. ---
II 124
Tarski/Truth: unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. - Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. - (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. - Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. - Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. - TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) - Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or".
---
II 125
Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. - This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. - Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: it is not important for it. - (> Compositionality). ---
II
Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. ---
II 142
Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. ---
Horwich I 477
FieldVsTarski/Soames: hides speech behavior. - Field: introduces primitive reference, and so on. -> language independence. - SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. - FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Vocabulary Field
 
Books on Amazon
II 237
Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? - Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. - New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence. ---
II 267
Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. ---
II 355
Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: having non-standard models. - Solution: extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". - FieldVs: that is cheating. - New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. - it would be cheating to assume that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism). ---
III 9
Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. - Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Friedman Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 498
Korrespondenztheorie/Kausaltheorie der Referenz/Michael Friedman/M.Williams: (wie Boyd mit der Verläßlichkeit unserer Methoden befaßt): wenn Wissenschaft als rationales Handeln gerechtfertigt werden muss, muss es möglich sein zu zeigen, dass es eine enge Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit gibt. ((s) Lager: Friedman: „substantieller W Begriff, VsDeflationismus),. Lösung/Friedman: ein statistisches Gesetz für die Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit. Dies leiten wir von unseren psychologischen und physikalischen Theorien und den Theorien darüber, wie der Geist durch Interaktion mit der Umgebung zu Überzeugungen kommt, ab.
Friedman/M. Williams: weil er Wahrheit innerhalb von Gesetzen verlangt, scheint das einen substantiellen W Begriff zu verlangen.
DeflationismusVsFriedman/M. Williams: aber das stimmt nicht. Und das könnte auch gar nicht sein: Das Zitattilgungsschema liefert die Mittel für semantischen Aufstieg und auch semantischen Abstieg: d.h. Wahrheit kann immer wegparaphrasiert werden. So kann man Friedman paraphrasieren. Bsp
Für jedes p, wenn p durch unsere Methoden bestätigt wird, dann wahrscheinlich p.
((s) ohne Wahrheit).
M. Williams: das involviert Quantifikation über Propositionen oder Sätze (statements). Verwandt mit „Alles was er sagte“, und dafür gibt es ähnliche konventionelle Lösungen.
Wahrheit/FriedmanVs: kann damit aber nicht ad acta gelegt werden: das Zitattilgungsschema allein zeigt nicht den Sprachgebrauch (s.o.).
Kompositionalität/W Theorie/Friedman: These WT verlangt eine kompositionale WT.
Wahrheit/Deflationismus/M. Williams: das heißt aber nicht, dass ein reicherer (substantieller) W Begriff benötigt wird! Das zeigt der Fall von Davidson (s.o.).
Selbst Validierung/Selbst Bestätigung/Überzeugung//Wissenschaft/FriedmanVsDavidson/M. Williams: Friedman These: Selbst Validierung ist möglich. Aber dazu darf nicht angenommen werden, dass unsere Erklärung, wie Referenz bestimmt ist, von vornherein garantiert, dass unsere Überzeugungen wahr sind.
Pointe: d.h. dass Friedman keinen substantiellen W Begriff aus der Tatsache herleitet, dass Wahrheit in Gesetzen vorkommt. (?).
Statt dessen argumentiert er für einen „realistischen“ Ansatz .für Referenz.
I 499
substantieller W Begriff/Friedman: ist dann ein Abfallprodukt davon! Selbst Validierung/Friedman/Zirkel/M. Williams: erscheint zirkulär, weil wir die Methoden gebrauchen, die bestätigt werden sollen.
Ähnlich;:
VsPutnam: Kausaltheorie der Referenz: setzt die Verläßlichkeit voraus, die sie erklären will.
Lösung/PutnamVsVs: es ist nur eine Art „Check der Konsistenz“.
Lösung/Friedman/M. Williams: es ist kein Zirkel, weil nicht von vornherein garantiert ist, dass es unsere besten Theorien sind, die die Verläßlichkeit garantieren.
Wissenschaft/Friedman: eine wichtige Aufgabe ist es zu zeigen, wie Wissenschaft nicht ihre eigene Belegbasis unterminieren kann. Wie Quine sagt:
Wissenschaft/Quine: verteidigt sich von innen, gegen ihre Selbstzweifel.
Friedman/M. Williams: das sieht so aus, als ob Friedman Raum für einen allgemeinen Skeptizismus schafft. Das wird klar wenn er unterscheidet:
a) Kausaltheorien der Referenz
b) Theorien die auf dem Prinzip der Nachsicht basieren, (Davidson).
Referenz/Davidson/M. Williams: nach Davidson ist die Zuschreibung von Referenten eine Sache der Methode unserer Interpretation.
Verläßlichkeit: d.h. dass wir auf Dinge referieren, über die wir verläßlich berichten können ist keine empirische Tatsache, die wir aus „unseren besten Theorien“ ableiten.
Kausaltheorie/Referenz/Friedman: dagegen: spezifiziert Referenz durch Überlegungen, die unabhängig von Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze die wir zufällig akzeptieren, sind.
Überzeugung/FriedmanVsDavidson: das läßt die Möglichkeit offen, dass die meisten (oder alle) unserer Überzeugungen falsch sein könnten.
I 500
Wahrheit/Friedman: dann haben wir etwas signifikantes (substantielles?) gezeigt, wenn wir zeigen, dass unsere Methoden meist wahre Überzeugungen liefern. Aber das geht nur mit der Kausaltheorie, denn sie erlaubt diese selbst kritische Kraft, die am Ende die Selbst Rechtfertigung liefert. Skeptizismus/Friedman/M. Williams: diese Selbstkorrektur ermöglicht Friedman dadurch, dass er allgemeinen Skeptizismus zuläßt.
M. WilliamsVsFriedman: das ist pervers, so wie man eine Krankheit erwirbt aus Freude daran, sie zu kurieren. Außerdem setzt er eine Menge voraus, z.B. die Existenz „unserer induktiven Methoden“, oder die kausale Definition von Referenz.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Brandom Vs Deflationism
 
Books on Amazon
I 467
Deflationism is in danger to undermine itself. fact. Snow is white
No fact: no fact is claimed when we say "It is true, that snow is white".

NS I 163
Wahrheit/Bedeutung/BrandomVsDavidson: die Zurückführung von Bedeutung auf Wahrheit könnte nur mit einem stärkeren Wahrheits-Begriff gelingen, der nicht zur Verfügung steht. (BrandomVsDeflationismus, BrandomVsTarski). Folgerungsbeziehungen/Brandom: drei Arten von Folgerungen, die die Bedeutung erhellen:
1. solche, die zu weiteren Überzeugungen verpflichten (Bsp deduktive Schlüsse).
2. ...erlauben (induktive und deduktive)
3. ...ausschließen.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Deflationism Davidson Vs Deflationism
 
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Horwich I 457
Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form:
I 457/458
Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds:
Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with:
Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to:
Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently.

Rorty VI 32
Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases!

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Deflationism Field Vs Deflationism
 
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I 102
Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true.
Field II 126
VsDeflationism/Field:
1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which ​​requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves
has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme.
DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that
II 127
Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful.
3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections.
4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages.
5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true").
6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives.
7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others.
FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical.
II 135
Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way.
II 137
Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens).
II 138
VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Deflationism Wright Vs Deflationism
 
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I 26
Wahrheit: gibt es einen Begriff der Wahrheit, der frei ist von metaphysischen Verpflichtungen, und dennoch assertorisch ist? Deflation/Deflationism/deflationary approach: Ramsey war hier der erste. (In jüngster Zeit: Horwich: "Minimalismus"): Wahrheit assertorisch (behauptend, aber nicht durch Annahme metaphysischer Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte gestützt). Tarskis Zitattilgung reicht aus.
Wahrheit ist keine substantielle Eigenschaft von Sätzen. Wahre Sätze wie "Schnee ist weiß" und "Grass ist grün" haben nichts gemeinsam! (>Rorty, >Brandom).
Wichtig: man kann das Zitattiglungsschema benutzen, ohne den Gehalt zu verstehen! Man kann sich dem Prädikat "wahr" "annähern". (Goldbachsche Vermutung).
Deflationism Thesis: der Gehalt des Wahrheitsprädikats ist der gleiche wie der Anspruch, den sein assertorischer Gebrauch erhebt.
WrightVsDeflationism: statt dessen "minimale Wahrheitsfähigkeit", "minimale Wahrheit" hier "Minimalism": Kernbestand anerkannter Maßstäbe.
I 35
Berechtigte Behauptbarkeit/Assertibilität/Negation: Bsp "Es ist nicht der Fall, dass P" ist T dann und nur dann, wenn es nicht der Fall ist, dass "P" T ist.
das ist für berechtigte Behauptbarkeit nicht von rechts nach links gültig! .Und zwar, wenn der Informationsstand neutral (unentscheidbar) ist. (Aber für Wahrheit)(>Neutralität, Unentscheidbarkeit).
Es ist dann korrekt zu behaupten, dass es nicht der Fall ist, dass P assertibel ist, aber unkorrekt zu behaupten, dass die Negation von P berechtigt assertibel ist.
Daher müssen wir "T" und "assertibel" unterscheiden. ("assertible": von jetzt an für "berechtigt assertible"). (VsDeflationism, der nur eine Norm anerkennt.)
I 47
VsDeflationismus: keine Theorie, sondern ein "Potpourri". Es gibt gar keine eindeutige These.
I 48
InflationismVsDeflationism: (unsicher) DS’ "P" ist wahr(E!P)("P" sagt, dass P & P) (! = das dem P Genügende existiert)
I 53
Minimalism/Wright: erkennt im Gegensatz zum Deflationism an, dass Wahrheit eine echte Eigenschaft ist. Der Besitz dieser Eigenschaft ist normativ verschieden von berechtigter Behauptbarkeit. (VsDeflationism).
I 97
WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: die klassisch deflationäre Auffassung der Wahrheit ist in sich instabil. Keine Norm des Wahrheitsprädikats kann festlegen, dass es sich von berechtigter Behauptbarkeit unterscheidet. Mit dieser Konsequenz ist aber die dem Zitattilgungsschema - und damit auch der Negationsäquivalenz - zugeschriebene zentrale Rolle nicht verträglich.
Die normative Kraft von "wahr" und "berechtigt behauptbar" fällt zwar zusammen, kann aber extensional potentiell divergieren.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Deflationism Brendel Vs Deflationism
 
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I 35
Deflationismus/BrendelVsDeflationismus: gibt mit der Ablehnung eines philosophisch gehaltvollen W-Begriffs gleichzeitig die semantische Eigenschaft von Wahrheit mit auf. a) Prosatz-Theorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit ist überhaupt keine Eigenschaft
b) Redundanztheorie/Brendel: These Wahrheit hat nur syntaktische Funktion. (Disquotationstheorie: dito, Quine: dito (> semantischer Aufstieg)).
BrendelVsDeflationismus: kann gar nicht auf einen semantischen W-Begriff verzichten. Ohne ihn ist er unverständlich. (s.u.). Daher kann er auch nicht Basis für den Begriff des Wissens dienen.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation
 
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Horwich I 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism.)
Truth/Putnam: is a property - PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (Mirror of Nature): truth no property.
---
I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
---
I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions (WB) was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). ---
I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (DS). ---
I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
I 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
---
I 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H.
 
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Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the ML is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

Horwich I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic, ML) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptancy).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Field Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 89
Knowledge of Consistency/FregeVsDeflationism: (§95, Foundations of Arithmetic): We can only determine that a concept is consistent by first producing something that falls under it. (p.106). FieldVsFrege: this is obviously not literally correct: E.g. we can see that the concept of a "winged horse" is consistent without producing such a horse. But you can weaken the argument: then it acknowledges that there is knowledge of possibility that does not arise from a knowledge of actuality, but from the reflection of the logical form of the concepts.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Grice, P.H. Field Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon
II 223
Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy.
Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well.
Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role.
FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it.
II 224
Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation.
Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless.
Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation.
VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)).
VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Proof Theory Deflationism Vs Proof Theory
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 100
VsDeflationismus: Problem: wie rechtfertigt man die Nützlichkeit des Schließens auf metalogischer Ebene statt auf der Objekt Ebene? Beweistheorie: hier insbesondere gibt es gar keine Objektebene!
Objektebene: hier machen die Aussagen keine Referenz auf Sätze oder Formeln. Oder abstrakte Analoga davon wie Propositionen). Und damit auch nicht auf Axiome, Schlußregeln oder Ableitungen.
Problem: wie können wir dann die Anwendbarkeit (Nützlichkeit) von beweistheoretischem Schließen zeigen?
I 101
DeflationismusVsBeweistheorie: da diese mit mathematischen Entitäten arbeitet, kann der Deflationist nicht annehmen, daß wir überhaupt Wissen von ihr erhalten. Wie kann der Deflationist dennoch ihre Nützlichkeit zeigen? 1. wir müssen die normalen Definitionen beweistheoretischer Begriffe zurückweisen und welche ohne Referenz auf mathematische Entitäten (mE) finden.
a) wir brauchen eine hinreichend kraftvolle Theorie aktualer Inskriptionen, ohne Modalität: mit einer solchen Theorie könnten wir Begriffe wie "e ist eine wohlgeformte Inskription", "e und f sind typ identische Inskriptionen" , "d ist (eine Inskription, die) eine Ableitung (enthält in bezug auf System F)",
sowie verschiedene Prädikate von Inskriptionen, die diese strukturell beschreiben (z.B. von einem bestimmten Inskriptions Typ A zu sein). Das könnte in Logik 1. Stufe ausgeführt werden.
b) wir müssen eine modale Extension schaffen: in der wir z.B. "A ist ableitbar" verstehen als "es ist möglich, daß es eine Ableitung gibt, deren letzte Zeile eine A-Inskription ist".
VsPlatonismus: also nicht: "es existiert aktual ein bestimmter Typ abstrakter Sequenzen abstrakter Analoga der Symbole.
Field: damit soll kein neuer Typ von Möglichkeit neben logischer Möglichkeit eingeführt werden außer wenn wir sie aus strikter logischer Möglichkeit plus anderen akzeptablen Begriffen definieren können.
Problem: 1. logische Möglichkeit ist gänzlich anti essentialistisch. (?). ((s) Nimmt nichts als wesentliches Substrat an? Als Wesen, als Entität?)
Field: das bringt ein Problem für die Übersetzung von Sätzen, wo "ableitbar" im der Reichweite des Quantors liegt. (s) "Es gibt etwas, (eine Entität) das ableitbar ist".
Field: Bsp "er äußerte eine ableitbare Inskription" wäre immer falsch in einer naiven Übersetzung.
I 102
Lösung: substitutionale Quantifikation. (ungleich Kripke/Wallace). 2. Problem: die Konsistenz mit axiomatischer Beweistheorie ist nicht hinreichend für Beweisbarkeit im normalen Sinn: Unvollständigkeits Theoreme liefern Fälle von unbeweisbaren Formeln, wo die Behauptung, daß es einen Beweis gibt konsistent ist mit der Beweistheorie.
Lösung: für die Beweisbarkeit von A ...Existenz eines Beweises kompatibel sein mit einer (nominalistischen oder platonistischen) Beweistheorie die in einer kraftvollen Logik aufgestellt ist, die Ableitungen ausschließen kann, die nicht echt endlich sind. z.B. eine Logik mit einem Quantor "es gibt nur endlich viele" oder mit substitutionalem Quantor.
stärker/schwächer/(s): stärker: eine Logik, die unendliche Ableitungen ausschließt.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Zitat/VsProsatz Theorie/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: man wirft der Prosatz Theorie vor, Fälle zu ignorieren, wo Wahrheit von Zitaten, d.h. Namen von Sätzen ausgesagt wird. Bsp (27) „Schnee ist weiß“ ist wahr.
CGB: wir könnten hier mit Ramsey sagen, dass (27) einfach bedeutet, dass Schnee weiß ist.
CGBVsRamsey: das verschleiert wichtige pragmatische Merkmale des Beispiels. Sie werden deutlicher, wenn wir eine fremdsprachige Übersetzung heranziehen. Bsp
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Warum (28) anstatt von
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Oder
If snow is white, then…
CGB: hier gibt es mehrer mögliche Gründe. Es kann sein, dass wir deutlich machen wollen, dass der Originalsatz auf Deutsch geäußert wurde. Oder es könnte sein, dass es keine elegante Übersetzung gibt, oder wir kennen die Grammatik des Deutschen nicht gut genug. Oder Bsp „Schnee ist weiß „muss wahr sein, weil Fritz es gesagt hat und alles was Fritz sagt, ist wahr.
I 345
Angenommen, Englisch* hat eine Möglichkeit, einen Satz formal zu präsentieren: Bsp „Betrachte __“ („consider).
(29) Betrachte: Schnee ist weiß. Das ist wahr.
CGB: warum soll das nicht genauso funktionieren wie „Schnee ist weiß ist wahr“ in normalem Englisch?
VsCGB: man könnte einwenden, dass damit eine Referenz auf Sätze oder Ausdrücke verlangt wird, weil Anführungszeichen namenbildende Funktoren sind.
Anführungszeichen/CGB: wir weichen von dieser Darstellung ab! Anführungszeichen sind keine namen bildenden Funktoren. ((s) bei CGB nicht).
Zitat/CGB: sollte im normalen Englisch vielleicht nicht als Referenz auf Ausdrücke betrachtet werden. Aber das wollen wir hier nicht weiterverfolgen.
I 346
VsCGB: man hat der Prosatz Theorie Tunnelblick vorgeworfen: Vielleicht haben wir bestimmte, grammatisch ähnliche Konstruktionen übersehen? Bsp (30) John: es gibt sieben beinige Hunde
Mary: das ist überraschend, aber wahr.
(31) John: das Sein von Wissen ist das Wissen von Sein
Mary: das ist tiefgründig und es ist wahr.
Ad (30): natürlich ist die erste Hälfte, „das ist überraschend“ in keiner Weise prosentential. Es ist eine Charakterisierung!
VsCGB: Ad (31) „ist tiefgründig“ drückt eine Eigenschaft aus, die Mary dem Satz zuschreibt. Warum sollte man „wahr“ nicht in der gleichen Weise auffassen?
CGB: es liegt nahe, „das“ hier als auf einen Satz referierend aufzufassen. Aber das würde die Sache komplizierter machen, weil wir dann „das“ und „es“ unterschiedlich behandeln müssten in „das ist wahr“ und „es ist wahr“.
CGBVsVs: 1. es ist einfach nicht wahr, dass das „das“ in „das ist überraschend“ auf eine Äußerung referiert (in dem Sinn dessen, was gesagt wurde, bzw. eine Proposition).
Was ist hier überraschend? Tatsachen, Ereignisse oder Zustände (states of affairs).
Aussage/Überraschung/CGB: eine Aussage kann nur als Akt überraschend sein.
I 347
Das Überraschende an der Aussage ist die berichtete Tatsache. ((s) Aber dann doch der Inhalt eher als der Akt des Aussagens.)
CGBVs(s): es ist nicht die Tatsache, dass es sieben beinige Hunde gibt, die in (30) als wahr behauptet wird, denn diese Tatsache kann nicht wahr sein!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositionen sind nicht tiefgründig. Tiefgründig können Akte sein. Bsp Einsichten oder Gedanken.
Wahrheit/Akt/Handlung/Aussage/CGB: aber Aussagen im Handlungssinn sind nicht das, was man wahr nennt. ((s) siehe auch StrawsonVsAustin, dito).
Referenz/Prosatz/CGB: selbst wenn wir Bsp „das ist überraschend, aber es ist wahr“ als referierend ansehen, referieren die beiden Teile nicht auf dieselbe Sache! Und dann ist die Theorie nicht mehr ökonomisch.
Referenz/Prosatz Theorie/CGB: gibt es vielleicht andere Fälle, wo es plausibel ist, dass ein Pronomen auf eine Proposition referiert? Bsp
(32) John: Einige Hunde fressen Gras.
Mary: Das glaubst Du, aber es ist nicht wahr.
Proposition: wird oft als Träger von Wahrheit aufgefaßt, und als Glaubensobjekt. (CGBVs).
I 348
Allerdings, wenn „das“ hier als referierendes Pronomen aufgefaßt wird, dann muss der Referent eine Proposition sein. CGBVs: wir können „das glaubst du“ auch anders auffassen: als prosententiale Anapher (wie oben bei Bsp „das ist falsch“, mit vorgeschaltetem Negations Präfix). Dann haben wir keine pronominale Referenz.
Pointe: es geht darum, dass keine Eigenschaft zugeschrieben wird. Wahrheit ist keine Eigenschaft.
VsCGB: anderer Einwand: es sei ebenso ein „Tunnelblick“, dass wir nur „das ist wahr“ aber nicht Bsp „das ist richtig“ im Blick haben. Oder das Bsp „übertrieben“ von Austin.
Bsp ein Kind sagt
Ich habe 15 Klötze
Das ist richtig.
I 349
Frage: sollte das (und Bsp „Das ist eine Übertreibung!“) prosentential aufgefaßt werden? CGBVsVs: „das ist richtig“ ist hier die Feststellung, dass das Kind richtig gezählt hat, dass es etwas richtig ausgeführt hat. Manchmal kann sich das überlappen mit der Feststellung, dass eine Äußerung wahr ist. Das Überlappen muss es geben, weil es keine klare Grenze zwischen Sprachlernen und Sprachgebrauch gibt.
I 349
Anapher/Prosatz Theorie/VsCGB: könnte man nicht den Prosatz doch aufsplitten und das einzelne „das“ als Anapher nehmen? CGBVsVs: dann müsste man auch „ist wahr“ abspalten und nicht mehr als referierend, sondern als charakterisierend auffassen ((s) Und damit als eigenschafts zuschreibend).
CGBVs: dann müssten wir unsere These aufgeben, dass Rede über Wahrheit vollkommen verständlich ist ohne „Träger von Wahrheit“ oder „Wahrheits Charakteristik“.
Außerdem:
Referenz/CGB: es ist bekannt, dass nicht jede Nominalisierung referierend sein muss ((s) Bsp Einhorn).
Prädikation/CGB: auch muss nicht jede Prädikation charakterisierend sein.

göttliche Perspektive//außen/PutnamVsGottesstandpunkt/Rorty: Putnam amüsiert sich wie James und Dewey, über solche Versuche.
Rorty: er hat aber ein Problem, wenn es um PutnamVsDisquotationalismus geht: dieser riecht ihm zu reduktionistisch, zu positivistisch, zu „behavioristisch“ (transzendentaler Skinnerismus“).
Wahrheit/Putnam: wenn ein Philosoph sagt, Wahrheit sei etwas anderes als Elektrizität weil es wohl Raum für eine Theorie der Elektrizität aber keinen für eine WT gebe,
I 456
und dass die Kenntnis der WB alles sei, was man über Wahrheit wissen könnte, dann leugnet er, dass Wahrheit eine Eigenschaft ist. Damit gibt es dann auch keine Eigenschaft der Korrektheit oder Richtigkeit ((s) >Deflationismus, PutnamVsDeflationismus, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: das heißt zu leugnen, dass unsere Gedanken Gedanken sind und unsere Behauptungen Behauptungen.
Theorie/Existenz/Reduktion/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam nimmt hier an, dass der einzige Grund dafür zu leugnen, dass man eine Theorie für ein X braucht, ist, zu sagen, dass das X „nichts als Y“ sei ((s) eliminativer Reduktionismus).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson muss zeigen, dass Behauptungen auf Geräusche reduziert werden können. Dann müsste der Feldlinguist Handlungen auf Bewegungen reduzieren.
Davidson/Rorty: aber dieser sagt nicht, dass Behauptungen nichts als Geräusche seien.
Statt dessen:
Wahrheit/Erklärung/Davidson: anders als Elektrizität ist Wahrheit keine Erklärung für etwas. ((s) Ein Phänomen wird nicht dadurch erklärt, dass ein Satz, der es behauptet, wahr ist).





Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Wright, Cr. Rorty Vs Wright, Cr.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other.
Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive.
RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations.
1) to justify actions, and
2) another obligation to do the right thing.
It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another.
Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed.
Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation."
VI 41
"Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration.
RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given?
E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard.
VI 42
I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart.
VI 42/43
Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property".
Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences.
VI 45
Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input."
VI 46
Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse!
VI 46/47
Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines!
Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner.
What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content).
VI 48
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale.
VI 48/49
Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it.
Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term.
VI 50
WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell.
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral).
Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general".
Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell).
We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion.
Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction.
Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint".
World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution.
VI 52
True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson).
VI 56
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Deflationism Versus Field I 91
FregeVsDeflationismu

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Deflationism Versus Horw I 498
M. Friedman per substantial role of truth - truth is demanded within laws - FriedmanVsDeflationism.
Prosentential Theory Versus Horwich I 456
PutnamVsDeflationism - PutnamVsGrover.
Truth = Property Pro Horwich I 431
Truth / Putnam: is a property - PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Deflationism Versus Horwich I 456
PutnamVsDeflationism - PutnamVsGrover -
Horw I 502
Truth / Putnam: must be substantial - that is, have an explanatory role - (s) Difference theory or truth of a theory - Putnam: otherwise > cultural relativism.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Non-Factualism Boghossian, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Brandom I 469 +
VsNon-Factualism/BoghossianVsDeflationism: Thesis: the n.-f. of deflationism is incoherent.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Truth Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 502
Truth / Putnam: must be substantial. Otherwise, it leads to cultural relativism. ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property PutnamVsDeflationism).
Put V 10
Putnam: truth and rationality are intimately linked. Rational acceptability is the only criterion for what is a fact. Eg It may well be rational to accept that a picture is nice. And to that extent, it is also a fact that the image is beautiful.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Minimalism Wright, Cr.
 
Books on Amazon
Read Logik III 49
Minimalistische Wahrheitstheorie/Minimalismus: Wright, u.A. Wright These: die Behauptung, Wahrheit sei keine substantielle Eigenschaft, kann wesentliche Zuge des Begriffs der Wahrheit nicht erklären, insbesondere, daß sie sich von gerechtfertigter Behauptbarkeit unterscheidet.
Wright: These Wahrheit geht über Behauptbarkeit hinaus, indem sie stabil (einmal wahr, immer wahr) , und absolut (ohne Grade der Rechtfertigung) ist.
III 243
Def Minimalismus: falls er in irgendeiner Form möglich ist, zeigt er, daß dieser Gedanke verworren ist. Er schreibt objektive Wahrheitswerte zu, ohne einen zusätzlichen Bereich von Objekten anzunehmen. (Minimalismus ist die These, über die Wahrheit gebe es nicht mehr zu sagen, als was im Wï·"Schema enthalten ist.) (>Wright) Rorty Wahrheit/Wright: These Wahrheit eigenständige Norm. (sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationismus, Wirght pro Spielart des Minimalismus mit Wahrheit als eigenständiger Norm neben einer bloßen Eigenschaft von Sätzen.