Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Nelson Goodman on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

I 31
Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master.
, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory.
I 34
The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out.
"The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false).
I 147
GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised:
"'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white".
>Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme.
I 149
Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test.
I 146 ff
GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious.
Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale.
III 242
The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter.
Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form.
IV 208
Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity.
IV 205
Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z