Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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George Berkeley on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments
I 230f Imagination/abstract/Berkeley: the idea of a triangle must be neither acute nor stump nor rectangular etc. - Then it’s not a triangle - so there are no abstract ideas. VsBerkeley: he merges the problem with the abstraction: how is it possible that a one can have a relation to a class or species? (General/special). >Generality, >Abstraction. There can be no similarity between something that is an idea and something that is no idea. - A perception cannot reflect something that is external to perception. >Similarity, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
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> Counter arguments against Berkeley
> Counter arguments in relation to Imagination
