Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Berkeley Kant Adorno XIII 57
Berkeley/KantVsBerkeley/Adorno: Kant (...) calls Berkeley, whom we would call a spiritualist, an idealist and speaks of dreamy idealism, because it is an idealism that simply contests the reality of the external world, while its own transcendental idealism as an attempt for the rescue of objectivity, precisely wants to be empirical realism.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Experience James Suhr I 93
Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled term": like "life" and "history". ---
Diaz-Bone I 55
Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories. >Association.
---
I 59
Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere. ((s) = Being is perceiving.)


Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Generality Berkeley I 231
General/Berkeley: only when a word is sign of several ideas - a particular one then assumes the function to represent generality. ArmstrongVsBerkeley: there is no sign for something general. >Signs/Armstrong.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
God Berkeley Stegmüller IV 380
Berkeley/Stegmüller: Berkeley is in favour of theism. - He introduces a theistic concept of God. -
IV 381
VsBerkeley/Stegmüller: 1. Vs: there could be several ghosts, not merely one God. - 2. Vs: The order is exaggerated
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Ideas Rorty I 74
"Idea of idea," Berkeley / Rorty: makes it possible to make the concept of an extended substance superfluous. - BerkeleyVsDescartes.
II (f) 129
Berkeley / Rorty: Thesis: "nothing but another idea can be like an idea" - RortyVsBerkeley: He should have said - only one sentence may be relevant to the truth of another seentence - ((s)> Coherence Theory).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ideas Sellars I 51
Ideas/Berkeley: the idea of A cannot be the idea of B - SellarsVsBerkeley: he would not be able to admit the idea of something crimson - ((s) red and crimson are not mutually exclusive).

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Imagination Berkeley I 230f
Imagination/abstract/Berkeley: the idea of a triangle must be neither acute nor stump nor rectangular etc. - Then it’s not a triangle - so there are no abstract ideas. VsBerkeley: He merges the problem with the abstraction: how is it possible that a one can have a relation to a class or species? (General/special). - There can be no similarity between something that is an idea and something that is no idea. - A perception cannot reflect something that is external to perception.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Immanence Chisholm II 33
Def immanence principle/ Berkeley / Rutte: "real external thing": absurd, because otherwise there would have to be thoughts that are thought by nobody - VsBerkeley: confusion between "not intended" and independent thought - objects that are independent from thinking therefore do not have to exist - Berkeley: There is no specific experience for verifications - we can make the same predictions when denying the outside world.

Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Mental States Berkeley I 222
Mind/Berkeley: The mind is different from imagination - but always based on ideas. - It is the active substrate of the passive idea. HumeVsBerkeley: a mind can generate no idea in another spirit. - I do not recognize the mind by sense impressions, but by want.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Perception Chisholm I, 136ff
Perception/ChisholmVsTradition: Appearance rather than feeling - adverbial speech: "feels reddish" - cannot be comparative - hallucination: here it depends on the mode of experience - appearance: divisible> sense data language is permissible. See also phenomenological language., >Sense data. - perception: it is epistemically evident to me that the object is there - transcendent evidence: judgment about the object is related to me - perceptible properties: secondary qualities - 1. primary qualities: indirect attribution of a property, 2. non-propositional: the subject takes possession of the property true, self-presenting - does not imply the object . ---
I 150
Perception/Knowledge/Theory of Knowledge/Chisholm: Epistemic Principle 9 de re: x is such that it is evident to x that it is F (less pure) - not applicable if thing does not exist - not to reveal existence non-reflectively, not self-presenting. ---
I 152
Negative perception: seems to demand incompatibility, but it does not have to - Russell: negative perception: empirical propositions, directly known, not developed - Chisholm: e.g. hear nothing: psychological state - negative perception/Whitehead: creates consciousness in first place. - Chisholm pro: Awareness of one's own intentional attitudes. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 24
Perception/Rutte: more than experience: taking an external through the senses - experience: could also be purely immanent. ---
II 24
Aporia of perception/Hartmann: how is correspondence possible if the one is consciousness-immanent and the other consciousness-transcendent? - Causing of experiences has very different properties than having experiences. ---
II ~ 25
Perception problem: not whether we perceive things as they are, but whether we can infer from our experiences a causer. - Rutte: experience-like core of the immediate given (SellarsVs) - perception/Rutte: effect of the object evokes a legal order of experience which causally determines the experiences and provokes expectations. ---
II 27
Perception/Helmholtz: not as an image of properties but their "indications". These are interpreted on the basis of hypotheses - the mode of appearance of a thing is structurally reflected in a certain regular order of our sensory experiences. Hypothetical realism: Schlick, Kraft, Popper, Konrad Lorenz et al. ---
II 34
Perception/Rutte: success/failure already presupposes realism. - linguistic analytical philosophy: criteria for deception - Berkeley: does not exist. VsBerkeley: then there is not even a conceptual distinction of hallucination, but this is presupposed by Berkeley himself. ---
II 36
Realism/Truth/Rutte: whoever wants to know whether there are outside things can perhaps guess the truth about it - there is no truth-oriented way to find it out because no successes or failures can be demonstrated that might speak for or against the assumptions.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Perception Pinker I 148
Berkeley: e.g. cherry: is just a mixture of sensations. If you take that away, you take away the cherry. PinkerVsBerkeley: we can have exactly the same knowledge of two objects and yet know that they are two - before swapping we number them.
---
I 176
Sensory perception/thoughts/Pinker: have an emotional coloring. They need a governing body, an "I".

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Rationalism Chisholm II 36f
RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position - methodology / Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world.
II 39
Rationalism/Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities - reason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive, is also true for indecision - it is more attractive to maintain realism - solipsism: less attractive.
Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986


II 76
KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility.
Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Reality Berkeley I 217f
Matter/material world/outer world/reality/Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality!
I 232
Involuntary perception is a moment of reality.
Danto I 202
LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared. Berkeley - Schopenhauer: there are only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents.
Danto I 206
World/reality/Berkeley/Danto: there is nothing but ideas. - But we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. - BerkeleyVsPlato: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science/Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Sensations Quine Rorty I 135
Quine: there are no feelings. (As the sun is not "rising".)
Quine V 15ff
Sensation/Quine: structured wholes (figures) - not flashes of light - VsBerkeley: Depth: is not accessible - perceived shape, not stimuli (> consciousness/Quine) - (this is within reception) - stimuli instead of sense data.
V 17
Gestalt TheoryVsSense Data - QuineVsGestalt Theory: meaning related with receptors, not with consciousness.
V 63
Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch and smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided.
Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories.
V 64
Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions ((s) circumstances), but of language ((s) > semantic ascent).
V 65
Observation Sentences/Quine: are the gateway to language and science. They usually do not talk about feelings but about external things.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Similarity Berkeley Putnam V 96
Similarity/PutnamVsBerkeley: the question of whether A and B are similar to each other is meaningless: everything is similar to each other in any respect. - Self-reflection on similarity is circular, because attention on a thing presupposes similarity. Similarity is not self-interpreting.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Skepticism Searle III 179
TraditionVsSkepticism: if one asserts something that goes beyond the experience, then one is constructing something totally unverifiable anyway. So if the reality consists of nothing but our experience, the skepticism comes to nothing (in the tradition). The scepticism only allows the abyss between appearance and reality. SearleVsTradition: it is not true that the experience is what is perceived. I also do not conclude from the perception to the object. SearleVsBerkeley: my experience gives me access to something that is not an experience itself: the table.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

World Berkeley Stegmüller IV 384/385
Berkeley/Stegmüller: There is an ambiguity: a) Our view of the world is not correct. - b) God himself perceives a four-dimensional world - (of modern physics). 1. MackieVsBerkeley: The anatomy of perception also belongs to the physical world.
2. If there is freedom of will, we should also be able to bring about changes in God's ideas.
3. According to Berkeley God's ideas should be free of contradictions, but not complete. - I.e. not completely determined. - They have the status of intentional objects. For example, I can think of an object without knowing its exact place. - Analogously, God's ideas would also have to be indeterminate.
4. Many details arise quite naturally. - According to Berkeley, they become artificially more complicated.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Berkeley, G. Danto Vs Berkeley, G. I 209
VsBerkeley: Violates the common sense. Everything seems to have the nature of a dream. Another problem: Berkeley actually is aware of the existence of objects at times, since they appear to anyone. What happens to things when I turn off the light in the kitchen and go away? Surely there is still a lot of cockroaches, but it is questionable whether their world is mine.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Berkeley, G. Frege Vs Berkeley, G. IV 47
FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no bearer. If there is no bearer, there are no imaginations either. But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet the object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a bearer of my consciousness is just one part of this consciousness, while another part may be a "moon image"? I.e. that something else is taking place while I judge that I’m looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I in turn, so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the bearer of my imagination. So that what I say something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued, E.g. when I think that I feel no pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its bearer just as I am the bearer of other ideas. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path is clear to recognize other people as an independent bearers of their imagination. Even imaginations may be the common object of thought by people who do not have these images. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Berkeley, G. Hume Vs Berkeley, G. Danto I 213
Hume and Berkeley: if I do not assume an external object x, what better reasons do I actually have for assuming the existence of a self, or of a mind?
I 214
HumeVsBerkeley: Berkeley therefore had his hands full to assert that there is no idea of ​​the self since minds for themselves are no ideas, were not perceptible for themselves. That is why he had to allow something as abstruse as the object x which he had actually discarded. Hume: So he should either drop the idea of ​​the minds or allow the object existence. Hume: when I enter 'myself', I always stumble on perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself without any perception. 'Bundle of different perceptions, constantly on the move'. Hume: for him there is no object, of which the manifestations were manifestations, and no subject to which they would manifest themselves.

Berkeley I 221
HumeVsBerkeley: another mind cannot cause an idea in a mind anymore than a substance. VsHume: the objection fails to recognize that Berkeley sees a conceptual contradiction in the concept of 'material thing', which cannot be transmitted in the same way to the mental substances. (A not perceived thing would be a contradiction, like a not perceived perception).
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Berkeley, G. James Vs Berkeley, G. I 59
Pure experience/James: Experience is the reality! (> Berkeley: being is being perceived, being of things is their being known.) >Sensations/Berkeley, >Reality/Berkeley, >Sensory Impressions/Berkeley, >World/Berkeley. JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere! ((s) = Being is perceiving.)
Berkeley, G. Kant Vs Berkeley, G. Putnam I 167
Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth.
I 167/168
KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory".
BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Berkeley, G. Locke Vs Berkeley, G. Danto I 202
Berkeley - Schopenhauer: there are only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared.
There's nothing else. So there is nothing to create a discrepancy. (Similar to Schopenhauer: world as imagination).
Representation/Locke/Danto: Locke considered representationalism to be true and held the view that one compares the idea of an object with the object itself.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Berkeley, G. Phenomenalism Vs Berkeley, G. Danto2 I 216
DantoVsBerkeley: still the question remains, why do I need God, if I turn off the light in the kitchen. One answer is phenomenalism. Phenomenalism: the reference to objects is always the last reference to the sensory experience. The whole theory is a kind of translation program.
Berkeley, G. Pinker Vs Berkeley, G. I 148
Associationism/Association/Berkeley: "Take away the sensations of softness, wetness, red, and sourness and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being different from the sensations I say it is a mixture of sensations." VsBerkeley: that never worked. E.g. we can have exactly the same knowledge of two objects, and still know that they are two! If two identical chairs are reversed, the state is changed, even if we know no property that distinguishes the chairs. We just number them.

I 161
Category/Blurred Categories/Pinker: E.g. all subjects unanimously came to the statement that 13 was a better example of an odd number than 23! E.g. a mother is a better example for a woman than a comedienne, a moment later they claim that a number can only be either even or odd, a human can only be man or woman, no gray areas. I 162 E.g. guess If we learned that chimpanzees eat onions, we would (wrongly) think it likely that gorillas also eat them. Pinker: but in fact we do not work in a way that would make us assume that. (also VsBerkeley). Therefore, humans are more complex than the connectoplasma.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Berkeley, G. Prior Vs Berkeley, G. I 91
PriorVsBerkeley: E.g. I cannot consistently think that I have never thought about a particular thing ("this crocodile" or that the grass is green) and will never think of it. That was Berkeley's error, inferring from the perception of the impossibility of the Second on a completely unsecured impossibility of the First, because I cannot think that there are (unspecified, not particularized) things that I cannot think.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Berkeley, G. Putnam Vs Berkeley, G. V 94
Correspondence Theory: it could be saved by being limiting it to sensations and mental images. PutnamVsBerkeley: error: The fact is that everything resembles everything else in infinitely many ways. >Correspondence theory.
V 95
The question, are A and B similar to each other? is completely meaningless, it is not specific enough.
V 96
Similarity: The number of similarities is limited only by our mental abilities and our time. If there are too many similarities, there are also too many causalities. So similarity cannot be based on causal chains. Recourse/Similarity/Putnam: arises if we are to decide privately on similarity ourselves. If we were to turn our attention to something, we already presume the similarity.
Error/Delusion: it sure can be deceiving, but the term "horse" does not refer to situations in which something happens, but to certain animals.
Causal chains: which is reasonable? If I can decide that, I previously have the reference. >Causal chains.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Berkeley, G. Quine Vs Berkeley, G. Quine II 213
QuineVsBerkeley: there is more substantial similarity between the knowledges of two people than between person and thing (language, observation terms have inclination to consensus).
V 15
Sensation/Quine: primarily structured entities (figures) not light flashes, etc. Space/Depth Dimension/QuineVsBerkeley: not reconstructed from inference, because the two-dimensional data for them are not conscious.
Perception/Quine: this is about shape, not about stimulus (they are covered by reception).
Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that objects exist at all and that science is true?
V 16
Quine: the introduction of the physical senses would have appeared to them as circle.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Berkeley, G. Russell Vs Berkeley, G. Newen I 50
RussellVsBerkeley: his thesis must be wrong, because it has to accept God's existence and his perception to our own existence. ---
I 51
Russell: one direction of the biconditional is wrong: why should something exist because it is perceived? ---
Russell IV 84
Universals/quality/Russell: Suppose, we assume that someone would deny that there are even any universals. Then we would have to determine that we cannot prove that there are qualities, while we might well prove that there must be relations. ---
IV 85
E.g. "blackness": if we deny that there is an "abstract idea", at which all black things participate, then we still need something like similarity. And this similarity is again something universal: a relationship, relation. One cannot say that there is another similarity for each pair. Because then we would have to admit that these similarities look similar.
---
IV 86
RussellVsBerkeley, RussellVsHume: have overlooked counter objection against the denial of the "abstract ideas" because they, too, only thought of qualities as universals, and did not notice the relations (e.g. similarity).

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Berkeley, G. Verschiedene Vs Berkeley, G. I 218
Reality/Existence/Ontology/Samuel JohnsonVsBerkeley: his solution also seems paradox. In particular, it violates everyday experience. ((s) not perception, because it could be the same. Experience).
I 219
Example Johnson: hit a stone with his foot. VsJohnson: at most showed that he had misunderstood Berkeley's thesis. Berkeley had such objections in mind from the beginning.
Berkeley: also according to his immaterial hypothesis, e.g. "the horse stands in the stable", "the wall is white", etc.




Berkeley, G. Mackie Vs Berkeley, G. IV 384/385
Berkeley/Stegmüller: interpretation a): of his philosophy: not all details of our conception of the world are accurate in detail, only God gives us the ideas that accidentally allow for such interpretations. interpretation b): God himself perceives a four-dimensional world with a microstructure as it is brought to light by modern physics.
That sounds more plausible, but bears four difficulties:
We can trace and explain the sensory physiology, e.g. of the eye.
Such explanations pose a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it tackle it?
1. MackieVsBerkeley: part of the physical world are also anatomy and physiology of sensory perception itself. According to theism all that would be completely meaningless.
The difficulty for Berkeley's theory, however, is greater when a causal relationship is being denied!
IV 386
2. MackieVsBerkeley: Free will: if it existed, we would have to be able to bring about changes in God's ideas just by acts of volition! 3. MackieVsBerkeley: (more profound): according to Berkeley divine ideas would have to be consistent, but they need not be complete, that is, not necessarily determined continuously! They have the status of intentional objects, and their logic would also apply here: Ex.: I can think of a book on the shelf without thinking of the exact spot where it is located. Similarly, God also would have to have indeterminate ideas!
In contrast, our sensual data altogether appears to reflect a completely determined world.
VsVs: Berkeley could defend himself: it would be a peculiarity of God ....
4. MackieVsBerkeley: many details are completely natural, if one assumes a material, objective world; Berkeley artificially complicates them.
IV 387
For the purposes of theoretical and modern physics a materialist theory is preferable.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Berkeley, G. Peacocke Vs Berkeley, G. I 51
Meaning Space/Sensory Space/Perception Space/Peacocke: is undeniable, and it is neither just artificial nor derivative. It is obviously not populated by experience itself.
Rather, there is a correlated space for each intrinsically spatial sense which is characterized by it.
I 52
E.g. if we are touched at the neck, it is something else than if we see something in front of us. E.g. but it is the same sense of "closer" when we hear or see someone approaching. (Representational) and it refers to the same space. ((s) This is about a sense of the word, not perceptual sense).
PeacockeVsBerkeley: wrongly inferred from the (correct) premise that vision and touch have no common ideas (ideas, notions) to the wrong conclusion: that a sense of dimension should have priority with respect to the philosophical explanation here.
Asterisked Predicates/"Elliptical*"/"Red*"/Field of Vision/Asterisk/Peacocke: asterisked predicates are truly spatial in a way! They relate to size and shape in the visual field.
There is no ambiguity here, because different spaces are affected.
"Elliptical" makes sense for us in different arbitrary spaces. (Not only physical).
If it was just about a single space, there would be problems: see above: Problems with the translation theory or additional representational content to explain "elliptical" only by public, physical space.
Sensory Data/Peacocke: the sense data theory has characteristic spatial concepts such as square or elongated sensory data, etc.
The insight consists in that these spatial predicates
I 53
cannot be defined at the level of representational content. The space in which these additional spatial predicates are located, is the sensation space (non-representational).
This distinction prevents us from committing the error of asking: "Are sensory data surfaces of physical objects?" "Can we perceive sensory data ?".

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Berkeley, G. Solipsism Vs Berkeley, G. Berkeley I 219
VsBerkeley: ein Argument gegen eine Reduktion der Dinge auf ihr Wahrgenommenwerden wäre, daß sie dann keine permanente Existenz mehr hätten. BerkeleyVsVs: man könnte erwidern, daß zwar ein bestimmter Mensch nicht immer alle Dinge wahrnimmt, aber doch an jeden Gegenstand wenigstens ein Mensch denke.
Vs: doch in einer Zeit, in der man noch unbewohnte Länder und Meere entdeckte, muß dieses Argument Berkeley schwergefallen sein.
I 220
Statt dessen wird die Seinskontinuität abhängig von Gott. Die Frage, warum Berkeley überhaupt eine Kontinuität fordert, ist damit aber noch nicht beantwortet! VsBerkeley: sein Dingbegriff sei künstlich und spitzfindig.
BerkeleyVsVs: er stehe selbst auf der Seite der einfachen Leute, den seine Philosophie führe wieder auf die einfachen Ursprünge zurück.
VsBerkeley: dabei übersieht er, daß das philosophisch Primäre weder in der Philosophie noch im Alltag das Einfache zu sein pflegt.
Traum/Realität/VsBerkeley: Frage: wie kann man zwischen Wirklichkeit und Phantasie unterscheiden?
Man könnte versuchen die Differenz dadurch festzustellen, daß man die willkürlichen von den unwillkürlichen Vorstellungen trennt.
Berkeley VsVs: da aber keine Vorstellung eine andere verursachen kann, müssen auch die gegen unseren Willen
I 221
entstehenden Vorstellungen von einem Vorstellenden, d.h. einem Geist, hervorgerufen werden. Da diese Vorstellungen stärker, lebhafter intensiver und dauerhafter sind als unsere Phantasiegebilde, müssen wie von einem Geist hervorgerufen werden, der stärker ist als der menschliche Geist. So wird die Stärke und Dauerhaftigkeit zu einem Kriterium von Wirklichkeit.
VsBerkeley: 1. Problem der Anwendung des Kriteriums: seine Unbestimmtheit. Es ist bloß relativ. Wie soll man bei einer Rivalität der Merkmale entscheiden?
Bsp besonders intensive, aber unregelmäßige Vorstellungen im Vergleich zu sehr schwachen, aber regelmäßigen Vorstellungen?
SolipsismusVsBerkeley: 2. wenn schon der Geist als Vermögen angesehen wird, Vorstellungen zu produzieren, ist es dann möglich, daß ein Geist in einem anderen Geist Vorstellungen hervorruft, und welches sind die Bedingungen dieser Möglichkeit?
I 222
DiderotVsBerkeley: "Brief über die Blinden", lettre sur les aveugles": "Idealisten werden diejenigen Philosophen genannt, die nur ihre eigene Existenz und die Existenz der Empfindungen in ihnen anerkennen. Ein extravagantes System, das seine Entstehung nur einem Blinden verdanken kann.
Und dieses System ist zur Schande des menschlichen Geistes und der Philosophie am schwierigsten zu widerlegen, obwohl es am absurdesten ist.
VsDiderot: hier wird nicht der Idealist Berkeley geschildert, sondern ein Solipsist.
Berkeley, G. Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. II 33
Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of ​​an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent".
Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews.
We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world.
We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience.
II 34
In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things.
BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete!
VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism).
II 35
Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist!
VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination!
Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?).
(Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here).
Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway.
VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation.
III 36
RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Berkeley, G. Stegmüller Vs Berkeley, G. Stegmüller IV 376
Perception/Berkeley: the elements of ideas (the real things) depend on the will of the perceiver! They run in accordance with certain rules (which we would call natural laws today). Deceptions do not work this way. This proves that the divine spirit is more powerful than ours.
Reality/Berkeley: those ideas that make up what we call reality don't need to be constantly brought out again. If we do not perceive them, they remain existent because God's Spirit constantly perceives them.
VsBerkeley: unclear: if an idea exists only in and through being perceived, then it seems to be an object of consciousness. But then it is impossible that more than one mind could perceive exactly the same idea!
VsVs: For example, the tree I see, which is only my own idea, ceases to exist when I cease to see it.
IV 377
Although the ideas are causally dependent on the perceiving minds, they are not constituted by being perceived! Ideas: would then be more than mental contents or objects of reference: the real things would be ideas directly produced by God. The tree would then be independent of me.
Terminology: "Immaterial realism". Realism because for the perceiver there is a whole world of other spirits and ideas.
Theism/Stegmüller: Even ordinary theism claims that the physical world is "dependent on God", but this relationship remains dark here. In contrast, Berkeley's system is a clear and understandable interpretation: the world simply consists of ideas that exist in the divine spirit.
IV 382
Materialism/Idealism/Berkeley/Stegmüller: the decision for an alternative depends on the statement on Berkeley's seven arguments (IV 379 380).
VsBerkeley:
on (i): what kind of similarity does the materialist demand? on (ii): Locke only assumes that there are acceptable explanations for seeing, hearing, touching, etc., in which only objects with spatial properties are used as a starting point, but whose other properties need have no similarities with our ideas of secondary qualities. The question of whether this is similar for primary qualities can be left open.
IV 383
on (iii): even if movement, size, etc. are relative, they can be of an objective nature! Relativity does not imply mental dependence! on (v): it could be that a theory about a mind-independent reality is confirmed by the fact that it provides a better explanation for our sensory data than any other theory.
Moreover, this argument is worthless for Berkeley: it is not specifically directed against materialism as opposed to its immaterial realism.
The basic problem of any theory of representation: the "veil of perception" also exists here!
on (vi): this is indeed a problem for materialism, but that such a difficulty as the body soul problem occurs does not prove the untenability of all variants of this theory.
on (vii): things or qualities that are similar to our ideas do not need to be passive as well!
Conclusion: StegmüllerVsBerkeley: no argument from BerkeleyVsMaterialism is conclusive!

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Realism Berkeley Vs Realism Chisholm II 33
Reality/Review/Berkeley: the experiences and their progressions provide verifiers for the acceptance of externalities. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when they deny the outside world.
We cannot invoke any instance other than our order of experience.
II 34
In order to show that things are causers, we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the outside things without our experiences. But that is impossible. The same order of experience could exist if there were no external things at all.
BerkeleyVsRealism: with this, realism becomes superfluous!
VsBerkeley: but the same applies now also to spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (That it is superfluous like realism).
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Skepticism Frege Vs Skepticism Davidson II 124
FregeVsSkepticism: the skeptic has no cure, because he cannot even assume for his next statement that his words still have the same meanings as before.
Dummett I 58
Skepticism: never sure whether sense corresponds to a relation -Frege: just a severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated.
IV 45
FregeVsSkepticism: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! - If everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imagination! - Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination.
IV 50
Imagination/Psychology/Skepticism/Frege: not everything is imagination, otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences. (s) VsFrege: That does not make it impossible for everything to be imagination at the end of the day. (reductio ad absurdum is not enough.)) -
IV 51
Perception/Frege: sensory perception necessarily requires sensation, and this is part of the inner world.
Frege IV 46
FregeVsSkepticism: interestingly, in his consideration the opposites turn into each other. (>"Dialectic"). E.g. a sensory physiologist as a naturalist is initially far from considering the things he is convinced to see and touch as his imagination.
IV 46
Stimulus/Frege: skepticism can easily refer to him: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! We are experiencing only one end of the process that protrudes into our consciousness! Perhaps other causes are at work? So everything dissolves into imagination, also the light beams. The empirical sensory physiologist thus undermines his own conditions. Everything requires a carrier, I have considered myself as the carrier of my imagination, but am I not myself an imagination?.
IV 47
Where is then the carrier of these imaginations? If everything is imagination: there is no carrier. Also, no imaginations are somehow distinguished. Now I experience the change into the opposite: FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imaginations! ((s) that introduces a new concept, which does not exist in Berkeley: that of the carrier). But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a carrier of my consciousness is only one part of this consciousness, while another part is perhaps a "moon image"? I.e. something else is taking place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I, etc. so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So that what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued E.g. that if I think that I don’t feel any pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be.
IV 48
I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its carrier as I am the carrier of other images. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path towards recognizing other people as an independent carriers of imagination is clear. Images may also be the common object of thought by people who do not have this image. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Various Authors Berkeley Vs Various Authors Ber I 224
Absolute/time/space/science/BerkeleyVsNewton: there is no absolute time, no absolute space, no absolute motion, no absolute force.
I 225
Theological root: an idea is not cause of another idea, a force is not cause of another force. Cause of all natural things is only God. Reality/Time/BerkeleyVsNewton: God gives us a sequence of ideas. Therefore, there is no absolute time. Time is the series of these ideas.
Bucket Experiment/BerkeleyVsNewton: tries to show that there is no absolute space, but its refutation is flawed. Yet there is no absolute space.
Science/VsBerkeley: how is a natural science possible at all, if all perceptions are not confused, but directly caused by God?
Solution/Berkeley: just as he clings to the reality of things, he also clings to the regularity of natural phenomena, which could also be broken by him as a result of the Creator's goodness and wisdom.
Ber I 212
BerkeleyVsScholasticism: its "pros and cons" (Sic et Non) had become fashionable. Mirror only uncertainty. Since Descartes: there have been attempts to escape the controversy by withdrawing to unquestionable knowledge in order to begin a new construction.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997