Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Christopher Peacocke on Language - Dictionary of Arguments

II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary.
>Situations
, >Behavior, >Vocabulary.
((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?)
PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation.
Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism.
II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme

T(s) ↔ p

plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
>Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction.
II 171
Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence.
>Prima facie, >Evidence.
II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto).
>Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention,
>Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer.
Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction:

T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond.

>Truth conditions, >Conjunction.
Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.
>Conventions.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976


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