Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Christopher Peacocke on Language - Dictionary of Arguments

II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary.
, >Behavior, >Vocabulary.
((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?)
PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation.
Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism.
II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme

T(s) ↔ p

plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
>Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction.
II 171
Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence.
>Prima facie, >Evidence.
II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto).
>Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention,
>Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer.
Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction:

T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond.

>Truth conditions, >Conjunction.
Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Send Link

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z