Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Reductionism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 138 Def reductionism/Fodor: roughly speaking, the connection of the token physicalism with the assumption that there are natural-kind predicates in ideal complete physics corresponding to the natural-kind predicates in all ideally completed individual sciences comprises reductionism. Reductionism: natural kind predicates correspond to natural kind predicates. Fodor/thesis: reductionism is too strong a requirement for the individual sciences. >Type/Token-Identity, >Type/Token, >Physicalism, >Identity theory, >Token-physicalism. I 142 I argued that the co-extensions are nomologically necessary! Bridge laws are laws, too (FodorVs). I 143 Reductionism does not guarantee an adequate vocabulary for all individual cases. >Vocabulary. I 144 Def Reductionism/Fodor: natural kind predicates correspond to natural kind predicates (or the kinds are coextensive). Def token physicalism/Fodor: an event corresponds to an event. Def type physicalism/Fodor: a property corresponds to a property._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Reductionism
