Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Categories: categories are basic concepts for classifying the objects of a knowledge domain into different groups or hierarchies. In philosophy, the category systems of different authors can differ considerably. Concepts which are not suitable for classifying are transcendentals, e.g. the concept of similarity. However, these concepts are again applicable to categorized objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gilbert Ryle on Categories - Dictionary of Arguments
I 13ff Category Confusion/Ryle: category confusion means counting elements in the same category as the set. I 35 f Reasonable Actions: reasonable actions are not the origin but design-distinguished. Conscious act: a conscious act is not two actions. >Reason, >Consciousness. Physical/Mental: are two descriptions of the same. >Description levels, >Levels(Order). I 37/38 The habit of talking loudly is not loud itself. I 46 Feeling "in the head": I do not feel the rolling of the ship in the head, but in the legs. I 49 Ability: an ability is not reciting rules, but applying them. Ability is not an event word but a modal word. The disposition of ability is no second action beside the first. >Disposition, >Ability. I 162f Law - Error/Ryle: It is an error to confuse hypothetical generalizations with categorical individual judgments, e.g. a ticket entitles to a ride, it is not the ride itself. Laws give authority for inference, not the inference itself (facts: are stations). >Inference, >Facts, >Errors._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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> Counter arguments against Ryle
> Counter arguments in relation to Categories
